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THE
NATIONS'
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GERMANY



Thirteenth-century Relief from Shrine of Charles the Great, Aachen, showing the Emperor dedicating his chapel to the Virgin

THE NATIONS' HISTORIES


GERMANY

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PREFACE

THIS sketch of German history was already partly written at the outbreak of the war, and after much deliberation it has been decided to adhere in the main to the original plan and purpose of the book. The notes on German antiquities have therefore been retained, in the hope that some day they may be useful, if not to Englishmen, at least to travellers who speak English. The war has principally affected the last four or five chapters, the political history of Germany in the nineteenth century having been given more space than was at first allotted to it.

The maps, it is hoped, will make the text clearer, but they are not meant as substitutes for an historical atlas, the constant use of which is particularly essential to an understanding of German history.

German proper names have been spelt in German fashion, except when there is a well-established and familiar English form. There seems no purpose in using French names, such as Cologne, Mayence, or Trèves, for places which are unquestionably German.

My grateful thanks are due to many friends for help of various kinds, especially to Professors Tout and Ramsay Muir, of Manchester University, and the Registrar of the same

University, Mr Edward Fiddes, M.A., who have sacrificed to my proof-sheets much time which they could ill spare, and have offered invaluable criticism and advice. Finally, I would put on record my debt to my wife, whose help and encouragement have been continuous, and who has ungrudgingly spent many weary hours on the compilation of the index.

W. T. W.

Queen's University
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GERMANY

CHAPTER I

THE GERMANS AND THE ROMANS

EVERY Englishman knows that the earliest attempt to describe his country comes from the pen of Julius Cæsar. Germans owe a similar debt to the great Roman; and his dealings with Germany may thus be appropriately taken as the starting-point for a survey of her history. In the days of Cæsar the great plain of north Germany was in the possession of peoples of Teutonic blood, and among them, mostly towards the west, were the tribes from which the present-day Germans have sprung. What is now south Germany was inhabited by Celts, who held also the modern Austria and Bohemia, thus fencing in the Teutons on the south and south-east. Beyond the Vistula dwelt numerous Slavonic tribes of which little is known.

How and when the Teutons conquered their territories in Germany we do not know for certain. Neither can we say when and where they separated from the other branches of the great Indo-European family of nations—from the Greeks and Romans, the Celts, the Slavs. The study of language, religion, and prehistoric remains throws some light on these interesting and difficult questions: but that light is dim and confusing, and in such a book as this it is best

to ignore prehistoric times, and to content ourselves with Germany and its people as we find them in the days of Cæsar.

In Cæsar's time Teutons had been settled in the North German plain for at least two hundred and fifty years. About the year 300 B.C. the Greek explorer Pytheas reached the coast of Holstein, and there found tribes with names which are unmistakably Teutonic. But since the days of Pytheas the Teutons had multiplied greatly; the plains of North Germany became too narrow for them; and they had begun to look with envy on the rich land beyond the Rhine. About fifty years before Cæsar wrote, the Cimbri and the Teutones, tribes dwelling in the Danish peninsula, had set out with their families, stock, and chattels, to seek a new home in South Gaul. There, however, the Romans were already in occupation, and their superior discipline and skill prevailed in the end against the fierce emigrants, who were well-nigh exterminated. But it was an episode big with meaning for the future.

The next forty years were among the most critical in the history of Western Europe. The question was, who would conquer Gaul first, the Romans or the Germans? With Rome distracted by civil war, the Germans had a glorious chance. But their numerous tribes had no unity of policy or purpose; the opportunity slipped by; and in 58 B.C. Julius Cæsar went to Gaul, and soon resolved to conquer the whole land, expel all Germans who had made encroachments, and secure the Rhine as the frontier of Roman territory. After five years his triumph was complete. He overthrew Ariovistus, a chief of the great German tribe of the Suevi, who had been called in by a Gallic tribe at war with a neighbour; other German intruders met with a like fate; and Cæsar even crossed the Rhine, and spent a few days on German soil.

The conquest of Gaul by the Romans was of the greatest moment to Germany. For over two hundred years the Germans made no serious effort to break through the Roman

frontier. In that time, with their numbers rapidly increasing, and their movements restricted on every side, it was inevitable that their social, economic, and political organization should be profoundly modified. And the process was hastened by the fact that they soon had to fight for their very existence.

For the Romans were not satisfied with the frontier which Julius Cæsar had given them. In the reign of the first Emperor, Augustus, their generals reduced the country between Italy and the Danube, and their conquests were organized as two provinces, Rhætia and Noricum. Now this left a wedge of German territory running far into the Roman Empire. The Romans were always somewhat afraid of the Germans, and felt that the Empire would be much more secure if the frontier could be pushed from the Rhine to the Elbe. Several expeditions into Germany met with little serious resistance, and about the beginning of the Christian era the country west of the Weser was organized as a Roman province.

It seemed as though Germany was to meet the fate of Gaul. But the Roman successes were illusory. The land was covered with forests, heaths, and swamps; campaigning was slow and toilsome; it was hard to come to grips with the enemy; and though the Germans had offered little opposition, they had never been really subdued. The oppressive rule of the second Roman governor drove a number of the tribes into common action. A widespread conspiracy was formed, its moving spirit being a young prince of the tribe of the Cherusci. The Romans called him Arminius; his modern compatriots have wrongly taken this name to be a corruption of "Hermann"; but as "Hermann der Cherusker" he is and ever will be honoured by Germans as the first champion of their national independence.

We cannot suppose that the idea of German nationality

had any influence on Arminius. But his immediate task he did well. In 9 A.D., while marching with three legions through the trackless heaths of the Teutoburg Forest, between the Weser and the Ems, Varus, the Roman governor, was set upon by the revolted tribes. In a running fight, which lasted three days, the Romans suffered enormous losses. Finally their general committed suicide, the cavalry fled, and the poor remnants of the infantry surrendered, only to be helplessly killed. The disaster made a deep impression at Rome, and it virtually marks the end of her attempt to conquer Germany. It is true that a few years later a great Roman army again crossed the Rhine: but one or two expeditions across country led to no solid result; and in 17 A.D. the Emperor Tibérius recalled the ambitious Roman general and abandoned a forward policy on the Rhine.

Henceforward the Germans were, as a rule, left in peace. The list of provinces of the Roman Empire does indeed contain the names Upper and Lower Germany. But these titles were suggested by Roman pride rather than by facts. The districts in question, though partly peopled by Germans, were on the left bank of the Rhine, which in those times was properly part of Gaul. The boundary of the two provinces was the little stream of the Vinxtbach, which flows into the Rhine about half-way between Remagen and Andernach.

While they despaired of conquering Germany, the Romans still felt anxious about the dangerous angle between the upper reaches of the Rhine and the Danube. From time to time expeditions crossed the Rhine to chastise or overawe restive tribes. And towards the end of the first century of our era, the Emperors began to build a long line of fortifications between the two rivers. This barrier started opposite the boundary of Upper and Lower Germany. Crossing the Taunus mountains, it struck the Main near Hanau, followed

its course as far as Miltenburg, and then ran across country to Lorch, some thirty miles east of Stuttgart. Up to this point the defences (except along the river) consisted of an earthen rampart, strengthened at intervals by forts and watch-towers. At Lorch the boundary of the province of Rhætia was touched. Thenceforward the fortification, now in the form of a solid stone wall, ran eastwards along the northern frontier of the province until it reached the Danube near the modern Regensburg. The whole line was called the *Limes Germanicus*. It was built by different Emperors at very various times; it was not an effectual bar to aggressive German tribes; but it was a great achievement in military engineering, and in the Middle Ages, under the name of the Devil's Wall, its remains—which are still visible in many places—were regarded with superstitious awe by the descendants of those it had failed to check. The districts enclosed by the rampart were called the *Agri Decumates* or Tithe-lands, because certain Gauls who had been permitted to settle there paid a tenth of their produce to the Romans. But the *Agri Decumates* were never administered as a province: they were regarded as a buffer between the wild Germans and the Empire proper.

Thus, though Germans may rightly boast that the Romans never conquered them, a good part of what we call Germany was for a long time under Roman domination. In the provinces of Noricum and Rhætia, in Upper and Lower Germany, even in Gaul, there grew up Roman cities from which many famous German towns derive their origin. In Pannonia, east of Noricum, was Vindobona, now Vienna. Juvavum in Noricum is Salzburg. Regina Castra in Rhætia has become Regensburg; Augusta Vindelicorum, Augsburg. On the Upper Rhine, Argentoratum, Mogontiacum, and Confluentes are known to-day as Strassburg, Mainz, and Coblenz; while lower down the Roman stations Bonna and Colonia Agrip-

pinensis betray the derivation of the names Bonn and Köln. In all these places Roman relics of great interest are to be seen; but the finest centre for the classical archæologist is Trier, which in Roman times was included in Gaul. As Augusta Trevirorum, Trier was a most important city; in the closing days of the Roman Empire it was even an imperial residence for some time; and its bygone magnificence is reflected in the remains of a fine gateway, an amphitheatre, the imperial palace, and a basilica.

Nevertheless, very little of what we know as Germany was thoroughly Romanized. The Roman population consisted mostly of soldiers or people dependent on the army for a living. The conquered inhabitants seem as a rule to have lived much as they did before. And it must be remembered also that they were nearly all Celts. Few Germans lived within the Empire; nearly all remained free beyond the Rhine and the Danube. Nevertheless, the presence of the Romans on the confines of their lands exercised a vast influence on their society and culture. But to understand the nature of that influence it is necessary to look more closely at the character of the Germans themselves.

At this point we are in luck's way, for one of the most famous books of classical antiquity deals with this very subject. This is the *Germania* of Tacitus, a work written about 100 A.D. Here and there its statements must be received with reserve, for Tacitus was inclined to exaggerate the contrast between Germany and Rome: but, along with the earlier and less complete description of Cæsar and other authorities of less weight, it enables us to form a satisfactory conception of the condition of Germany in the first two centuries of the Christian era.

The Germans formed one of the three main groups into which the Teutons can be divided. The most northerly of these—the Scandinavians—became the Danes and Northmen




Photo. Frith

The Porta Nigra of Trier

The gate was built by the Romans in the second half of the third century.

with which English history has made us familiar; their descendants now dwell in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. The East Teutons numbered in their ranks the famous tribes of the Goths, Vandals, and Lombards; they played a great part on the stage of history, and, as we shall see, met with very various fates. The West Teutons were the ancestors of the Germans of to-day. But even within these three groups there was no political unity. They were composed of independent tribes, each jealous of its liberty; and though veneration for a holy place or danger from a common enemy might sometimes lead to the formation of a confederacy, such unions were either loose or short-lived. It was characteristic that soon after the defeat of Varus, Arminius was waging bitter war against another German prince, and that the liberator of Germany should in the end be miserably murdered by some of his own kinsmen who suspected him of wishing to establish a kingdom for himself.

To the German of the time of Tacitus, then, the state was the tribe. And even the tribe was very loosely organized. There was no permanent central government. According to Tacitus the supreme authority was the assembly of all the free men, which met at fixed intervals. This assembly—Thing or Moot the Germans called it—chose the chiefs who governed the subdivisions of the tribe, decided questions of peace and war, and tried offenders accused of serious crimes. But our knowledge of similar assemblies in other primitive communities warns us against making too much of the democratic element in the early German state. The election of a chief can seldom have been more than the formal recognition of an ascendency already possessed in virtue of noble blood, great wealth, and a large retinue; and Tacitus himself says that all important matters were debated by the council of chiefs before being submitted to the assembly, which might only say "Aye" or "No" to their proposals.

The sphere of a single chief's jurisdiction Tacitus called a *pagus*, which merely means a district; we may conveniently term it a *hundred*, the name it perhaps had when the organization described by Tacitus was, in a more advanced form, transplanted to England by the Angles and Saxons. The chief led the warriors of his hundred to battle, and presided over the hundred-moot. That assembly dealt with legal cases of minor importance, and determined the distribution of the land of the hundred among its inhabitants. In the eyes of most Germans the hundred was probably much more important than the tribe; we even hear of hundreds seceding from one tribe and joining another.

Such, in outline, was the political constitution of a German tribe about 100 A.D. Nothing, it will be noticed, has been said about kings; for as yet they were not known among the Germans. Some of the other Teutonic tribes, however, had kings, who were elected by the tribal assembly, and stood to the tribe in much the same relation as the chief to the hundred.

Tacitus, who favoured republican views, greatly admired the freedom of the Germans, which he contrasts with the servitude of Rome to the Emperor. But this freedom was the freedom of people who have not yet learnt the art of government. To a German of the second century the tribe meant little. The laws it imposed on him were few. He had small affection for the land on which it dwelt. To him his own kinsfolk were in every way more important than the mass of his fellow-tribesmen. He lived in a village of which every inhabitant was probably related to him by blood. In war he fought surrounded by members of his own family. If a kinsman was killed or wronged, it was his right and duty to execute vengeance on the offender. The Germans, in fact, were still in that stage of civilization where the bond of kin is the supreme social force. Their sense of the common

interest of the tribe being so imperfect, it follows that, though their legends told that all Germans were descended from a common ancestor, they had no living consciousness of the unity of their nation.

The village communities of the Germans were not large. Every freeman had his house and court or farmyard; each house stood by itself, often at some distance from its neighbours. Apart from his house and adjacent premises, the German had no private property except his cattle, for the land surrounding the village belonged to all the freemen in common. The wood and pasture were always open to all. The arable was generally divided into two great fields: every year one lay fallow, and the other was before harvest divided into a number of strips, which were allotted to the villagers according to their status. The work of ploughing and sowing was done in common; and though each man took the produce of his own portion, harvesting had of course to be done by all at one time.

This system did not favour agricultural progress. But it satisfied the wants of the Germans, who as yet set little store by agriculture. Cattle-rearing was still held in higher esteem, and a man's wealth still estimated by the number of his beasts. Tilling the ground was indeed regarded as rather beneath the dignity of the free German warrior. His proper occupations were hunting and fighting; manual work might be left to his wife and slaves, or, if he were a great man, to serfs, who were perhaps descended from the survivors of conquered tribes, and who were allowed the use of plots of land on condition of paying a rent in corn or cattle to their lord. The only professional handicraftsman was the smith: the German family built its own house, and what simple furniture and utensils it needed were made at home.

The German felt no shame in sitting idle while his wife dug in the field; but for all that women were held in very high

respect. Only the greatest chiefs ever had more than one wife. A man's wife was treated as his equal, and in times of perplexity her advice was eagerly sought, for the Germans ascribed to women an almost prophetic insight. In time of war the wives accompanied their husbands, and standing aloof during battle encouraged them by their cries, afterwards showing great devotion in their care of the wounded.

In view of their veneration for women, it was natural that to the Germans the cardinal virtue should be chastity. Truthfulness and fidelity to promises were also held in special regard. But they had their vices. In time of peace they were lazy and gross, abandoning themselves to gluttony and drunkenness. Many of them were desperate gamblers. In their frequent outbursts of furious anger they were capable of appalling brutality.

Their religion was in essence a worship of the forces of nature, which, however, had already been personified as gods and goddesses. Originally the chief of the gods was Ziu, ruler of the heavens like the Greek Zeus, who was plainly a near relative of his. But by the second century he was being ousted from his supremacy by Wodan, the one-eyed god of the winds, who, clad in sky-blue mantle and hat of clouds, nightly rode through the air on his white horse, with his two ravens on his shoulders, and followed by a ghostly army. He was the god of victory, who sent the Valkyries to carry slain warriors into the joys of Walhalla; he was the patron of learning, of song, and of all intellectual activity. Then there was Donar, the thunder-god, who conquered the giants Frost and Snow, and who sent fruitful rain upon the earth. The chief goddess was Wodan's consort, Freija—the guardian of the home, the goddess of love and marriage. And there were hosts of spirits, gnomes, pixies, and elves, though the Germans were on the whole less fanciful in their superstitions than the Celtic nations.

The Germans believed that warriors slain in battle went to Walhalla, whereas all who died a "cow's death" on their straw bed went to Hel, a dim, cold region, where they led a cheerless and inert existence. The worship of the Germans was very simple. Temples were rare, and it was generally in sacred groves that the priests offered sacrifice, or sought to discover the will of the gods by prayer and divination. There was no priestly caste or order; and in each household it was the duty of the head of the family to render the necessary acts of worship to the tutelary gods.

Such, so far as we can gather, were the Germans of the time of Tacitus. Other Roman writers have little to say about their social or political institutions. To most Romans they were merely a race of barbarous warriors, who made it necessary to keep big armies on the Rhine and the Danube. And it is evident that the Roman legions found them very formidable enemies. Tall, and large-limbed, of commanding aspect, with fierce blue eyes and long yellow hair, they always excited a certain awe in the breast of the Roman soldier. Their equipment and discipline were no doubt rude: but their wooden shields and their spears—which were light enough to hurl—were not to be despised, and arrayed as they were according to hundreds and families, they had an incentive to desperate bravery which was lacking to their professional foes. And there was in a German host another element which made for exceptional courage and devotion. Each chief had the right of surrounding himself with a retinue of young warriors. They followed him to battle, fought under his immediate command, and if he fell they died with him. On his side, the chief upheld their interests in time of peace, and provided their weapons and food. It was the ambition of every young man to belong to the war-band of a famous warrior; while the renown of a chief depended largely on the numbers and prowess of his "companions." The bond between the chief

and his retinue was very strong, as strong as the bond of kinship: and the existence of these war-bands was destined to exert great influence on the social and political evolution of the German tribes.

But though the Germans remained free to develop their characteristic institutions, the presence of the Romans on the Rhine and Danube naturally affected them in many ways. The frontier witnessed a fairly vigorous trade. Amber, skins, feathers, and cattle were exchanged for wine, weapons, ornaments, and finery of all kinds. Money slowly came into use among the Germans, though it was long scarce. Improved methods of agriculture were learnt, and the cultivation of the vine was introduced. Houses, hitherto made of wood or clay, were now sometimes built of stone. Other changes affected the very foundations of German society. In Cæsar's time the Germans were still a semi-nomadic people. Each tribe had its own territory, but within this it moved about, cultivating a different tract of land each year. When, however, the Romans established rigid limits to the movements of the Germans, the natural growth of population soon rendered this system impossible, and by the beginning of the second century the Germans had become a settled people.

Another effect of the pressure of the Romans was the formation of larger political groups among the Germans. As land became more and more valuable, some tribes fell under subjection to others, and weak tribes made leagues to defend themselves against dangerous neighbours. Slowly the tribes coalesced into four main groups. In south Germany there were the Alamanni, whose name survives in the French Allemagne. Between the Main and the Harz Mountains we find the Thuringi; on the lower Rhine were the Franks, along the North Sea the Saxons. They were all names of ill-omen to the Romans. In fact, though the Emperors had dammed

the stream for a time, the pent-up waters would rush on more furiously than ever when once the barriers were broken.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I

Roman antiquities are numerous in south Germany and the Rhineland, but are mostly to be found in museums. Those at Bonn, Köln, Mainz, Mannheim, Trier, Augsburg, and Regensburg may be mentioned, but there are many others with good collections.

Of antiquities *in situ* those at Trier are by far the finest. They include parts of the cathedral, a basilica, a palace, an amphitheatre, baths, and the Porta Nigra. At Köln there is the Römergang, an underground passage, and the so-called Römerturm contains Roman work. Near Homburg-vor-der-Höhe is the Saalburg, one of the largest camps on the *Limes*, extensively but intelligently restored in modern times. Regensburg has interesting remains of the Roman fortifications. Most of the other relics of the Roman Empire appeal only to the expert archæologist.

CHAPTER II

THE KINGDOM OF THE FRANKS

In the second century the Roman Empire reached its greatest extent. There seemed no enemy strong enough to threaten its existence from outside; and a succession of just and able Emperors gave it peace and good government within. Nevertheless, the historian can discern symptoms of internal decay; while Central Europe was beginning to be stirred by that mighty movement known as the Wandering of the Nations, which in three centuries was to cause the downfall of Rome's power.

Unskilled in agriculture as they were, the prolific inhabitants of Germany found it increasingly hard to produce enough food for their wants. They might have enlarged their resources by cutting down the forests which covered most of the country; but as a rule it seemed easier to conquer the fertile fields of the nearest Roman province. Moreover, with tribal wars incessantly raging, there were many homeless and landless men ready to enlist under an adventurous leader and seek comfort and wealth across the Rhine or the Danube. In the latter half of the second century the German tribe of the Marcomanni came surging across the middle Danube, penetrated into Italy, and were only with the utmost difficulty repelled by the great philosopher-emperor, Marcus Aurelius. Half a century later the Goths—the most important of the eastern group of Teutonic tribes—conquered the province of Dacia, now Roumania and eastern Hungary, and spread terror throughout the Balkan peninsula and even

in Asia Minor. Simultaneously, the Alamanni broke through the *Limes*, and settled in the country between the upper reaches of the Rhine and the Danube. The Franks were encroaching on north-eastern Gaul; the Saxons were making piratical expeditions against the coasts of Gaul and Britain. The life of the Empire seemed in grave danger.

But Rome was still very strong. The timely appearance of several vigorous Emperors checked the barbarian advance. The frontiers were restored to almost their former extent; reforms in government and administration retarded the advance of internal decay; and for about a century, though there was much fighting, and though from time to time the assailants broke the line of defence, the Romans, on the whole, held their ground.

It must be remembered, however, that conquest was only one of the ways by which Germans gained a footing in Roman territory. From the early days of the Empire they had been encouraged to enlist in the army, and with the decline of the spirit and prowess of the Roman citizens, the number of German recruits increased fast. In the third and fourth centuries Germans even rose to high commands. Then it not infrequently happened that the imperial government made a treaty with a German tribe, allowing it to settle within the Roman borders on condition of defending the frontier against its less favoured compatriots. Thus, years before the collapse of the Empire, there were many thousands of Germans on its soil—a fact which helps to explain certain rather astonishing events which followed.

The Germans in the Empire—whether soldiers or settlers—seem generally to have fulfilled their obligations: but their presence certainly tended to weaken the Roman resistance when the Teutonic attacks were resumed about the year 375. There was now a new and urgent force impelling the Teutons against Rome. The Huns, a Mongolian race, still in the

nomadic state of society, utterly barbarous, bloodthirsty, and ruthless, had been advancing westward from their homes in central Asia. About this time they crossed the Volga, swept across the steppes, and fell upon the Goths. Thousands of Goths were driven to take refuge in the Roman Empire, and after suffering a crushing defeat at Adrianople in 378, the imperial authorities made no serious attempt to prevent them from doing so. But the refugees were restless and warlike; and after a quarrel between the West Goths and their nominal protectors, Alaric, the Gothic king, attacked Italy, and in 410 took and plundered Rome. To defend the capital, nearly all the Roman troops had been withdrawn from the Rhine. Gaul lay helpless before the Teutons, who surged over the frontier in masses. The Germans, however, were strangely slow to move, and for some time the invaders were almost all of the eastern group of Teutonic tribes. The Vandals conquered south Gaul and Spain, and, on being driven thence by the West Goths, who had soon left Italy, they went over to Africa and established themselves there. About the same time their kinsmen the Burgundians crossed the Rhine, and after many vicissitudes succeeded in setting up a kingdom in south-east Gaul.

Meanwhile Germany was in chaos. With the Huns pressing westward, with Teutonic peoples from the east fleeing before them towards Gaul, the old distribution of territory could not be maintained: it was every tribe for itself, and the Huns take the hindmost. The Alamanni seized the modern Alsace, the Franks the modern Belgium. Britain was the prey of Saxon pirates.

To confound confusion, the Huns suddenly began to threaten the existence of all the states, new and old, in western Europe. Their king, Attila, had established an empire, which included many Teutonic tribes; and under the force of his personality the undisciplined Hunnish hordes became an army of horse-

men, savage, cruel, and barbarous as ever, but now ruled by a single will and directed towards a single purpose. In the middle of the fifth century Attila swept across Germany, wreaking such havoc that legends told that no grass would grow where his horse had trod. The Huns rode on into Gaul; but the common dread of "the flail of God" had united Teutons and Romans; a motley host faced the Huns on the Catalaunian Plain near Troyes; and the skill of the Roman leader Aëtius gained the day. Attila had to retreat; and two years later he died, and his realm fell to pieces. Nearly all his Teutonic subjects recovered their independence.

The defeat of Attila brought little relief to Rome. In 475 a quarrel broke out between the reigning Emperor and the barbarian soldiers who were at once his chief protection and his chief danger. Their leader, Odovacar, forced the Emperor, Romulus Augustulus, to resign, and established himself as king over Italy. Thus, in the year 476, ended the rule of Rome in western Europe, though few at the time understood the significance of what had happened. And it must not be forgotten that the Roman Empire had for some time been divided into two parts, and that, for another thousand years, there was at Constantinople an Emperor who claimed all Rome's dominions, and who at first really did rule over the Balkan peninsula and all the Roman provinces eastward thereof. But his dominions were mainly Greek or Oriental in population and culture; and despite his title and claims the true Roman Empire belonged to the past.

Odovacar was soon overthrown by Theodoric, King of the East Goths, who led his people into Italy from their seats on the lower Danube. The East Goths were the noblest of all the invaders of the Empire, and Theodoric was an upright and enlightened ruler, executing strict justice as between Goths and Romans, and doing his best to establish a stable

and prosperous kingdom. For thirty years Italy enjoyed peace and order such as it had not known for generations.

Though most of the events that have just been traced do not in strictness belong to the history of Germany, it is impossible to understand the subsequent course of that history without some knowledge of them. In particular, they affected the future of the Franks, and it was the Franks who laid the foundations of the Germany of to-day.

When the Roman Empire came to an end, the Franks were settled on both sides of the middle and lower Rhine. They fell into three main groups—the Salian Franks, who held what is now Belgium; the Ripuarian Franks, in the country round Köln; and the Upper Franks, who had pushed forward into the valley of the Moselle. They had never been politically united, and there were now several Frankish states, dignified by their rulers with the title of kingdoms. Among the Salians the leading royal family was that of the Merovings, and in the last quarter of the fifth century the head of this house was a young prince called Chlodovech or Clovis—a name familiar to us in its later forms of Ludwig and Louis.

The Franks were still rude and fierce, little touched by civilization. Though they had kings, they retained in its essentials the system of government described by Tacitus. But they had long had intimate relations with the Romans, in whose armies thousands of Frankish warriors had served, and with whom the people as a whole had been on friendly terms. This may perhaps explain their previous failure to join the other Teutonic tribes in carving kingdoms out of Roman territory. Clovis, however, was ambitious and utterly unscrupulous. In the year 486 he began his career of conquest by invading northern Gaul, which still claimed to be part of the Roman Empire. The so-called Roman governor was overthrown at Soissons, and Clovis became master of the country as far as the Loire. Next he turned against the

Alamanni, and established his rule not only over Alsace but also over their ancestral lands along the Main and the Neckar. A war against the Burgundians was indecisive; but when Clovis attacked the West Goths in southern Gaul, his success was such that only the intervention of the great Theodoric saved them from complete subjugation. Meanwhile, by force and treachery, Clovis had made himself sole king of all the Frankish tribes: so that when he died in 511 he was lord of a large, compact kingdom, comprising two-thirds of Gaul, and a part of south Germany. His sons continued his conquests, seized the Burgundian kingdom, drove the West Goths into Spain, overcame the Thuringians in central Germany, and laid hands on Bavaria. By the year 550 the kingdom of the Merovings had reached its greatest extent.

For two centuries more the family held sway over the Frankish territories. But there is no need to dwell on the history of these times. It is little save a record of brutal crimes, clumsy intrigues, and indecisive civil strife. Clovis himself had been nothing better than an intelligent and wonderfully vigorous beast; and as time went on, his successors, though they reproduced his vices, gradually lost his few virtues. During the seventh century the Meroving stock seemed to become exhausted; king followed king to an early grave, after a reign in which he had been the tool of the great nobles. Prominent among these was an official known as the Mayor of the Palace.

One cause of the prevalent confusion was the German custom which prescribed that a man's possessions should be divided among his sons. Thus the Frankish dominions were seldom under a single ruler. Various schemes of partition were adopted; but gradually four divisions became permanent. These were Aquitaine, Burgundy, Neustria, and Austrasia. Neustria—the new kingdom—comprised the greater part of northern Gaul—the district, that is to say, which had re-

mained Roman till conquered by Clovis. Here the Franks had not settled thickly enough to change the essential characteristics of the population. Most of the inhabitants were still of Celtic or Roman blood, and their language was a degenerate Latin. Austrasia—the eastern kingdom—included the old Frankish territories to the west of the Rhine and all the conquered lands in south Germany. The people were German in race, spoke various German dialects, and their society and culture were developed from those described by Tacitus. Burgundy and Aquitaine were sometimes separate kingdoms, sometimes under the influence of Austrasia, more often ruled by Neustria.

Despite feckless kings, despite internal division and strife, despite the incredible moral corruption of the ruling race, the Frankish realm escaped destruction, a sense of its unity was retained, and throughout the Merovingian period it was unquestionably the strongest power in western Europe. Various causes contributed to this astonishing result. In the first place, the Franks were for long exposed to no danger from outside. The other Teutonic kingdoms were less favoured. In the early part of the sixth century the Vandal kingdom in Africa was destroyed by an expedition sent from Constantinople by the great Emperor Justinian: and not long afterwards, Theodoric being dead, a like fate overtook the East Goths in Italy. But this threatening rally of the Eastern Empire was of short duration; for the Lombards—the last of the Teutonic invaders—soon tore away most of Italy, and in the seventh century the rise of Mohammedanism led to the conquest of all North Africa by the Arabs. Thus the most formidable rivals of the Franks had small opportunity to attack them; while little was to be apprehended from the West Goths in Spain or the unsubdued inhabitants of north Germany, of whose state at this time we know next to nothing.

The Franks, moreover, had not much to fear from their conquered subjects. Our knowledge of what happened to the Britons during the Saxon invasions is apt to give us a quite false notion of the character of the new kingdoms on the Continent. Rough and brutal as the victors might be, they bore no animosity towards the subjects of Rome. Their fellow-tribesmen had served in Roman armies, some might even have been Roman generals; they themselves had very likely fought as allies of the Emperor against other barbarians. They might despise the effeminate provincials, but they had a vast respect for Roman administration and law, and stood in great awe of the Emperor. Nearly all the barbarian conquerors acknowledged his authority and received from him high-sounding titles: even Clovis was proud to be invested by the Emperor of the East with the utterly valueless office of consul. Thus no effort was made to exterminate, exile, or enslave the conquered population; to the peasant the fall of the Roman Empire often meant little more than a change of landlord. His lot seldom became much worse. In fact, except in districts like north-east Gaul, where the invaders settled thickly, he soon took his revenge. Conquerors and conquered began to intermingle; the old system of society, law, and government profoundly modified that of the ruling race; and it is significant that the modern languages of Italy, France, and Spain are based on Latin. In these circumstances there was little to goad the subject peoples into rebellion.

In the case of the Franks the relations between victors and vanquished were unusually harmonious. When Clovis began his exploits he was a heathen: but during a doubtful battle with the Alamanni, he called on the God of the Christians, promising to serve Him if he gained the day; and when victory was his, he redeemed his vow, most of the Franks following their king's example. Now there was

nothing remarkable in the conversion of a Teutonic people to Christianity. Most of the invaders of the Empire had been Christians before they began their attacks. But it so happened that nearly all had been converted by missionaries who held the views of the heretic Arius on the question of the Divinity of Christ; whereas the subjects of Rome in the west accepted the orthodox doctrine. In many of the new kingdoms this difference created between rulers and ruled a breach which could never be repaired. Clovis, however, was baptized by an orthodox bishop, and though his conversion had little effect on his behaviour, he made the heretical beliefs of the Burgundians and West Goths a pretext for attacking them—an attitude which won him the warm approval of the clergy. Henceforth there was a close alliance between the Gallic Church and the Merovingian monarchy. Theodoric the Goth was a humane and upright ruler, but he divided the Substance of the Godhead, and so must be denounced. Clovis was a bloody-minded and treacherous villain; but as he thought rightly concerning the Trinity, it was fitting for a churchman to write of him that "he walked with an upright heart, and did what was pleasing in the eyes of God." The support of the Church was one of the chief causes of the long continuance of the Merovingian kingdom.

It may readily be imagined that the Church got no good from its connection with the Frankish State. It became, in fact, utterly corrupt. Learning almost disappeared from Gaul; and it is significant that for long the Gallic clergy made no attempt to convert the still pagan Germans across the Rhine. On the morals of the Franks themselves the influence of their new faith can hardly be traced. For Gaul as a whole the Merovingian period was a time of general decline. Agriculture went backward; manufacturing industry almost disappeared. Good government was not to be expected from the enfeebled descendants of Clovis; and

in the prevalent disorder men forgot the calamities of the last period of Roman rule, and looked back to the days of the Empire as a golden age. Nevertheless, the two hundred and fifty years of Merovingian rule had most far-reaching effects on the political institutions of Western Europe. A time of strife and change is often accompanied by an increase in the authority of the central government. The subject population of Gaul, familiar with the notion of an absolute monarch, was inclined to ascribe unlimited powers to their new ruler. And, in a large kingdom, an assembly of all freemen was manifestly out of the question. Thus, contemptible though the Merovingian kings might often be, their theoretical authority tended continually to grow. The king became regarded as the source of all justice and the dispenser of all official power. He continued many of the Roman taxes, and drew a revenue from fines and gifts. And as the prerogatives of the crown multiplied, it was inevitable that the old popular institutions should steadily disappear. The ordinary freeman, in short, lost his share in the government of the State. An annual meeting of great men took the place of the obsolete general assembly.

In the king's household there was a staff of officers whose influence gradually rose until they became ministers of state. Such were the seneschal, the marshal (who was supposed to have charge of the royal stables), and, most important of all, the Mayor of the Palace, who controlled all the other dignitaries. Like the chief of the days of Tacitus, the Frankish king had a retinue of picked warriors, who accompanied him wherever he went. They were now termed *antrustions*.

Local administration was in the hands of counts, appointed by the king. The sphere of each was known as a *Gau*, and in Austrasia corresponded to an old tribal division. Sometimes, especially near the frontier, several *Gaus* would be united under the command of a duke, whose duties were mainly

military. The count led the host of his *Gau*, collected the royal dues, and administered justice in his court, where he was assisted in giving judgment by a few of the leading men of his district. The chief survival of the old days was the hundred. This remained as a subdivision of the *Gau*, and the hundred-moot still met, though only for the trial of petty legal cases.

The law administered in the different courts varied very much. Each district had its own customs. As yet there was little written law, though under Clovis some of the customs of the Salians had been codified. Judicial procedure, especially in Austrasia, was primitive ; and almost any crime, even homicide, might be expiated by a money payment. There was, in fact, a regular tariff of fines for murder, the amount being fixed according to the rank of the victim.

The constitution of the Merovingian State was thus undergoing a transformation. In form, a centralized monarchy was superseding the old Teutonic constitution. In practice, as we shall see, the personal feebleness of the kings was sowing the seeds of feudalism—a system equally fatal to royal power and individual liberty.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II

Merovingian antiquities are almost non-existent in Germany. Fragments of the cathedral of Trier date from this time, but there are no other remains of much interest.

CHAPTER III

THE CAROLINGIAN EMPIRE

THE Frankish realm would have been ruined by the Merovings had it not been rescued in the nick of time by one of the greatest families of all history. It has been mentioned that, as the Merovingian stock became more and more feeble, increasing power fell into the hands of the mayors of the palace. Frankish history in the seventh century consists largely of the ferocious wars waged between the mayors of Neustria and Austrasia. The issue of the strife was decided in 687 at the battle of Tertry, near St Quentin, where the Austrasian leader Pepin gained a complete victory over the Neustrians. Pepin, whose family had provided several mayors of the palace in times past, is generally called Pepin the Young, to distinguish him from his grandfather, who founded the greatness of the house. Soon after his victory at Tertry he himself became mayor of Austrasia, and virtual ruler of both that province and Neustria. The Merovings held the crown for another sixty years; but they were henceforth passive tools of Pepin and his descendants.

The triumph of Pepin is of the utmost importance in German history. Hitherto Neustria had generally been the dominant part of the Frankish territories. Henceforward, Austrasia took the lead, and the genuine Franks, German in blood, language, and institutions, became the most weighty element in the State.

Pepin's aim was to establish one strong government for the

whole of the Frankish dominions. This was no easy task. The German peoples beyond the Rhine, if they had not actually repudiated the authority of the Merovings, were living in virtual independence under hereditary dukes of their own blood. Aquitaine was in similar case; and it cost Pepin and his son much hard fighting to reduce these districts to obedience.

It was during the rule of Pepin that the conversion of Germany was first taken seriously in hand. In Roman times there had been Christian bishoprics along the Rhine and the Danube. Later, in the sixth and seventh centuries, the enthusiastic Irish Church sent missionaries like St Columban and St Gall, who laboured in south Germany with the utmost devotion, and founded several famous monasteries. Nevertheless, most of the Germans were still heathen; in fact, it was apparently in the Merovingian period that the wonderful German mythology assumed its final shape.

Pepin saw that a Christian Germany would be more ready to tolerate the yoke of the Christian Franks. His interest in the question is a sign that the Frankish government had ceased to regard Neustria as its first concern. Despairing, it would seem, of the Frankish clergy, Pepin turned to England, where the newly-converted Saxons were full of missionary zeal. A certain Willibrord answered his appeal, and with twelve companions laboured among the Frisians on the shores of the North Sea. Other evangelists of various nationalities strove to complete the conversion of the rest of the country. The greatest of all was the Englishman Winfrith, better known by his later name of St Boniface, who from 719 onward preached to the tribes of northern and central Germany. He founded numerous monasteries, gave the German Church a settled government by the establishment of such famous bishoprics as Würzburg, Regensburg, and Salzburg, and crowned his labours by carrying out a much-needed reform

and reorganization of the Church throughout all the Frankish dominions. In 754 he met a martyr's death at the hands of the Frisians.

Meanwhile great events were coming to pass in Gaul. Pepin died in 714, and after a short period of civil strife his power came into the hands of his illegitimate son Charles, surnamed Martel or the Hammer. For twenty-five years Charles continued his father's policy with even greater success. He it was who established the undisputed supremacy of his house in the Frankish realm, and it is just that his line should be known in history as the Carolings—the sons of Charles. He vigorously asserted his authority over restive Neustrians, Aquitanians, and Germans; he ruled the Church strictly, incurring some odium by subordinating its interests to the need of establishing a strong central government. But strong government was essential to the welfare of the land, and Charles has rightly been called the second founder of the Frankish kingdom.

Pepin and Charles appeared only just in time. For a terrible danger from outside now threatened the whole country. The Mohammedan Arabs, after overrunning North Africa, had in 711 crossed the Straits of Gibraltar and in a year or two subjugated the West Goths of Spain. They soon crossed the Pyrenees, confident of easy success in Gaul; but in 732 they were met by Charles and his host near Poitiers, and the desperate struggle which followed ended in a great victory for the Franks. Before long the Arabs were forced back into Spain, and the rest of western Europe was saved for Christianity.

On Charles's death his power was at first shared by his two sons. Luckily the elder soon retired to a monastery, and the other, Pepin III., commonly called the Short, became the sole governor of his land's destinies. After a year or two he resolved to reconcile theories with facts, and be king in name

as well as in deed. A council of Frankish nobles readily gave its consent; but this was not enough for the cautious Pepin. For some time the influence of the Pope of Rome had been increasing by leaps and bounds; and very friendly relations had for many years subsisted between the house of Pepin and the Holy See. Pepin now sent an embassy to Rome to ask if he might lawfully depose the Merovingian puppet-king, and assume the royal style himself. Pope Zacharias wisely answered that the man who held the real power ought also to have the appropriate title. So in 752 the last poor Merovingian was sent to a monastery; at a great council of nobles Pepin was raised on a shield and hailed as king, after the ancient Frankish custom; and two years later another Pope, Stephen II., came from Italy and solemnly crowned and anointed the new monarch. Naturally the alliance between the Carolings and the Papacy became closer than ever.

The Pope's object in crossing the Alps was to crave help against the Lombards, with whom the See of Rome had a long-standing quarrel. It is thought by many that Pepin had promised assistance as the price of the Pope's consent to his assumption of the crown. At all events he twice led an army against the Lombards, forced them to recognize his suzerainty, and bestowed on the Pope certain lands in central Italy. He thus laid the foundations of the temporal power of the Papacy, and sowed the seeds of infinite trouble for his successors.

But to contemporaries Pepin's reign seemed very glorious. His most foolish act was his last, for, ignoring all the lessons of recent history, he divided his dominions between his two sons, Charles and Carloman. The Carolings, however, were again fortunate. Three years later Carloman died; and from 771 to 814 Charles was sole ruler of the Franks.

Charles the Great deserves that epithet as fully as any man to whom history has given it. He was great alike in his

personality, his achievements, and his influence on later ages. Physically he was eminently qualified for his part. Tall, strong, well-proportioned, and quick in motion, he was fitted for feats demanding either energy or stamina. And his mind was in no wise inferior to his body. He was a successful and, for those days, a scientific general. He was a wise administrator and lawgiver. More remarkable still, he loved learning, understood Latin and Greek, knew how to read, could even write a little, and was a generous patron of scholars. His religious faith was genuine; he was regular and devout at the services of the Church, zealous for its true welfare, and a munificent benefactor of the clergy. Morally, he stood above the standards of his age. Not only was he just and honourable in his dealings, but he rose superior to gluttony and drunkenness, the two vices most characteristic of the early Germans. He had indeed grave faults. He was liable to outbursts of passion and cruelty, and some of his wars were conspicuously barbarous even in the eighth century. And his besetting sin was unchastity: his court was grossly immoral: and it was his licentious life which deferred till the twelfth century his recognition as a saint. But, with all his shortcomings, he was a very great man. It is natural for Englishmen to compare him with Alfred the Great. The two have many points in common. The West Saxon is perhaps the finer character, but the Frank is unquestionably the greater figure in history.

Charles's fame rests on a triple foundation—his military achievements, his administration and legislation, his revival of the Roman Empire in the West.

Whereas the earlier Carolingians had been mainly occupied in defending their territories or in coercing insubordinate subjects, Charles vastly enlarged his dominions. The scene of his first great exploit was Italy. In 773 and 774, Charles, responding to the Pope's call for help, overthrew the Lombards

and had himself proclaimed as their king. Later, he attacked the Saracens of Spain, drove them back to the Ebro, and annexed a strip of territory to the south of the Pyrenees. In the legends which afterwards clustered round the name of Charlemagne, his feats against the Moslem hold the place of honour. But his greatest achievement was the conquest of the Saxons—a task which cost him thirty years of intermittent fighting.

In Merovingian times the Saxons had occasionally been constrained to recognize the supremacy of the Frankish king. In reality, however, they were independent. They were spread over north Germany from the Rhine to the Elbe, from the Eider to the Harz Mountains. Though the old tribal organization still prevailed among them, four large groups could be distinguished. Immediately to the east of the Rhine dwelt the Westphalians; in the valley of the Weser were the Engrians; beyond them came the Eastphalians, with the Elbe for their eastern frontier; while between the lower reaches of that river and the Eider, lived the Nordalbingians. Across the middle Elbe were Slavonic tribes which, in the confusion of the fifth and sixth centuries, had occupied the old seats of the East Teutons; beyond the Eider the Danes were beginning to fit out those plundering expeditions with which English history makes us familiar.

The Saxons were still heathen; in fact, they were very much as they had been in the days of Tacitus. They were troublesome neighbours. Their lack of political unity prevented them from making organized war on the Franks; but every attempt at rebellion on the part of subjects of the Frankish king was aided and abetted by the Saxons; and it was no wanton lust of conquest that led Charles to undertake their subjugation. The task was indeed desperately hard. Saxony was for the most part flat, but much of it was a wilderness of wood, heath, and

swamp. It was difficult to strike a decisive blow; for the Saxons had few forts and no towns worthy of the name; they seldom fought in large numbers, but carried on an irregular warfare, surrendered when hard pressed, and rose up again as soon as the Frankish host had passed elsewhere.

But for Charles's inflexible will the work would never have been completed. It did not take long to secure a nominal submission of the Saxons; that was offered in 776, after two campaigns. Charles established garrisons to keep the country in order; he carried away numerous hostages; and the Saxon chiefs were forced to accept Christianity. Notwithstanding these precautions, Charles's back was no sooner turned than the Saxons were up in arms. This rising was suppressed without much trouble, and Charles's triumph was celebrated by the wholesale baptism of thousands of the vanquished. Unfortunately Charles soon tried to exterminate paganism by issuing most ferocious laws against those who still worshipped the old gods. This precipitate policy led to a revolt which nearly lost him Saxony altogether. A valiant leader, Witikind, stirred up the tribes of the north. The Frankish officials and clergy were massacred, churches burned, and heathen altars restored. Charles came with a mighty host, and many of the rebels gave in. But when in obedience to his commands they brought to him those of their countrymen who had distinguished themselves in the rising, the barbaric element in Charles got the better of him, and all the prisoners, upwards of four thousand in number, were slaughtered at Verden on the river Aller. The cruelty brought its own punishment. The whole country blazed up; two years of desperate fighting followed; and it was not until Charles had twice marched with fire and sword from the western frontier to the Elbe that the Saxons again despaired. The end of the revolt, in 785, decided the fate of Saxony. There were four more risings in the next twenty years, but

none sufficiently formidable to threaten serious danger to Frankish domination.

Charles was not content with the Elbe as a frontier. He led an expedition against the Slavonic tribes beyond, and the land as far as the Oder came under his overlordship. One of his sons forced the Czechs of Bohemia to pay tribute. Further south the Frankish armies overthrew the Avars, a Hunnish tribe who dwelt along the Danube in the modern Hungary. They, too, had to do homage to Charles, and their king obediently suffered himself to be converted to Christianity.

At this point it is convenient to review the boundaries of Charles's dominions. As King of the Franks, he ruled over a strip of north-eastern Spain, the whole of the modern France, and all Germany west of the Elbe and the Bohemian Forest, including the present-day Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and Tyrol. To the east of these lands came a belt of tributary states inhabited by Slavs or Avars. Moreover, as King of the Lombards, Charles claimed to rule Italy, though his authority was never effective far to the south of Rome. It was a magnificent realm, and we cannot wonder that men began to think the name of king inadequate for him who held it.

It should be noted that, for the first time, all Germans were brought under a single rule. If Charles had done nothing else this would suffice to make him memorable in German history. Moreover, it was in his time that the North Germans began to lead a civilized life. It was he who founded the first towns in north Germany; they grew up around the episcopal sees which he established at Bremen, Münster, Paderborn, and other places in the lands he had conquered.

Both old and new territories were governed by Charles with great care and energy. He has left behind him a high reputation as an administrator and a lawgiver. Yet the machinery of government remained very much as it was in

Merovingian times, only Charles saw to it that the wheels were kept running. The royal court became larger; but, except that there was no longer a mayor of the palace, the great officials remained in general as before. There was still an annual assembly, known as the Mayfield, which every free man perhaps had the right of attending, though in practice it was composed of great officials and landowners. In local administration, however, Charles abolished the hereditary duchies which had given his predecessors such trouble. As a rule he allowed no one to stand between the count and the central government, though in certain frontier districts several counts were placed under the authority of a margrave (*Markgraf*, count of the *mark* or border), whose functions were mostly military. The count's powers were in essentials the same as of old. His district was still divided into hundreds; but the hundred-moot had ceased to meet, and in its stead a few leading men of the neighbourhood assisted the count when he came round to render justice.

Unfortunately the counts often proved oppressive and corrupt; and in his zeal for purity of administration, Charles established as a regular part of the state machinery an institution which his forbears had used only occasionally. From the ranks of his nobles, counsellors, and clergy, he annually chose a number of trustworthy and experienced men whom he sent, by twos or threes, on tours of inspection through the realm. These *missi*, as they were called, held very wide powers. It was their duty to promulgate new laws, to communicate royal instructions to the counts, to hear and investigate all complaints, to enquire carefully into the conduct of the count and his subordinates, to collect information as to the state of the Church, and even to report on the morals of the people in general. The *missi* did good work as long as there was a vigorous king to supervise them; but soon after Charles's time their visita-

tions became mere formalities, and before long they ceased altogether.

Charles's fame as a lawgiver is not altogether deserved. It is true that he issued a large number of enactments, known as Capitularies; but these are mostly of an administrative rather than a legislative character. There was no body of law which applied to every part of the Frankish realm, and justice was still administered according to the customs of each region. Charles, however, checked the growth of diversity by having these customary rules written down where this had not already been done.

Charles, as we have seen, was a generous patron of the Church. His motives, however, were political as well as religious, for in his government of the Frankish kingdom, he relied much on the assistance of the clergy. A bishop was expected to keep an eye on the nearest count, and to report any shortcomings to the king; while the lower clergy were regarded as policemen almost as much as priests. But Charles never allowed the clergy to get out of hand. He appointed all bishops himself, and the counts had to watch the bishops just as the bishops watched them. And the king considered it quite within his competence to reform the discipline of monasteries, to make regulations for religious worship, even to give decisions on points of doctrine. His attitude to the Pope was very independent, certainly not that of an inferior. Trouble was sure to arise from Charles's ecclesiastical policy, but for the time all went harmoniously.

Letters and science were among the king's chief interests. At his court were to be found the most learned men in all western Europe; among the best known was the Englishman, Alcwin of York. Such foreign scholars and their Frankish pupils were held in great esteem by Charles, who loved to hold discussions with them on every subject under the sun. Of more permanent value were the manuscripts of

the classics which they copied out, thereby preserving works which would otherwise have been lost. Shocked at the bad grammar of the letters written to him by the clergy, Charles ordered that schools should be established at all the great monasteries. Latin was the main object of study, but it is interesting to note that at Osnabrück, in newly-conquered Saxony, Greek was to be taught, so as to facilitate intercourse with the Eastern Empire.

The great king was also a patron of the arts. He loved music, tried to preserve the old German legends, and introduced into religious worship the Gregorian chants which had for long been used in Italy. He was a mighty builder, and much still remains of the fine chapel which he had erected for the palace at his favourite town, Aachen.

Never before had such prosperity and order prevailed in the Frankish territories. It is not astonishing that Charles's subjects began to ask one another what ought to be done to the author of such benefits. If a wretched do-nothing Merovingcould be King of the Franks, surely the greatness of Charles should be marked by some higher title. And the only higher title familiar to Charles's subjects was that of Roman Emperor.

To us it may seem ridiculous that a Frankish ruler, who spoke a German tongue, lived after the German fashion, and governed his realm by laws and institutions that were mostly German in character, should claim to sit in the seat of Augustus and Marcus Aurelius. But to contemporaries there was nothing grotesque in the notion. Reference has been made to the respect felt by the Teutonic peoples for Roman culture, administration, and law, and to the delight with which barbarian chiefs accepted worthless honours from the Roman Emperor. They did not conceive of themselves as destroyers of the Empire; they were rather taking the place of the governors of the conquered provinces. In course of time the prestige of Rome naturally declined. The Frankish kings

ceased to care whether their authority was recognized by the Emperor or not. Nevertheless, there was still a lively tradition of the greatness and majesty of Rome. The subject peoples pictured in rosy colours the happiness of the times when they had been Roman citizens. And it must not be forgotten that the Eastern Empire was still exceeding great and strong, and that wonderful tales of its government and magnificence were continually reaching western Europe.

Much more precise ideas were entertained by the clergy—the only class among whom any learning was to be found. It is strange how the persecutions of the early Church were overlooked and how attention was fixed on the last century-and-a-half of Roman rule in the west, when the Emperor was a Christian, the protector and benefactor of the Church, and the active foe of heathenism. To churchmen of the next age, the defence of the faith seemed the essential function of the Emperor. The Church was not complete without him. And in an age of licence and brutality they may be pardoned for thinking that religion could not exist without a strong government to uphold it.

That this strong government must be a monarchy no one doubted. The evolution of the barbarian states, no less than the tradition of the Empire, precluded any other view. Moreover, no educated man would have admitted that Rome had ever abandoned her authority over western Europe. For some time, it might be, the Emperor had not chosen to exert that authority; but his it still rightfully was. And, further, was it not plain from Scripture that the Roman Empire was to last for ever, or at all events till the appearance of Antichrist should presage the approaching end of the world? So, though Franks might lord it over Gaul, Lombards over Italy, and even infidel Saracens over Spain, the authority of the Empire was not dead but only sleeping.

But, it may be said, was there not an Emperor at Con-



Photo. Exclusive News Agency

Charles the Great's Palace Chapel at Aachen

The chapel, octagonal in shape, now forms part of the Minster. It was built in the years 796–804, and was copied from Italian churches in the Byzantine style.

stantinople, and was not he, if anybody, the rightful possessor of all this power? Ought not the western kings to have acknowledged his supremacy and obeyed his commands? In strict logic, perhaps, they ought. But the Emperors of the East were no better than they should be. They were at daggers drawn with the Pope of Rome, and in the Greek Church they upheld, even by force, opinions which came shockingly near heresy. And it so happened that in 797, the reigning Emperor was violently deposed by his own mother, the Empress Irene, who put out his eyes, kept him prisoner in a monastery, and tried to govern the state herself.

In the west it was generally denied that a woman could wear the imperial purple. In any case, it was argued, Irene was a lawless usurper. The imperial throne was vacant. But in the west there was a prince whose lands were wider even than those over which Irene tyrannized—a prince who ruled with strength and justice, who befriended the Church, and who had smitten the enemies of the Lord and spread the gospel among the heathen. His Frankish blood mattered nothing, for any citizen of the Empire was eligible for the imperial title. Was not the will of God plain, and would it not be impious to disregard it?

Such ideas as these were widespread when in 800 Charles paid a visit to Rome. A rising in the city had collapsed before the threat of his vengeance, and now he had come to investigate charges which had been made against Pope Leo III. Leo was soon declared innocent, and it behoved him to show his gratitude. We do not know how far he discussed his intentions with the king or with the Frankish nobles; but though Charles must have been aware of what was contemplated, the despatch with which Leo acted seems to have taken him by surprise. For on Christmas Day, during the celebration of mass at St Peter's, while Charles was kneeling in prayer at the high altar, the Pope came down

from his exalted throne, placed on the king's head a golden crown, and bowed in obeisance before him, while from the vast assemblage rose a great shout: "To Charles Augustus crowned by God, the great and peace-giving Emperor, be life and victory."


Out of the circumstances of Charles's coronation later writers, both medieval and modern, have constructed elaborate theories as to the source and character of his imperial powers. The applause of the Roman populace, the presence and approval of the Frankish nobles, and especially the initiative taken by the Pope, have each been emphasized as the essential element in the ceremony. Every detail, in fact, has been made to yield its significance. But it may be assumed that none of those present thought much about the theoretical import of what passed. If pressed to give reasons for his action, the Pope could no doubt have argued plausibly on the lines suggested above. But Charles had so many facts on his side that he could afford to disregard theories. He was, as a matter of fact, never carried away by his new dignity. The Pope, the clergy, and the Roman populace probably thought that they really were bringing back the days of old. Charles had no such illusions. He recognized that his power rested on his position as king of the Franks, and even if he had understood the Roman system of government, he could never have imposed it on the most valuable section of his subjects. So his methods of administration, his wars and conquests, his virtues and vices, were but little affected by his coronation. And though by his subjects in Italy and Gaul he was regarded with increased awe, his authority over them was really no greater than before.

Nevertheless Charles took his new dignity very seriously. His actions are henceforward infused with a new spirit. In his laws and proclamations there is discernible a confidence that he is in a special sense God's viceroy, called to establish

God's kingdom on earth. When he fights the unbeliever, he does it in the spirit of a crusader. His concern for the Church increases: he is still the benefactor, but even more the overseer and reformer. He feels himself responsible for the moral welfare of all his subjects. In fact, the imperial office was to Charles a religious rather than a secular dignity. In his view the epithet Holy was inseparable from the Empire, which was ordained of God as a means of grace. And though this conception was not fully developed till much later, Charles has the credit, if credit it be, of making the first serious attempt to realize the ideal of a Holy Roman Empire.

Charles's belief in that ideal moulded the whole future of Germany. He must inevitably figure in the history of many lands, but it is to Germany that he specially belongs. French romancers have made him a hero of their nation, and even to Englishmen he is most familiar as Charlemagne. But he was German in blood and speech, in dress and habits, in feeling and interests. His favourite residence was Aachen, then and now a German town; and when he died, it was in the crypt of his chapel at Aachen that his body was placed, seated on his throne, clad in the imperial robes and grasping the imperial sceptre.

The best evidence of Charles's greatness is what happened after his death. The whole Empire fell to his only surviving son Lewis, commonly called the Pious or Kindly. Lewis was a very religious man, quite free from his father's vices. He purified the imperial court; he drew still closer the bonds between Church and State; he reformed abuses, and ruled with justice and mercy. For some years all went well. Rebellious tributaries were chastised, and even the Saracens in Spain and the Emperor at Constantinople sought his friendship. But Lewis lacked his father's foresight and force. He had associated with himself as Emperor his eldest son


EMPIRE OF CHARLES THE GREAT
The shading shows the division made at the Treaty of Verdun in 843
NEUSTRIA
AUSTRASIA
BURGUNDY
AQUITAINE
SPANISH MARK
CALIPHATE of CORDOVA
Ebro
Loire
Poitiers
Tours
Fontenoy
Meuse
Rhine
SAXONS
Hamburg
Bremen
Verden
Paderborn
Thuringia
Tributary Slavs
Elbe
Oder
BOHEMIA
Slavs
FRANKS
Regensburg
Vindobona
Strassburg
Augsburg
ALAMANNI
BAVARIA
Salzburg
St. Gall
Avar
AVARS
Czechs
LOMBARDY
States
Slavs
Rome

Lothair; and two other sons he made governors respectively of Aquitaine and Bavaria. The young men were loyal enough till a second marriage brought Lewis a fourth son, known later as Charles the Bald. In their jealousy Lothair and his brothers began a series of intrigues, which, when the Emperor's partiality towards his infant child became manifest, developed into open revolt. Then followed ten years of calamity. Lewis showed himself utterly wanting in decision and energy. Twice he was taken and imprisoned, once he was deposed by a solemn assembly of Frankish nobles. But each time the mutual jealousies of the rebels deprived them of the fruits of their victory, and Lewis might have recovered much of his power had he not, in every arrangement which was suggested, shown himself madly anxious to secure the lion's share for his youngest son. Meanwhile the Slavs, so meek in the days of the great Charles, were encroaching on the eastern borders of the Empire; and, worse still, the Norse rovers were ravaging its northern coast and learning that even inland districts might be raided with impunity.

In 840 Lewis died on the island of Ingelheim in the Rhine, near Mainz. His eldest son Lothair, disregarding arrangements made with his father, claimed the whole of the Empire for himself. Lothair's younger brother Lewis, commonly known as the German, whom the late Emperor had recognized as king of Bavaria, united with Charles the Bald, who ruled Neustria, to defend their rights. In 841 a murderous battle at Fontenay, near Auxerre, ended in the defeat of Lothair. Next year his two brothers confirmed their alliance by a solemn oath sworn before their armies at Strassburg. Each king swore in the tongue of the other's followers, and the oaths, which have been preserved in full, are among the earliest and most valuable monuments of the infant German and French languages. Soon afterwards Lothair was constrained to give in; and in 843 the treaty of Verdun settled

the claims of the three brothers. Lewis the German was recognized as king of all Germany east of the Rhine, with the exception of Frisia (now Holland). Charles the Bald added Aquitaine to Neustria. As for Lothair, he was given the imperial title, the kingdom of Italy, and a long, narrow strip of territory stretching from the Mediterranean to the North Sea. A glance at the map will give a clearer conception of it than ten pages of description: but it should be noted that it contained most of the old kingdom of Burgundy, most of Austrasia, including Aachen, and the whole of what is now Holland.

Lothair's portion was an ill-compacted collection of provinces differing in race, language, and institutions. It soon fell to pieces. His share of Austrasia became known as Lotharingia, whence are derived the German Lothringen and the French Lorraine, a reminder that the northern part of the "middle kingdom" has principally figured in history as a bone of contention between the realms on each side of it. For these realms stood on much firmer foundations. Each was homogeneous in essentials. The subjects of Lewis were all of German blood, they all spoke some kind of German tongue, their characteristic institutions were of German origin. Charles's dominions were peopled in the main by descendants of the Romanized Gauls; they spoke a language derived from Latin; their institutions and habits, whatever they might be, were certainly more Celtic than German. In fact, after 843 we may with propriety speak of a kingdom of Germany and a kingdom of France. Before the treaty of Verdun, the important events of the history of Germany mostly occurred elsewhere. Afterwards, except for one period, the destinies of the Germans were shaped on the soil of Germany.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III

In Germany there are few buildings of the Carolingian period. At Aachen the octagonal part of the present Minster was built by Charles the Great. There is some late Carolingian work in the Minster at Essen, and the crypt and octagon of St Michael's, Fulda, belong to the first half of the ninth century. The church of St Justin at Höchst-am-Main dates from the same time, but has been severely restored.

GENEALOGICAL TABLE TO ILLUSTRATE THE HISTORY OF THE CAROLINGIANS.

Pepin the Old, Austrasian Mayor of the Palace, d. 639.

Ansigis, Austrasian Mayor of the Palace. = Begga.

Pepin the Young, Mayor of the Palace, d. 714.

Charles Martel, Mayor of the Palace, d. 741.

Carloman, Mayor of Austrasia, retired 747.

Pepin the Short, King of the Franks, 752–768.

Charles the Great, Joint-King of the Franks, 768–771. King of the Franks, 771–814. Emperor, 800–814.

Carloman, Joint-King of the Franks, 768–771.

Lewis the Pious, Emperor, 814–840.

Lothair, Emperor 840–855. (Male line extinct in 875.)

Lewis the German, King of the Germans, 843–876.

Charles the Bald, King of the French, 843–877. Emperor, 875–877.

Carloman

Charles the Fat, Emperor, 881–887.

Carolingian Kings of France.

Arnulf, King of the Germans, 887–899, Emperor, 896–899.

Lewis the Child, King of the Germans, 899–911.

CHAPTER IV

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GERMAN KINGDOM

THE new German kingdom had been set up by conspiracy and rebellion. And at first it seemed as though the sins of its founder were to be visited on his realm. The seventy-five years after the treaty of Verdun were probably the most wretched in German history. The young state was exposed to a new wave of barbarian invasion. It is true that the Northmen, whose activity was now at its height, paid rather more attention to France than to Germany, where the Saxons of the north were nearly a match for them. From time to time, however, they wrought great havoc in the eastern kingdom. In 845 they burned the newly-founded town of Hamburg; but their worst ravages came some thirty-five years later, when one host cut to bits on the Lüneburg Heath a great Saxon and Thuringian army, while another overran Austrasia, and sacked every great town, including Aachen, where they stabled their horses in Charles the Great's chapel. The Slavs were also troublesome; but the worst calamity of all was the advent of a new foe—the Magyars. These were a Mongol race, nearly akin to the Huns. They were still utter barbarians, ruthlessly cruel and shamelessly perfidious. Magnificent horsemen and archers, they overwhelmed the slow German levies; and for years they raided Germany and Italy much as they pleased. They ravaged as far north as Bremen, and even appeared in Lotharingia. In the turmoil all orderly government disappeared, while learning and religion were

expelled from vast regions where the monasteries and churches had been destroyed by the Magyars.

To make matters worse, the Carolingian house rapidly degenerated. Its leaders never became so contemptible as the later Merovings; but both physically and morally they were utterly unable to cope with the evils that beset them. Lewis the German, it is true, was a vigorous ruler, and in his time Germany suffered much less than the other states set up at Verdun. But, instead of devoting all his energies to the barbarian invaders, he was too often ready to take advantage of the difficulties they were causing to France. His unscrupulous greed involved both states in unnecessary wars, which generally left matters just as before. One success he did, however, gain; for when Lothair's second son died without heirs in 869, Lewis was able to push his frontier as far as the Meuse, thereby bringing Köln, Trier, and Aachen within his territories. A little later nearly all the rest of Lotharingia was annexed: and thus the first round in the struggle for that unhappy district ended in favour of Germany. But this was the one notable achievement of the Carolingian kings of Germany, and it was accomplished at the cost of unnecessary suffering for all western Europe.

The collapse of the Carolingian house came with startling suddenness. At the beginning of 875 there were nine legitimate representatives of the male line. Ten years later there were two—Charles, called the Simple, a small boy of the western branch—and Charles the Fat, youngest son of Lewis the German. Thanks to his cousin's tender age, the singularly incapable Charles the Fat was able for three years to rule as Emperor over all the dominions of his great namesake. But in 887 he was deposed. The French chose as their ruler Odo, Count of Paris, though on his death twelve years later Charles the Simple was made king, and it was not till 987 that the Carolingians finally ceased to rule over France. As for the

Germans, they acknowledged as king Arnulf, duke of the frontier province of Carinthia, a grandson of Lewis the German, but of illegitimate birth. Arnulf strove vigorously against the evils of his time; but the Magyar terror was at its height, and the state of Germany went from bad to worse. Arnulf's feeble son, Lewis the Child, who succeeded him, died in 911, and this event marks the end of Carolingian rule in Germany. It marks, too, the end of the domination of the Franks in western Europe. The echo of their great deeds sounded in the names France and Franconia; but henceforward they cannot be distinguished as a separate people, and the leadership of Germany passed to other stocks. But they had played on the stage of history a creative part which gives them a unique rank among the peoples of Europe.

On the death of Lewis the Child there was serious danger that the German kingdom would come to an end. There were two grave menaces to its existence. One was the reappearance of the old tribal duchies. As yet the Germans possessed a very imperfect consciousness of their national unity. They seem, indeed, to have recognized a distinction between themselves and the inhabitants of France; but the idea of a single German state made no strong appeal to their minds. A man was a Bavarian or a Saxon first, a German second. This attitude was natural. Each division of the kingdom had its own laws, customs, interests, and dialect. A Bavarian and a Saxon could scarcely understand each other. And the consequent tendency towards separatism had been immensely strengthened by the barbarian invasions. The later Carolings were unable to defend the whole kingdom. In the prevalent confusion the administrative system of Charles the Great had completely broken down. Each district had to take care of itself, and, with the old bonds still strong, the members of each tribal division inevitably drew closer together, took common action, and looked for a common

leader. Here they were helped by the ambitions of the nobility. The *missi* had long since disappeared, and the counts, almost uncontrolled by the harassed king, were eagerly increasing their authority, and becoming an hereditary nobility. Other wealthy landowners were also usurping power. Towards the end of the ninth century, despite the opposition of the crown, some of these secured recognition as dukes over large regions. Thus it came to pass that when the line of the Carolings died out, Germany was divided into five great duchies. In the north was Saxony, governed by the famous and powerful family of the Ludolfings. West of the Rhine lay Lotharingia—the northern part of the dismembered Middle Kingdom, comprising, of course, most of the old Austrasia. In central Germany, round the basins of the Main and the Neckar, was Franconia, so called from the large Frankish element in its population, a feature dating from the conquest of the Alamanni by Clovis. In the south-west, along both banks of the Rhine, was Swabia—still sometimes termed Alamannia. Lastly, a rough triangle in shape, between the Bohemian Forest, the Lech, and the Alps, came Bavaria—a region which had always retained a strong spirit of local independence.

Within their territories the dukes claimed almost royal authority. And indeed it was not by the crown that their claims were effectively disputed. Their worst enemies were rival nobles in their own duchies. So bitter was the internal strife in Swabia and Franconia that it seemed likely that they in their turn would split up into independent parts.

The ambitions of the nobles bring us to the second great danger to the German kingdom. This was the rise of feudalism. The growth of feudalism was very gradual, its origins are numerous and complex; but setting details and controversies aside, one may say broadly that feudalism became an important factor in German society during the troubles of the

ninth century, and that it was based on three institutions—commendation, the benefice, and the immunity.

Commendation was the act whereby a man placed himself under the special protection of another, on condition of rendering him faithful service. Commendation pure and simple created a merely personal bond, but not infrequently it was supplemented by an agreement giving the protector various rights over the other's land, which sometimes was only retained by the owner on a very precarious tenure. There were several reasons which made commendation a common practice in ninth-century Germany. Every free landowner was bound to render military service whenever the king wanted him. In the old German tribe this was no great hardship; but in the days of Charles the Great, whose Empire was immense and whose wars were almost incessant, it was a grievous burden. But if a man commended himself to a neighbouring magnate, he joined the class of the unfree; he lost in dignity, but probably gained in comfort. For though the State made an effort to retain his services in time of war, it generally failed, and he stayed at home unless he had explicitly pledged himself to follow his lord to the field. A second cause of commendation was the need of protection during the barbarian invasions. A man's lord undertook to defend him; he would shelter him in his stronghold, and organize concerted resistance to the enemy. And as the poor peasant commended himself to a more powerful neighbour, so did the latter seek the protection of someone yet greater; and thus was created a social pyramid, with the king as its apex. The practice was naturally welcomed by the great; it provided them with a force of dependants pledged to obey them.

Very closely connected with commendation was the benefice. A benefice was a piece of land given by the owner to some person for his use. Originally it was rather a loan than a gift; the benefice ceased to exist on the death of either giver

or receiver. But the tendency was for benefices to become hereditary, and to be regarded as property which could not be resumed unless the holder failed to fulfil his obligations, or died without heirs. Attempts were also made to treat administrative offices as benefices—the counts, for instance, becoming an hereditary nobility—though this development was long successfully resisted by the crown. Now a landowner did not, of course, create benefices for nothing. If the grant was bestowed on a monastery or bishopric, as would often be the case, the return would perhaps be made in prayers for the benefactor's soul. As a rule, however, the recipient agreed to pay a rent in money or kind, or undertake some work for the grantor, or render him military service. This last obligation was generally laid on those who were given royal benefices: in fact, the first laymen to receive such grants seem to have been the antrustions of the Merovingian kings, the condition being that they should act as the king's bodyguard in time of war. The number of benefices soon began to increase rapidly, for the holder of a benefice would often carve out of it a smaller one for someone else. Thus there came to be a long chain of benefices connecting the king with very humble subjects. Later, a benefice was known as a *fief* or *feu*, from which we have the word "feudal."

Now it is clear that commendation and the grant of benefices led to very similar results. By the tenth century, in fact, a benefice-holder was regarded as the *vassal* of the lord who had given him his land; his personal status, that is to say, was the same as if he had commended himself to that lord. Thus within the state there were numerous groups with common obligations to a lord as their bond of union; and it was natural that they should often consider their duty to their lord before their duty to their king. Royal authority was being undermined by a multitude of private contracts. The king, of course, had a double claim on the obedience of his immediate

vassals: but if any of them chose to rebel, they could often count on the assistance of those under them.

But it was the *immunity* which above all made feudalism a danger to the State. An immunity was the right of exemption from some burden, duty, or liability imposed by law. It might consist in freedom from taxation. In its most coveted form, however, it gave the privileged person the right to exclude all royal officials from his lands, and, as a consequence, to hold courts of justice and exercise jurisdiction over his tenants. The first immunities seem to have been granted by the Merovings to the Church; and by the tenth century all episcopal and monastic estates possessed very wide privileges. In time laymen began to receive similar grants. But it must be remembered that many of the rights claimed and exercised by nobles were simply usurped by them without any leave or licence from the king. Periods of civil strife and barbarian invasion always produced a thick crop of unauthorized immunities. Each powerful landowner aspired to be ruler as well as leader and protector of his dependants. Each count, not content with being a government official, strove to become a little prince. And, when the great dukes arose in Germany, they claimed within their territories the powers of a king.

Fully and logically developed, feudalism would have involved the complete ruin of royal power. In an ideal feudal state the king would have no control over anyone except his tenants-in-chief. The king of France, indeed, was for many years almost in this plight. It is usual to speak of the feudal "system," and perhaps the term may justly be applied to the state of affairs in France. But in England and Germany there never was any feudal system. Feudalism has been a great force in the development of both countries; but at no time have their politics and society been under its exclusive domination. And at the date we have reached, the grip of

feudalism on Germany was much less strong than it afterwards became. Lotharingia was most under its influence; but east of the Rhine the old German institutions had held their own till the time of Charles the Great; and in Saxony the organization of society was still almost unchanged. In south Germany, however, the transition was proceeding apace. Small proprietors were becoming rare; the peasants, though not yet serfs, had started on the course that would make them so; everywhere the nobles were arrogating political power to themselves and doing what they pleased. Unless the crown intervened at once, it would find feudalism an even greater foe than the spirit of tribal independence.

Feudalism is often spoken of as if it were wholly bad—a device of wicked landlords to enslave the poor and free themselves from all control. But its hold on medieval society was largely due to the services that it had rendered to western Europe. Feudalism was a many-sided phenomenon. It may be profitably considered from the standpoint of a politician, a sociologist, or an economist. From another point of view it is a military institution—a method of organizing national defence. And it was militant feudalism which saved Germany and France from the barbarians. The Northmen and Magyars conducted their raids on horseback, the former stealing their mounts from the country near their point of landing. Now the tribal militia of the Germans consisted mostly of footmen; in action it was a formidable force, and if the numbers were equal, a fair match for the Danes and too strong for the Magyars. But its mobilization took a long time; and it moved too slowly to force an action or follow up a success. Feudalism, however, provided a smaller but much more effective force of heavily-armed cavalry. From early Carolingian times benefices had generally been given by the king on the condition that the holder should furnish a certain number of first-class horsemen in time of war. The

king's vassals imposed similar conditions on those who held lands from them. A feudal state, therefore, possessed a national force of heavy cavalry; and in the event of a sudden raid on any district, the local magnates could quickly put into the field a body of horse which would as a rule be adequate to cope with the danger. Further, the expeditions of the Northmen and Magyars were flying raids. Their first object was plunder. The Magyars, too, had no love of fighting for its own sake, and preferred to follow the line of least resistance. Both kinds of invaders consequently disliked conducting sieges; in fact, when they undertook them, they generally failed. Now a number of independent peasants possessed neither the means nor the organization necessary for building fortifications. But the feudal lord had not only the wealth but also, in his numerous dependants, the labour. So all over western Europe castles arose. According to our notions, they were neither large nor scientifically constructed. But they served their purpose. Even earthworks were generally enough to baffle the invaders. The persons and property of the lord's tenants would be brought within the shelter of the stronghold: nothing worth taking was left outside: and if the enemy sat down and tried to starve the defenders out, he ran the risk of being caught by a relieving force.

Feudalism was, of course, not the only cause of the ultimate repulse of the barbarians. Nevertheless, it proved of incalculable service in the defence of western Europe, and as long as the external danger continued, its existence was fully justified. Unfortunately, when the peril passed away, feudalism remained. For centuries its influence on Germany grew stronger and stronger, and that influence was now almost wholly bad. At a time when in other countries feudalism had been overthrown and strong governments established, it effectively hindered the attainment of German political unity.

A sketch of the main features of feudalism was necessary to make clear the position of the German kings who followed the Carolingians. For, despite the perils which threatened it, the German monarchy did not die. There was a faint sentiment of nationality in the land; there had been a king of Germany for most of the past seventy years; and the Franconians, in particular, cherished memories of Charles the Great, and were loth to see the work of their race altogether undone. So on the death of Lewis the Child a number of Franconian and Bavarian nobles chose as king a Franconian count, by name Conrad. Conrad tried hard to make his power effective, but he carried little weight beyond central Germany. Lotharingia, indeed, refused to remain in a state no longer ruled by a Caroling, and paid allegiance to Charles the Simple, king of France. Conrad's greatest service to his country was rendered on his death-bed, when he urged the Franconian nobles to bestow the crown on Henry duke of Saxony, who had been his most formidable rival. An assembly of magnates from Saxony and Franconia took Conrad's advice, and in 919 Henry, called the Fowler, became king and opened a new era of German history.

In tenth-century Germany, no king could hope to be strong unless he was either a great tribal chief or a great feudal noble. Henry the Fowler was already the former. His duchy of Saxony was the largest and strongest of the four into which Germany was now divided. Over his territories he had long exercised regal power. His subjects were the most vigorous and warlike of the inhabitants of Germany. The majority of them were still free landowners, all accustomed to the use of arms; and their numbers and valour made them more than a match for the feudal cavalry of the south. In Saxon hands, the monarchy lacked neither prestige nor resources.

The most striking characteristic of Henry the Fowler was his practical common sense. His policy was to recognize

facts, and limit himself to such tasks as were imperative. Thus he made no effort to coerce Swabia and Bavaria, whose dukes, though formally recognizing him as king, continued to act like independent sovereigns. His immediate duty was to strengthen Saxony and drive out the barbarians. When the Magyars made an invasion, he secured their withdrawal and a long truce by promising them a heavy annual tribute. It was not heroic, but it was shrewd. For when the Magyars had gone Henry began to reorganize the defences of his duchy. He gave lands near the frontier to vassals pledged in return to fight as horsemen in time of war, and in the same regions he established a number of strongholds to serve as rallying-points and refuges in time of invasion. Then he took the offensive against the Slavs and the Danes. He defeated the Wends in what are now Brandenburg and Lusatia, granted estates in his conquests to Saxon warriors, and erected numerous fortified posts. He aimed at making each of these the nucleus of a town: out of every nine colonists one had to do garrison service and help to build houses, while his lands in the country were cultivated by the other eight.[1] Many towns in central and eastern Germany owe their existence to Henry the Fowler —Quedlinburg, for instance, in the Harz mountains, Magdeburg and Merseburg, on his eastern frontier, and Meissen in the region conquered from the Slavs.

Henry also forced the Slavonic Czechs in Bohemia to acknowledge his suzerainty. He met with great success against the Danes, and established the "mark" or frontier-district of Schleswig to protect north Saxony against them. But his greatest triumph was achieved when the truce with the Magyars came to an end. He refused to continue the tribute, and inflicted on an invading host a terrible defeat near Rietheburg on the river Unstrut. Henry's prestige was now very high. Even before this, Lotharingia had returned to its allegiance to the German kingdom; and it seemed

as though it was within Henry's power to make his authority effective both there and in the south. But he took no measures to this end: he spent his closing years moving without pomp or show from one to another of his palaces in the Harz mountains, indulging in his favourite recreation of hunting. In 936 he died. His work had been to increase the strength of the already strong Saxony, and to point the way to a renewed expansion eastward of the German people.

The new king, Otto I., had all the strength and shrewdness of his father. But his mind was full of lofty ideas concerning his duty to Germany and Christendom, and he was resolved to be king in fact as well as in name. He was at once recognized by the great dukes, who waited on him at the magnificent feast which followed his coronation at Aachen. When, however, he began to cut down their powers and to treat them as his officials, they soon rose in rebellion. For three years Otto was hard pressed by the dukes of Franconia and Lotharingia, helped by discontented Saxons; but a victory at Andernach on the Rhine at last decided the issue in his favour. Otto now disposed of the duchies as he saw fit. Franconia he took himself, Bavaria was given to one of his brothers, Swabia to his son, Lotharingia to a son-in-law. These arrangements, however, proved no guarantee of internal peace, and Otto would probably have been better advised to sweep away the duchies altogether, notwithstanding the discontent which such a policy would at first have caused.

But though Otto was willing to make his kinsmen dukes, he refused to give them all the powers held by their predecessors. By the side of each he established an official called the Count Palatine, whose duty it was to watch over the interests of the crown. The king's chief concern, however, was to keep in his hands the appointment of bishops. Whereas Henry the Fowler had been somewhat suspicious of the Church, Otto's aim was to use it as a counterpoise to the

nobility. In carrying out this plan he had valuable help from his youngest brother Bruno, his chancellor, whom he made archbishop of Köln. Under Bruno, a permanent staff of clerical officials was established at Otto's court. The king himself bestowed vast estates and privileges on bishoprics and monasteries, of course taking care that these were given to men he could trust. Henceforth bishops and abbots figure among the greatest feudal magnates of Germany. As the principle of clerical celibacy was now generally accepted, their powers could not become hereditary; and as Otto ruled the Church with a firm hand, and was regarded by ecclesiastics as their patron and protector, his policy greatly increased his influence. The resources of the church lands and the moral authority of the clergy were in fact at the disposal of the crown.

Otto's schemes for the aggrandizement of the Church were greatly facilitated by the continued successes of the Germans against the tribes beyond the Elbe. Before the end of the reign the German advance had reached the Oder, and the newly-won territories were divided into several Marks, each governed by a margrave who had under him a number of counts and lesser officials. In the north, along the Baltic Sea, was the Mark of the Billungs, so-called from its governor, Hermann Billung, a great friend of Otto's, a mighty warrior, and the founder of a family very famous in German history. To the south of this came the North or Old Mark, to be known in later times as the Mark of Brandenburg. Between the Old Mark and Bohemia, after various experimental divisions, the new territories were shared by the two Marks of Lusatia and Meissen, the latter, after many and perplexing vicissitudes, being now for the most part included in the kingdom of Saxony. Meantime, the Bavarians also had been pushing eastward, and had set up the East Mark, which afterwards developed into the duchy of Austria. Southward of this lay

Carinthia, a district long in dispute between Germans and Slavs, but now finally included in the German kingdom.

In the Saxon Marks Otto, following in the footsteps of his father, planted German settlers and founded new towns. But, notwithstanding the ferocity of the fighting, the Slavs were not all driven out. The survivors were still heathen, and Otto, like Charles the Great, was anxious for the conversion of his conquered enemies. Bishoprics at Brandenburg, Havelberg, Meissen, and elsewhere were founded as centres of evangelizing activity, and later in his reign Otto established at Magdeburg an archbishopric which was to organize and direct the whole mission to the Slavs. The work had a promising beginning, and the preachers of Christianity were soon able to advance into regions where German arms had not yet penetrated. Otto's zeal, however, was not entirely due to a concern for Slavonic souls. Out of the large estates which the conquests brought into his hands, he was able to endow the newly founded sees and monasteries with very rich possessions, thereby adding to the strength of the ally of the crown against the nobility. It is significant that the Saxon magnates, though nominally Christians, did all they could to thwart the mission to the Slavs.

Against the Danes Otto acted as against the Slavs, strengthening the Mark of Schleswig and making the new archbishopric of Hamburg the base of a missionary campaign in Denmark and Scandinavia. Henceforward the Danes gave no serious trouble. And Otto's reign saw also the last raid on Germany by the Magyars. In 955 a terrible horde of them came burning and pillaging over the south. But though civil war had just been raging, all Germany united together under the king's leadership, and a glorious battle on the Lechfeld near Augsburg drove the raiders from the land. After this, the Magyars soon settled down on the plains of Hungary, where they still form the most important element in the population.

Otto's energy was felt far beyond the limits of Germany. His power was strikingly illustrated in 946, when he led a Saxon army into the heart of France and rescued the Carolingian king, Louis IV., from a rising of the feudal nobility. But it is for his exploits in Italy that Otto has been given the title of the "Great." Italy had for long been in a miserable condition. The Magyars had wrought terrible havoc, and Saracen rovers not only had established themselves in Sicily and the south, but had seized the heights of the Riviera and were harrying the north-west. There was nobody strong enough to make head against them. The see of Rome had been occupied by a series of corrupt and licentious popes. There was still supposed to be a king of Italy, but the title merely furnished a pretext for strife between greedy nobles. In 950 Adelaide of Burgundy, the beautiful widow of one of the claimants to the throne, appealed for help to the dukes of Bavaria and Swabia. Each led an army across the Alps, and though one was Otto's brother and the other his son, the king could not allow two dukes to accomplish their evident purpose of seizing Italian territory for themselves. In 951 therefore Otto headed an expedition to Italy. The two dukes thought it wise to withdraw; Adelaide, whom her rival had now seized and imprisoned, was rescued, and Otto immediately married her. But this was the only element of romance in the enterprise. So far from marching to Rome for the imperial crown, as he was expected to do, Otto would not even become king of Italy. He allowed Adelaide's enemy, Berengar of Friuli, to keep that title, in return for an acknowledgment of his suzerainty.

CHAPTER V

GERMAN KING OR ROMAN EMPEROR?

FOR the next ten years Otto had plenty to occupy him in Germany. But in 960, Pope John XII., who had meanwhile ascended the papal throne, appealed to him for help against King Berengar. The Pope was a licentious youth, whose policy was merely directed towards the political aggrandizement of his family; but Otto, glad of an opportunity to secure control over the Holy See, crossed the Alps with a great army, put Berengar to flight, assumed the title of king of Italy, and then marched to Rome. There he was crowned Emperor by the Pope in February, 962.

Thus began the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. Probably no one at the time had any idea of the importance of Otto's coronation. Since the days of Charles the Great the imperial title had fallen into some contempt. It had been sought after by every ambitious prince, whether he was fitted to adorn it or not. The last German to hold it had been Arnulf; after his time it had passed successively to two rival claimants for the Italian throne. For such men to be called Emperor was mockery; and it is significant that since 924, no one had made any effort to secure the imperial crown. Still, the memory of Charles the Great lingered; it was felt that western Europe would be ruined without an Emperor; the progressive party among the clergy were anxious that Otto should assume an office which gave him full authority to reform abuses in the Church; and Otto himself thought

that as Emperor he could treat the Pope with a high hand, make the Church still more an instrument of his policy, and perhaps increase the awe and respect felt towards him by his German subjects. But his conduct as Emperor gave little indication of the immense significance of his coronation. It is true that in 963 he deposed John XII., not for his vices, but for plotting against himself; and the next Pope was bound to him hand and foot. But his new power was used to further his old aims. His mind was still centred on Germany. The division of Lotharingia into two duchies and the establishment of new sees among the Wends interested him far more than some desultory military operations which he undertook against the Saracens in south Italy. He liked, it is true, to assume the Emperor in his dealings with other sovereigns or his own nobles; and he was very proud to secure for his eldest son the hand of the princess Theophano, daughter of an Emperor of the East. His desire to make the imperial power hereditary in his family is shown by the fact that he had his son crowned joint-Emperor during a third expedition to Italy in 966. But he never allowed his head to be turned by dreams of universal dominion; and it is unjust to charge him with having diverted the eyes of Germans from their natural tasks and started them on a wild-goose chase which nearly ruined their nation. The freaks of later Emperors would have been denounced by Otto as sternly as by any modern historian. It might perhaps have been better for Germany if he had never crossed the Alps. But it is difficult to see how he could have avoided intervention in Italy, and how, considering the ideas of his age, he could be expected to turn his back on the imperial crown. It is evident now that in many ways he was laying up trouble for his successors: but it is easy to be wise after the event, and hard to forecast the mistakes of future generations.

The dangers of the connection between Germany and Italy

were strikingly illustrated soon after the great Emperor's death. His son and successor, Otto II., was an able and vigorous young man. He began his reign well by defeating his rebellious cousin, the duke of Bavaria, and subsequently reducing the extent of that duchy; and the king of France having seized Lotharingia on the death of Otto the Great, he not merely reconquered the stolen territory but punished the thief by an expedition which nearly captured Paris. But, after these exploits, his attention was almost entirely taken up by Italy, where he tried to drive the Greeks and Saracens from the south. Though successful at first, he was utterly defeated in 982, and before he could make any serious attempt to retrieve his fortunes he died at Rome. Just previously, the effects of his absence from Germany appeared in a desperate rising of the Wends, who recovered all their lands up to the middle and lower Elbe. Only in the Mark of Meissen did the Germans hold their ground.

The interests of Germany were neglected by Otto II.; they were almost ignored by Otto III. The new king was a boy of four when his father died. For eight years the regency was held by his mother, the Empress Theophano, who filled his head with all the high-flown doctrines of imperial power which prevailed at the court of Constantinople. After her death, Otto was educated almost entirely by churchmen, who also instilled into him lofty and impracticable ideas of his duty to the Church and the world. Their pupil, a quick and clever youth, learned his lesson well. When in 996 he began to rule for himself, he at once left Germany, had himself crowned Emperor at Rome, and there began to build a palace and established a splendid and pompous court, where he copied the ceremonial observed at Constantinople. His mind was full of plans for the reform of the Church and the advancement of learning: he encouraged the foundation of new monasteries, organized missions to the Hungarians and Slavs,

and raised to the Papacy Gerbert of Aurillac, the most learned man of the time, whose knowledge was so great that he was suspected of intercourse with the devil.

The Germans Otto regarded as coarse and rustic; after 996 he seldom appeared among them. The fantastic and sentimental bent of his character is well illustrated by the story, probably true, that while visiting Aachen in 1000, he had the vault of Charles the Great opened, and gazed at the dead Emperor sitting in state on his throne. He was quickly brought back to present realities by the news of a revolt in his beloved Italy, and for the rest of his life he was struggling unsuccessfully against this and similar risings. In 1002, at the age of twenty-two, he died: a high-minded and gifted man, extolled by contemporaries as "the wonder of the world" and "the restorer of the Empire," but unpractical, morbid, and one of the worst rulers that Germany has ever had.

It was indeed lucky for Germany that Otto died young. The dukes had been enlarging their authority. Worse still, Otto had alienated many leading ecclesiastics by his plans for setting up among the Slavs churches free from all German control. To the German prelates this seemed mere folly, especially as the Wends were still restless, and in Poland there had arisen a strong Slavonic state, which had already begun to attack the Saxon Marks. There was thus real danger that the work of Otto I. would be altogether undone—a danger intensified by the fact that his grandson died without issue. The German like the imperial crown was theoretically elective; and though son usually succeeded father, there was always a possibility of civil war on the death of a king, and a probability of it if he were childless. In this case, however, the nobles of Bavaria, Franconia, and Lotharingia chose Henry, the duke of the first of these duchies, who happened to be a great-grandson of Henry the Fowler. The Saxons therefore soon

gave him their allegiance; and with his recognition by the Swabians, the crisis was ended peacefully.

Henry II., who reigned till 1124, is not one of the heroes of German history. Yet he deserves much praise for bringing his country back to the safe paths which Otto the Great had followed. He was a great friend of the clergy, and restored harmonious relations between them and the crown; while at the same time he would brook no attempts to make the Church independent of his control. Against the Slavs he continued Otto the Great's policy, setting up at Bamberg a bishopric to serve as the headquarters of a renewed missionary campaign among the Slavs of Bohemia, where heathenism still lingered, and fighting hard, though with indifferent success, against the Poles. Nevertheless, he was not unmindful of wider interests. Three times he crossed the Alps, once to receive the crown of Italy, once to be made Emperor, once to enforce his claims to the obedience of the south. In this last enterprise he met with scant success: his abilities in fact were not equal to the part of Emperor: and in Germany itself his cautious but undistinguished rule never won for him the respect felt towards Otto I. But a man of his character was probably the type of king that Germany most needed at the time.

With Henry II. the line of Saxon Emperors comes to an end. Yet the succession was settled with little strife. Descent from a daughter of Otto I. and the support of the great prelates won the crown for Conrad, a Franconian count, whose reign lasted from 1024 to 1039. Conrad was not in the first rank of the territorial nobility, and such power as he possessed was largely derived from a lucky marriage. But once on the throne, he proved himself a great warrior, a firm ruler, and a clear-headed and practical statesman. During the reigns of himself and his son the authority of both the German monarchy and the Empire reached their

highest point. Later sovereigns had more brilliant gifts and ambitions, and left behind them a more enduring memory; but none of them wielded a power so real as that of the first two Franconian Emperors.

In his shrewd common sense, Conrad was not unlike Henry the Fowler. He kept a firm hold on the Church, treating it as the servant of the temporal power and refusing any concessions to the party of reform. Against the Slavs he fought with vigour, and won back some of the territory that they had recovered since the days of Otto I. The power of the dukes was broken: when Conrad's step-son, the duke of Swabia, rebelled, he was soon defeated and slain: Swabia was given to the Emperor's son, who was also chosen duke of Bavaria: and as Franconia no longer had a duke, only Saxony and Lotharingia were out of Conrad's immediate control. Still more impressive was Conrad's acquisition of the kingdom of Burgundy, the southern part of the "Middle Kingdom" created in 843. The Burgundian king, old and childless, had acknowledged Conrad as his heir; in 1032 the latter entered into his new possession; and thus the whole of Lothair's old realm was now annexed to the Empire. Though mainly concerned with Germany, Conrad led two expeditions to Italy. The first of these saw his coronation as Emperor, a ceremony attended by Canute, King of Denmark, Norway, and England. Nevertheless, Conrad's authority over Italy was never very real: and it was ominous for the future that his second invasion was undertaken to chastise the archbishop of Milan, who, backed by the people of that city, was trying to assert his independence of imperial rule. Another disquieting sign was Conrad's recognition of the hereditary nature of the fiefs of sub-vassals. The greater nobles had already in practice made their benefices hereditary; and Conrad's concession was an attempt to win over the lesser landowners to the side of the crown as against their overlords. He was, it is true,

recognizing what was almost everywhere an accepted fact; but that this was the case shows how feudalism was still strengthening its hold on Germany.

Whatever dangers might be in embryo, there was little in the reign of Conrad's son Henry III. to remind contemporaries of their existence. To begin with, Henry succeeded his father as a matter of course—the first king of Germany to ascend the throne unopposed. Under him, moreover, the Empire extended its influence over a wider sphere than ever before. Poland, Bohemia, and Hungary acknowledged Henry's overlordship. His marriage with a French princess secured at least peace and friendship with that kingdom. But it was above all in his dealings with the Papacy that Henry's power made itself evident. Once again the Holy See had fallen into bad hands: factions of Roman nobles set up puppets of their own with no regard for the spiritual welfare of the Church. When three rival popes began to fill Rome with strife, a synod of clergy called Henry to the rescue. In 1046 Henry went to Rome; all three claimants were deposed; the bishop of Bamberg was chosen as Pope, and at once crowned his patron as Emperor. After his death, three German prelates, nominees of Henry, were successively elected to the papal throne. Now Henry, unlike his father, was hand-in-glove with the clerical party of reform; and the most important result of his intervention was that the Holy See became permanently committed to their policy.

In Germany, Henry had no trouble for many years. It was significant, however, that he found it necessary to appoint new dukes in Swabia, Bavaria, and Carinthia, all of which had been under his direct rule when he came to the throne. The Saxon nobles, moreover, became discontented owing to the support he gave to the ambitious schemes of the archbishop of Hamburg, who aspired to build up a principality for himself in north Germany. In 1054 the duke of Upper

Lorraine rose in rebellion because Henry refused to grant his claim to the Lower Duchy. The revolt was joined by the new dukes of Bavaria and Carinthia, and was rendered particularly formidable by reason of the recent marriage of the ringleader to the widow of the Marquis of Tuscany. Henry had again to go to Italy, but his operations were successful, and the rising collapsed. Nevertheless, the passions aroused were not yet cool when Henry, at the age of thirty-nine, unexpectedly died. His eldest son was only six years old.

With the death of Henry III. in 1056 a new phase of German history begins; and it is convenient at this point to review the progress achieved since Henry the Fowler became king. The sense of German national unity had immensely increased. Germans now regarded it as a matter of course that they should be ruled by one king. The prestige of the monarchy had been considerably raised by the acquisition of the imperial title. Its material strength was also much greater: the king ruled over wider territories and within them his authority was more effective. At the same time the crown had failed to overcome many serious obstacles. The dukes were not so powerful as in the time of Henry the Fowler; but they were still formidable, and even the strong and capable Henry III. found it impossible to do without them. Feudalism, too, had strengthened its grasp on German society; a powerful hereditary nobility had established itself; and if it had hitherto been kept in check, it was mainly because Germany had been blessed with a remarkable succession of strong kings. New dangers, moreover, had become apparent. The revival of the Empire might invest the German king with a halo of sanctity; it might introduce lofty ideals into German politics: but it carried with it the risk that the attention of the king might be drawn away from the true interests of Germany, and this danger was enhanced by the doctrine that the imperial crown must be received from the

Pope and, if possible, at Rome. Lastly, the wealth and power lavished upon the Church were well bestowed as long as they were used in accordance with the wishes of the crown: but if the clergy should become alienated from the monarchy, later Emperors would have cause to curse the ecclesiastical policy of Otto the Great and those who imitated him.

If the political future was rather doubtful, the social state of Germany was still less promising. In Saxony, it is true, free peasant proprietors remained numerous, and the main features of the old system of society had been preserved. Elsewhere, however, every man had his lord. Two grades of nobility can be distinguished—the dukes and counts, with other great landowners, and the knights, a class which had grown out of the need for mounted troops to repel the barbarians. Below came an undistinguished mass of unfree peasants. Exempt from military service, they had ceased to carry arms; and if they had few political duties, they had no political rights. Their material condition, however, was not hard; as yet they were far from sharing the fate of their brethren in France, who were virtually serfs.

In one respect, however, German society had advanced. When Henry the Fowler became king, town life was almost unknown to the east of the Rhine. But the new security of life and property, the fortifications and bishoprics established in the marks, and the intercourse with Italy and other foreign lands, had led to the growth of towns all over Germany. They owed their importance to a variety of causes. In the Rhine basin Köln took the lead by reason of its convenient situation for trade with France, the Netherlands, and England. Mainz, on the other hand, was specially famous as the seat of the most powerful German prelate. In the south Regensburg was not only a bishopric, but, thanks to the Danube, a great commercial centre. Magdeburg, situated on the Elbe, a metropolitan see, and near the Slavonic frontier, naturally

became the greatest town of the east. In and around the Harz mountains there were several places of importance. There were salt springs at Halle: near Goslar—a favourite residence of the kings—there were valuable silver mines: and the episcopal city of Hildesheim became famous as a centre of ecclesiastical art. The right of holding a market was often granted by kings, bishops, and nobles to places in their domains; and many a German city owed the beginnings of its prosperity to this privilege. As yet, except in the Marks, it was unusual for a German town to have walls; and of course very few would in modern eyes be more than large villages.

In general prosperity and culture there can be no doubt that the Germans had made astonishing progress. At the middle of the eleventh century Germany was perhaps the most orderly and civilized country in Europe. The connection with Italy had stimulated a notable revival of letters and art, which several of the Emperors, especially the first and third Ottos, had done their best to promote. Under the shelter of the monasteries, much literary work was done. It was not marked by profound thought or elegant style, and the language used was not German but Latin—the tongue of the clergy and therefore of all educated men. Nevertheless the writers of this age show a surprisingly wide range of interest. The history of their own time was the most common theme, the best-known chronicler being Widukind, a monk of Corvey on the Weser—our leading authority for the reigns of Henry the Fowler and Otto the Great. But monks and nuns were not above writing epic poems about heroes past and present; though the most astonishing productions of the period were the plays of the nun Hroswitha, of Gandersheim, who took Bible stories as her subjects and Terence as her model.

As always in the Middle Ages, the most flourishing art was architecture, and some of the most noteworthy churches of


GERMANY IN THE EARLY MIDDLE AGES
POMERANIA
BILLUNGS MARK
NORTH MARK
POLAND
SAXON
LOWER LOTHARINGIA
LUSATIA MARK
MEISSEN MARK
RINGA
THU
BOHEMIA
MORAVIA
HUNGARY
Laon
Premontré
Paris
Clairvaux
UPPER LOTHARINGIA
FRANCONIA
EAST MARK OR AUSTRIA
BAVARIA
FRANCE
SWABIA
Citeaux
FRENCH BURGUNDY
UPPER BURGUNDY
Cluny
Clermont
LOWER BURGUNDY
CARINTHIA
FRIULI
L Y
I T A
Milan
Verona
Venice

Germany date from these years. In ecclesiastical architecture the Germans never developed a distinct style of their own; and though many national peculiarities can be observed, the churches of the tenth and eleventh centuries were built in the style known as Romanesque, which developed in Italy out of the architecture of the Roman Empire and gradually spread over Western Europe. In Germany, the years from 900–1050 are termed the early Romanesque period. A typical church of this time consisted of a long narrow nave, two aisles of lesser height, short transepts, and a short chancel or choir ending in an apse. The nave walls were pierced by clearstory windows and carried on semi-circular arches, supported by columns or piers. The roof was generally flat and of wood, though towards the end of this period stone vaulting began to appear, especially at the crossing of nave and transepts. The windows were small, with round heads. The general effect of the interior was one of simplicity and austerity. Decoration seldom went beyond a few plain mouldings, the carving of conventional designs on capitals, and painting on the walls and roofs. Outside, the church presented an equally plain appearance. At the west end there were often two towers crowned with short, gabled spires: and the architects of the day had a pleasing fondness for little pointed turrets at the corners of the building. The long stretches of wall were relieved by arcades of round arches. Otherwise there was little ornamentation.

Early Romanesque churches are often singularly beautiful. There is about them a simple dignity that is most impressive. The exquisite proportion of their parts, and the delicate contrasts of their large masses of light and shade, invest them with a peculiarly soothing and restful influence. It was on broad general effects that the architects of this style relied. What advance architectural art had made in Germany may best be realized by comparing the churches of this time with



Interior of St. Michael's, Hildesheim

The church was built in the early years of the eleventh century, and though repeatedly altered and restored in later times, it remains one of the best examples of early Romanesque architecture in Germany.

the best Saxon work in England. The splendid St Michael's at Hildesheim and the quaint little church at Bradford-on-Avon were probably erected within a few years of each other. And yet, three centuries before, England had been sending missionaries to Germany.

Though less advanced than architecture, other arts had made great progress. Painting on glass was practised with success; the illumination of manuscripts reached a high standard in the great monasteries; and the disappointing cathedral of Hildesheim is partially redeemed by its doors, which show that in the art of casting in bronze, at least one eleventh-century German had little to learn.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V

There are few German churches built entirely in the early Romanesque style, which, however, often appears in buildings which were mostly erected at a later date. The following churches may specially be mentioned as containing good work of the early period of Romanesque:—

Hildesheim: St Michael's.
The abbey church of Moritzberg.
(Though restored at various times, both of these give an excellent impression of an early Romanesque church.)
Köln: St Maria im Kapitol.
St Cecilia (parts).
St Ursula (nave, except roof).
Church of the Apostles (W. tower and other parts).
Trier: The Cathedral.
Regensburg: St Stephen's Chapel.
Island of Reichenau, Lake of Constance: Churches of Oberzell, Mittelzell, and Unterzell.

Very few traces of secular buildings of this period are left. Parts of the Kaiserhaus at Goslar date from this time; but otherwise such remains as exist are of small interest to any but experts.

CHAPTER VI

THE EMPIRE AND THE PAPACY

In the last chapter repeated mention was made of the reform party among the clergy; and before considering the events which followed the death of Henry III., it is necessary to look more closely at their opinions and aims.

In the medieval Church, all great movements of reform began with a revival of monastic enthusiasm. The source of inspiration in this case was the abbey of Cluny, near Macon, in the French duchy of Burgundy. During the collapse of the Carolingian Empire, most monasteries had become corrupt; and the object of the duke of Aquitaine who in 910 founded Cluny was to establish a house which should faithfully observe the rule of St Benedict, professed by all monasteries, but followed by few. Cluny soon became famous; and many other houses, old and new, sought to imitate its pure and austere life. Hitherto every monastery had been an independent and self-governing community. But the second abbot of Cluny, Odo, established the principle that all offshoots of Cluny and all houses following its methods were to be regarded as parts of the abbey they imitated. The priors of these other monasteries all owed obedience to the abbot of Cluny, and periodically met in council at Cluny under his presidency. Thus strict oversight was maintained, and a common policy pursued. The "Congregation of Cluny" became a most powerful organization.

Standing as they did for the maintenance of a strict and

ascetic rule, the Cluniacs from the first were advocates of a thorough reform of the Church at large. It seemed to them that its spiritual functions were being forgotten, and that it stood in grave danger of being swallowed up by feudalism. Bishops were commonly little more than feudal magnates. Most of the parish priests were married; and there was an evident tendency for churches to descend from father to son, like a feudal fief. The times were brutal and licentious; the world, in fact, was very evil; and only by complete separation from it could the Church be saved. The clergy must cease to entangle themselves in worldly affairs: the rule of celibacy must be strictly enforced, and bishops must devote themselves to their spiritual duties. The Church, moreover, should be totally independent of the State: and bishops must no longer be appointed by secular rulers.

Such lofty aspirations, which were naturally disliked by most of the clergy, could never be realized without the assistance of some strong central authority. For this the Cluniacs looked to the Papacy. What the abbot of Cluny was to all Cluniac houses, that the Pope was to be to the Church. Supported by numerous forged documents which everyone, then and long afterwards, believed to be genuine, they were able to argue with great force that the Pope ought to be the absolute monarch of the clergy.

The Cluniac views spread rapidly. But they of course encountered much opposition from secular rulers who did not want to lose the services of their most useful officials, and from bishops who did not want to lose their political influence. The hardest task, however, was to capture the Papacy itself. Little could be hoped from popes who were puppets of Italian factions or nominees of the Emperor. To do them justice, the religious interests of the early Emperors generally obscured their political foresight, and most of them sympathized with the efforts of the reformers to purify the

clergy. From time to time, popes who held the new views were appointed. But, except during the short rule of Otto III., there seemed no chance of the Papacy becoming independent.

It was not till the days of Henry III. that Cluniac views triumphed at Rome. By his vigorous intervention the Emperor raised the Papacy from the degradation into which it had relapsed, set it free from the Roman nobility, and enabled a succession of reformers to ascend the papal throne. The pontificate of Leo IX. (1049–1054) is generally regarded as marking the final capture of the chair of St Peter by the advocates of reform.

Henry III. doubtless thought that the Empire could be trusted to maintain its control over the Church. But the long minority of his son gave the reformers their chance. During this time papal policy was directed by Hildebrand of Soana—one of the greatest men in medieval history. Brought up in a monastery where reforming views were held, he had later visited Cluny itself, and Cluniac teachings had left a deep mark upon him. A man of great personal force, inflexible will, and inexorable pertinacity, he was admirably fitted for his work of freeing the Papacy from all secular control and of giving effect throughout the Church to the views of the reformers. In 1073 he became Pope himself: but during the previous twenty years, first as papal subdeacon and then as archdeacon of Rome, he had been the instigator of every progressive move. The most notable features of this time were his successful efforts to reorganize the papal finances, the skilful diplomacy whereby he allied the Papacy with several Italian potentates, in particular the Norman adventurers who had recently established themselves in the south, and the introduction of a new rule for papal elections, which were henceforth to be made by the "College of Cardinals," consisting of certain leading churchmen of the diocese of Rome.

Thus the way was cleared for the great enterprise which Hildebrand undertook soon after he became Pope Gregory VII. The worst abuse of the time seemed to him the lay investiture of bishops—that is, their nomination by a secular ruler, who bestowed on them the ring and crosier which were the symbols of their office. To make matters worse, they were required to do homage before receiving their insignia, and they were commonly expected, or even commanded, to make their benefactor a present of money. The Emperor Conrad had been particularly zealous in exacting this, regarding it as a tax on the extensive financial privileges which most bishoprics possessed. The protests of the reform party had led Henry III. to abandon the custom; but it had been occasionally revived under his successor. Outside the Empire it remained common. The strict reformers regarded the practice as flagrant simony—an attempt to buy the gift of the Holy Ghost with money.

In 1075 a synod held by the Pope issued a decree absolutely forbidding the investiture of bishops and abbots by laymen. Offenders, giver and receiver alike, were to be automatically excommunicated. The effect of this decree on Germany may readily be estimated. The German Church had been deliberately exalted as a counterpoise to the nobility. In return for their great estates and immunities, the bishops had acted as ministers and lieutenants of the crown. Now the Pope declared that the king must have no control over their appointment. The whole political balance of Germany would be upset, and the royal power would be in imminent danger of collapse.

The weak point in Hildebrand's position was that neither he nor his supporters had any intention of giving up the possessions and privileges of the Church. Logically, that would have been the result of the Cluniac principle of complete separation of Church and world. But the views of the

reform party had developed. The Church must be free of all secular control; but the Church, which ruled men's souls, must surely be superior to the State, which was concerned merely with their bodies, and the Pope, the vicar of Christ, must be superior to the Emperor. It was inferred that the Church had a right to all its powers and property, and was free from the conditions under which it had received them. The outcome of such opinions was a long struggle between the Church and the temporal power in every part of western Europe; and the clergy became even more concerned with politics and worldly affairs than they had been before the Cluniac revival.

In the Investiture Contest, which was the first round in the great struggle between Empire and Papacy, each party had much right on its side; and the student of history is apt to marvel that a reasonable compromise was arranged only after forty years of bitter strife. The blame rests mainly with Hildebrand, who resolutely shut his eyes to the strong points in the case of his opponents, and displayed an overbearing arrogance which any self-respecting ruler was bound to resist. His object, in fact, was much wider than the abolition of simony; it was the complete humiliation of the Empire.

Unfortunately for Germany, the Pope's first blow fell at a time when Henry IV. was ill-prepared to resist it. The early years of his reign had been disturbed by quarrels about the regency. Soon after Henry began to rule for himself, he was forced by the nobles to dismiss his unpopular minister, Adalbert, the ambitious archbishop of Bremen. The king never forgave Adalbert's enemies: and he soon succeeded in removing one of their leaders, the duke of Bavaria, from his duchy, which he gave to a Swabian count whose name of Welf was destined to be renowned throughout later European history. But the deposed duke allied himself with the

Saxons, all classes of whom were exasperated by Henry's disregard of their ancient rights and by the heavy taxation which his extravagant life rendered necessary. A very formidable rising broke out. Henry, deserted by nearly all his subjects, purchased peace by extensive concessions. As the Saxon peasants refused to observe the terms of the bargain, many of the lay nobles now joined the king against them. The Saxons were defeated, and Henry in his turn was able to evade the fulfilment of his promises. It was when affairs were in this situation that Pope Gregory hurled his thunderbolt.

Henry at first took no notice, and one or two sees which fell vacant were filled in the old way. The Pope threatened to declare him excommunicate. Thereupon Henry assembled at Worms a council of German clergy, which declared Gregory unfit for his office and pronounced his deposition. This sentence was communicated to the Pope in grandiloquent language. When it reached him, a great synod was sitting at Rome. Amid immense enthusiasm Gregory retorted by excommunicating Henry and proclaiming all his subjects released from their oaths of allegiance.

The Pope's decree proved more effective than the king's. The Saxons renewed their rebellion; most of the feudal nobility, seeing a chance of extorting fresh powers from Henry, followed their example; and a majority of the bishops fell away also, some afraid to support a king cut off from the Church, others cleverly won over by the Pope. A council of lay and spiritual magnates met at Tribur near Mainz, and resolved that no obedience should be shown to Henry till he had made his peace with the Pope, and that he should be deposed unless within twelve months he could secure his release from the ban of the Church. Gregory was asked to pronounce his decision at a further council to be held at Augsburg in the following year.

The Pope had already begun his journey, when Henry, resolving in his straits on a desperate cast, crossed the Alps and appeared in north Italy. The nobles of Lombardy, who had more to fear from the Pope than from the Emperor, were inclined to assist him ; and Gregory in alarm took refuge in the mountain castle of Canossa, which belonged to his faithful ally the Countess Matilda of Tuscany. But Henry came not for conquest but for pardon. For three bitter wintry days the pitiless Pope kept him waiting outside the castle gate. At last, clad in the garb of a penitent, he was admitted, and fell at the Pope's feet crying for mercy. Gregory, at the prayer of some of his own followers, removed the sentence of excommunication, but in return Henry had to promise that he would accept the verdict of the Pope and the German nobles concerning the charges that had been brought against him by his subjects.

Such was the famous surrender at Canossa—one of the most dramatic episodes of history. It has generally been regarded as a heavy blow for the Empire. Some modern writers, however, belittle its importance. They regard it rather as a clever if undignified move on Henry's part, and point out that Henry's appearance in Italy seriously embarrassed the Pope, encouraging his Italian enemies and rendering it unwise for him to make his projected visit to Germany. At the same time, the king's release from excommunication brought back to him many of his German subjects. Henceforward, the Pope's position was never so strong as it had been in 1076. He might still have the better of the struggle, but the complete triumph he desired was no longer possible.

If we look no further than the immediate political situation, this view certainly has much to commend it. Nevertheless, the Empire paid heavily in the long run for such advantages as it gained by Henry's surrender. The power of the Holy

Roman Emperor was based largely on the prestige and mystery which surrounded his sacred office. These foundations of his strength were grievously shaken by such humiliation as Henry had undergone. The medieval mind, attaching great importance to forms and symbols, would dwell on the humiliating act itself rather than the diplomatic advantages which followed from it. Thirty years before an Emperor had been acting as censor of papal morals, pulling down popes and setting them up: now his son was grovelling in abject submission at the feet of one of their successors. It is no wonder that the papalists were rendered doubly confident of success: they could now urge that an Emperor had by an overt act recognized his inferiority to the Pope.

With Canossa, there began forty-five years of intermittent strife, in which blood and ink were shed in equal quantities. Papalist writers developed their theories in numberless tracts. The most fantastic arguments were employed, the most far-fetched analogies triumphantly put forward as proofs, the most irrelevant texts of Scripture cited. But the two points most strongly emphasized were the superiority of the spiritual (which the Pope represented) to the temporal (for which the Emperor stood) and the promise of Christ to Peter—"Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven"—the Pope as Peter's successor, it was assumed, having all his prerogatives. Less respectable arguments, however, were used with equal confidence. The sun and moon are respectively types of the Papacy and the Emperor; therefore the Emperor's power must be derived from the Pope. Cain, we are told, was the first to build a city; therefore the temporal state, being founded by a murderer, must be essentially bad. The Donation of Constantine—a document really forged, though this was not discovered till long afterwards—was used to prove that a Roman Emperor had granted to the Holy See the rule of western Europe.

The imperialists, though later in the field, soon began to reply with vigour. "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and unto God the things that are God's"—this text was the key of their position. Papacy and Empire are co-ordinate powers; each is directly derived from God; each is equally essential to the well-being of the world; each has its appointed sphere which it ought not to transgress except at the request of the other. In this world the soul is inseparable from the body, nay, its ultimate fate may be determined by the body; so the Empire is as important as the Papacy in the sight of God. The papalist texts and analogies are shown to be inapplicable, and answered by others equally irrelevant. Thus, the two swords which the disciples had in the garden of Gethsemane are taken to typify the civil and the ecclesiastical powers; one is now wielded by the Emperor, the other by the Pope. Much more convincing is the imperialist argument from history; it was easy to show that Christ and the early Christians submitted to the authority of the Empire, and that, more recently, it was only imperial intervention that had saved the Papacy from complete degradation.

Neither of these rival theories sprang into complete being at once. The imperial case, in fact, was fully developed only when the Empire was long past its prime. And from the first the papal position was on the whole the stronger. It was more in accordance with certain fundamental ideas which no one, not even imperialist pamphleteers, ventured to deny. And while the papalists boldly claimed universal supremacy for the Pope, very few writers, especially at first, ventured to do the same for the Emperor. He was the Pope's equal, and independent of him, but no more. It was natural that the clearness and confidence of the papal claim should create an impression in its favour.

Of course few people—and those almost all clergy—could

understand the arguments of either side; and the laity chose their party from a great variety of motives. Plots and treason determined the course of events more often than skill and courage. On the whole, the fighting which took place during the Investiture Contest was most futile. Despite Henry's submission at Canossa the German nobles, in the Diet or Assembly of Forchheim, pronounced his deposition and set up in his stead Rudolf duke of Swabia, affirming at the same time that the German crown was purely elective and that bishops should be freely chosen by the chapters of vacant sees. Then began three years of civil war. Henry, supported by the Rhenish cities, the lesser nobles of Franconia and Swabia, and a party of the bishops, struggled with unexpected success against Rudolf, whose strength lay in Bavaria and Saxony. In 1080 the Pope made a false move. He again excommunicated Henry, and claimed that no episcopal election was valid without his agreement. His arrogance caused a reaction in the Emperor's favour; and a synod of German clergy once more pronounced Gregory unfit for his office, and elected an Antipope who took the title of Clement III. Soon afterwards Henry's rival was killed in battle, and for the time the war in Germany ceased.

During the following years, Henry completely turned the tables on Gregory. In 1084 he captured Rome, and was crowned Emperor by Clement the Antipope. Gregory who held out for some time in the castle of St Angelo, was rescued by Robert Guiscard, the great Norman ruler of South Italy: but he found it wise to accompany the Normans when they retired. Next year he died at Salerno. His last words were: "I have loved justice and hated iniquity; therefore I die in exile." The great Pope retained his self-righteous enthusiasm to the last.

For the next five years the Emperor had little trouble either in Germany or in Italy. Then, however, Pope Urban II., who

had occupied the Holy See since 1088, began to weave a new combination against him. A marriage alliance was made between the Countess Matilda of Tuscany and the heir to the duchy of Bavaria. Henry had again to go to Italy, where for seven years he struggled with ill-success against the forces of Matilda, the machinations of the cunning Urban, and treachery in his own family. Meanwhile Urban made a triumphant tour in France and Burgundy, and at the Council of Clermont initiated the First Crusade. In the general enthusiasm for the enterprise, the prestige of the Papacy rose higher than ever.

Henry, however, struggled gamely on. In Germany he was popular with the peasants and townsfolk. He tried hard to conciliate the Pope, refraining from the election of a new Antipope when Clement died, and declaring his readiness to go on crusade as soon as he was freed from the sentence of excommunication which had once more been pronounced against him. But the feudal nobles had no desire for peace, and the Emperor's son, also called Henry, wishing to be on the winning side, suddenly threw in his lot with them. In 1105 the poor Emperor was treacherously seized at Coblenz by his son, and at Ingelheim he was forced to sign a formal abdication. But he soon escaped from his captors, and with spirit unbroken began to organize further resistance. In 1106, however, he died at Liége.

The reign of Henry IV. was most disastrous for Germany. His personal character, too, was stained by vice, and he lacked the practical good sense which had marked so many of his predecessors. Yet it is impossible not to admire the unfaltering courage with which he upheld the cause of the Empire against the Papacy, and that of the German crown against the feudal nobility.

Henry IV. was succeeded by his treacherous son. But though he had been encouraged in his rebellion by the papal

party, the new sovereign soon proved himself an even more vigorous upholder of royal and imperial rights than ever his father had been. At the first opportunity he marched into Italy at the head of an exceptionally large army. The Pope, Paschal II., lacked the firmness of Gregory and the subtlety of Urban; he hastened to come to terms; and in 1111 it was arranged that Henry should renounce all control over episcopal elections and the Church should surrender all her estates and political privileges. Such an agreement was of course the logical outcome of Cluniac views. But Paschal had reckoned without his clergy. A furious outcry rose throughout the Church, the protest deriving added strength from the fact that the temporal possessions of the Papacy had been excepted from the operation of the treaty. When the Pope seemed about to yield to the storm, Henry entered Rome, and after fierce street-fighting carried Pope and cardinals away with him. To regain his liberty Paschal crowned Henry as Emperor and consented to leave the investiture of bishops in his hands, on condition that the Church might keep her estates and power. Again the clergy refused their consent; and in France there was even talk of declaring Paschal a heretic. It was maintained that the Pope, having given his promise under constraint, was not bound to keep it—a pernicious doctrine which appears over and over again in the Middle Ages to excuse breaches of faith. Paschal accepted this view, and repudiated the agreement. Henry, occupied by disturbances which had broken out in Germany, was unable to retaliate till 1116, when he again occupied Rome, where his wife Matilda, daughter of Henry I. of England, was crowned Empress. But the Pope managed to keep out of his way, and nothing decisive was achieved.

Both sides, however, were weary of the struggle. In France and England, a satisfactory compromise had already been attained; and when in 1119 the tactful and statesmanlike

Calixtus II. became Pope, an effort was made to arrange reasonable terms with the Emperor also. As soon as each side was willing to listen to the arguments of the other, astonishing progress was made. It was decided to leave the question to a council of the German clergy. This met at Worms in 1122, and was presided over by a papal legate. In a few days it achieved its object; and the Concordat of Worms in six sentences brought to an end a struggle which had lasted nearly fifty years. Henry granted to the Church "all investiture by the ring and the staff" and "freedom of election and free consecration in all churches of the Empire." For his part the Pope conceded that elections of bishops and abbots should be made in the king's presence; so that, if dispute should arise, he might lend his support to the most worthy candidate. And before consecration the prelate-elect was to receive from the king possession of his estates and temporal jurisdiction, and to do homage for them.

It was an honest and reasonable attempt to be just to both God and Cæsar. The bishop's spiritual authority was to be received from the Church; but the State was to have a guarantee that his temporal power would be loyally exercised. Homage was to be rendered between election and consecration —that is to say, before the candidate became a fully-constituted bishop. At the same time, it was possible that the Emperor might have an objectionable candidate forced on him; though the stipulation that elections were to be made in the royal presence furnished a practical safeguard against this. Nevertheless European opinion regarded the Concordat as a victory for the Papacy. After all, when men looked back to the days of Henry III., it was evident that the changes since then had all been in favour of the Pope. The Papacy might have won only half a loaf, but it had begun the struggle with no bread at all. This view of the Concordat was of much practical importance; for when the fight between

Papacy and Empire was renewed on other issues, it was the papal party that had the confidence born of success.

Apart from the question of episcopal appointments, the Investiture Contest had most disastrous effects on Germany. The central authority had been greatly weakened. The great nobles had made good use of so excellent an opportunity to increase their independence. The crown could no longer rely on the loyalty of the Church. Henceforward the German king had to trust to the resources of his own estates, and the support of the lesser nobility and the towns. But these aids were not enough to save the royal power from continual and often rapid decay.

CHAPTER VII

THE PARSONS' KINGS

WHEN, in 1125, Henry V. died, the line of Franconian Emperors came to an end. Once again the German nobles were free to give effect to their right of electing the German king. Not that Henry had omitted to prepare the way for a successor. During the Investiture Contest, one of the staunchest supporters of the Emperor had been Frederick of Hohenstaufen, whose castle of that name stood on the summit of a peak in the Swabian Alp, the beautiful range of hills which separates the valley of the Neckar from the upper basin of the Danube. Round about lay the family estates, including the village of Waiblingen—a name which was to become a battle-cry over half Europe. Frederick's services to Henry IV. had been rewarded by the hand of the Emperor's daughter and the title of duke of Swabia. He thus became one of the greatest magnates of Germany, notwithstanding the fact that his territory comprised only the northern part of the old Swabian duchy. In Henry V.'s time Frederick's younger son Conrad was made duke of Franconia; and he and his elder brother, also called Frederick, were regarded by the Emperor as his heirs. The elder of the two, moreover, had married the daughter of Henry the Black, duke of Bavaria. Henry V. was confident that one or the other would be chosen as his successor.

But there were powerful interests at work on the other side. The bishops, now committed to Hildebrand's views, had no

wish for a strong Emperor—especially one from a family whose fortunes had been established through their opposition to the Pope. Most of the nobles were likewise disinclined to elect anyone likely to keep them in order. And the influence of Saxony, still the largest, strongest, and most independent duchy, was exerted against the aggrandizement of a southern house. The cunning Archbishop of Mainz made skilful use of these various motives; and eventually the choice fell on the duke of Saxony, Lothair.

Notwithstanding his advanced age, Lothair was still an energetic and shrewd man. But he cannot be counted among the great Emperors. He quarrelled with the family of Hohenstaufen, and so involved Germany again in civil war. Helped by his son-in-law, the duke of Bavaria, he was victorious; but the conflict was the beginning of a long struggle between Bavaria and Swabia, "Welf" and "Waiblingen," which did untold harm to Germany, and which, spreading to Italy, gave rise to the ferocious and insane feuds of the Guelfs and the Ghibellines.

Lothair's election was largely due to the papal party in the German Church; and for most of his reign he showed himself properly obedient to his benefactors. He made two expeditions to Italy, in each case with the object of upholding Innocent II., a Pope who held fast to the Hildebrandine traditions, and who was opposed by a rival of less strict views. Lothair's intervention achieved its purpose, but his subservience to Innocent did no good to the prestige of the Empire. The Pope, indeed, was so overbearing to his protector that the two finally fell out, but Lothair's death soon afterwards averted a serious development of the dispute.

Like Henry V., Lothair had made plans which came to nothing. He had hoped that his son-in-law, the duke of Bavaria, would succeed him. But as Saxony and wide lands

in Tuscany fell to the duke on the Emperor's death, he was passed over as too powerful. It was now the turn of the Hohenstaufen, and the influence of the clergy secured the crown for Conrad of Franconia, the younger of the two brothers disappointed in 1125. For over a century the family ruled over Germany, giving her a succession of kings who rank among the most gifted sovereigns in history.

Conrad was a gallant warrior and a generous and upright man. But though he fought against the Welfs and took Bavaria from them, he troubled little about either Germany or the Empire. Elected through the influence of the clergy, he was what the Germans call a "Pfaffenkönig," a parsons' king, and even more devoted to them than his predecessor. When St Bernard of Clairvaux came to Germany preaching a holy war against the Turk, Conrad at once felt moved to take the cross; and in 1147, with his nephew, Frederick of Swabia, and a considerable force of Germans, he set out for the East. The expedition, known as the Second Crusade, was a failure; during Conrad's absence, the Welfs stirred up a revolt in Germany; and when he returned, its suppression occupied him till shortly before his death in 1152.

On the whole, the power of the German crown became weaker during the reigns of Lothair and Conrad III. Yet these years were not unpropitious to the nation. In the first place, they witnessed the renewal of the German advance eastward. For upwards of a century the settlers in the Marks had generally been on the defensive, and very little of the ground lost to the Wends in 983 had been reconquered. When duke of Saxony, however, Lothair had initiated a new aggressive movement. He won successes against both Danes and Slavs, and the duke of Poland recognized his suzerainty. In 1134 he gave the North Mark to a count of the house of Ascania (a corrupt Latin form of Aschersleben), who had rich estates in the Harz mountains. The North Mark now com-

prised nothing more than a small strip of land on the west bank of the Elbe. But the new margrave, who was known as Albert the Bear, was an ambitious and energetic man; partly by diplomacy, partly by arms, he succeeded in acquiring a considerable tract beyond the river; and his new territories were henceforth known as the Mark of Brandenburg, a Wendish stronghold which he had only taken after a long siege. In Conrad's time the enthusiasm for the crusade operated in favour of further expansion. Those who could not go to Palestine were invited to join in a holy war against the heathen Slavs. Though no dazzling success was gained, the movement marked the beginning of a period in which German civilization, under the cloak of religion, made great advances eastward.

At the same time, there was a renewal of missionary activity among the Slavs. The first half of the twelfth century saw one of the great religious revivals of the Middle Ages. The Cluniac monasteries had begun to degenerate, but other orders took their place. Some reformers saw the cause of monastic corruption in the common life enjoined by the Benedictine rule. Hence there arose the Carthusian order, in which, though belonging to a common monastery and attending certain services in a common church, the monks spent their days, took their meals, and slept in separate cells. Though founded by a German, Bruno of Köln, the order was most flourishing in France. A few houses were indeed established in Germany, but there the Carthusians were altogether overshadowed by the Cistercians. The Cistercian order derived its name from the abbey of Cîteaux in French Burgundy, founded in 1098. The abbey sent forth offshoots, and thus there arose a new Order, following a rule based on that of St Benedict, but differing from it in many details. The Cistercians saw in the departure from rigid asceticism the root of all the evils that had overtaken earlier monasteries. They

wore the coarsest garments, subsisted on plain and scanty fare, and even in their churches would allow no architectural ornament and no rich vestments. Remote and uncultivated spots were chosen as sites for their houses. Land round a Cistercian abbey, it is true, seldom remained untilled for long, for when not at service or meals, every monk was required to devote himself assiduously to some allotted task, which would often have to do with agriculture, as each monastery supported itself. Rough manual work, however, was not performed by the monks themselves, but by inferior and uneducated members of the Order, known as *conversi* or lay-brethren.

The organization of the Order was such that every Cistercian house was under the control and supervision of several authorities. And for many years the Cistercians remained wonderfully austere, and wielded enormous influence. During the second quarter of the twelfth century the most powerful man in Europe was neither Pope nor Emperor but the famous Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux, one of the first Cistercian houses. His renown led to the foundation of numberless Cistercian monasteries in all parts of western Europe; and the Cistercian Order played a notable part in the Christianizing of the eastern Marks of Germany.

In this work, however, even the Cistercians were outdone by an order of another type. A monk was essentially a recluse; he influenced others by example, not by precept. Everybody regarded the monastic life as higher than that of the parish priest; but there were many who regretted the selfishness of a monk's ideals, and held that to live in a community and according to an ascetic rule was not incompatible with an active concern for the good of those outside. Hence there arose what were known as Regular Canons. Of these the most famous order was that of the Premonstratensians, so-called from their mother-house Prémontré, near

Laon in France. Their founder was a German, Norbert of Xanten, whose renown for holiness raised him in 1126 to the archbishopric of Magdeburg. It thus came about that the Premonstratensians were in the forefront of the mission against Slavonic heathenism. Norbert's canons lived in monasteries; their lives were as ascetic as those of the Cistercians; but they were allowed, or rather it was their duty, to go about among the people of the neighbourhood, preaching, hearing confessions, administering the sacraments, and generally caring for their spiritual needs. Christendom and Germany owe them a heavy debt for what they did.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VII

The century from 1050 to 1150 marks roughly what is known as the middle Romanesque period of German architecture. The churches of this time were still plain and dignified, both outside and in, but ornament became more profuse and vaulting appeared in the cathedrals and big abbeys. Work in the middle-Romanesque style is plentiful, but has seldom survived on a large scale, most of the churches erected at this time having been rebuilt or restored by architects who troubled little about preserving their original appearance. A few of the most instructive and accessible examples of the style may, however, be mentioned :—

Köln : Churches of St Cecilia and St Ursula (parts).
Laach : (near Andernach) the Abbey Church.
Mainz : The Cathedral and the chapel of St Gotthard (very important).
Worms : Church of St Paul.
Speyer : The Cathedral (perhaps the best example of all).
Quedlinburg : The Abbey Church.
Magdeburg : Cloisters of the Church of Our Lady.

CHAPTER VIII

THE STRUGGLE FOR ITALY

ON the death of Conrad III., his nephew, Frederick of Swabia, was peacefully chosen king. With him we enter on the most brilliant period in the history of the Holy Roman Empire. After Charles the Great, Frederick Barbarossa, or Redbeard, was perhaps the most gifted and able of all the medieval Emperors. He has become a hero of the German nation, and in truth he was one of the noblest Germans that have ever lived. But his interests were centred in the Empire, rather than in his northern kingdom. He was filled with lofty ideas of imperial greatness and power, regarding the Empire as founded by God for the temporal and spiritual welfare of all mankind. His attitude reminds one of Otto III.; but Frederick had a fund of practical common sense and a steadfastness of purpose that Otto entirely lacked. In fact, if anybody could have realized the splendid ideals embodied in the office of Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick Barbarossa was the man. Pure, generous, and straightforward in character, strong, active, and graceful in body, a skilful commander, valiant warrior, and eloquent speaker, he was the pattern of a Christian king of the Middle Ages. In his enthusiasm for his imperial mission he sometimes sacrificed the interests of the German kingdom; yet he set before the eyes of the nation a kingly type which was never forgotten and which has had an inspiring influence on Germany ever since.



Relief of Frederick Barbarossa in the Monastery of St. Zeno
Reichenhall, Bavaria

Perhaps because his mother was a Welf, Frederick began his reign by bestowing on Henry the Lion, now head of that family, the duchy of Bavaria. Henry of Babenberg, to whom Bavaria had been given by Conrad III., was created duke of Austria, which now became free from Bavarian overlordship and was granted unprecedented rights and immunities. By these and other concessions to the great nobles, Frederick secured a period of internal peace, though it is true that they seriously impaired the supremacy of the crown. It is likely, however, that Frederick at this time thought little of his position as German king. He wished to give effect to all the prerogatives and authority of the Roman Emperor. From the lofty heights of imperial power and prestige, he could smile at the strivings of dukes or margraves for petty estates and privileges. If the nobles were not content with their powers neither was he content with his. If their authority was increased, it was only that his might be increased still more.

Frederick, however, was too practical a man to trust entirely to an authority which he did not yet possess, and which, in any event, it might prove hard to make effective. He wished to beat the nobility at their own game; to make it clear that his strength was based not merely on his election by the German magnates, or his coronation by the Pope, but also on broad, wealthy, and populous estates. The domains of the Hohenstaufen, which lay mostly in the fertile valley of the upper Rhine, were alone enough to make Frederick one of the greatest men in Germany. They were thickly dotted with castles built by Frederick's father. Carefully administered by a large staff of officials, they produced a very substantial revenue. Frederick tried to add to them by every honourable means. He achieved a noteworthy accession to his resources when in 1156 he married the heiress of the county of Upper Burgundy.

The policy of enlarging the royal domain was unquestionably a wise one. In France it led to the triumph of the crown over feudalism. In England it was largely the size and wealth of their personal estates that enabled the kings to hold their ground against the nobility. Unfortunately the German crown seems to have been somewhat despised by Frederick and most of his successors. Henceforward, a German king either pursues impracticable ideals of imperial greatness or, more frequently, uses his position merely to increase the influence and resources of his family. In either case the rights of the German crown were apt to be sacrificed.

During nearly all his reign Frederick's interests were centred in Italy. His aim was to enforce what he conceived to be his imperial rights over the whole of that country. In these aspirations he was much influenced by Rainald of Dassel, his most trusted counsellor, whom he made Imperial Chancellor and archbishop of Köln. Rainald was one of the most astute diplomatists of German history; but though he served his sovereign brilliantly, the principles of his policy were altogether opposed to the real interests of Germany. Both he and Frederick drew many of their ideas from the Civil Law of the Roman Empire, the study of which was now being eagerly pursued in Italy, especially at the great law-school of Bologna. The Bolognese doctors were never tired of insisting that Frederick, as Roman Emperor, possessed all the prerogatives of an Augustus or a Constantine. Frederick naturally welcomed such doctrines, though, as a practical statesman, he recognized the expediency of waiving some of the rights ascribed to him. Nevertheless, his lofty notions sometimes led him to lose sight of the unalterable differences between the Italy of the eleventh century and the Italy of a thousand years before.

In Italy Frederick had two chief enemies—the Pope and the cities of Lombardy. In material power the former was

not a dangerous opponent. It was all he could do to keep a hold on his own city; for the Romans were a turbulent people with republican aspirations, and more than once in the twelfth century made Rome too hot for their bishop. But in districts remote from the Pope's presence his moral authority was at this time immense. A sentence of excommunication was as damaging to a prince as half a dozen defeats in battle; and the most selfish and treacherous enterprises met with widespread approval if they were directed against enemies of the Holy See. And among these, in general estimation, the Emperor must inevitably be counted.

For some time, however, the Lombard cities were a more immediate danger to Frederick. The crusades had given a great stimulus to trade with the East; and the towns of north Italy, already of commercial importance, advanced more rapidly than ever in population and wealth. By this time many of them had republican constitutions of their own, and were practically independent of any external control; while some of the strongest, in particular Milan, had established a supremacy over their less powerful neighbours. Any attempt to revive imperial rights over north Italy was certain to meet with obstinate resistance.

The strife began when in 1154 Frederick made his first expedition to Italy. It was not primarily a military enterprise; Frederick's main object was achieved when he was crowned Emperor by Adrian IV.—the solitary English Pope in history; but he had shown his hostility to the northern cities, and on his way home a determined though unsuccessful attempt to cut him off was made by the Veronese.

Soon afterwards there came the end to Frederick's friendship with the Papacy. At a solemn assembly of German magnates an envoy from Rome delivered a message in which Adrian spoke of the Empire as a "benefice" granted by the Holy See. The implied claim to feudal overlordship caused

such an outburst of anger among the German nobles that the Pope thought it well to explain his words away. Nevertheless, the incident was in effect a declaration of war, and marks the beginning of the second phase of the great struggle between the Empire and the Papacy.

In 1158 Frederick entered seriously on his work in Italy. He soon took Milan and reduced the other cities to submission. But the despotic claims which he now asserted provoked an immediate rebellion, and it was only after a two years' siege that Milan, the ringleader, fell. Her walls were levelled with the ground; and the towns which had assisted her, though allowed to keep a measure of independence, were each put under a German governor.

Meanwhile Adrian IV. had died. A majority of the cardinals had chosen as his successor Alexander III., a man notorious for his high views on papal authority. The imperialist party among the cardinals, however, set up an Antipope more favourable to Frederick's policy. Alexander was generally recognized by western Christendom; but Frederick declared that it was his right to decide between rival claimants to the Holy See. In 1167 he marched on Rome, occupied the city, and drove Alexander to flight.

This victory marks Frederick's nearest approach to success in his Italian policy. The decline of his fortunes began immediately. A pestilence broke out in his army, carried off Rainald of Dassel, and compelled a retreat to Germany. For seven years Frederick was unable to return, and his long absence ruined his schemes. The Lombard cities, casting aside their old jealousies, formed themselves into a powerful league. Alexander III. entered into a close alliance with them. His authority was recognized by all save Frederick's personal supporters in Germany and Italy. Thus when in 1174 Frederick returned to the charge, he found his foes united and stronger both morally and materially.

From 1174 to 1178 Frederick met with a series of disasters. He failed to capture Alessandria—a new fortress built by the Lombard League and named in honour of the Pope. The German army, in fact, was quite inadequate for its task, for many of the nobles, including Henry the Lion, held aloof; and the Emperor's defeat by the Milanese at the battle of Legnano in 1176 was only to be expected in the circumstances. Nevertheless, the moral effect of the battle was great. It drove Frederick to come to terms with the Pope. At Venice, in 1177, the Emperor kissed Alexander's foot in acknowledgment of his spiritual authority, and recognized the independence of the city of Rome. On his side, the Pope freed Frederick from the sentence of excommunication, and abandoned his alliance with the Lombards. With these the Emperor concluded a truce which in 1183 became a definitive peace. The cities were allowed to keep their rights, subject to the confirmation of their officials by the Emperor. In return they gave a formal acknowledgment of his authority.

Frederick's policy had failed. Yet the treaty marked a check rather than a defeat. After all, his influence in Italy now was greater than it had been at the beginning of his rule. And in 1186 he scored a very notable triumph by the marriage of his son Henry to Constance, the heiress of the Norman realm of Naples and Sicily. Imperial power, if weak in the north, was by this match to gain a stronghold in the south.

Though Italy claimed most of the Emperor's time, his reign saw striking events in Germany. Frederick's generosity towards Henry the Lion was not met with the gratitude it deserved, and the ambitious Welf took advantage of his sovereign's preoccupations to attempt the formation of a strong and independent state in the north. He promoted the colonization and conversion of Holstein and Mecklenburg, which were annexed to his Saxon duchy. The Baltic trade was encouraged, and the city of Lübeck owed

much of its subsequent prosperity to Henry's commercial policy. On Brunswick, his favourite residence, he bestowed valuable privileges, while in Bavaria he founded Munich. In other spheres Henry's doings were less commendable, and bitter complaints were raised against his efforts to bring under his rule the Emperor's tenants-in-chief in north Germany. Finally, Frederick intervened. Henry, thrice summoned to defend himself before the Emperor and his fellow-princes, refused to appear. He was outlawed, and his lands declared forfeit. Frederick used the opportunity to break up the old tribal duchies of Saxony and Bavaria. Great territories in Westphalia were given to the archbishopric of Köln. The ducal title, and many of Henry's estates in the east went to Bernard of Anhalt, a son of Albert the Bear. Several Saxon bishoprics were freed from all overlordship save that of the Emperor himself. The duchy of Bavaria, shorn of Styria, was bestowed on Frederick's Count Palatine, Otto of Wittelsbach. Henry tried to resist, but soon gave in; and on promising to go into exile in England for three years, he was allowed to keep his domains of Brunswick and Lüneburg. It was a great victory for Frederick.

The overthrow of Henry the Lion ended the existence of the tribal duchies which had played so influential a part since the ninth century. The old "peoples" of Germany were now all deprived of political unity. Frederick's victory thus destroyed a powerful disintegrating force. On the whole, however, the results were not beneficial to the nation. North Germany was in future not so strong for defence or advance against the Danes or the Slavs. The crown, moreover, failed to turn Henry's downfall to its own advantage; and the establishment of numerous states of moderate strength proved more detrimental to German unity than the four or five big duchies of former days.

For the time, however, Frederick stood on a high pinnacle of power and fame. His might and influence were fittingly displayed at the brilliant festival held at Mainz in 1184 to celebrate the knighting of his two eldest sons, where the Emperor, surrounded by the nobility of the German nation, presided over the contests of his knights in arms and song. But high as Frederick's reputation stood, it was further enhanced when, in 1188, he came forward to fulfil the Emperor's duty of leading the hosts of Christendom against the infidel. Western Europe, aghast at the recent capture of Jerusalem by the famous sultan, Saladin, was eagerly taking up arms for another crusade. Richard of England and Philip Augustus of France resolved to join, and it looked as though the greatest kings of Europe were to serve under Frederick's command. Germany itself responded with enthusiasm to the appeal for action; and it was at the head of a magnificent army, and accompanied by his son Frederick of Swabia and some of the greatest German princes, that the Emperor set out for the East. He went overland, by way of Constantinople and through Asia Minor. The army had reached Cilicia without serious mishap, when the Emperor, in trying to swim his horse across a swift river, was swept away and drowned. His body was recovered, and was carried at the head of the army as it continued its advance towards the Holy Land, under the command of Frederick of Swabia. But the Emperor's loss was irreparable. The Germans grew discouraged under the attacks of the Turks and the ravages of disease. They did indeed reach Acre, where they were reinforced by detachments of their countrymen who had come by sea; and they took part in the siege of the town. But Frederick of Swabia soon died; the precious bones of the Emperor fell into the hands of the infidels; and in the end, after Leopold of Austria had quarrelled with Richard of England, the German force went despondently home, leaving the French and English

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to reap what small success was to be won. The failure of the crusade was symbolical of what was to follow in Germany. It was the loss of the Emperor that had ruined it, and the removal of his commanding personality also meant the ruin of the German kingdom.

At first Frederick's death seemed to have made little difference to the political state of western Europe. His eldest son, who now became Henry VI., had all his father's energy and force, and was an extraordinarily able man, though inclined to be hard and cruel. Under him, to outward seeming, the Empire became more powerful than ever. But his authority rested on unstable foundations, and whatever he might achieve elsewhere, Henry was an ill friend to Germany. To him the focus of his power was his Norman inheritance in south Italy. Hitherto, however interested in Italian affairs, the Emperors had always treated Germany as the source of their strength and their base of operations. Now, for some sixty years, the position was reversed, with results disastrous to Germany and the Empire alike.

It was not without difficulty that Henry VI. established himself in Naples and Sicily, for on the death of his father-in-law in 1189, his subjects, reluctant to accept a German lord, set up as their king an illegitimate member of the old royal house. The Emperor's first attempt to drive him out was broken off through a rising in Saxony headed by Henry the Lion, who had returned from England. Luckily, the English king, Richard I., was soon afterwards handed over to the Emperor by Leopold of Austria, who had taken him prisoner. Richard was Henry the Lion's brother-in-law, and was therefore induced by the Emperor to mediate between him and Henry. But though a satisfactory arrangement brought the rebellion to an end, it was not till 1194 that Henry VI. was able to complete the reduction of Naples and Sicily.

For the next two or three years Henry played the Emperor



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Worms Cathedral.

This is one of the best examples of the later Romanesque style, dating mostly from the second half of the twelfth century.

as none of his predecessors had done. All Italy obeyed him. Germany remained quiet. Richard of England had sworn allegiance to him as part payment for his release, and the other kings of northern Europe he treated as his vassals. He assumed a lofty tone towards the Emperor of Constantinople, and the marriage of his brother to a Byzantine princess suggests that he had some thought of eventually adding the Eastern Empire to the dominions of his house. The Christian kings of Cyprus and Armenia acknowledged him as their overlord. He even exacted tribute from Mohammedan princes in North Africa. It was all very impressive and very futile. For in 1197, when in the midst of preparations for a great crusade, he was cut off by a fever at the age of thirty-two. His heir was three years old.

CHAPTER IX

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE HOUSE OF HOHENSTAUFEN

THE stars in their courses were against the Empire. As if its plight were not bad enough already, the year after Henry VI.'s death saw the elevation to the Papacy of one of the greatest men in medieval history. In enthusiasm and determination Innocent III. was scarcely second to Hildebrand, and he excelled him in sagacity and address. During his rule the Papacy reached the height of its power. Later it may now and then have been stronger as a political force, but never before or since has its strength been drawn from so many sources, political, moral, and spiritual, as in the days of Innocent III.

Against the Empire Innocent played a winning game with great success. Taking advantage of the minority of Henry's heir, he drove the imperial officials out of central Italy, and improved the occasion by making substantial additions to the papal states. From Constance, the Emperor's widow, he exacted an acknowledgment of papal suzerainty over Naples and Sicily, and on her death acted as guardian of her son Frederick.

Meanwhile there had been a disputed election to the crown of Germany. The Welfs had raised their heads again, and while Philip of Swabia, brother of Henry VI., was upheld by the partisans of the Hohenstaufen, an equally strong party supported Otto of Brunswick, son of Henry the Lion. The consequent civil war resolved itself into a struggle between south and north. Each party sought foreign allies, Philip

in France, Otto in England; but at first neither obtained much effective help from abroad. The Pope, of course, took care to fish in the troubled waters. As the parties were fairly equal in strength, he was excellently placed for exacting a heavy price for his aid, and papal authority over the German Church, which had somewhat declined under Frederick Barbarossa, was fully restored. Moreover, by supporting Otto at first, Innocent obtained the surrender of many of the imperial claims over Italy. Then, when Philip's cause seemed in the ascendant, Innocent went over to him, set him free from the sentence of excommunication which of course had been pronounced against him, and received further benefits as a reward. In 1208, however, Philip was murdered. His party for the time collapsed. Otto, a very short-sighted politician, bought back the Pope's favour and secured coronation as Emperor by abandoning all imperial rights over Italy and all imperial control over episcopal elections. No sooner, however, did he consider his position secure than he repented of his bargain, and tried to revive the Emperor's authority beyond the Alps. Innocent promptly excommunicated him, and soon afterwards his intrigues in Germany, backed by the influence of France, persuaded some of the German princes to proclaim as their king Henry VI.'s son Frederick, whose kingdom of Naples and Sicily had, though with much difficulty, been preserved for him by his guardian the Pope. Frederick swore allegiance to the Pope and confirmed all Otto's concessions. Then he went to Germany, where his cause made great headway. The decisive battle was fought in 1214 at Bouvines in Flanders, where Otto, helped by an English force sent by his uncle King John, was overthrown by Philip Augustus of France, at the head of an army of French and Germans. The defeated Emperor struggled on for a few years more, but in 1218 his death left Frederick II. undisputed king of Germany.

The twenty years since the death of Henry VI. had been a sorry time for the German realm. Imperial and royal rights had been dissipated. The nobles had taken advantage of the civil war to increase their independence. And though there was once again a strong man on the throne, he had been placed there by the Papacy and France. Popes had often influenced royal elections in Germany, but never before had they introduced a candidate from abroad, and never before had a German king owed his throne to foreign arms.

It was in Frederick's favour that in 1216 the career of Innocent III. came to an end. Yet the Papacy still retained the commanding position to which he had raised it. Germany was by no means the only kingdom which had suffered at his hands. Innocent had claimed feudal overlordship of all the realms of Europe, and his pretensions had been recognized by Hungary, Aragon, Portugal, and the wretched John of England. He had quarrelled with the great Philip Augustus of France over that monarch's matrimonial offences, and in the end Philip had submitted. The capture of Constantinople by the so-called Fourth Crusade in 1204 had brought the Eastern Empire under the spiritual authority of Rome. And in the last year of his life the Pope had greatly impressed Europe by holding the fourth Lateran Council—a general council of the whole Church, attended by four hundred bishops. There Innocent as supreme lawgiver had promulgated numerous decrees on the abuses and difficulties with which the Church was vexed. Achievements such as these filled Europe with deep veneration not only for Innocent himself, but for his office and for the man who was judged worthy to succeed him.

Frederick II. was nevertheless resolved to make himself independent of papal control. But he had done homage to Innocent for his kingdom of Naples and Sicily, promising to keep it separate from the Empire, and to bestow it on his

young son Henry. With the Holy See so strong and influential, and Germany always ready for revolt, it would indeed be hazardous to break these engagements.

In Frederick, however, the Papacy had as formidable an enemy as it ever met. The young king stands beside his grandfather as one of the most interesting figures of the Middle Ages. He was indeed cast in a very different mould. Frederick Barbarossa was essentially a man of his age—the pattern of a medieval sovereign, medieval alike in his virtues and limitations. But Frederick II. seems to belong to no particular time or country. Without a doubt he was the most brilliant and versatile man of his day. But his gifts did not lie along the beaten medieval track, and he was quite out of sympathy with the ideals of his contemporaries. Though a respectable general, he was not by nature a warrior, and preferred diplomacy to arms as a means of gaining his ends. But it was in the administration of his own dominions that he was most interested. He was a skilful organizer and wise lawgiver, with a boldness and originality of conception that raised him far above any other statesman of his time. Perhaps, however, it was his personal character and private tastes that caused his astonished subjects to style him the "wonder of the world." Frederick had been brought up amid the brilliant and luxurious civilization of Sicily, where Greek and Arabian influences were still powerful. He had been greatly affected by Oriental religion and philosophy, and in his attitude towards such matters he was quite free from the characteristic prejudices of the medieval man. In regard to theology he seems to have been a complete sceptic; and his enemies were probably minimizing the extent of his heterodoxy when they charged him with a belief in Islam. For the moral teaching of the Catholic Church he showed not the least concern. In his public dealings he freely adapted his means to his end, and

his private morality would have befitted an Oriental sultan much better than a Holy Roman Emperor. It is when we turn to Frederick's intellectual interests that he appears in his most pleasing light. He was at once a scientist, a philosopher, and a man of letters. Every branch of learning excited his interest. Mathematics and medicine he eagerly studied; he ruled his actions and policy by the advice of his astrologers; and his pet hobby was his menagerie, where he collected all manner of strange beasts, the habits and structure of which he observed with the closest attention. Camels, dromedaries, and a renowned elephant added lustre to his royal progresses. Of course his love of scientific knowledge laid him open to the suspicion of being in league with the devil; and there was doubtless much wild superstition mingled with his scepticism. But that Frederick was a serious student is proved by his Latin and Italian poems and a learned treatise from his pen on the art of falconry. Later scholars, moreover, owe him a debt of gratitude for his foundation of the universities of Naples and Palermo.

Such was the unique man who sought to recover the ground lost by the Empire in the days of Innocent III. Luckily for him, the new Pope, Honorius III., was of a conciliatory turn. In 1220 Frederick had his son Henry crowned king of Germany, a clear proof that he meant to evade his promises about the separation of Sicily and the Empire. But Frederick skilfully placated the Pope by promising to lead the crusade that was being set on foot, and thus one of Innocent III.'s most cherished aims was foiled. Frederick's crusade proved one of the most remarkable episodes in his strange career. It was not until 1228 that he set out; and before then, having quarrelled with the successor of Honorius, Gregory IX., he had been excommunicated. The military Orders in Palestine would have nothing to do with an Emperor under the ban of the Church, and did their best to thwart him. But by

skilful diplomacy he won from the Sultan of Egypt the cession of Jerusalem and other holy places, and was himself crowned King of Jerusalem in the holy city. These successes led to no lasting result; but it is quite in accordance with the rest of Frederick's career that he, an excommunicated infidel, should have achieved more than any of the orthodox crusaders of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. On his return home, he found that the spiritual head of Christendom had taken advantage of his absence to invade his territories. But it took only a short time to repulse the papal troops, and in 1230 Gregory IX. found it wise to make peace with his foe.

Before describing Frederick's next and final struggle with the Papacy, it will be well to consider briefly his way of dealing with his dominions. Whatever his ancestry might be, he was certainly no German by character or habit, and it was natural that he should devote most of his time and thought to his southern realm. There his aim was to destroy the political influence of feudalism and to establish an absolute monarchy, supported by a standing army of mercenaries and a trained civil service. A striking feature of Frederick's rule was his concern for state finance, and his successful attempt to secure a regular and permanent revenue. Under him Sicily was, in fact, governed like an eighteenth-century state under a "benevolent despot"; and in political ideas he had more in common with Frederick the Great than with any contemporary ruler. It was the Emperor's ambition to extend his system of administration over the whole of Italy.

Germany was treated on altogether different lines. Frederick plainly regarded it as of secondary importance. To him it was a source whence armies might be drawn to support his Italian policy. Consequently the German nobles must at all costs be kept in a good temper. Frederick was ready to bestow concession after concession on the German

magnates; and in so doing he abandoned many of the remaining prerogatives of the German crown.

Though a sceptic on religion and the arch-enemy of the Papacy, Frederick was always anxious to be on good terms with the clergy of his territories. As early as 1220 he sought to secure the friendship of the German prelates by recognizing their right to several valuable privileges: henceforth they had almost complete jurisdiction over their subjects, and no one without their consent might found cities or build castles on their estates. This blow to royal power was followed by one still more fatal, for a statute issued in 1231 gave even wider rights to the greater temporal nobles. This was, of course, a complete departure from the traditional policy of favouring the lesser nobility and the cities in order to counterbalance the power of the magnates. It was, in fact, explicitly laid down that cities were to obey the lords on whose lands they were built, and that their municipal authorities should not exercise any jurisdiction beyond their walls. Frederick's policy had the effect of making the more powerful nobles into virtually independent princes. He did indeed try to safeguard his own authority, and at Mainz in 1235 he issued a stern prohibition of private war and set up an imperial court which was to do justice between the great nobles. But as at the same time he confirmed all their privileges, these measures were of small practical value.

Germany was now a thoroughly feudal state. Whereas in France and England the power of the great vassals had begun to yield before the growing might of the crown, in Germany the might of the crown had for three centuries been gradually declining in face of the ever-multiplying privileges of the great vassals. Henceforth the authority of the crown depended entirely on the personality of the king. Frederick himself, when he chose to intervene, could still make his power effectively felt. But it was seldom that he

chose to intervene. In the early years of his reign, Engelbert, archbishop of Köln, had acted as his vicegerent, struggling hard and with some success to uphold the royal power. After his murder in 1225, however, the condition of Germany became worse under the rule of Henry, the Emperor's incapable and dissolute son. Henry's policy towards the nobles was at variance with that of his father; and it was naturally most injurious to the prestige of the crown for the Emperor and his lieutenant to be acting on opposite principles. With much difficulty Frederick kept his son under some control till 1234. Then he rose in rebellion; but the Emperor, coming north, easily defeated him, and had him removed to south Italy, where after some years' imprisonment, he took his own life. The princes who had joined the rising were treated with mildness; and the Welfs were finally pacified by permission to assume the title of Dukes of Brunswick. After overcoming the resistance of the duke of Austria, who was more obstinate than his fellow-malcontents, Frederick secured the German crown for his second son Conrad, still a small boy. As might have been expected, Germany soon relapsed into a state of disorder, which continued for many years almost unchecked.

For the rest of his life, Frederick was involved in the decisive struggle between the Empire and the Papacy. Having as he thought established peace in Germany, Frederick wished to assert his authority over north and central Italy. He found that the league of Lombard cities had engaged in treasonable dealings with his son Henry, and, with this pretext, he went to war with them in 1237. Helped by a fine German force he won a great victory at Cortenuova: but his cruel treatment of the vanquished merely prolonged their resistance, and, seeing that the final issue was doubtful, the Pope made an alliance with the cities and launched a sentence of excommunication against him. The conflict which followed


was carried on with great savagery. At first Frederick made headway in Italy. It was a notable triumph for him when his son Enzio captured at sea a shipload of prelates on their way to Rome to assist in decreeing his deposition. In 1241, Gregory IX. died, and so weak was the papal cause that the Holy See remained vacant for two years. When at last Innocent IV. was chosen Pope, Frederick raised no opposition, for it was generally expected that the new pontiff would soon make peace on terms acceptable to the Emperor. But Innocent disappointed all expectations, fled from Italy, and in 1245 held a general council of the Church at Lyons, where the deposition of Frederick was solemnly pronounced. The energy of the papal party in Germany led to the election as a rival king of the Landgrave of Thuringia, and on his death in 1247, of Count William of Holland; the young Conrad was quite unable to put either of them down. Meantime, luck had turned against Frederick in north Italy. His son Enzio was taken prisoner, and he himself met with several reverses. In 1250, while in his own southern kingdom, preparing for a desperate effort to retrieve his fortunes, he suddenly died. With him ended the greatness of the house of Hohenstaufen, the greatness, too, of the Holy Roman Empire. He failed partly because of the radical unsoundness of his German policy, but chiefly because he had undertaken a task far beyond his strength. Yet his contemporaries were right in thinking him a very great man. Strange legends soon clustered round his memory. Even in Germany, where he had been little seen, it was told that he was not dead but sleeping in the Kyffhaüser hills, and that he would one day re-appear to restore peace to the Empire and purity to the Church. Later, the tradition was connected with Frederick Barbarossa—and more appropriately so, for he was essentially a German hero, whereas his grandson was entirely out of sympathy with the national genius.

What little remains to be told of the Hohenstaufen may be put into a few words. On his father's death Conrad IV. went to Italy. With the help of his valiant half-brother Manfred and the Italian imperialists, he had made some progress, when in 1254 he was cut off by death, leaving an infant son Conradin. Manfred, who became king of Sicily, held his own with such success that the Pope offered his realm to Charles of Anjou, brother of Louis IX. of France. Marching to Italy with a French army, Charles invaded the dominions of Manfred, who was presently defeated and slain. Conradin, now fifteen years of age, strove to restore the fortunes of his house; but at the battle of Tagliacozzo in 1268 he too was overthrown, and falling into the hands of Charles, was executed. The French established themselves in Naples and Sicily. The imperial cause in Italy was irretrievably ruined.

In Germany the period from 1250 to 1273 is known as the Great Interregnum. Royal authority was in abeyance, and every noble did that which was right in his own eyes. The most significant event of these years was the formation of a great league of cities, mostly in the Rhine valley: more than a hundred joined, from Bremen in the north to Basel in the south, their object being to protect their trade and secure free communication between themselves. Many Germans did not even render lip-service to any king. After Conrad's death in 1254, his supporters did not trouble themselves to confer the crown on his infant heir; and most of the nation remained indifferent to William of Holland, who died in 1256. There was no agreement as to a successor, some choosing Alfonso of Castile, others Richard, earl of Cornwall, brother of Henry III. of England. Alfonso never visited Germany at all, and Richard's transitory appearances were utterly fruitless. There is no need to dwell on this dismal time, which came to an end when in 1273 Rudolf of

Habsburg, on his election as king, attempted to gather up the fragments of royal authority.

THE HOHENSTAUFEN



CHAPTER X

GERMANY UNDER THE HOUSE OF HOHENSTAUFEN

To enthusiasts for the national principle in politics, the period of the Hohenstaufen must seem a disastrous one for Germany. It witnessed, as we have seen, a striking increase in the number and power of the feudal princes. For many years afterwards the name Germany had small political significance; and the political history of the country becomes little more than a collection of the histories of the various German principalities. To make matters worse, the old custom of dividing a man's land among his sons was still very frequently followed. The result was that by the middle of the fourteenth century, there were in Germany sixty ecclesiastical and forty secular princes, each acknowledging no overlord save the Emperor and each exercising almost sovereign rights—legislative, judicial, financial, and military—over his subjects, though his territories might comprise only a few square miles of land. The Emperor had little control over these potentates—less, in fact, than was possessed by the nobles and cities under them, who in their assemblies (*Landtage*) were often able to extort liberties in return for grants of money to their frequently impecunious lords.

No attempt can be made in a short book to trace, even in barest outline, the history of a quarter of the states; but to understand the course of events in Germany during the later Middle Ages, it is necessary to notice the families which were most influential when the line of Hohenstaufen came to an

end. In the north the two most powerful houses were those of Ascania and Welf. The former, descended from Albert the Bear, had already split into two branches, the elder holding the Mark of Brandenburg, the younger the dismembered duchy of Saxony, which was destined to be divided and again divided in a most bewildering way. A similar fate was before long to befall the Welf duchy of Brunswick. The northern principalities of Germany consequently played a somewhat subordinate part in the last centuries of the Middle Ages.

To the south-east of Saxony came the Mark of Meissen, now hereditary in the family of Wettin, which during the Great Interregnum succeeded in extending its power into central Germany. There the greatest principality had been the Landgraviate of Thuringia: but the ruling line dying out, the eastern part of its estates went to the house of Wettin, in whose hands it soon underwent perplexing subdivision, while the western half became the important Landgraviate of Hesse.

In the south the Wittelsbach family was unquestionably the greatest. The founder of its good fortune was Otto of Wittelsbach, who had been made duke of Bavaria in 1180 after the overthrow of Henry the Lion. Some thirty years later the family had also acquired the County Palatine of the Rhine. These vast possessions, however, were not kept in one hand; and Bavaria was now divided into an Upper and a Lower duchy, and the younger branch of the Wittelsbachs ruled the latter. The old duchy of Swabia had altogether disappeared, and the most important lords within its former borders were the margrave of Baden and the count of Würtemberg.

At the close of the Great Interregnum, however, the most powerful prince of the Empire was not a German at all, though he had many German subjects. This was King Ottocar of

Bohemia, an able and vigorous ruler of Slavonic blood, who had added to his possessions the German districts of Austria, Styria, and Carinthia. One must also take into account the enormous territories of some of the great churchmen. The archbishops of Mainz, Köln, and Magdeburg, not to mention others, were in temporal resources surpassed by very few secular nobles.

Despite their predominance in politics, the princes were not the class with most influence on the general life of the nation. Medieval civilization, in Germany as elsewhere, reached its highest point during the period of the Hohenstaufen; and its best characteristics were at this time embodied in the class of knights. Though of various origin—some being descended from military vassals of the king or nobles, others from their officials or personal dependants—the knights of Germany were now a well-defined and homogeneous class. The old distinction between free and unfree had lost its significance, and the great social barrier lay between those who had been trained to arms and those who had not.

In the thirteenth century the knightly class formed an international brotherhood. Throughout western Europe the knights underwent the same training, recognized the same code of conduct, and strove after the same ideals. The principles which were supposed to animate them are commonly summed up in the word "chivalry." To be loyal to his lord, zealous for the Church of Christ, fierce towards infidels, gentle and respectful to women, helpful and merciful to the weak and unfortunate, generous to his personal enemies—such were the commands which chivalry laid upon a knight. Like other men, medieval knights generally fell far short of their professions; but about the beginning of the thirteenth century, they perhaps came nearer the realization of their ideals than at any other time.

It was by their enthusiasm for art and letters that the knights rendered their chief services to Germany. The knight's castle might still be a rude habitation, and not very formidable even as a stronghold; but it was often the home of a really high culture. At this time, in fact, the military class rivalled, if it did not surpass, the clergy as the leader of German thought. The heroes of the first great period of German poetry were nearly all knights. Their genius generally turned towards epics on romantic subjects, most commonly chosen from the legends of King Arthur, which had been learned from the French. Among the best remembered of these knightly poets are Gottfried of Strassburg, who wrote the story of Tristan, and Wolfram of Eschenbach, whom Wagner makes one of the characters in "Tannhaüser," and who furnished the same composer with the theme of another opera by his poem "Parsival." And the name Wagner is a reminder that about this time the *Nibelungenlied*, with its legends of German gods and heroes, took its final shape, though the many wandering minstrels who contributed to its growth are not known to us by name.

Besides the epic romances, lyric poetry also flourished under the Hohenstaufen. It was the age of the Minnesinger—the singers of love—who, inspired by the Troubadours of south France, celebrated the charms of their mistresses and the virtues of the numerous great men who delighted to honour the Muse. Henry VI. and Frederick II. wrote verses themselves; the court of the Austrian dukes was well-known for its love of letters; but most famous of all was the Landgrave Hermann of Thuringia, whose castle of the Wartburg won an almost legendary renown in the history of German poetry. It must not be supposed that these poetic nobles stood aloof from the main currents of national life. The greatest of the Minnesinger, Walter von der Vogelweide, was a keen partisan of the Empire in its strife with the Papacy, and




Photo. Exclusive News Agency

The Wartburg from the South

The gabled building to the right is the oldest part of the castle, dating from the late Romanesque period, and contains the hall where the famous "Contest of Song" is traditionally said to have been held.

bitterly lamented the encroachments of Innocent III. on the independence of the German crown. The literary movement undoubtedly did much to foster a sense of national unity, though it was powerless to check the disintegration of the German kingdom.

In this literary activity, brilliant as were its results, there was one disquieting feature. It was stimulated from France, and most of the knightly poets consciously imitated French models. The same influence is to be traced in the other art which flourished at this time—architecture. To the end of the twelfth century German builders had continued to develop the Romanesque style on their own lines. Then, in the early part of the thirteenth century, they favoured what is known as the Transition style — still essentially Romanesque, but more ornate and marked by the introduction of many features characteristic of Gothic. Now Gothic architecture came from France, where it appeared about the middle of the twelfth century, and though it penetrated slowly into Germany, after 1250 it was the fashionable style even there. The Gothic style sprang from the desire of architects to make their churches higher and lighter. Its essential feature was the lofty ribbed vault. The weight of the roof, concentrated on the ribs, was ultimately supported partly by the piers of the nave, and partly by flying buttresses. The height of the vault made it possible to have large windows in the clearstory; thanks to the flying buttress, the nave piers became less cumbrous and the outer walls less ponderous; and thus the windows of the aisles became larger also. A natural outcome of these changes was the general use of the pointed arch—a very characteristic symptom, though not an essential feature, of Gothic architecture. At first Gothic ornament was simple and severe, but in course of time it became very elaborate. The stonework of the windows in particular lent itself to ornate

treatment. Window-tracery, at first rigidly geometrical in design, grew more and more flowing, till, in the last stages of Gothic art, it became merely fantastic.

A typical Gothic church of Germany had a high vaulted nave, lower aisles—generally vaulted too—short transepts, and a choir or chancel—as a rule with a polygonal or circular east end. Outside, the most striking feature was an elaborate western façade, with one or two spire-capped towers. Gothic churches on the Continent are commonly more lofty than those in England; elaborate decoration appears at an earlier date; and a specially conspicuous difference is the absence of the great central tower which is so impressive a characteristic of many English cathedrals. It must be noted, however, that Gothic never got so firm a hold on Germany as on France and England. Though German Gothic developed certain peculiarities of its own, it was for some time regarded with a certain coolness as a foreign importation. Moreover, the high civilization of Germany in the early Middle Ages had produced many beautiful Romanesque buildings quite adequate to their purpose. These were suffered to remain, whereas in England the Norman churches were mostly swept away or entirely remodelled. Thus Gothic work of the highest order is relatively rare in Germany, and the Romanesque churches remain the best expression of the nation's artistic genius in medieval times.

In yet another sphere Germany had been overtaken by France. The twelfth century had seen a notable revival of learning in western Europe. The study of law, philosophy, and even natural science, had received a great impetus. The period between 1150 and 1250 produced the most learned and subtle scholars of the Middle Ages. Most were French or Italian, some English, very few German. It is true that one of the most renowned, Albert the Great, was a German by birth and taught for long at Köln; but he acquired his learning

and fame at Paris. And while at this time universities were beginning to grow up in France, Italy, and England, there were none in Germany till the fifteenth century.

It must not be inferred that culture and mental vigour had declined in Germany. The age of the Hohenstaufen was, on the contrary, one of great progress in art and learning. Germany had merely ceased to advance as fast as her neighbours. The vicissitudes of a nation's intellectual life can never be fully explained; but the frequent civil wars, the Italian ambitions of her leaders, and the preoccupation of the clergy with political affairs go far to account for the failure of Germany to maintain her place at the head of European civilization.

The worldly strivings of the clergy had somewhat impaired the authority of the German Church. It was still, of course, extremely powerful: its material resources were greater than ever. But its moral influence had slightly decreased. Walter von der Vogelweide's anti-clerical verses found an echo in many minds. This disaffection, which as yet was not strongly marked, was partly due to resentment at the claims of the Papacy, and partly to a feeling that the clergy were not doing their duty. The monastic movement of the early twelfth century had spent itself. The great prelates, their privileges vastly increased, were becoming more deeply immersed than ever in the affairs of this life. The first quarter of the thirteenth century, it is true, gave rise to a new movement for reform. St Francis and St Dominic founded their Orders of Friars—men who, though bound strictly by the monastic vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, were to lead a life of beneficent activity in the world, the Franciscans devoting themselves especially to the poor and suffering, while the special task of the Dominicans was to preach against heresy. Other Orders arose; the friars became a powerful force in western Europe; and their houses were soon to be

found in all parts of Germany. But though the first friars were perhaps the finest flowers of medieval religion, their successors soon began to fall away. They were pledged to absolute poverty and complete dependence on the alms of the charitable; but means of evading this vow were presently discovered, and, from their great heights, the friars fell to even greater depths than the declining Orders of monks and canons. At the time of the Interregnum, indeed, they were still a powerful influence for good; but in Germany they had not succeeded in restoring the Church to its former ascendency over men's minds.

During the period of the Hohenstaufen there also appeared the German military Orders. Despite the activities of missionaries, the Baltic lands to the east of the Oder were still largely peopled by heathen. Though crusades to the Holy Land were now always failures, the Church had increasing faith in the sword as a means of spreading the Gospel. In 1202 Adalbert, bishop of Riga, instituted the Order of the Knights of the Sword, their duties being to protect the German settlers in Livonia and make war on the obstinate pagans of that region. The knights did their work well, and before long Esthonia was also conquered. Meanwhile, however, another Order—that of the Teutonic knights—had entered on a similar work further west. Founded in 1190 before Acre by Frederick of Swabia, this Order had never achieved much in Palestine, where it was overshadowed by the long-established Templars and Hospitallers. Thus when a Polish duke, hard pressed by the fierce Prussians, appealed to Germany for help, Hermann von Salza, the Grand Master of the Order, resolved to transfer its activities from the Mediterranean to the Baltic. With the sanction of Frederick II., the knights in 1230 entered on the conquest of Prussia. After fifty years of hard fighting their task was complete. The land was colonized by German settlers who followed in the

wake of the warriors. Towns began to grow up round the chief castles, and the thirteenth century saw the beginnings of Königsberg, Thorn, Kulm, Memel, and other well-known places. In 1237 the Knights of the Sword united with their brethren in Prussia, so that for many years Livonia was also under the rule of the Teutonic Order. When not on active service, the knights were supposed to live as regular canons: so that some of the credit for the conquest of Prussia was due to the German church.

Meanwhile the lands between Prussia and the Elbe were rapidly being Germanized. By the end of the Hohenstaufen period, the Ascanian margraves of Brandenburg had pushed forward to the Oder, and crossing the river had laid hands on the region afterwards known as the Neumark. Colonists were invited from all parts of Germany; and though no attempt was made to exile or enslave the conquered Wends, these were gradually driven to the more barren districts, and steadily declined in numbers and wealth. Between Brandenburg and the Baltic, Henry the Lion had conquered the modern Holstein and Mecklenburg, and forced the Slavonic lords of Pomerania to acknowledge his suzerainty. His fall somewhat checked German progress; in fact, for a time his possessions beyond the Elbe came under the rule of Denmark. Nevertheless, German colonization went on, often encouraged by the Slavonic nobles themselves, and powerfully assisted by the numerous monasteries founded for the conversion of the pagan Wends. The settlers gathered in village communities and lived generally as free farmers, paying a fixed rent to the landlords. On the coast Lübeck and several other towns rapidly became prosperous. By 1230 the Danes had been forced to retire within their old boundaries, and Holstein, Mecklenburg, and Pomerania were henceforth reckoned as parts of the German kingdom. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries there was also a great influx of colonists into Lusatia

and Meissen, which were in future predominantly German in population. Enterprising merchants and peasants even made their way into the realms of alien kings. Many German settlements were at this time established in Bohemia and Hungary, and though these countries have never been Germanized, the descendants of the colonists remain to this day, speaking their own tongue and maintaining their national institutions.

Simultaneously with this expansion of German influence, and largely perhaps by reason of it, there occurred a remarkable advance in the economic prosperity of the country. Agriculture flourished. The three-field system of cultivating arable land was now almost everywhere adopted. The culture of fruit trees and the vine was more extensively practised. Pioneer work in the forests considerably increased the extent of cultivable soil. For people on the land, the times were distinctly good. Even unfree peasants, serfs though many of them had become, were as a rule pretty well off: their rents and dues were stationary, while the produce of their holdings increased. Moreover, the landlords were often ready to emancipate their serfs in return for a higher rent; and in this way, as well as by colonization, the number of free tenant-farmers grew rapidly. It must not be forgotten that the peasant was no longer bound to render military service; so that the civil conflicts of the time, except when warlike operations took place in his immediate neighbourhood, made little difference to his security and comfort.

Still more striking than the progress of agriculture was the growth of trade. This was helped by the peculiar connection between Germany and Italy, in favour of which an economist can say much more than a German patriot. Trade with Italy became specially active when the economic effects of the crusades began to be felt in the cities of Lombardy. Oriental luxuries—cunning metal-work, cotton and silk goods, spices,

wines—were brought over the Alpine passes to growing towns of south Germany like Regensburg, Augsburg, and Ulm. Thence they would be sent by way of the Upper Danube and the Rhine to Mainz—golden Mainz as it was called in early medieval times—whence they might be carried into France, or forwarded to Köln, the port for England. Or else they might be despatched through Nürnberg to Erfurt, and so to Saxony and the Slavonic Marks. But the trade with Italy, though the most important, was not the only channel of German commercial activity. The Baltic was the scene of much going and coming between the German coast towns, of which Lübeck took the lead, and the Scandinavian kingdoms or Russia. From the north raw materials, such as skins and timber, were imported in exchange for the manufactures of more civilized Germany.

This development of trade necessitated a much more extensive use of money than had been usual in the days when each village community was mainly self-supporting. The change was made easier by the productiveness of the mines in the Harz and the Erzgebirge, which were worked with great energy. The value of money naturally fell; in western Germany it was almost halved during the Hohenstaufen period. At the same time a system of credit began to appear. For some time the Jews were the only money-lenders; but their monopoly was soon attacked by banking companies of Italians. The Germans themselves did not take up the business till a later date.

With the growth of trade, the merchants of course became an important element in German society. In each city they organized themselves into a gild for the promotion of their common interests. In many foreign towns, too, there were societies of German merchants—at Venice, Novgorod, Wisby, London, and other centres of German commerce.

This commercial activity was naturally accompanied by

an increase in the number and size of the German towns, which also benefited by the development of manufacturing industry at this time. The grant of the right to hold a market was often the beginning of a town's importance; and, as was natural, handicraftsmen were inclined to settle where there would be a frequent concourse of possible customers. In the thirteenth century the great capitalist employer was almost unknown. The master-craftsman worked himself, assisted by a few journeymen and apprentices. The masters soon began to organize themselves into craft-gilds, with strict regulations about hours of labour, quality of goods, and rates and prices; while the municipal government had the right of revising these rules in the interests of workmen or consumers. But it must not be supposed that the population of a German town in the Middle Ages consisted entirely of merchants and craftsmen. The community would still have a very vital interest in agriculture; many inhabitants would work in the fields outside the walls. Medieval towns were of course very small according to our notions. Few would be bigger than the country town in the south of England to-day. In the thirteenth century even important centres of trade like Köln or Nürnberg had only some 20,000 inhabitants.

This development of town-life was not merely of economic significance; it led also to most important social and political results. Beside the nobles, knights, and peasants there appeared a new class, the burghers, who were to play a most influential part in the subsequent history of Germany. And already the strivings of the towns for an independent government had borne much fruit. Originally, of course, the town was governed by the founder, whether the king or some great noble. He commonly set over it an officer nominated by himself, who usually acted with the advice of some of the prominent townsmen. Gradually an aristocratic class formed itself, consisting of long-established families, rich merchants,

or great landowners; they alone might sit on the governor's council. It was the aim of such aristocracies, as of feudal nobles, to secure political privileges from their overlords. In course of time they met with much success. New rights were sometimes gained by supporting the lord against his enemies, sometimes bought by money, sometimes established by force, for every town with any pretensions was now girt with walls and towers and imposed on its inhabitants the duty of bearing arms. For a long time, moreover, it was the policy of the Emperors to favour the towns as a counterpoise to the nobles. Thus by the middle of the thirteenth century, despite Frederick II.'s hostility, the larger towns had acquired so many judicial and financial privileges that they were almost independent city-states. The right of executing justice, regulating trade, and levying tolls and taxes belonged to the aristocratic council, at the head of which sometimes appears an elected officer called the Bürgermeister. The craftsmen had no share in the town government, though in time of war they formed the infantry of the municipal army. Already, it is true, many cities were the field of an agitation for a more democratic constitution, but as yet these movements had led to no practical results.

Though the civic authorities might often be narrow and selfish in their views, it was only within the walls of the towns that orderly and efficient administration could be found in Germany during the thirteenth century. Particularly in their regulation of finance the city governments were far ahead of contemporary princes. With prosperity and security went a certain interest in learning and art. In fact, during the dreary centuries which followed the fall of the Hohenstaufen the towns were the most promising feature of German life.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER X

During the first part of the Hohenstaufen period, the popular style of architecture was still essentially Romanesque. Churches, however, were now richly ornamented, and vaulted roofs, not unknown before, were common. With the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Transition style appeared. For some time the essential features of buildings generally remained Romanesque, though Gothic characteristics, such as the pointed arch, became increasingly fashionable. About 1250 the Transition style was completely ousted by genuine Gothic.

Churches in the late-Romanesque and Transitional styles are numerous in Germany. Under the Hohenstaufen, the country was fairly prosperous, and many churches were rebuilt on more ornate lines. The following buildings are good illustrations of the styles in vogue :—

Late Romanesque :

Köln : Church of the Twelve Apostles ; Great St Martin's ; parts of St Gereon.
Bonn : The Minster.
Andernach : Parish Church.
Coblenz : Church of St Castor.
Worms : Cathedral.
Strassburg : Cathedral (choir and transepts : Strassburg Cathedral illustrates admirably the transition from Romanesque to Gothic) ; Church of St Thomas.
Hildesheim : St Godehard's.
Halberstadt : Church of Our Lady.
Brunswick : The Castle Church.
Regensburg : The Scots' Church.

Late-Romanesque work in brick remains in several churches of north Germany, notably the abbey church at Jerichow (near Schönhausen, Bismarck's birthplace), and Lübeck Cathedral (nave).

Secular buildings in the style are represented by the Wartburg (gatehouse and Landgrave's Palace), the ruins of Frederick Barbarossa's palace at Gelnhausen, not far from Frankfurt-on-Main, and the so-called Templars' Lodge at Köln.

Transitional :

Köln : St Andreas (parts), St Cunibert.
Strassburg : Cathedral (choir and transepts).
Brunswick : St Martin's.
Naumburg : Cathedral.
Bamberg : Cathedral.
Würzburg : The Neumünster.
Limburg-on-the-Lahn : Cathedral.



Photo. Frith

Strassburg Cathedral, from the South

The contrast between the Gothic nave and the Romanesque transept and choir should be noted.

CHAPTER XI

THE HOUSE OF HABSBURG AND ITS RIVALS

THE Interregnum was brought to an end through the influence of the lesser nobility, the cities, and, wonderful to relate, the Pope. The Papacy had learnt that to call in France against the Empire was to cast out Satan by Beelzebub, and hoped that if Germany again had a king, she might be able to check the rapidly growing power of her neighbour. The choice of the German princes fell on Count Rudolf of Habsburg. With the accession of Rudolf begins a dreary and bewildering period of more than two centuries. The chief political feature of this time was the decline of the power of the Emperor and the growth of the independence of the princes. Germany always had a king, who may for convenience be called the Emperor, though very often, not having been crowned by the Pope, he had strictly no right to that title. On election he styled himself king of the Romans, thereby asserting his claim to imperial authority; but really his power was limited to Germany. And even there his strength was very small. The imperial estates, once so wide, had for the most part been sold, given away, or seized by nobles during the recent disorder. The sources of imperial revenue had similarly been dissipated. The Emperor, as Emperor, was in fact one of the poorest sovereigns in Europe. His strength depended almost entirely on the hereditary possessions of the house to which he belonged. And as the office of Emperor was elective, it is not astonishing that the German kings of this

period generally troubled themselves little about their royal or imperial prerogatives and used their position merely to expand their family possessions. As a matter of fact, it was from the rise of great principalities that the political salvation of Germany was to come. For many years, however, no family succeeded in gaining an established predominance. In 1273 there was no single house conspicuously stronger than any of its rivals; and the princes were so jealous of their independence that they commonly combined to depress any family that seemed to be growing powerful, and not infrequently gave the crown to a candidate of small influence simply because his influence was small. The later Middle Ages consequently saw remarkable fluctuations in the power of the leading houses. It is idle to trace their varying fortunes in detail. At the end of this period, however, the Habsburgs began to tower above all their rivals; and the rise of their influence is therefore worthy of attention. Otherwise, the details of the political history of the time lead nowhere in particular, and can be passed over briefly.

Rudolf of Habsburg was chosen by the princes because of his insignificance. The castle from which he took his title stood in the valley of the Aar, just within Upper Burgundy. His family can be traced back to the tenth century: for about a hundred years they had been counts of Zürich; and they held extensive property in the valleys of the Aar and the Reuss. Thus their influence lay mainly in what is now Switzerland, though they also possessed lands in Alsace and the Black Forest. It is one of the ironies of history that the election of the first Habsburg Emperor was largely due to his nephew, the Burgrave of Nürnberg, Frederick of Hohenzollern.

In 1273 Rudolf of Habsburg was well advanced in years. But he was a practical man and a brave warrior, and probably disgusted the princes by his energy. His policy was to recover as many of the domains and rights of the crown as he

could, and to increase the estates of his family. In the latter object he succeeded better than in the former. He took vigorous action against Ottocar of Bohemia, who refused either to recognize the new king or to surrender the lands which he had seized during the recent turmoil. Ottocar was forced to submit, and hand over Austria, Styria, and Carinthia; when he again rebelled Rudolf defeated and slew him at the battle of the Marchfeld, near Vienna. With the consent of the leading princes Rudolf gave Austria and Styria to his two sons, and the Habsburgs have held the two duchies ever since. The rest of Rudolf's reign was taken up with vain efforts to put down rebellious nobles, to establish public order, to exact a revenue from the cities under his immediate rule, and to persuade the princes to elect his son as king during his life-time. It is significant that Rudolf never tried to assert the imperial authority in Italy.

When Rudolf died in 1291, the princes, alarmed at the rising fortunes of the Habsburgs, chose Count Adolf of Nassau, who, though brave and of some ability, was yet quite devoid of the resources necessary to uphold his dignity. To make his position worse, he had bought his election by wholesale surrenders of royal prerogatives and property. Adolf soon got himself into trouble by his self-seeking intervention in a feud which was raging in the Wettin family about their Thuringian estates, and by the support which he gave to the Rhenish cities against the nobility. Before long the archbishop of Mainz, with other princes, declared Adolf deposed, and proclaimed as king Albert of Austria. In 1298, Adolf was slain at the battle of Göllheim in the Palatinate, and the victorious Albert reigned in his stead.

The second Habsburg king was a very capable and energetic man, though cold and harsh. He pursued the policy which he had been raised up to oppose, gave great political and commercial privileges to the towns, and with the help of them

and the smaller nobles, put down the consequent rising of the Rhenish princes. His attempts to expand the territories of his house were less successful. Like Adolf, he tried to fish in the troubled waters of Thuringia, but was defeated by the Margrave Frederick of Meissen, who afterwards restored the power of the family of Wettin. It was a sign of the times that the king of the Romans should engage in a vulgar private war with one of his nominal subjects.

After 1308, when Albert was murdered for personal reasons by a nephew, the house of Habsburg relapsed into comparative obscurity. During the next hundred and thirty years the most prominent family in Germany was unquestionably that of the counts of Luxemburg. The house held a small patrimony in the Ardennes, and though subject to the Empire, it was rather French than German in sympathies and interests. The Luxemburg kings were generally men of considerable talent. But they lacked the material and moral force necessary to put their ambitious schemes into effect, and on the status of the German crown their influence was disastrous.

Count Henry of Luxemburg, who was chosen king in 1308, was already famous as a valiant knight, and being of a romantic turn, was anxious to repeat the achievements of Frederick Barbarossa in Italy. There utter confusion prevailed. Every city and principality was distracted by the feuds of the Guelf and the Ghibellin factions—the former, under the cloak of enthusiasm for the Papacy, seeking to establish democracy; the latter, under colour of devotion to the Empire, striving to maintain or restore the ascendency of the nobles. The better spirits of the Ghibellins, however, really did look for the advent of an Emperor to restore peace; and it is to this hope that we owe the *De Monarchia* of the great Dante, a work which, though fantastic and unconvincing to the modern mind, is yet the most complete statement and defence,

from the medieval standpoint, of the theory of the Holy Roman Empire. But the Emperor's visit, which was to put everything right, proved a dismal fiasco. At first Henry was successful. After being crowned king of Italy, he posed with some success as mediator between the warring factions, and in many cities set up imperial vicars to keep the peace. From Lombardy Henry marched to Rome; but part of the city, including St Peter's church, was held by the king of Naples, and it was in the dilapidated church of St John Lateran that Henry received the imperial crown from a papal legate. This was the end of his success. Risings broke out in Lombardy; the Guelf party raised their heads again; the Pope, at first friendly, encouraged resistance. In 1313, beset by insurmountable difficulties, Henry died suddenly in Tuscany. His German realm had seen little of him. One notable achievement, however, marked his reign. Bohemia being rent by civil war, one of the parties invoked the Emperor's aid. Henry's son John was married to the daughter of the last Bohemian king, and after some fighting succeeded in establishing himself on the throne. Bohemia became the kernel of the strength of his house.

Deeming the houses of Luxemburg and Habsburg overpowerful, a majority of the "Electors" chose as Henry's successor, Lewis, duke of Upper Bavaria, the head of the family of Wittelsbach. His claims were disputed by Frederick the Fair of Austria; and it was not till 1322 that the latter was defeated and captured at Mühldorf on the Inn. Frederick became reconciled to Lewis, and when, some years later, the Emperor went to Italy, he left his former foe as his regent.

As Henry VII.'s reign had seen an attempt to revive imperial authority in Italy, so did that of his successor see a renewal of the old quarrel between Empire and Papacy. But though the conflict was full of sound and fury, it signified very little. Like the Empire, the Papacy had sadly fallen from its former

grandeur. At the end of the thirteenth century, the most arrogant of all the popes, Boniface VIII., had tried to give practical effect to the view that he was lord of the world in both temporal and spiritual matters. His claims were more than once successfully defied by Edward I. of England and Philip the Fair of France; finally, in a supreme quarrel, the Pope was seized and insulted by the French king's agents in Italy. The prestige of the Holy See was irremediably hurt. Two years later French influence among the cardinals secured the election of the Gascon, Clement V. The new pontiff moved the papal court to Avignon on the Rhone, a city which, though not actually on French territory, was entirely under French influence. Thus began the "Babylonish Captivity" of the popes, which lasted for more than seventy years. A series of Frenchmen filled the chair of Peter, and even those with some personal claims to respect were generally regarded as tools of French policy.

The year 1316 saw the election of John XXII., a learned but over-ambitious Pope, who strove to enforce the highest claims of the Holy See. He asserted that he had the right to mediate between the contending parties in the German civil war, took advantage of the struggle to extend papal influence in Italy, and when Lewis took measures to protect his rights, excommunicated him and laid Germany under an interdict. It seems likely that he wished to secure the German crown for the king of France.

Lewis replied vigorously by accusing the Pope of heresy, and appealing from him to a General Council of the Church. A long and violent battle followed, in which the pen was much more freely used than the sword. Lewis was supported by many churchmen, especially the strict party among the Franciscan friars, who had quarrelled with Pope John's interpretation of their founder's injunction to observe absolute poverty. Very lofty theories of imperial authority were put

forward. Dante himself, Marsilius of Padua, an Italian scholar, and William of Ockham, an English friar, probably the three greatest thinkers of the day, vigorously upheld the Emperor's cause. Marsilius and Ockham denied that papal authority came from God, and asserted that it was only by consent of the whole Christian Church that the Pope had any right to exercise greater power than other bishops; but it was significant that their arguments, if logically pressed, would have been equally destructive of the Emperor's claim to be God's vicegerent in things temporal.

How meaningless the whole dispute was becoming received striking illustration when, in 1327, Lewis made an expedition to Italy. He received the Italian crown at Milan. Then he marched to Rome, where he was crowned Emperor by one of the civic officers, who was for the occasion deemed to represent the Roman people. Being Emperor, he felt himself competent to nominate a Pope, who at once crowned him over again to make his imperial title unassailable. The whole episode is delightfully Gilbertian: it is no wonder that the Antipope met with no support, or that Lewis soon found it well to retreat to Germany.

The most significant feature of the contest was the rise in Germany of a national spirit of hostility to the Pope. In 1338, six of the "Electors" met at Rense, opposite Oberlahnstein on the Rhine, and there issued a declaration that the imperial power was derived from God alone, and that the Emperor-elect had no need of papal confirmation. These principles were immediately afterwards re-affirmed by a Diet of the nobility at Frankfurt.

The feeling indicated by these utterances was merely anti-papal; it did not make for the restoration of the authority of the Emperor. Lewis evidently knew this; and though he allied with Edward III. when England began the Hundred Years' War against the Pope's chief supporter, his heart was not in

the business, and his chief concern in his later years was to enlarge his own territories. The extinction of the ruling families in Brandenburg and Lower Bavaria enabled him to confer these principalities on his son. He sought, against all justice, to lay hands on the Tyrol, and put forward a claim to several counties in the Netherlands. This grasping policy kindled widespread anger. Backed by the Papacy, John of Bohemia was chosen king by a majority of the "Electors"; and the cause of the Luxemburg family was making headway when in 1347 Lewis died.

John of Bohemia had already met his end at the battle of Crecy, in circumstances well known to Englishmen. His son Charles, however, overcame one or two rivals, and again established the house of Luxemburg on the throne. He was somewhat assisted by the distraction of men's minds from politics through the terrible plague called the Black Death, which ravaged Germany from 1348 to 1350. One of its effects was an outburst of religious mania, which showed itself on the one hand in savage massacres of the Jews, and on the other, in the appearance of fanatical sects and orders, like that of the Flagellants, who walked half-naked about the country in procession, lacerating one another with whips.

Charles IV. was an able man, of a cautious and patient temperament. As Emperor, his aims were very modest. His interests were centred in Bohemia; in Germany at large he was content if tolerable order was preserved.

The most famous event of his reign was the issue of the Golden Bull of 1356. This document, so called from the golden *bulla* or capsule which contained the imperial seal, laid down the law touching imperial elections. There had never been any authoritative pronouncement as to the number or qualifications of the voters; in practice, however, the right of voting had for about a century been limited to six or seven of

the greatest princes, who were consequently termed Electors. The Golden Bull finally stated that the number of these was seven—namely, the Archbishops of Mainz, Köln, and Trier, the King of Bohemia, the Count Palatine of the Rhine, the Margrave of Brandenburg, and the Duke of Saxony, who now held a small principality with its capital at Wittenberg. Imperial elections were to be decided by a majority of these potentates, who were to meet for the purpose at Frankfurt, under the presidency of the archbishop of Mainz. The dignity of the seven was guaranteed by the declaration that their electoral territories were indivisible and by the grant to them of full sovereign rights over their subjects, who were not even to have the right of appeal to the Emperor.

The importance of the Golden Bull has often been exaggerated and its terms over-harshly criticized. Charles "legalised anarchy and called it a constitution," is Lord Bryce's epigram on it. But what did it matter whether anarchy was legalized or not? it was there, and for over a hundred years no ruler had succeeded in suppressing it. Another criticism passed is that the German crown was made elective for ever, whereas the one hope of the nation was the rise of a strong hereditary monarchy. In theory, this argument is good; in practice, however, the rights of the Electors had much less influence after 1356 than before. Until 1437 the Empire was held by the house of Luxemburg, and from that time until its disappearance, with one brief interval, by the house of Habsburg. It followed that disputed elections, with the consequent civil wars between rival Emperors, became much less frequent. It is true that the sovereign powers of the Electors were now recognized by law, and that it became the object of every other prince to gain similar prerogatives. But the stipulation that the electoral principalities were to be indivisible was of distinct benefit to Germany, which had suffered much from the repeated division of princely estates. In short,

the Golden Bull did Germany no harm and in one or two ways it even did good.

Though Charles twice went to Italy, he troubled little about his power there. On his first visit in 1354, he was crowned at both Milan and Rome, and made much money by selling privileges to nobles and cities. His second expedition, in 1368, was intended to encourage Urban V., who had returned from Avignon to Rome. As a matter of fact, it benefited no one; and in 1370 Urban went back.

In Bohemia, however, Charles proved himself a statesman. He worked hard for the welfare of his subjects. Trade and culture advanced. The king established an archbishopric at Prague, thereby making the Bohemian Church independent of German control. In his capital he also founded a university, the first east of the Rhine, which soon began to flourish exceedingly. To him Prague owes some of her most imposing features—the cathedral, the royal castle of the Hradschin, the fine Karlsbrücke. Under his beneficent rule, a strong national feeling arose among the Slavonic Czechs, whose patriotism soon took a direction hostile to the numerous Germans in their midst.

From Bohemia Charles was able to extend his rule over Lusatia and Silesia: late in his reign a treaty with the Wittelsbach margrave gained him Brandenburg: so that on his death in 1378 the influence of his house stood at a great height. He was succeeded by his son Wenzel, whose election as German king he had already secured. A younger son, Sigismund, who had married the king of Hungary's heiress, was put over Brandenburg.

Wenzel, a lazy toper, was the disgrace of the house of Luxemburg. Even in Bohemia, where his family was very popular, his misgovernment excited a rising of the magnates, and he was for some time imprisoned. At the same time Germany was distressed by wars between the nobles and the

leagues of Swabian and Rhenish towns; and Wenzel's prohibition of civic confederacies was totally disregarded. His incapacity gave a majority of the Electors a pretext for declaring him deposed and appointing Rupert, the Count Palatine, as king in his place. From 1400 to 1410 Rupert tried hard to assert his claims; but an expedition to Italy was repulsed, and even in Germany he had no authority whatever.

On Rupert's death, a majority of the electoral college chose Wenzel's brother, Sigismund, now king of Hungary. Another party set up Jost, the margrave of Moravia; and as Wenzel still refused to surrender, there were for a time three claimants to the imperial title. Luckily Jost died after a year; and the two brothers came to an agreement whereby Sigismund was to exercise imperial authority, while Wenzel remained king of Bohemia. From 1411 to 1437, therefore, Germany was under the rule of Sigismund.

Meanwhile, the Church had been passing through a crisis which gave a great chance to the Emperor. In 1377 Pope Gregory XI. had again restored the papal court to Rome. On his death shortly afterwards, the cardinals elected an Italian, Urban VI. Urban soon managed to offend the French party at his court; and the French cardinals, asserting that the Roman mob had frightened them into choosing him, proceeded to a new election. Their nominee, who called himself Clement VII., established himself at Avignon. Thus began the Great Schism of the West, which lasted for nearly forty years. All that time there were at least two Popes anathematizing each other savagely, organizing "crusades" against each other, and throughout showing a disregard for the interests of Christendom which disgusted all thoughtful men in western Europe, and inflicted grave injury on the prestige of the Holy See, already damaged by the Babylonish Captivity. The Pope of Rome was supported by Italy, Germany, and England; his rival by France, Castile, and Scotland.

Soon there arose a general cry for the restoration of unity and a thorough reform of ecclesiastical abuses. The lead in the movement was taken by the University of Paris; a majority of the cardinals on each side were won over to its views; and at their summons a General Council of the Church met at Pisa in 1409. The Council was abortive. It pronounced the deposition of both Popes, and chose a new one. The only result was that for some years there were three Popes just as during part of the same time there were three Emperors.

The credit for finding a way out of this confusion belongs to Sigismund. According to medieval theory, it was the duty of the Emperor to intervene when the Church was in trouble. Sigismund was a vain, showy man, lacking in firmness of purpose. But he was clever and ambitious, and the notion of fulfilling the Emperor's function of upholding the interests of Christianity appealed to his imagination. On an expedition to Italy, he was able to force John XXIII., the successor of the Pope nominated at Pisa, to summon a General Council to the city of Constance.

Meanwhile a great uproar had arisen in Bohemia. There was in that country a growing anti-clerical and anti-German movement, which came to a head when John Hus, a popular preacher and a professor at Prague University, fell under the influence of the works of John Wycliffe, and from denouncing the abuses of the clergy, went on to deny the authority of the Pope, to criticize the whole system of Church government, and to call in question several Catholic doctrines. Hus's most conspicuous opponents being Germans, he became a national hero, and his views spread like wildfire. King Wenzel, though refusing to make a definite pronouncement, was disposed to favour Hus, and pleased his Czech subjects by altering the constitution of the University so as to give a preponderating voice to its Slavonic members. The German

students and professors thereupon left Prague and set up at Leipzig the first university in Germany proper. The religious dispute, however, was still raging when the Council of Constance was summoned. Invited by Sigismund to defend himself before the leaders of the Church, Hus agreed to go, and was given an imperial safe-conduct.

The Council had three main objects: to restore unity, to repress heresy, and to effect a reformation of the Church "in head and members." It was an enormous assembly, representing as well as could be expected the whole of the Catholic Church. At the outset, it declared itself superior to the Pope. John XXIII. did his best to place obstacles in its way, and even succeeded in escaping from Constance. Not to be thwarted, however, the Council pronounced his deposition, and went on with its work. One of Pope John's rivals was also deposed; the other presently resigned. John Hus, notwithstanding the Emperor's safe-conduct, was tried, convicted of heresy, and burnt at the stake. But numerous and profound differences of opinion proved fatal to all plans for adequate reform. After much dispute, it was resolved to give the Church a head before settling this problem; and the new Pope, Martin V., who was at once recognized by practically all western Europe, foiled the reform party by promising to deal separately with the grievances of each nation. In 1418, then, the greatest Church Council of the Middle Ages came to an end without remedying any serious abuses.

The Council bore bitter fruit for Germany. The Bohemians were boiling with wrath at what they considered the betrayal of their hero by the Emperor. On Wenzel's death in 1419, Sigismund was quite unable to secure recognition as his successor. For a time, almost all Bohemia was Hussite. There were two parties; one demanded only moderate reforms, in particular the granting of the cup to the laity in

the Communion, while the second, more radical than Hus himself, would in later times have been called advanced Protestants. The Hussites, however, presented a united front to Sigismund's attempts to conquer them. A crusade was preached against them; the army of the Empire was called out; but time after time they defeated invading expeditions. The advanced party—called the Taborites, from the name which they gave to their headquarters in south Bohemia—were organized into a first-class army by John Zizka, who, though blind, was a tactician of extraordinary talent. When he died, his successor Procop continued his work with hardly less skill, and the Hussites taking the offensive, spread terror over central and east Germany. Thuringia, Meissen, and Saxony were fearfully ravaged. The imperial forces lost their morale, and the Empire became the laughing-stock of Europe. It was not until 1434, when the General Council of Basel had conciliated the moderate Hussites, that the Taborites were at last overcome and Sigismund was able to establish himself in his Bohemian inheritance.

In Germany nothing came of Sigismund's attempts to reform the administrative system and strengthen imperial authority, and apart from the Hussite invasions his reign is chiefly remarkable for some momentous changes in the distribution of German territory. Sigismund's election as Emperor was largely due to his trusted adviser the burgrave of Nürnberg, Frederick VI. of Hohenzollern, and in 1415 his services were rewarded by the grant of the Mark of Brandenburg with the electoral dignity. Henceforth the Hohenzollerns were one of the leading families of Germany. Soon afterwards the younger line of the house of Ascania died out, and in 1423 the electorate of Saxony was bestowed on Frederick the Quarrelsome, margrave of Meissen, the head of the house of Wettin. The name Meissen soon began to

fall into disuse, and the Mark to be spoken of as part of Saxony. Of equal importance for the future was the marriage of Sigismund's daughter to Albert, duke of Austria—an alliance which again made the Habsburgs the greatest family in Germany when in 1437 the death of Sigismund without male heirs brought the house of Luxemburg to an end.

The imperial election which followed was one of the most critical in German history. For the first time, there was a collision between the interests of the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollerns. Frederick, margrave of Brandenburg, was known to covet the imperial crown. But, jealous of the newly-won strength of his family, the Electors preferred Sigismund's son-in-law, Albert of Austria, a courageous and able prince, worthy to be the first of a long and unbroken line of Habsburg Emperors. When, after a short reign, Albert died in 1439, his cousin Frederick, duke of Styria, was chosen as his successor.

Frederick had found favour because his resources and character seemed to preclude any chance of his strengthening the central power at the expense of the princes. The Electors knew what they were doing. Hitherto, however mistaken their aims, however visionary their ideas, the kings of Germany, from Henry the Fowler onward, had nearly all been active and able men. Even the wretched Wenzel had his moments of energy and was not unintelligent when sober. But Frederick III. had not even enough vigour for vice. He was pious, frugal, interested in learning: but his efforts to rule were utterly futile: and indeed he devoted much more thought to the occult sciences than to the maintenance of his imperial rights. For all practical purposes, there was no longer an Emperor at all. The princes and cities waged their private wars at will, and Frederick seemed quite content that they should. On all sides, the borders of Germany were being cut short. Bohemia and Hungary, both of which had

belonged to Sigismund, soon set up national kings of their own, and were lost to the Habsburgs for nearly seventy years. The Poles successfully attacked the Teutonic knights in Prussia. The Danes made encroachments in the north. In the south the Swiss were vindicating their independence with ever increasing success. In Italy, needless to say, Frederick's influence was nought, though he has the distinction of being the last Emperor to be crowned at Rome. Even the German Church suffered from Frederick's want of vigour. The Council of Basel, which met in 1431, had attempted the work of reform, and had passed resolutions cutting down the Pope's financial and judicial rights. The resistance of Eugenius IV. led to a schism: when he declared the Council dissolved, the majority of its members declared him deposed, appointed another Pope, and continued their work. For some time there were again two Popes, each pretending to preside over a General Council. It was a splendid opportunity for the kings of Europe to secure some measure of independence for the churches of their realms. France indeed accepted the reforms passed at Basel, and they were solemnly adopted as the liberties of the French Church. But Frederick took the part of Eugenius, and in 1448, by the Concordat of Vienna, he formally recognized all the claims of the Papacy over the German Church. It was largely owing to his attitude that the final victory in the dispute fell to the reactionary party. The attempt to reform the Church from within had failed; the old abuses continued; the Reformation had become inevitable.

Frederick's one political interest was the aggrandizement of Austria. His faith in the future greatness of the Habsburgs was unwavering, although his efforts to recover some of their Swiss estates led only to disgraceful defeats. And, through several extraordinary strokes of fortune, he really became the founder of the house of Habsburg as a first-class power. Patient intrigue and the timely deaths of

kinsmen brought together into his hand the Habsburg possessions of Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and the Tyrol. Even more lucky were his dealings in the west. Since the middle of the fourteenth century, the rulers of the French duchy of Burgundy had become potentates of the highest rank. By inheritance, marriage, diplomacy, conquest, a vast number of estates, some in France, some in Germany, had passed under their sway. In France they ruled Picardy, Artois, and Flanders, as well as their original duchy. Within the borders of the Empire they had the County of Burgundy, Luxemburg, Brabant, and almost all the rest of the Netherlands. Though in theory vassals of either France or the Empire for every acre they held, the rulers of this vast inheritance were in the fifteenth century as powerful as any of the kings of Europe; and the possession of Flanders, the leading centre of industry, placed fabulous wealth at their command. For nearly fifty years this collection of estates had been successfully ruled by Duke Philip the Good. When he died, in 1467, he was succeeded by his warlike and ambitious son Charles the Bold. Charles's dearest aim was to restore the old "Middle Kingdom" of Lotharingia; and the first step must clearly be the conquest of the duchy of Lorraine, which separated Luxemburg from his Burgundian lands. Alarmed at Charles's energy, Louis XI., the cunning king of France, made an alliance against him with the duke of Lorraine, the Swiss, and the Emperor. Charles, however, detached Frederick from the league by suggesting a marriage between his daughter Mary and the Emperor's son Maximilian. Then he fell upon Lorraine, and conquered it. But when he turned against the Swiss, he suffered repeated disasters, and in 1477 at Nancy his army was overwhelmed and himself slain.

Nevertheless the projected marriage took place, and after some difficulty most of Charles's territories, including the wealthy Flanders, were secured for the Habsburgs. At once

Austria became a first-class power, and at the same time, the neighbour and foe of France.

In another quarter Frederick won for his house benefits which were to be even more lasting. In 1485 Matthias Corvinus, king of Hungary, attacked his Austrian lands and even took Vienna. But after the death of Matthias in 1490, Maximilian drove the Hungarians out, and with the new king, who ruled Bohemia also, made a treaty which gave to the Habsburgs the prospect of succeeding to both realms. Thus when in 1493 Frederick died, there was once more in Germany a power which might prove strong enough to restore national unity.

CHAPTER XII

GERMANY IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES

In France or England a period of inefficient government has nearly always witnessed a decline in every sphere of national activity. Germany's experience, however, has been different —a fact which is strikingly illustrated by the last two centuries of the Middle Ages. In the history of the German State they are most depressing; in the history of the German people, they are on the whole interesting and attractive.

Of course there were signs of decadence in many quarters. Medieval culture and ideals were ceasing to inspire or satisfy, and as yet there was no new system to take their place. Of feudalism only the bad effects remained. The princes seemed to have lost whatever high principles they ever held, and to be concerned only with the expansion of their territories. The knights had fallen on evil days. Their artistic enthusiasm had ebbed away, partly no doubt because they had lost their self-respect. For they had grown very poor; the value of money had fallen, the standard of comfort had risen: the rents of the peasants were fixed by custom as strong as law: and many a knight, forbidden by caste pride to restore his fortunes by trade, had to encumber his estates with debt or turn highwayman. Robber knights in fact became one of the curses of Germany. The Church, too, was in evil case. The higher clergy were growing more and more worldly. The parish priests, though many earnest and faithful men were to be found among them, were frequently the worst enemies of their flocks. The saintly Thomas à Kempis and

his fellow Brethren of the Common Life show that the German Church was still able to produce spiritual heroes: but on the whole, and especially after the failure of the Council of Basel, little respect was felt for the clergy or monks, though as yet there was in Germany no criticism of orthodox doctrine.

A good illustration of several tendencies of the time is provided by the fortunes of the Teutonic knights in their duchy of Prussia. Throughout the fourteenth century they flourished exceedingly. Their headquarters at Marienburg, near Danzig, became one of the most magnificent fortifications in Europe. They enlarged their borders at the expense of the Poles and the Letts. Their lands were well-governed by an elaborate system of officials. Many Germans settled in the country; numerous towns arose; an extensive trade grew, Danzig becoming one of the chief commercial cities of the Baltic. After 1400, however, the future grew dark. The Letts became Christians, and with no more infidels to fight the Order ceased to have any purpose. Then, by the union of Lithuania and Poland, a strong Slavonic kingdom was formed on the borders of Prussia. In 1410 the knights were attacked, and only the intervention of the Emperor Sigismund saved them from serious losses of territory. But the respite was only for a short time. Luxury and vice had ruined the morale of the Order. Its Prussian subjects, kept in strict subjection, regarded the Poles as saviours. Even the German settlers became disaffected and demanded a share in the government. Eventually, after a desperate conflict, the Poles were victorious. By the peace of Thorn in 1466 the Order gave up West Prussia, and was suffered to keep the eastern half of its lands only on condition of recognizing Polish overlordship. Henceforth the lands of the Order were cut off from Germany by a wedge of Slavonic territory along the valley of the Vistula. It was a catastrophe which has not yet ceased to affect the course of German policy.



Photo. Photochrom Co.

The Castle of Marienburg, near Dantzig, from the West

This was the headquarters of the Teutonic Order in its best days. After the Peace of Thorn in 1466, the Grand Master moved to Königsberg.

The higher ranks of German society had therefore little to boast of in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. On the other hand, real progress was made by the lower orders. Despite the weakness of the central government, it was a time when individual liberty and prosperity increased. Just as the Emperor was forced to give concessions to the princes, so were the princes in their turn driven to confer privileges on their subjects. Even the peasants were on the whole comfortably off. Free farmers became slightly more numerous than before, and though there were of course many serfs, bound to the soil and subject to various irksome and humiliating burdens, still the force of custom made their holdings hereditary and secured for them much material comfort. And from this period dates one of the greatest achievements of the peasant class—the establishment of the Swiss Confederation. It originated in 1291, when the free communities of the "forest cantons" of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden, which acknowledged no lord save the Emperor, united in an "everlasting compact" to defend their rights from the encroachments of the Habsburgs. The repeated attacks of the Austrian dukes were repelled by several dazzling victories; other cantons and several cities joined the league; and by the end of the fifteenth century the confederation was to all intents and purposes an independent state. The history of the Swiss republic is being treated in another volume of this series: but it should not be forgotten that the original members of the confederation were all Germans and all subjects of the Empire.

The Swiss Confederation, being peculiarly successful, has become specially famous. But it was far from unique. Similar associations among the German cities were common, and some of them were for a while equally powerful. It was from the towns that there came all that was best in German life at this time. Since the fall of the Hohenstaufen they

had become more independent and prosperous than ever. Their development, it is true, had not been peaceful. Most of them had been the field of a bitter struggle between the ruling aristocracy and the unenfranchised craftsmen. Generally the latter had won a share in the municipal government, and especially in the south, many towns had a democratic constitution. But internal strife seems seldom to have checked for long the growth of wealth. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the towns of Germany were the seats of a high culture and of the best government to be found in Europe.

The political influence of the German towns was now at its height. Mention has already been made of the league of Rhenish cities founded during the Great Interregnum. That confederacy soon broke up, but in the middle of the fourteenth century it was revived and became even more powerful than before. Not long afterwards a still mightier league was organized by the cities of Swabia—their object, apart from the general protection of their trade and liberties, being to resist the dangerous ambitions of the duke of Würtemberg. Against him a regular war was waged, for a time with much success. The league became the strongest force in south Germany. It formed an alliance with the Rhenish cities; and several princes were glad to be enrolled as members. Then the knights, afraid of both the great nobles and the towns, took to forming confederacies of their own. The conflict between the Swiss and the Habsburgs became connected with the strife further north, so that civil war was general in southern Germany and the Rhineland. Had the cities won, Swabia might have become another Switzerland. But several great feudatories of the south-west united against the towns; and in 1388 the Swabian cities were decisively defeated by the duke of Würtemberg near Stuttgart, and those of the Rhine by the Elector Palatine at Worms. The Emperor Wenzel, ready to kick the side that was down,

thereupon forbade the formation of any further leagues by the towns. This command was scarcely heeded: in the next century, for instance, we find a league of Franconian cities, headed by Nürnberg, fighting against the Hohenzollern family. But the overthrow of the Swabians had ruined the chances of the establishment of a republic of united city-states in south Germany.

The Swabian League was not, however, the greatest in Germany. That distinction belongs to the famous confederacy commonly known as the German Hansa, to which, at the end of the fourteenth century, every important town of the north belonged. The league was composed of very various elements. Its origins may be traced to those associations which, as early as the twelfth century, were formed by German merchants in foreign towns. The earliest and most important of these gilds was that of Wisby, on the island of Gothland, the centre of the commerce of the Baltic, and important also by reason of the valuable fishing-grounds near at hand. Before long similar societies of German traders arose further afield—in Novgorod, for the Russian trade, in Bruges, the chief port of industrial Flanders, and in London, already famous as a wool-market. To such associations the word Hansa—society or gild—began to be applied, and soon acquired a special and technical significance.

Close association of merchants abroad led naturally to more intimate connection between the cities from which they came. Numerous small leagues made their appearance in north Germany. Of special moment was an alliance made in 1241 between Hamburg and Lübeck for the protection of the overland route from the Baltic to the North Sea. This proved the nucleus of the great Hanseatic League. The northern towns which joined it from time to time fell into two groups. Those west of the Elbe were known as the Saxon cities, and those in Mecklenburg and Pomerania as the Wendish

cities, from the Slavonic tribe which held these regions before their colonization by Germans. Bremen, Hanover, Quedlinburg, Halberstadt, Hildesheim, and Brunswick are illustrious names among the Saxon group; and besides Lübeck, Rostock and Stralsund figure prominently in the Wendish section. Presently the league was extended by alliances with the cities in the basin of the lower Rhine, headed by Köln, and in the opposite direction with Danzig and other leading towns in Prussia. Brandenburg also supplied a contingent. Wisby of course belonged to the Hansa, and even distant German colonies like Riga became members. The chief town of the league was Lübeck, which was the centre of government.

The great wealth and power of the Hansa were regarded with enmity by the Scandinavians and Danes. In 1361 Waldemar IV. of Denmark attacked and destroyed Wisby, closed the Sound to the ships of the league, and withdrew the privileges which he and his predecessors had bestowed on it. The Hansa forthwith resolved on war. With the aid of Sweden and many of the nobles of north Germany, the league took Copenhagen, seized several Danish islands, and harried the coasts of Waldemar's Norwegian allies. The war was ended in 1370 by the peace of Stralsund. Freedom of trade was granted throughout Denmark to the Hansa, the Sound was placed under its control, and it was agreed that no Danish king might succeed to the throne without the league's consent. Soon afterwards Norway in her turn had to throw open her markets. The power of the Hansa was now at the flood. Seventy-seven cities, including every place of note in north Germany, belonged to it, and it had the complete monopoly of the Baltic trade.

For the next hundred years and more, the Hansa was one of the great powers of northern Europe. It had a vigorous and intricate foreign policy, which it supported by a fleet of

fighting ships. With all the rulers in the sphere of its activities it had concluded treaties which secured its members in the enjoyment of vast privileges. Any potentate who offended the Hansa would have his ships attacked, and his trade damaged. Yet there was never any chance of the league becoming a federal state. For one thing, its cities were too widely scattered. They were, moreover, at very various stages of growth. Some, like Lübeck, were virtually independent republics; but many were still under the control of an ecclesiastical or secular prince. The Hansa had been formed in the interests of foreign trade. It was essentially a commercial association; the object of the towns which belonged to it was to maintain their trade abroad, not to defend their liberties at home. The organization of the league was therefore simple. A representative assembly met from time to time at Lübeck to pass regulations and authorize the levy of contributions. Disobedient members were "put outside the Hansa," which meant an economic excommunication. This penalty, too, was occasionally inflicted on towns where the democratic party was strong: for Lübeck and most of the other leading members of the league were under aristocratic governments. As a rule, however, each city was free to settle its internal affairs as it pleased.

Strong as the Hansa was, the continuance of its prosperity depended rather on the weakness of its rivals than on its own might. During the fifteenth century it retained its commercial supremacy in northern Europe. Afterwards, however, it soon began to decline. The mutual jealousies of its members led to secessions. A strong monarchy was established in Sweden, and set itself to ruin the trade of the Hansa with that country. The rise of Poland injured its influence on the eastern shores of the Baltic. English and Dutch merchants became more enterprising, and their competition was often successful. The Baltic fishing-grounds, which had been a source of great

wealth, were for some unknown reason deserted by the herrings. The sixteenth century was an age when the kings of Europe took more interest than before in the trade of their subjects; but there was no powerful sovereign to take the part of the hard-pressed Hansa. On the contrary, it was the Emperor Charles V. who was instrumental in securing the opening of the Sound to ships of all nations. In 1560 Norway was bold enough to take away the commercial privileges of the league; in 1598 Elizabeth of England did the like. At the same time, geographical discoveries had turned men's eyes to America and the East, and the relative importance of the Baltic became less. After the sixteenth century the Hansa consequently ceased to exercise any appreciable influence outside Germany. The magnificent town-halls and churches of some of the North German cities are the most enduring monuments of its greatness.

It must not be supposed, however, that the interests of the German towns were directed exclusively towards politics and money-making. They were at this time the centres of whatever artistic or intellectual activity was to be found in the country. Art and learning, formerly under the patronage of the clergy and the nobles, now found their best friends in the burghers. Especially in the towns of south Germany the traveller cannot fail to be struck by the number of churches in the late Gothic style. Most of them were built, not by clergy, monks, or nobles, but by the craft-gilds, who vied with one another in erecting splendid buildings in honour of their patron saints. In the north, where stone was difficult to procure, the architects showed astonishing skill in the use of brick, and strange as it may seem, many impressive Gothic churches, public buildings, and fortifications, were constructed of that material. In all parts of Germany this period produced fine town-halls, of which not a few survive, and the town-gates of the time are often very imposing. Domestic




Photo. Frith

Strassburg Cathedral, West End

The construction of the west front of Strassburg Cathedral was begun in 1277 by the citizens to celebrate their recent attainment of independence from the rule of their Bishop.

architecture also reached a high level. Unfortunately examples of it are comparatively rare; for the old houses that give their peculiar charm to such towns as Hildesheim, Nürnberg, or Rotenburg date mostly from the sixteenth century. Sculpture, wood-carving, casting in metal, were likewise practised by real artists, and though their names have mostly perished, their works remain in many churches. Nor were painters wanting, and the greatest artist of his time, Memling, was of German birth, though his work was done mainly in Flanders.

During the fifteenth century, Germany began to be influenced by the revival of learning which was bearing such wonderful fruit in Italy. Though it was not till 1409 that the first German university was founded, before the death of Frederick III. Leipzig had more than a dozen flourishing rivals. But Germany's greatest contribution to letters was the invention of printing. There have been numberless disputes as to which city had the honour of giving birth to the inventor, and which produced the first printed book. It seems established that Mainz may justly claim both distinctions, and that it was in 1439 that John Gutenberg set up the first printing-press in the city. At all events, before many years were over, every self-respecting town in south Germany and the Rhineland had its press; by the end of the century there were twenty-five in Nürnberg alone. It was fitting that Germany, about to initiate a revolution which was to alter the course of European history, should have created the means of spreading the new ideas.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XII

From the fall of the Hohenstaufen to the end of the fifteenth century the Gothic style of architecture was supreme in Germany. It is unfortunately not possible to distinguish clearly between different phases of German Gothic: there were no well-marked features peculiar to special periods, such as in England enable

us to subdivide Gothic architecture into the Early English, Decorated, and Perpendicular stages. Some of the most ornate Gothic structures of Germany were built in the thirteenth century, some of the most austere in the fifteenth, though as a rule there was a tendency towards greater elaboration of detail as time went on. Gothic churches are numerous in Germany, but in proportion to their numbers there are few which appeal strongly to anyone acquainted with the cathedrals of France and England.

From the first half of the thirteenth century, when Gothic was still a foreign importation and when most builders remained under the influence of Romanesque principles, date the Church of the Minorites and the decagonal part of the Church of St Gereon at Köln, and the Church of Our Lady at Trier. Here the imitation of French models is plain. In Magdeburg Cathedral, on the other hand, the choir, eastern towers, and eastern bays of the nave, which were built at this period, while French in their general characteristics, exhibit in their details many features peculiar to Germany. The same may be said of the western parts of Halberstadt Cathedral, another important example of early Gothic. The churches mentioned are all constructed on Gothic principles, and their ornamentation is essentially Gothic in character; but they are plain and severe, and the architects have attempted no startling effects.

Of fully-developed Gothic the following examples may be specially noted:

Köln: Cathedral. (Though in its present form it was largely built in the nineteenth century—especially the nave and the west front—medieval designs have generally been followed.)

Strassburg: Cathedral. Nave and west front. (Note in the illustration facing p. 128, the elaborate windows and buttresses and contrast them with the corresponding parts of a church in the severe Early English style, then in vogue in England. The famous west front was begun in 1277, but the work was much interrupted, and the spire was not built till the fifteenth century. The architect of at least the lower stages was Erwin of Steinbach, one of the greatest medieval artists. Many features of the design are derived from French models, but the prominence of perpendicular lines was in the thirteenth century a peculiarity of German Gothic.)

Freiburg: Cathedral. (A very fine example of the style.)

Metz: Cathedral. (Essentially French in character.)

Xanten: St Victor's.

Oppenheim (near Mainz): St Catherine's.

Frankfurt-on-Main: Cathedral.

Regensburg: Cathedral.

Augsburg: Cathedral.
Ulm: The Minster. (A very fine example of late Gothic, and specially interesting as a parish church which owes its magnificence to the ambition and artistic interest of the burgher class. It contains much admirable carving, in both stone and wood, and some excellent glass, all dating from the close of the Middle Ages.)
Nürnberg: Several churches, of which St Lawrence's is the most notable. (These also yield striking evidence of the prosperity and enthusiasm of the German towns of the later Middle Ages.)

It is only in details that the churches named show national peculiarities. In material, ground-plan, and general design, they offer nothing unfamiliar to the Englishman or Frenchman. It is otherwise, however, with the brick churches, and the so-called hall-churches. The use of brick made impossible elaborate flying buttresses, large windows, and intricate mouldings. Brick churches are as a rule plain and solid in appearance, with none of the delicacy and grace which characterize the Gothic churches of France. Nevertheless, builders in brick often produced an impressive effect by careful consideration of the proportions of the structure, and by the use of arcades and coloured tiles. The interiors were further relieved by metal-work and carved wood, mere accessories in a stone church, but often an integral part of the design in one of brick. Brick churches are very numerous in north Germany, many being built in the Hanseatic towns in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Among the most noteworthy are the following:

Lübeck: St Mary's (the finest of all, and a model for countless other churches.)
Cathedral (choir and aisles.)
Rostock: St Mary's.
Stralsund: St Mary's.
Schwerin: Cathedral.
Breslau: Several churches, in particular St Elizabeth's.

The general plan of these churches is that familiar to Englishmen. They have a lofty nave, aisles lower in height, and a choir. But north Germany also contains many examples of the so-called hall-churches, with aisles equal in height to the nave, and either no choir at all or a very short one. This form of church became increasingly fashionable as the Middle Ages drew near their end, and many buildings of the kind were erected in the fifteenth century. Most hall-churches were of brick, but there are numerous fine examples in stone. The type is not unknown in other countries, but it appears so frequently in Germany that it may be counted a peculiarity of German medieval architecture. Among the hall-churches of note may be mentioned:

Marburg: St Elizabeth's. (One of the earliest examples.)

Münster: Cathedral.
Stendal: The Minster, St Mary's.
Brandenburg: St Catherine's.
Danzig: St Mary's.
Meissen: Cathedral.
Munich: Church of Our Lady.
Landshut: Church of the Holy Ghost.

Remains of medieval monasteries are less numerous than might be expected. In Protestant states, while monastic churches were often preserved, the other buildings of a religious house were often entirely swept away. Even in Catholic states many monasteries have been suppressed, and those that remain have generally been radically altered in post-medieval times. The abbey of Maulbronn (Cistercian), founded in the twelfth century, well preserved and carefully restored, perhaps retains more than any other its medieval appearance. Bebenhausen near Tübingen also has a highly interesting Cistercian abbey. The Abbey of Laach, near Coblenz, may likewise be mentioned.

Secular Architecture:

Domestic buildings dating from the Middle Ages, though not as numerous as is often supposed, are to be found in most of the historic German towns. Private houses in the Gothic style survive in some numbers at Köln, Frankfurt, Hanover, Hildesheim, Brunswick, Halberstadt, Lübeck, Rostock, Stralsund, Nürnberg, and Regensburg. At Wimpfen-am-Berg (near Heilbronn), there are interesting remains of an imperial palace of the thirteenth century.

Gothic town-halls are comparatively common. Good examples are to be seen at Aachen, Köln (central part and tower), Trier (old Rathaus, now museum), Münster, Hanover (old Rathaus), Hildesheim, Halberstadt, Goslar, Bremen, Lübeck, Stralsund, Danzig, Jena, Rotenburg (part), Regensburg (west part), and Munich (old Rathaus).

Relics of the military architecture of the Middle Ages are of course plentiful, but there are few substantial remains of earlier date than the thirteenth century. The disturbed state of Germany down to comparatively modern times made it worth while to keep a castle in repair and to enlarge and remodel it as military science progressed. Early work was thus often swept away. Moreover, the wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries destroyed many medieval castles. "Blown up by order of Turenne" is the epitaph of not a few. Germany therefore has little of peculiar interest to offer to the student of military architecture in the Middle Ages, though her many ruined castles are of course a highly picturesque feature of certain districts.

Castles are naturally most numerous in hilly regions. The Rhineland abounds in them. Among the finest are Altenahr, Marksburg (near Braubach; the only medieval castle on the

Rhine which is not a ruin), Rheinfels (St Goar), Reichenberg (near St Goarshausen), Rheinstein (Assmanshausen: as it now stands, largely built in the nineteenth century, but carefully modelled on medieval designs), Ehrenburg (on the Moselle not far from Coblenz). Alsace also contains many interesting remains, of which the castles of Girbaden and Rappoltsweiler may be specially mentioned. Würtemberg and Bavaria had innumerable castles, but with very few exceptions these have fallen into complete ruin (like the famous castle of Hohenstaufen), or been rebuilt in modern times (like the ancestral stronghold of the Hohenzollerns).

Owing to the scarcity of stone and the lack of strong positions, castles were relatively rare in north and central Germany. West Prussia, however, possesses in the castle of Marienburg the finest medieval fortification in all Germany. Like most buildings of the Teutonic Order, it was constructed of brick. The High Court (to the right in the illustration) was begun in 1280, the Middle Court (to the left) in 1335. The castle was at once a stronghold, a monastery, and, from 1309 to 1466, the residence of the Grand Master and the headquarters of the Order.

In Saxony the Albrechtsburg at Meissen is a good example of a late medieval fortification; and in Thuringia parts of the Wartburg date from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

While German castles have suffered severely, the walls and gates of the towns often remain in a good state of preservation. The fortifications of cities which have maintained their prosperity have as a rule been destroyed, but smaller towns not infrequently retain a large part of their medieval defences. Interesting gates or walls exist at Köln, Ahrweiler (near Remagen), Boppard, Oberwesel, Bacharach, Trier, Hagenau, Lübeck, Esslingen (near Stuttgart), Nürnberg, Nördlingen (between Nürnberg and Augsburg), Dinkelsbühl (not far from Nördlingen), Rotenburg, and Regensburg.

The Holstein Gate of Lübeck is one of the finest town-gates in Germany, and an excellent example of brick architecture.

CHAPTER XIII

REFORM OR REVOLUTION?

FREDERICK III.'s successor, Maximilian, was without question the most powerful prince in Germany. There seemed some hope that once again the crown might make its authority felt. Maximilian himself had many qualities likely to shed lustre on his royal dignity. He was handsome and active, a gallant knight and dashing sportsman; his mental gifts were considerable, he was eloquent, had been carefully educated, was a genuine patron of art and letters; he was keenly interested in military matters, and had withal great schemes for restoring the imperial power to what it had been in the days of Frederick Barbarossa. But all these promising traits were more than counterbalanced by his defects. He lacked firmness of purpose; no sooner had he entered upon one project than his fancy was caught by another; he was unpractical and visionary, fonder of his own dreams than of hard facts. Thus he never seemed quite sure whether he cared more for the welfare of his own family or for that of the Empire; he allowed himself to be drawn into vain enterprises in Italy; and—most disastrous of all—his notions of imperial dignity prevented him from taking advantage of the desire for reform which was manifest among the German princes. Many of these were seriously concerned at the disorder and lawlessness which prevailed, their own authority being often as little regarded as that of the Emperor. Projects of reform had been mooted in the days of Frederick III.; and



Photo, Underwood

The Holstein Gate, Lübeck

An example of the brick architecture of North Germany. The gate was built in 1477, and restored in 1871.

these were revived and urged upon Maximilian at several meetings of the imperial Diet. That body, originally an assembly of magnates, was now divided into three "colleges": the Electors formed the first; the princes, ecclesiastical and lay, the second; representatives of the imperial cities the third. Like the Emperor it had great power in theory, and very little in practice. Nevertheless it tried about this time to play the part of a German parliament. The greater princes, led by the Electors Berthold of Mainz and Frederick the Wise of Saxony, were anxious to provide a permanent revenue for the impoverished crown, to set up a central court of justice and a standing council of administration, and to divide Germany into ten "circles," over which were to be placed officers responsible for the maintenance of order. But the new institutions were to be controlled by the Diet, not by the Emperor: they would be the machinery of a federal state, in which the sovereign rights of the princes would remain intact; and Maximilian, with his high-flown notions of imperial prerogative, regarded them with unconcealed dislike. The reform party was indeed strong enough to force most of its proposals on the impecunious Emperor. But the new imperial chamber found its duties encroached upon by the old imperial court of justice which Maximilian galvanized into new life. The administrative council had its usefulness curtailed by a similar body which the Emperor established for his personal estates. The system of the "circles" came to little, for the new scheme was regarded by few with enthusiasm, and was greatly disliked by the cities and by the lesser nobility, who were unrepresented in the Diet. The only result of the movement was to establish much cumbersome machinery, which in later times made the task of reform more hopeless than ever.

Maximilian's foreign policy shows him in no better light than his rule at home. In most of his dealings he acted rather

as head of the Habsburgs than as head of the Empire. In the later Middle Ages, Germany's political relations with other states had been slight. Maximilian's Burgundian marriage, however, necessarily brought him into rivalry with France, which still kept a hold on some of Charles the Bold's fiefs. The Emperor's interests were widened still more by the marriage of his son Philip, the lord of Burgundy and the Netherlands, to Joanna of Castile. Joanna's parents were Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, who by uniting their realms had made Spain into a first-class power, which soon received a great accession of strength by the discoveries and conquests of her subjects in America. Philip died in 1506, Joanna soon afterwards went mad, and the heir to Spain and all the Burgundian and Habsburg lands was their little son Charles. Thus Maximilian was interested not merely in the question of the Burgundian inheritance, but also in the struggle between France and Spain for the supremacy in Italy. The conflict had been initiated in 1494 by Charles VIII. of France, who had some claim to the kingdom of Naples, and as his successor Louis XII. claimed Milan also, the French had for a time occupied both these states. Ferdinand of Aragon, who himself had rights in the south, soon drove them out of Naples: but till 1525 they managed generally to hold Milan. Now Milan was in theory a fief of the Empire. It moreover commanded the route into Italy over the St Gotthard Pass. Maximilian was anxious to obtain for Austria a new outlet to the Adriatic; and at the same time he wished to increase his importance in the eyes of the French, for he had dreams of a French marriage which might make his grandson Charles lord of all western Europe. Actuated by one or other of these motives, he made various attempts to intervene in Italy. None of them led to any useful result. In 1508 an expedition to gain the imperial crown and chastise Venice was easily checked by the forces of that city. Shortly after-

wards Maximilian joined the League of Cambrai, formed by all the great Powers to crush the wealthy republic; but beyond brutal ravages of Venetian territory the Germans did little. Later; changing his policy, he joined Henry VIII. of England in an attack on France, and after condescending to receive English pay, was rewarded by one or two towns near the western frontier of Flanders. But as a rule his foreign enterprises merely dissipated Maximilian's scanty revenues and diverted his attention from his proper task of ruling Germany.

Yet in his schemes for the aggrandizement of his family, Maximilian was as lucky as his father. The Spanish marriage of his son has already been mentioned. It is true that he fell just short of success in his attempts to secure the hand of a French princess for his grandson Charles. But Ferdinand, Charles's younger brother, was married to the daughter of the king of Hungary and Bohemia; and it was agreed that if the heir to those realms should die without issue, both should fall to Ferdinand. This arrangement accelerated the operation of the treaty made in the days of Frederick III., and in 1526 Hungary and Bohemia became Habsburg lands. Thus the present Austrian Empire owes the greater part of its territories to Maximilian.

The reign of Maximilian may be passed over quickly, for there was nothing conclusive about it. The time was one of transition. It is significant that Maximilian was called "the last of the knights." For all the dominating ideas of the Middle Ages were vanishing; all the conditions of politics, society, and thought were changing. New powers had appeared in Europe; a new and more subtle diplomacy was taking the place of the artless cunning of the politicians of the Middle Ages. Military tactics had been modified by the victories of the Swiss and Hussite infantry. The feudal horsemen had ceased to be the backbone of an army; in the Italian wars the issue of a battle had generally been

decided by the Spanish or Swiss foot, and the German armies of the time owed their strength, not to the mounted knights and men-at-arms, but to the infantry called Landsknechts—paid troops recruited from the lower classes and armed with long pikes. Fire-arms, moreover, were now of great value in warfare, and a train of artillery was essential to the success of a big campaign. It followed that the importance of the lesser nobles and the knights was greatly diminished, for only the great princes could afford to pay regiments of foot or buy cannon.

The most powerful cause of change, however, was the Renaissance. Every aspect of that wonderful movement was to be seen in Germany at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Everywhere the political and social conceptions of the Middle Ages were disappearing, and with them went the respect for old German customs and laws. The prevalent enthusiasm for antiquity revived the influence of the Civil Law of Rome, with its hard and fast definitions of rights and obligations. Landowners began to despise the customary rights of their peasants, to evict them from their holdings and seize their common woods and pastures. The authority of the sovereign received new sanctions; absolute monarchy seemed the only right form of government. In England, France, and Spain the power of the crown had already risen; in Germany it was not yet certain whether the new notions would operate in favour of the Emperor or the princes.

On German art the influence of the Renaissance was equally great. Gothic architecture was first modified, then ousted, by classical styles. The change was of more than doubtful value; though in domestic architecture the period of transition produced most of the work that delights us in the streets of the old towns. More healthy was the development of painting. Great artists like Albrecht Dürer of Nürnberg, Hans Holbein of Augsburg (familiar to us by his work in England), and Lucas

Kranach, court-artist to Frederick the Wise of Saxony, show by their disregard for medieval convention, their insight into character, and their command of their materials, how far German painting had advanced within the past few years. The cities were still the chief centres of German art. In the south especially, they were enthusiastic patrons of music. It was in the early days of the Renaissance that the Meistersinger of Nürnberg and other towns flourished; and if they presently began to sacrifice beauty and power to their pedantic regard for correctness of form, the vitality of German music was saved by the people, for many of the finest and most famous of the German folk-songs date from about this time.

But in Germany the Renaissance was pre-eminently a revival of learning. The celebrated men of the German Renaissance were nearly all scholars, eager students of the wisdom of antiquity. A great impetus was given to education; new schools were founded everywhere. The classical literature of Rome was enthusiastically read, edited, and imitated. Greek was soon taken up with equal zest: and the influence of Greek philosophy made itself evident in the appearance of a series of mathematicians and astronomers, one of the earliest of whom, Johann Müller, commonly called Regiomontanus, founded at Nürnberg the first observatory in Germany, and by his writings contributed not a little to the successes of the explorers of the time in unknown lands and seas.

In Italy, the contempt for medieval ideas and the interest in antiquity had led to an unbridled individualism, an utter contempt for the restraints of religion and morality. A similar effect was here and there visible in Germany, but only seldom. The German of the Renaissance was generally as public-spirited, as upright, and as religious a man as his grandfather. It is characteristic that the two greatest Humanists of Germany, Desiderius Erasmus and Johann Reuchlin, are best remembered for their services to theology.

It was the former's edition of the Greek Testament that rendered possible the intelligent discussion of Christian doctrine; while Reuchlin renewed the long-extinct study of Hebrew. And these names remind one that along with the revival of learning went a burning desire for the reform of the Church.

Erasmus, Reuchlin, and their fellows had no quarrel with Catholic doctrine: but they could not avoid a critical attitude towards the clergy and many institutions and practices of the Church. For controlling as they did the universities and most of the schools, the clergy in general regarded the new learning with bitter hostility. They seemed unable to distinguish between the essentials of their faith and the philosophical and scientific theories that had hitherto been accepted by the orthodox. Every change in educational method seemed to them a blow at Catholic doctrine. In many quarters a knowledge of Hebrew or even of Greek exposed a man to grave suspicion. Reuchlin himself was accused of heresy because he opposed the destruction of Jewish writings in which Christianity was attacked. It is no wonder that Erasmus and his disciples retaliated with bitter satires on ecclesiastical abuses and the ignorance of the monks and the clergy. Such works as the "Praise of Folly," by Erasmus himself, or the "Letters of Obscure Men," written under the inspiration of the learned knight Ulrich von Hutten, had a profound effect on public opinion, already inflamed against the Church. For there was much ground for complaint. Frederick III. had refused to avail himself of the reforms passed by the Council of Basel, and his acceptance of the Concordat of Vienna in 1448 had left Germany defenceless before the Papacy. In England, France, and even Spain many claims of the Pope were successfully resisted by the State. But in Germany papal authority was exerted to the full. The Pope drew enormous sums of



Photo. Photochrom Co

The Knochenhauer Amtshaus, Hildesheim]

The headquarters of the Guild of the Butchers. This is one of the finest examples in Germany of the domestic architecture of the early Renaissance. The house is of timber, and was built in 1529.

money from the country. He disposed of ecclesiastical benefices at his will. All the immunities claimed for the clergy by church law were recognized: no one in orders—from gravedigger to archbishop—could be brought before a secular court of justice; while the ecclesiastical courts interfered in many spheres only remotely connected with religion. The clergy in general were corrupt, worldly, immoral, and preached little but a crude doctrine of justification by the mechanical performance of works conventionally deemed good. Thus the gibes of the Humanists found a ready response among the people at large. Germany was not anti-religious, it was anti-clerical, and above all anti-papal. What was to come out of the strife? Would the critics win? Would the Church be purified from abuses, and stand forth as the leader of progressive thought? Or must there be downright rebellion?

Though men did not realize it, these questions were answered when on 31st October 1517, an Augustinian friar, professor of theology at the University of Wittenberg, nailed to a church door in that town a paper containing ninety-five theses, which he declared himself ready to defend against all opponents.

LIBRARY OF THE BOMBAY BRANCH OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY

CHAPTER XIV

THE REFORMATION

THE man who flung down the challenge was Martin Luther. His parents were Thuringian peasants, and in 1483, when Martin was born, his father was working as a miner at Eisleben. An energetic and enterprising man, Hans Luther presently moved to Mansfeld, where he became one of the most respected citizens in the town. As a child, Martin was very strictly brought up; his father had high ambitions, and wished to make his son a learned man. At the age of fourteen the boy was sent to the Latin School of Magdeburg; but after a year he was moved to Eisenach, where he lodged with Frau Ursula Cotta in a house still to be seen. Thence, in 1501, he went to pursue higher studies at the University of Erfurt, not far away; and after a course of four years he became Master of the Liberal Arts. It was his father's wish that he should be a lawyer. But in both Eisenach and Erfurt, the young man's mind had come under strong religious influences. Erfurt was a centre of theological learning; and many of his teachers were sympathetic with the methods of the Renaissance, and eager for the reform of ecclesiastical abuses. Luther became a prey to anxiety about the state of his soul; and shortly after taking his degree, he joined the Order of Augustinian Friars. This was perhaps the least degenerate of all the religious Orders, and as it claimed to follow rules of life prescribed by the great St Augustine, the writings of that father were studied by the friars with more attention than

was commonly given to them by contemporary theologians. Thus, when Luther's fits of religious depression still continued, he was comforted by Staupitz, the Vicar-General of the Order, with the doctrine that man's struggles after righteousness can avail nothing, that he is justified by faith, and saved by the grace of God alone. Eagerly accepting this teaching, Luther began to ponder over it and work out its practical consequences. Soon, however, he was called to a more active life. In 1502 Frederick the Wise, Elector of Saxony, had founded a new university at his capital town of Wittenberg. At the recommendation of Staupitz, Luther, now in priest's orders, was appointed professor of philosophy. But he continued his theological enquiries; and in 1511 a visit to Rome, undertaken in a spirit of piety and reverence, opened his eyes to the corruption and worldliness of the Church's rulers. In 1512 he became a doctor of theology, and was then given the more congenial position of professor in that subject. At the same time, his sermons in the castle-church attracted great attention. Students came from all parts of Germany to attend his lectures; the people of Saxony regarded him as a great spiritual leader; and he became a favourite of the Elector, who was delighted at the success of his university. Luther, however, was all this time a faithful member of the Church. What made him rebel was the abuse of indulgences.

In theory, and originally in practice, an indulgence was nothing more than a remission of penance. But to the uninstructed layman, the performance of penance cancelled the guilt of sin; hence if the Church remitted penance, it removed the guilt as well. To make matters worse, penance was often commuted for a money-payment, to be expended on pious uses. Then the view was adopted that purgatory was a penance, and that freedom from its pains might be secured by an indulgence. Thus the popular opinion was that God's

pardon and admission to Heaven might be bought with hard cash. Officially the Church never held this belief. But nothing was done to disabuse the mind of the public. Their superstitious ideas were rather encouraged by the possibility of purchasing indulgences for future offences and for the benefit of one's dead friends. And at the time of the Renaissance, indulgences, to all outward seeming, were simply a means of raising money.

Two successive popes, Julius II. and Leo X., had offered for sale a very valuable indulgence to raise funds for the building of the great new church of St Peter's at Rome. In Germany the indulgence was farmed by the archbishop of Mainz, who appointed as his travelling agent John Tetzel, a Dominican friar. In 1517 Tetzel, in great pomp and circumstance, was going round north Germany, doing a roaring trade. Frederick the Wise refused to admit him to his electorate, but many of his subjects crossed the frontier to buy Tetzel's wares. Some of Luther's flock made purchases. He refused to recognize their validity, and in wrath drew up his famous theses. They were entirely concerned with indulgences, and maintained, among other opinions, that an indulgence cannot remit guilt, that it cannot apply to purgatory, that only God can forgive sins, and that if He has forgiven a man's sins, an indulgence is unnecessary, if He has not, it is useless. The document was printed in both Latin and German; it had an enormous sale throughout Germany and aroused tremendous enthusiasm.

Tetzel and others published replies. They argued little. Their main position was that since indulgences had been sanctioned by both General Councils and Popes, it was impious to question their lawfulness. In Rome the dispute at first caused little concern. Tetzel being a Dominican friar and Luther an Augustinian, the controversy was regarded as merely an outburst of the standing jealousy between the two Orders. Besides, the traffic in indulgences had often been

denounced before without much effect. On learning, however, of the excitement in Germany, Leo summoned Luther to appear at Rome. At this point Frederick the Wise intervened; he was supported by the Emperor Maximilian, who had no particular love for the Pope and seems to have been rather amused by the controversy; and Leo granted their request that the rebellious friar might state his case before Cardinal Cajetan, who was shortly to meet the German Diet at Augsburg. The Cardinal made no impression on Luther, who refused surrender, and on leaving Augsburg made an appeal "from the Pope ill-informed to the Pope to be better-informed." A further emissary from Rome had friendly interviews with Luther, found him more conciliatory than had been expected, and agreed that the dispute should be submitted to arbitration. Meanwhile both parties should keep silent.

Then, however, Dr John Eck of Ingolstadt, a famous leader of the conservative school, challenged Andrew Karlstadt, one of Luther's colleagues, to a public disputation on the questions at issue. Luther was at once drawn back into controversy. Accompanied by many of the Wittenberg professors, and with an escort of two hundred students armed with halberds, he journeyed to Leipzig, where before an enormous and excited audience he and Eck put forward the utmost resources of their logic. Eck's aim was to force Luther into the assertion of undoubted heresy. His skill drove the reformer into a denial of the infallibility of popes or general councils, and, in the summer of 1519, he went off to Rome to procure Luther's condemnation.

Meanwhile the Emperor Maximilian had died, and the thoughts of Germany and the Pope were somewhat diverted from Luther to the question of the successor to the Empire. The Electors shrank from choosing so powerful a sovereign as Maximilian's heir, Charles,—king of Spain and Naples, lord of Burgundy, the Netherlands, and the hereditary estates

of the Habsburgs, with the prospect of soon securing control over Hungary and Bohemia. But when the name of Frederick the Wise was suggested, the Elector refused to stand; no other German prince seemed suitable; the candidature of Francis I. of France had little to commend it; and finally, on agreeing to certain reforms in the government and promising to employ German officials in Germany and to introduce no foreign troops, Charles was after all elected. He was only nineteen years of age, had hitherto lived in Flanders and Spain, could not speak German, and had shown little interest in his German lands. Consequently not very much was known of him, but he was said to be gloomy, taciturn, and rather stupid. Nevertheless, enthusiasts like Ulrich von Hutten hoped he would lead a national movement against the Pope.

Charles was unable to appear in Germany till late in 1520. Meanwhile the reform movement was making remarkable advances. Luther had been led to look more closely into the foundations of papal authority and the whole system of Catholic doctrine. In 1520 he published several important writings. "The Liberty of a Christian Man" elaborated with great force the doctrine of Justification by Faith alone. In the treatise "On the Babylonish Captivity of the Church" Luther attacked the Roman doctrine of the sacraments, and advocated the marriage of the clergy. Great as was the impression produced by these works, they were overshadowed by the appeal "To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation," a popular and trenchant statement of the need for reform and of Luther's own position, with much fiery denunciation of the corruption and immorality of both clergy and laymen. Immense enthusiasm was aroused. Monasteries were attacked; in many places the clergy went in peril of their lives; when, in this same year, the Pope issued a bull of excommunication against Luther, many bishops dared not publish it. As for Luther himself, he refused to retreat an inch, denounced the bull as a forgery,

and solemnly burned it in public. He was now cut off from the Church.

It was about this time that the Emperor, free at last to deal with German affairs, summoned the Diet to meet at Worms early in 1521. The princes hoped to gain his consent to further reforms of the kind forced on Maximilian. Charles wanted money and troops for an impending war with France. But the chief problem was the policy to be adopted towards Luther. There could indeed be little doubt as to the Emperor's sympathies. Though no fanatic, he had been strictly educated under clerical influence, and he was well aware that to support heresy would lose him the hearts of his Spanish subjects, some of whom had just been in revolt. But it was not known how far either his inclination or his power would carry him in an attempt to check the movement for reform. Charles found the princes in no submissive mood. They successfully urged him to revive the administrative Council, which had for some time disappeared; and the Imperial Chamber of Justice was reconstituted. Charles, it is true, managed to bring these bodies more under the control of the crown. But nothing came of suggestions for providing him with a permanent revenue; and though he was promised an army of 25,000 men, that number fell far short of his hopes. Charles wisely recognized that he must make a show of approaching the question of reform with an open mind. Disregarding Luther's excommunication, he summoned him before the Diet, and gave him an imperial safe-conduct. After a triumphal progress through central Germany, Luther appeared at Worms. He refused to withdraw anything he had said or written unless it was proved false out of Scripture. "Here," he cried, "I stand. Nought else can I do. God help me." Charles with a statesman's eye for practical issues, refused to allow debate on points of theology, and put to Luther the plain question: Was a General Council infallible? When Luther

answered no, he was dismissed. A final attempt to secure agreement came to nothing; and with the consent of the majority of the Diet he was put under the ban of the Empire. For another three weeks, he was protected by his safe-conduct; at the end of that time he would be hunted down as an outlaw. But while crossing Thuringia on his way home Luther disappeared. The war with France had already begun. Charles was called away, and did not return for nine years.

Luther's disappearance had been arranged by the Elector of Saxony, who had him seized and taken to his castle of the Wartburg, above Eisenach, where the reformer had been to school. In the castle the fugitive remained hidden for ten months, working at his translation of the Bible, issuing numerous pamphlets under the signature of "Squire George," and troubled by spiritual conflicts, in one of which occurred the celebrated repulse of the devil by Luther's inkstand, the consequent stain on the wall remaining in undiminished blackness unto this day. Soon, however, bad news came from Wittenberg. The Reformation, like all great religious movements, gave rise to much uncontrolled fanaticism. A wild sect had arisen at Zwickau, claiming special inspiration from Heaven, rejecting infant baptism, and denouncing all forms and ceremonies in worship. Some had made their way to Wittenberg, where Karlstadt was inclined to favour them. The populace had begun to invade churches, break images and pictures, and compel the priests to abandon the established services. Heedless of danger, Luther hastened home, denounced the fanatics in a number of powerful sermons, and restored decency and order. Directly afterwards began a series of events which for the time rendered impossible the execution of the Edict of Worms.

The German knights, restless, impoverished, enthusiastic for Luther, thought that the situation was favourable for the confiscation of the lands of the Church, which might go to

recruit their own decaying fortunes. Headed by Franz von Sickingen and Ulrich von Hutten, the knights of the Rhineland, Franconia, and Swabia formed a confederacy and began operations by a sudden attack on the electorate of Trier. But the city of Trier held out successfully; and other princes, both reformers and Catholics, came to the Elector's help. Sickingen was killed while defending his castle of the Landstuhl, near Kaiserslautern. Hutten fled to Switzerland, where he soon met a miserable death on an island in the Lake of Zürich.

No sooner had the knights been put down than the peasants rose up. Though few of them were in actual want, they had many causes for discontent. As was explained above, they had suffered through the introduction of Roman Law and the weakening of medieval conventions, and the evil effects of these changes were made worse by the general rise in prices which followed the discovery of the mineral wealth of America. Among minor grievances were the game-laws, which were strict and vexatious. The peasants, moreover, had been affected by the atmosphere of the Renaissance, and were no longer inclined to accept their hardships as a matter of course. Finally, there was the Reformation. Social reform was no part of Luther's programme; but it was inevitable that his teaching of the equality of all men in the sight of God should be given a material as well as a spiritual significance, and his denunciations of ecclesiastical corruption must have seemed to justify rebellion against the great prelates, who were among the most oppressive landlords. Discontent had long been growing; the peasants had formed associations for the redress of grievances; one or two small risings had already been put down. In May 1524, however, a very formidable revolt broke out in the Black Forest, and soon all southern and central Germany was in a blaze. Monasteries and castles were attacked; but in Swabia the peasants kept their heads, and in the Twelve Articles which set forth their demands, they asked for such

concessions as the abolition of serfdom, the diminution of rents and services, freedom to hunt, fish, and use the woods, and the right of choosing their parish priests. As the rising spread north, however, it became more brutal and its objects more extreme. In Franconia, where the rebels were led by Florian Geyer and Götz von Berlichingen, both of noble blood, a scheme for a democratic reform of the German constitution was drawn up. Here the rebels captured Heilbronn, forced many lords to accede to their demands, and were only checked by the heroic defence of the Marienberg at Würzburg. But it was in Thuringia that the rebellion was most extravagant. Led by the fanatical Thomas Münzer, the rebels committed unspeakable atrocities, and pursued fantastic plans for setting up a communistic state, which should have no ruler but God.

Luther, after at first urging moderation on both sides, was horrified by the doings of the insurgents, wrote a pamphlet against the "murderous and plundering" peasants, and advocated relentless measures of repression. His denunciations, which ignored the undoubted grievances of the rebels, were extravagant and unnecessary. Once the princes had recovered themselves, the rising was soon suppressed. The Thuringians were routed by Philip of Hesse at Frankenhausen, and within the next few weeks the Alsatians, Swabians, and Franconians were successively overcome. A most savage revenge was taken, and the last state of the peasants became considerably worse than the first.

The failure of the Peasants' Revolt made it clear that whatever benefits the Reformation might bestow on the lower classes, they would be of a purely religious nature. It was otherwise with the princes, whose authority was increased not merely by their suppression of the recent disorders, but also by the rapid spread of Luther's views.

In 1524 a congress was held at Regensburg by some of the

leading Catholic magnates. Of these the greatest was the Emperor's brother Ferdinand, to whom Charles in 1521 had handed over Austria and its dependencies. There were also present the two dukes of Bavaria, and the bishops of south Germany. It was resolved to resist the spread of Lutheran teaching. The reply came at once in the League of Torgau, formed for the defence of Lutheran principles by John the Steadfast, successor to Frederick the Wise, Philip, Landgrave of Hesse, several princes of the north, and the city of Magdeburg. The formation of this League was of course a flat defiance of the Edict of Worms and the Emperor's authority. But the Peasants' Revolt averted the outbreak of a religious war; and the Reformation continued its victorious career. Great cities like Hamburg, Lübeck, and Nürnberg accepted the new teaching. A most extraordinary revolution was carried out in East Prussia, where the Grand Master of the Teutonic knights, Albert of Brandenburg, turned Lutheran, dissolved the Order, and made its lands into an hereditary duchy under the overlordship of Poland. Ecclesiastical property was confiscated, the Church reorganized according to the teachings of Luther, and the educational system thoroughly reformed. In Switzerland, at the same time, the radical opinions of Ulrich Zwingli of Zürich were spreading fast; while shortly afterwards Lutheran teaching was adopted by Frederick I. of Denmark and Gustavus Vasa of Sweden.

The Reformation, however, was threatened by a brilliant success of the Emperor in his war with France. Charles's main objects were the conquest of Milan and the assertion of his claim to the French duchy of Burgundy. Most of the fighting was in north Italy; Charles generally had the better of it; but nothing decisive happened till 1525, when at the great battle of Pavia Francis I. was taken prisoner. To secure his release he agreed to surrender Milan and Burgundy.

But just as Charles was about to go to Germany and put down heresy, the faithless Francis repudiated his promises and formed with several Italian states a new league against the Emperor. Unable to be present at the Diet held in 1526 at Speyer, Charles instructed Ferdinand to adopt a conciliatory attitude. It was therefore resolved that in the matter of reform each state should so act "that it shall be ready to answer to God and the Emperor." It was also understood that Charles would try to secure the summons of a general council of the Church, which would deal with the whole religious question.

Realizing the Emperor's weakness, the princes of the reform party treated the resolution of the Diet as a permission to act as they pleased in their respective territories. Of course there were many Lutheran congregations in existence. In Prussia and several cities, as we have seen, the new doctrines had been officially accepted. As a rule, however, Catholic organization, discipline, and worship remained in theory unchanged, even where most of the population ignored them. But after 1526 many princes made church reform part of their home policy. The clergy were driven away, monasteries suppressed, ecclesiastical property confiscated. The head of the State became head of the Church, and called himself "bishop." Each reforming principality had its own church, organized according to the counsel of Luther and his learned and cautious friend Melanchthon. The pastors of parish churches and the superintendents of districts were alike appointed by the secular government. In matters of worship Luther was of a conservative turn; he would allow anything which to his mind was not expressly forbidden in the Bible; but the services were gradually modified till their main features were congregational hymn-singing and the sermon. Luther was now leading a quiet yet active life. He was pressing on with his translation of the Bible, which

was finished in 1534, and was destined to exert an incalculable influence on German speech and literature as well as on German life as a whole. He and his friends, too, were busily drawing up rules for the discipline and conduct of the clergy and schemes for the reform of education: for while much of the confiscated wealth of the Church went into the treasuries of the princes, a substantial proportion was devoted to the founding of charitable institutions and schools, the training of children being a matter in which Luther was specially interested.

In making such sweeping changes the reformers had nothing to fear from the Habsburgs, whose hands were full elsewhere. In 1527 Charles had turned his arms against Pope Clement VII., who had joined the league against him. A mixed army of Italians, Spaniards, and Germans marched on Rome, carried the walls by storm, plundered and ravished without mercy for over a week, and finally took the Pope prisoner. After some months Clement came to terms with Charles, but the latter was kept in Italy by the vigorous though vain efforts of the French to recover their ascendency. It was not till 1529 that the war ended by the Peace of Cambrai, in which the French renounced all claims in Italy and the overlordship of Artois and Flanders. Not long afterwards Charles was crowned Emperor by the Pope at Bologna, and the two pledged themselves to work in harmony for the extirpation of heresy.

It was not likely that Charles would be able to give much time to this pious task. A terrible danger was threatening Germany from the East. For about a century and a half the Ottoman Turks had been established in the Balkan peninsula; in 1453 they had captured Constantinople and thus put an end to the long enfeebled existence of the East Roman Empire. After a pause in their advance, they began about 1520 to press on against Hungary under the leadership of the great sultan, Soliman the Magnificent. In 1526

Lewis II. of Hungary was slain at the disastrous battle of Mohacz, and more than half the country fell into the hands of the Turks. In accordance with the treaty made by Maximilian, Lewis was succeeded in both Hungary and Bohemia by his brother-in-law Ferdinand of Habsburg. Ferdinand's heritage brought him nothing but trouble. To begin with, he had much difficulty in securing his recognition by the Hungarian nobility. Then, in 1529, the Turks advanced again, entered Austria, and laid siege to Vienna. The princes of Germany, seriously alarmed, sank their religious differences, and sent a great army to the rescue. The Turks had to retreat, but most of Hungary remained for many years under their overlordship and they were still an imminent menace to Germany.

Although Catholics and Reformers had fought together against the Turks, their relations were becoming more and more strained. At the second Diet of Speyer, in 1529, the Catholics carried an edict forbidding further religious changes; and the Reformers originated the name Protestant by the solemn protest which they drew up against the decree. The document was signed by the Elector of Saxony, the Landgrave of Hesse, the Margrave of Ansbach, three other princes, all of the north, and fourteen imperial cities. The Diet, and afterwards the Emperor, refused to consider the protest; but it showed that the Reformation could only be checked by force.

In 1530 Charles at last appeared in Germany, and at Augsburg met the Diet, which concerned itself almost entirely with the religious difficulty. The Protestants presented the Augsburg Confession—a statement of their beliefs, drawn up with great care by Luther and Melanchthon, who had studiously emphasized the points on which they agreed with the old faith. Four Swabian cities, which had accepted Zwingli's teachings, presented a confession of their own. The Catholics replied to the Lutheran manifesto by a "Con-

futation" written by Eck; Melanchthon, who was in the town, vainly made every concession he could; Charles demanded from the Protestants an unreserved abjuration, refused to accept their rejoinder to Eck, and, with the consent of a majority of the Diet, issued the so-called "Recess of Augsburg," which gave the Protestants five months to return to the Church, after which recalcitrants would be put down by force. During the following winter several of the chief Protestant princes and cities formed the League of Schmalkalden, pledging themselves to common resistance to the execution of the Recess of Augsburg. As usual, however, civil war was averted and Protestantism helped by trouble outside Germany. The Turks were again on the move. Charles, in need of all the support he could get, thought it well to conciliate the new confederacy, and by the Peace of Nürnberg in 1532 he agreed that no measures against the Protestants should be taken until the meeting of a General Council. He had his reward in the support of the Protestants against the Turks, who in face of the large force confronting them, retreated without doing much harm.

Nevertheless the multifarious demands of Charles's enormous territories again kept him away from Germany for several years. First Italy demanded his attention, then Spain. Next, he found it necessary to organize an expedition against the pirates of Tunis, who were the terror of the Mediterranean. The enterprise was a brilliant success: but it did no good to Charles's position in Europe. In 1536 he began another war with Francis, who had renewed his claims to Milan, and, to the scandal of Christendom, had made an alliance with the Sultan Soliman. After some indecisive fighting, a truce was made in 1538.

Protestantism in the meantime continued its rapid progress in Germany. In 1534 Duke Ulrich of Würtemberg, who years before had been driven from his principality for mis-

government, succeeded in recovering his heritage at the battle of Laufen on the Neckar. He at once established Protestantism in his duchy by the usual methods, much of the confiscated wealth of the Church being spent on the young university of Tübingen. This was a very notable victory for the Reformation, which in the south had hitherto been accepted by a few cities alone. About the same time Lutheranism became the religion of Pomerania.

It seemed for a time as if the prestige of Protestantism might be damaged by the extraordinary events which in 1534 came to pass in the Westphalian town of Münster. Of all the fanatical by-products of the Reformation, the sect of the Anabaptists was the most conspicuous. They rejected the authority of Church and Bible, claiming to be guided by direct and continuous inspiration; they refused to admit the right of the State to interfere in religious affairs; rigid adherence to a narrow and fantastic code of morals seemed to them the essence of Christianity; they were opposed to infant baptism, and, as their name implies, baptised their adherents over again; they believed that the second coming of Christ was near at hand, and that it should be prepared for by the establishment of a communistic "Kingdom of Zion." Anabaptist preachers from the Netherlands, led by Jan Matthys of Haarlem, won over the lower classes of Münster, drove out the bishop and his supporters, and established a republican government, which abolished private property, introduced polygamy, and massacred all who opposed it. Matthys soon died, whereupon a certain Jan of Leyden, calling himself King of Zion, succeeded for a time in ruling as a despot. The bishop of Münster, however, found support from many of the princes, both Protestant and Catholic, Philip of Hesse being particularly zealous in his cause. Münster was besieged and captured, the Anabaptist leaders were executed, and the authority and religion of the bishop restored.

Alarming as it was, this episode did nothing to check the advance of Protestantism. Great successes were achieved in many parts. In 1535 Joachim I., the Elector of Brandenburg, died, and his lands were divided between his two sons. Whereas Joachim had been a strong Catholic, his younger son, John, who received the district called the Neumark, at once introduced Protestantism into his lands; while the elder, Joachim II., who held the electoral title, broke away from Rome four years later and set up a state church, though like Henry VIII. in England he strove to retain most of the Catholic doctrines. To understand what happened in Saxony, it must be remembered that since 1485 the lands of the Wettin family had been divided into two parts. One branch of the house kept the electoral dignity, and ruled over the family possessions round Wittenberg, and over southern Thuringia. The other, with the title of Duke, had the old Mark of Meissen, with Leipzig as capital, and northern Thuringia. We have seen how successive Electors were pillars of the Reformation. On the other hand, Duke George remained Catholic till his death in 1539. Then, however, his brother Henry established Lutheranism, which was upheld by the next duke, Maurice, who succeeded in 1541. In the Rhineland, the Elector Palatine, finding that all his subjects were turning Protestant, took the same course himself; and even the archbishop of Köln began to reform the Church in his own electorate.

It is often said that the German Reformation was the work of the princes. In a sense that assertion is true. From the beginning the princes directed and controlled the movement. The new churches were not what we should call free churches; for the authority of Rome was substituted the authority of the temporal power. And it is probable that but for the support of the princes, Protestantism would have been stamped out by the Emperor. At the same time, the Reformation was un-

questionably welcomed by the people. A prince who reformed the Church in his territories was as a rule conforming to the wishes of his subjects, who not infrequently would have liked his policy to be still more radical. It was the Catholic princes and the bishops who had difficulties with their people. Austria, for instance, was only preserved for the old faith by the strictness of Ferdinand; the bishop of Passau had five candidates for ordination in five years; and in the years following the Diet of Augsburg many Catholic states were said to contain more monasteries than monks. In these circumstances it behoved Charles V. to walk warily. For a time he tried hard to bring about a reconciliation. In 1539 he agreed to a prolongation of the Peace of Nürnberg. Two years later, while the Diet was meeting at Regensburg, a conference was held in that town between theologians of both sides. Cardinal Contarini, who led the Catholics, was a man of moderate views and in favour of a considerable measure of reform. The chief Lutheran spokesman was the conciliatory Melanchthon. Agreement was reached on several important points. But the questions of the Sacrament and the authority of the Pope gave rise to great difficulties; and while these were still under consideration, the princes in the Diet showed plainly that they would accept no compromise. The negotiations therefore broke down. The princes had gained so much power through the division in the Church that they were determined to hinder a reconciliation.

At Regensburg it had once more been resolved that nothing should be settled till the meeting of a General Council. During the next four years Charles was again fighting the French and the Turks. By 1546, however, peace was made, and Charles, for the first time in his life, was able to devote his full energy to the suppression of heresy. His position was strengthened by the fact that a General Council had at last met at Trent in the Tyrol: but the Protestants, notwithstanding their

repeated demands for such an assembly, refused to recognize its authority, urging that it was not representative of the whole Church, and that the system of voting and rules of procedure were prejudicial to their cause.

Before the impending conflict began, Martin Luther died at Eisleben, on 18th February 1546. It has not been necessary to mention his name for some time. He was in fact rather the originator than the leader of the Reformation. So long afterwards, it is difficult to do him justice. He was neither a great thinker, a great scholar, nor a great organizer. As far as we can judge, Lutheran theology and church government owe much more to Melanchthon than to him. In controversy he was obstinate, violent, and frequently coarse; it was entirely his fault that nothing came of the attempt to unite the German and Swiss forms of Protestantism. His conception of religion was very narrow; he had little sympathy with the social grievances of the day; so long as his pet doctrines were upheld, he was willing to let the princes behave much as they liked. Yet he deserves his place among the heroes of the German nation, on which his personality had long-lasting influence. With all his faults, he was a brave, honest, and genial man. He gave the Germans their Bible, he gave them their hymns, and, it is hardly too much to say, he gave them their homes; for Luther's domestic life was for centuries an exemplar to the German family. Moreover, Luther was very human, and on questions of morality took as a rule a broad and sane view. "Christian freedom" was to him much more than a theological catchword; and his unconcealed pleasure in the good things of this life saved Germany from the freezing grip of Puritanism. And, while we may not admire his theology, men of all views will admit that he rendered a great service to religion by his insistence on its spiritual character, and his denunciation of the mechanical routine which was mistaken for spiritual life. Luther may

not have been a great scholar or statesman, but he was a great man.

It was well for Luther that he lived no longer, for the events of the next years would have grieved him much. The Schmalkaldic War, which began in 1546, was supposed to be fought on religious issues; but its course and result were really determined by political motives of a very sordid nature. Protestantism was not as strong as it looked. Many South Germans inclined to Zwinglian views, and there was not much love lost between them and the Lutherans. Several Protestant princes had held aloof from the Schmalkaldic League. The League itself, though very strong in appearance, was weakened by the mutual jealousies of its members, and moreover lacked an able leader. Above all, genuine religious zeal was wanting. Most of the princes, while they wished to serve God as well as Mammon, held more closely to the latter.

Before using force, Charles cleared the ground by diplomacy. He secured the neutrality of several Protestant states, including one or two members of the Schmalkaldic League, and even won over a few reforming princes to his side. His greatest triumph was his secret agreement with Maurice, duke of Saxony. Maurice was a Protestant, but he had quarrelled with his kinsman, John Frederick, the Elector, whose lands and title he moreover coveted. Charles won him over by promising to satisfy his ambitions. It was a brilliant move, for Maurice, both as general and politician, was beyond question the most able of the German princes.

In the summer of 1546 Charles pronounced sentence of outlawry against those who resisted his authority. He gathered in north Italy an army of Spaniards and Italians, which marched over the Brenner and Ehrenburg Passes into south Germany. There, instead of attacking him before the arrival of reinforcements from the Netherlands, the Protestant leaders remained on the defensive. Then news came that Maurice

of Saxony had attacked and overrun the electorate. John Frederick and Philip of Hesse at once hurried northwards. The Duke of Würtemberg and his fellow-Protestants of the south were at the Emperor's mercy, and soon surrendered.

The Elector of Saxony drove Maurice out of his lands, and indeed conquered most of the duchy. Maurice fled to the Emperor at Eger; then, advancing northwards, their united forces surprised the Elector's little army at Mühlberg on the Elbe, routed it utterly, and took John Frederick prisoner. He was forced to agree that Maurice should receive the electoral title and lands, but was nevertheless kept in captivity. Soon afterwards Philip of Hesse, in great straits, was persuaded by Ferdinand of Hungary, the Elector of Brandenburg, and Maurice himself, to surrender to the Emperor. Charles imposed very severe terms on him, and kept him in custody. The war seemed as good as over, for only in the extreme north did the Protestants attempt further resistance.

Meanwhile, the Pope had grown rather alarmed at the Emperor's wonderful success, which seemed to threaten his own political aims, and had removed the Council from Trent to Bologna. The defeated Protestants had promised to abide by its decisions; but once outside the Emperor's territories, the Council showed little zeal about reform and fell to defining articles of faith. Charles, however, at a Diet held at Augsburg in 1548, published the so-called "Interim," a provisional arrangement to secure religious peace till the Council should have finished its task. Broadly speaking, one may say that the Interim decreed the restoration of Catholicism, for only on the celibacy of the clergy and the grant of the cup to the laity in the Sacrament, were serious concessions made to the Protestants. As a rule, the Interim was accepted without open complaint, though Protestants generally were bitterly disappointed with it. But Maurice of Saxony enforced it only after making drastic alterations in its terms; and several


cities of the north, in particular Magdeburg, still refused to give way.

The Emperor's cause, however, seemed on the high-road to final success when, on the death of Pope Paul III., his successor recalled the Council to Trent, and showed himself ready to further the work of reform. Nevertheless, Charles's position depended largely on the support of Maurice, and Maurice was growing discontented. Charles had not rewarded him as liberally as he had expected. He had imprisoned Philip of Hesse, though Maurice, acting as he maintained with the Emperor's authority, had guaranteed his liberty. Moreover, Charles's treatment of the Protestants seemed to Maurice excessively harsh, and he strongly disliked the Interim. And, in common with most other princes, he thought that the Emperor was becoming far too powerful. Charles was working for the recognition of his son Philip as successor to the Empire and had secured his brother Ferdinand's reluctant consent to this scheme. Now Charles was known to care little for the interests of Germany, and it was likely that Philip, a thorough Spaniard, would neglect them still more. General discontent was also felt at Charles's use of foreign troops in the recent fighting—a flagrant breach of the promise he had given before his election.

But though the Emperor was generally regarded with hostility, Maurice had to act with caution. Charles was very powerful, and the Protestant princes were not likely to trust the chief agent of their undoing. So the duke accepted the task of reducing Magdeburg to submission. During the siege, however, he was carrying on negotiations with several leading Protestants, and with Henry II. of France, to whom he offered the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, Verdun, and Cambrai as the price of an alliance. Late in 1551 Magdeburg, after a valiant resistance, surrendered, but Maurice secretly gave the citizens permission to worship as they liked.

Soon afterwards the negotiations with France were successfully concluded, and Maurice, assured also of much support in Germany, determined to strike. He assembled at Erfurt the troops which had just reduced Magdeburg, and then, issuing a protest against the imprisonment of Philip of Hesse, the introduction into Germany of foreign soldiers, and the harsh treatment of Protestantism, he marched rapidly southward. Charles was at Innsbruck, keeping an eye on the Council of Trent: some of the Protestants had lately agreed to send representatives before it; and the Emperor, though he knew something of Maurice's intrigues, believed that on the whole things were going well. Maurice's sudden dash took him quite by surprise; the pass of Ehrenburg was stormed; Charles barely had time to escape from Innsbruck; and the assembled fathers of the Church scattered in confusion from Trent. At the same time the French crossed the frontier and occupied the districts named in their treaty with Maurice. Ferdinand, secretly annoyed at his brother's schemes regarding the succession to the Empire, refused to give him active help, and the Emperor was constrained to accept the terms of a treaty drawn up at Passau. Philip of Hesse was to be released; Maurice and his friends were to disband their troops; the question of religion and the complaints against the Emperor were to be dealt with by the Diet; and the Interim should be suspended.

It was three years before the Diet met. Meanwhile Charles was trying hard to improve his position by fighting the French and intriguing with the princes. But he achieved little, and completely failed in his attempt to recover Metz. The one happy event, from his point of view, was the death of Maurice, slain in the moment of victory at Sievershausen, where he was fighting against his former ally, the margrave of Kulmbach, who had broken the Treaty of Passau. Maurice was too unscrupulous to deserve whole-hearted admiration.


Holstein
Lübeck
Hamburg
Bremen
Elbe
BR
Haarlem
Leyden
Gelderland
Münster
Brunswick
Magdeburg
Wittenberg
Brabant
Rhine
Mansfeld
Eisleben
Frankenhausen
Leipzig
Eisenach
Erfurt
Jena
SAX
Marburg
HESSE
Cologne
Cambray
Schmalkalden
Zwickau
Meuse
Worms
Landwehl
Speyer
Würzburg
Königshofen
Verdun
Metz
Nürnberg
FRANCE
LORRAINE
Heilbronn
Ulm
Wirtemberg
Tübingen
Ingolstadt
Augsburg
BAVARIA
BURGUNDY
Basel
Constance
Zurich
SWITZERLAND
Innsbruck
TYROL
Trent
Konigsberg
Marienburg
PRUSSIA
POMERANIA
Oder
Vistula
BRANDENBURG
POLAND
SILESIA
Prague
BOHEMIA
Tabor
MORAVIA
HUNGARY
AUSTRIA
CARINTHIA
Germany at the Peace of Augsburg, 1555
Catholic
Protestant

But he had played his part with wonderful skill, and his mark on Germany was indelible. It was he who foiled Charles's design to make himself absolute, and who made inevitable the legal recognition of Protestantism.

Charles reaped no advantage from his adversary's death. The whole of Germany wanted a definitive settlement—a desire which was shared by Ferdinand. Eventually the Emperor gave way and summoned the Diet to Augsburg, Ferdinand presiding over its deliberations. In September 1555 the Religious Peace of Augsburg set the seal on the failure of the repressive policy initiated in the same city twenty-five years before.

The peace was essentially a compromise. The principle underlying it is summarized in the formula *cuius regio, eius religio*, or, as it may be freely paraphrased, "one prince, one religion." There was no grant of religious toleration: the subjects of a prince must conform to the church he favoured. The only concession to tender consciences was the stipulation that those who objected to the religion of their ruler should be free to settle in another state. Imperial cities, it was decided, were to retain the religion which they accepted in 1555. The peace applied to no forms of belief save Catholicism and Lutheranism, a limitation which afterwards became of the utmost moment. A knotty problem was provided by the estates of the Church. While it was agreed that those which had been secularized before 1552 need not be given back, nothing was settled about the legality of subsequent confiscations. Nor did the treaty decide what should happen to the lands of an ecclesiastical prince who wished to turn Lutheran. Ferdinand indeed proclaimed that a prelate who abandoned Catholicism should forfeit his estates and privileges: but the Protestants from the first declared that they would not regard the rule as binding. So the difficulty remained unsolved, the germ of serious trouble in the future.


With the Peace of Augsburg the first phase of the German Reformation came to an end. Many people will no doubt consider that the acceptance of Protestantism by more than half the nation is alone enough to counterbalance any evils that the movement may have produced. And no one can deny that the Reformation delivered Germany, whether Protestant or Catholic, from many grievous scandals and burdens. It is indisputable, too, that the Reformation effected great improvements in educational method and organization, and even if it be admitted that the Humanists might have achieved as much without first rending the Church in twain, the Lutherans nevertheless deserve high praise for their zeal in this cause.

In the sphere of politics, however, the effects of the Reformation were disastrous. Most of the princes had deliberately used it to further their own interests. Movements for reform that were not under their control were opposed by them as strenuously as by Catholics—witness their part in the suppression of the knights, the peasants, and the Anabaptists. Attempts at reconciliation met with their open disapproval: it was they who wrecked the negotiations at Regensburg in 1541. They had played their game with great success. Both in practice and in theory their power had grown. The confiscation of Church property had filled their treasuries, and they knew that their Protestant subjects would follow them against the Catholic Emperor. Moreover, their successful defiance of Charles, and the respect shown them—partly from conviction, partly from policy—by the reforming divines, had immensely raised their prestige. As for the Catholic princes, who were nearly all churchmen, they naturally imitated the Protestants in their independent attitude towards the Emperor, who in the circumstances was bound to treat them with the utmost consideration. Henceforth, a German prince was virtually an absolute sovereign.

There were no constitutional checks on his domestic rule; and though there was still an Emperor, with an imposing array of titles, he was seldom more than a picturesque survival. The Reformation had ruined the chances of a union of Germany under the house of Habsburg, and powerful as that house was, the religious excitement would have to subside before a strong central government could become a possibility.

Note.—In the map on p. 190, territory is marked as Protestant or Catholic on the principle *cuius regio eius religio.*

THE HABSBURGS IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES


Ferdinand, King of Aragon
=Isabella, Queen of Castile.
Maximilian I.
=Mary, daughter of Charles the Bold.
Joanna = Philip, Archduke of Austria, d. 1506.
Charles V., King of Spain, 1516. Emperor, 1519–1556.
Ferdinand I., Archduke of Austria, 1521; King of Hungary and Bohemia, 1526; Emperor, 1558–1564.
Philip II., King of Spain, 1556–1598
Maximilian II., Emperor, 1564–1576.
Charles, Archduke of Styria, d. 1590.
Philip III., King of Spain, 1598–1621.
Rudolf II., Emperor, 1576–1612.
Matthias, Emperor, 1612–1619.
Ferdinand II., Archduke of Styria; Emperor, 1619–1637.
Philip IV., King of Spain, 1621–1665.
Ferdinand III., Emperor, 1637–1657.
Charles II., King of Spain, 1665–1700. Died without issue.
Leopold I. Emperor, 1658–1705.
Joseph I., Emperor, 1705–1711.
Charles VI., Emperor, 1711–1740.
Later Emperors and present Emperor of Austria.




Photo. Frith]

The Otto-Heinrichs Bau, Heidelberg Castle

Begun in 1556, this is one of Germany's most remarkable public buildings in the best Renaissance style.

CHAPTER XV

THE AGE OF THE COUNTER-REFORMATION

AFTER the Peace of Augsburg came fifty of the most uneventful years in German history. There was seldom any violent collision between Catholics and Protestants; and the land was on the whole peaceful and prosperous. It is true that artistic and literary enthusiasm declined. Yet domestic architecture was still on a high level, and the influence of the Gothic style, though ever growing less, remained strong enough to modify the excessive regularity and stiffness to which the imitation of classical models tended to lead. The magnificent houses dating from this period testify to the continued wealth of the cities, where trade was still flourishing, despite the decline of the Hansa and the increased power of the princes.

The personality of the Emperors had much to do with the general quiet. In 1556, worn out with a life of ceaseless anxiety, Charles V. withdrew from the rule of his numerous dominions, and retired to a Spanish monastery, where two years later he died. The limits of our subject make it difficult to do justice to Charles. Rival interests and repeated ill-fortune prevented him from giving adequate attention to Germany, and, as we have seen, the aims of his German policy were never attained. Yet Charles was a statesman of very great ability—the greatest the house of Habsburg has ever produced. Outside Germany he met with striking success. Spain became stronger than ever; he had estab-

lished Spanish predominance in Italy, and pushed forward the frontier of the Netherlands at the expense of France; when he abdicated, the marriage of his son Philip to Mary Tudor seemed to have cleared the way for a union of Spain and England. Merely to have retained a hold on his original territories would in itself have been a remarkable achievement; and the strain to which Charles's victories had put him may be gauged by his refusal to expose his successor to a similar ordeal. He abandoned his scheme of securing the Empire for his son, who might well be content with his heritage of Spain, Naples, Milan, the County of Burgundy, and the Netherlands; and Ferdinand, king of Hungary and Bohemia, and lord of the old Habsburg lands, was thus practically sure of the imperial crown. For the next century and a half the house of Habsburg was divided into two branches, which, however, generally worked together in the field of European diplomacy.

In 1558 Ferdinand was elected Emperor, and during his six years' reign set himself to maintain the Peace of Augsburg. He was followed by his son Maximilian II., who had shown a certain leaning towards Protestantism, and had no inclination to upset the religious settlement. The next Emperor, Rudolf II., who succeeded his father Maximilian in 1576, was a strong Catholic by conviction, but, lacking self-confidence and resolution, he preferred the study of alchemy and astrology to business of state. For over fifty years, then, the domestic policy of the Emperors was to leave things alone. Their doings abroad were no more distinguished. The war with France which broke out in 1552, after going against Charles for some time, finally ended in favour of the Habsburgs; and by the Peace of Le Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559 the French gave up nearly everything they had gained, though, subject to the suzerainty of the Emperor, they were allowed to keep the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun. The main

causes of Charles's quarrels with France were inherited by Philip; and the foreign policy of the Austrian branch of the Habsburgs was concerned principally with the Turks. Neither side achieved any substantial success; and as a rule peace was officially preserved in return for a payment of tribute to the Sultan.

But though there are few stirring events to record during this time, momentous changes in the religious situation were quietly taking place. For some years after the Peace of Augsburg, Protestantism continued to advance. The secularization of ecclesiastical property went on. When the lands were held directly of the Empire, a lay administrator —generally a member of the royal house of the adjacent principality—was set over them; otherwise, they were simply confiscated by the prince. In north Germany, all the bishoprics east of the Weser, with the single exception of Hildesheim, met with one of these fates. Even in the Catholic states Protestantism spread apace. By 1570 seven or eight Germans out of ten were Protestant.

That Germany was not entirely lost to Rome was partly the fault of the Protestants themselves. The enthusiasm of the Lutherans was cooling. With the various state churches kept under the strict control of the government, it was not likely that they would call forth great popular devotion or even interest. Lutheran teaching, moreover, was too much of a compromise, and on many points, especially the Sacrament, too subtle, to appeal to the uninstructed mind. The Lutheran clergy were now occupied with wrangles over theological definitions; the new University of Jena, founded in 1558, became the home of Lutheran orthodoxy; and any deviations from the narrow way of correct belief were as savagely attacked by the predominant party as the teachings of the Humanists had been by the monks. It is no wonder that the Lutheran churches soon began to languish.

At the same time Calvinism was making headway in the south. After the Peace of Augsburg it soon became the most progressive, enterprising, and popular form of Protestantism. Its headquarters were at Geneva, over which Calvin himself long exercised absolute power. It was the religion of most of French Switzerland, and the Calvinists had come to an agreement with the followers of Zwingli in the German-speaking parts. Calvin's teaching was also widely accepted in France and the Netherlands; in 1560, it became the established religion in Scotland; and its progress in England was such that for some time it seemed certain to upset the religious settlement made by Queen Elizabeth. Calvin was a Frenchman, and his system of theology and government was marked by the logic and precision which the French love. There was nothing vague or hesitating about any aspect of Calvinism. Its teachings centred round the doctrine of predestination, which was stated with uncompromising clearness and without any qualification. Its code of morals was uncompromisingly strict. Its worship was uncompromisingly simple and severe. Its organization was orderly and systematic, and its elaborate apparatus of sessions, presbyteries, and synods gave every member a share in church government. Gloomy, harsh, and rigid as it was, Calvinism made a much wider appeal than Lutheranism; it proved much more stimulating to intellectual activity, and it was much better fitted to uphold the cause of Protestantism.

In 1563 the Elector Palatine of the Rhine accepted Calvinism, which was henceforth the predominant religion of south-west Germany. Attempts to reach an understanding with the Lutherans ended in complete failure; in fact, the Lutherans disliked the Calvinists little less than the Romanists. German Protestantism was divided into two camps, one swearing by the Heidelberg Catechism, the other

by the *Formula Concordiæ*—which belied its title by stating the Lutheran position in the most unconciliatory terms. It thus happened that the Protestants were disunited when unity was most necessary. For in the eighth decade of the century, Germany became affected by that remarkable rally of Catholicism, commonly styled the Counter-Reformation. In 1562, the Council of Trent, so suddenly interrupted by Maurice of Saxony ten years before, resumed its labours. By its theological definitions, it reduced Catholic doctrine to a compact and consistent system; and though to Protestants its reforms seemed utterly inadequate it did sweep out of the Church some flagrant abuses. The Council put new heart into Catholics. For over forty years they had been in some doubt as to where they stood; but now they knew what they were fighting for. They had, moreover, a formidable weapon in the "Supreme Tribunal of the Inquisition," reconstituted by Pope Paul III. in 1542, and modelled on the highly efficient Spanish Inquisition established by Ferdinand and Isabella. The organization of the Inquisition made it ubiquitous; its powers gave it an absolute censorship over all opinions and writings. The Church, furthermore, had a magnificent fighting force in the new order of the Jesuits, founded in 1534 by the Spaniard, Ignatius Loyola, and approved by the Pope in 1540. To the three monastic vows the Jesuits added a fourth of unconditional obedience to the Pope and the superior officers of the Order. Their policy was one of unceasing and many-sided activity. Every type of man was welcomed to the Order. Jesuits won the ear of princes and pulled the strings of diplomacy. Jesuits organized plots among the subjects of heretical princes. Jesuits were the most popular confessors and preachers. They set themselves to secure the confidence of the young, and wherever they went established schools and colleges which at once met with enormous success. And while their

propaganda involved them in many unscrupulous and criminal acts, some of them, as missionaries in the East Indies and America, set an example of self-denying heroism which has never been surpassed.

The Counter-Reformation was most successful in the dominions of Philip II., where, except in the northern provinces of the Netherlands, heresy was practically exterminated. In France the struggle was fiercer, but the spread of Protestantism was soon checked, and the Huguenots became a minority struggling for toleration. On the other hand, the over-hasty measures of Mary Tudor ruined the cause of Catholicism in England, and Scotland was seized and firmly held by Calvinism. In Germany it was some time before the Catholic retreat was stayed: but after the accession of Rudolf II. the tide began to turn. As early as 1556 the Jesuits had established themselves in Ingolstadt and Köln; and before long every Catholic city was a centre of their activities. Their first object was to secure the ecclesiastical principalities which had escaped confiscation. Thus, in 1583, the archbishop of Köln, who had adopted Protestant views, was expelled from his see by Spanish and Bavarian troops, an event which also guaranteed the success of the reaction in Münster and Paderborn. The other surviving bishoprics were saved with less difficulty. Presently it was the turn of the cities and lay principalities. In 1598 Aachen, which had become Protestant since 1555, was constrained by force to return to the old faith. The greatest successes, however, were gained in Bavaria and the Habsburg lands. In the former Maximilian I. became duke in 1598. He had been brought up by Jesuits, and enthusiastically applied himself to stamp out heresy in his dominions. At the same time, by administrative and financial reforms and by the creation of a standing army—the first in Germany—he made Bavaria the strongest state

in the Empire. A similar religious policy was carried out in Styria by the Emperor's cousin Ferdinand, who had also been educated under Jesuit influence.

The Catholic victories naturally caused alarm to the Protestants. But the Electors of Saxony, to whom the Lutherans looked for a lead, were, for political reasons, disposed to keep on friendly terms with the Emperor, and were very jealous of the Elector Palatine, who was the greatest man among the Calvinists of the south. These soon realized that the issue would have to be settled by force; there was talk of an association for the defence of Protestantism, and of an alliance with Henry IV. of France. In 1607 the situation became suddenly worse. An attack was made on a Catholic procession in the Protestant city of Donauwörth. The city was put under the imperial ban; Maximilian of Bavaria, who executed the sentence, not only restored Catholicism, but annexed the city to his duchy. The Catholics defended his action on the ground that Donauwörth had become Protestant since 1555; but the Protestants denounced it as a flagrant illegality. A year later they formed the Evangelical Union for the defence of their rights. It was joined by the Palatinate, Würtemberg, Baden, Ansbach, and a number of cities: but the Lutherans of the north held aloof. The Catholics replied in 1609 by the formation of the Catholic League, to which belonged Bavaria and several ecclesiastical states, including the electorates of Köln, Mainz, and Trier.

The inevitable war very nearly broke out in the following year, when a dispute arose over the succession to the estates of the Duke of Cleves, who had died without direct heirs. The Emperor alleged that the lands ought to fall to him, and was supported by the Catholic League; while the Evangelical Union made an alliance with Henry IV. of France, and took up the cause of the Elector of Brandenburg and another claimant, who for the time being had joined forces.

The murder of the French king averted a European war; the Union and the League made a truce; and in 1614 an agreement was concluded whereby the Emperor got nothing, and the lands in dispute were divided between the two claimants who had opposed him. But before long a yet more serious crisis was caused by events in the territories of the Habsburgs.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XV

The sixteenth century witnessed the gradual victory of the Renaissance style over Gothic. The German Renaissance produced few churches of note, though, during the Counter-Reformation, the Jesuits built several in a style imported from Italy. Among these may be mentioned St Michael's at Munich.

It was in the sphere of secular architecture that the Renaissance achieved its greatest triumphs in Germany. A distinction should be drawn between the numerous palaces built at this time by the princes and the public and private buildings of the towns. The former are generally modelled on Italian examples, if not actually built by Italian architects; the latter are genuine products of German art, retaining for some time many Gothic characteristics, and at first, in fact, showing the influence of the Renaissance only in their ornamental details. The most picturesque German towns owe their appearance mainly to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and not to the Middle Ages, as is commonly supposed.

Of ambitious, palatial buildings the following are noteworthy:

Heidelburg: Castle (Otto-Heinrichs-Bau and Friedrichs-Bau. The former is a fine example of early Renaissance architecture, having been begun in 1556. The designer was probably a German, but he was evidently dominated by foreign influences, whether classical or contemporary. The Friedrichs-Bau was built some fifty years later. The castle suffered severely at the hands of the French in the second half of the seventeenth century, and attempts to repair the damage were abandoned after further havoc had been wrought by lightning in 1764.)

Torgau: Schloss Hartenfels (early).

Dresden: Royal Palace (begun in 1504, but frequently altered).

Aschaffenburg: Royal Palace (early seventeenth century).

Stuttgart: Old Palace (begun in 1553).

Tübingen: Schloss (mostly sixteenth century).

Munich: Old Palace (early seventeenth century).

Of the towns with municipal and domestic buildings in the

characteristic German architecture of the period, the following may be mentioned : Köln, Frankfurt-on-Main, Freiburg, Hanover, Hildesheim, Brunswick, Goslar, Halberstadt, Lübeck, Danzig, Nürnberg, Rotenburg-on-Tauber, Dinkelsbühl, Ulm, Augsburg.

Hildesheim and Rotenburg retain the atmosphere of a Renaissance town better than any others. Perhaps the finest house in Hildesheim is the Gild-house of the butchers (p. 166). The general plan is Gothic ; but the ornamental details clearly show the influence of the classical revival in Italy.

CHAPTER XVI

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

In Bohemia an independent Protestant Church, which owed its origin to the Hussites, had become very prosperous. In face of the Catholic revival, however, its position was unstable, for up to the beginning of the century, religious toleration had never been formally recognized in the kingdom. In 1609, however, the Protestant nobility won a notable success. The weak rule of Rudolf had aroused much discontent in the Habsburg lands, and in 1608 a widespread rising had forced him to hand over to his brother Matthias the rule of all his hereditary dominions save Bohemia. Rudolf sought to secure Bohemian loyalty by issuing a royal charter which conceded religious toleration, and the right, with certain limitations, of building Protestant churches. The Bohemians accepted Rudolf's favours, but nevertheless fell away from him. In 1611 he had to surrender Bohemia to Matthias; and till his death in the following year he held only the barren title of Emperor. In this also he was succeeded by his brother.

In Bohemia, as in Germany, the cause of the Reformation was inextricably involved with the political aspirations of the nobles. They were jealous of the powers of their Habsburg rulers, and were alarmed at Matthias's assertion that the Bohemian crown was hereditary and his anxiety to secure the recognition of his cousin Ferdinand of Styria as his successor. At a meeting of the Bohemian Diet Matthias sprang

the question on the nobles, and, taken by surprise, they replied as he wished. They soon repented; and their annoyance was mingled with alarm for their religion, for Matthias, who formerly had favoured toleration, had now joined the League, and Ferdinand, who assumed the rule of Bohemia, was of course entirely at one with the extreme Catholics. A pretext for action was found in alleged breaches of Rudolf's charter of toleration. Headed by Count Matthias of Thurn, a band of nobles made their way into the royal palace at Prague, laid hands on two of Ferdinand's most intimate counsellors, and threw them and their secretary out of the window. The Protestants ran to arms; Moravia and Silesia rose up also; and Count Mansfeld, a Protestant free-lance, brought a troop of German mercenaries to the aid of the rebels. Before long almost the whole of Bohemia was lost to Ferdinand. Early in 1619 the Emperor Matthias died; Ferdinand was elected Emperor; but the rebels had already declared him deposed from the Bohemian throne, which they offered to Frederick, the Elector Palatine, who after some hesitation accepted it.

Thus began the Thirty Years' War, which, spreading from the Habsburg lands, soon involved all Germany and finally half Europe. It was one of the most ferocious, destructive, and unheroic struggles in history. Its cause was mainly religious, and for some time the religious motive was potent on both sides. But from the first, political and personal considerations played a great part, and as time went on these grew more and more powerful—and also more and more sordid—till in its last stages the war became nothing more than a means of livelihood to mercenary soldiers and of the aggrandizement of foreign powers at Germany's expense. Even to the military historian the struggle, except for one short period, is wanting in interest. It must not be supposed that the battles were fought by peasants and burghers eager to

defend their faith. The Germans who took part in the operations were almost all mercenary soldiers, bound only to the captain who had enlisted them. The adventurers who led these troops were men whose trade was war; they sold their services to this or that prince according to the terms offered, regardless often of what religion he or they professed to favour. Neither officers nor men had any interest in the speedy termination of the war; to sack a town pleased them better than a brilliant victory; and many of the battles were thus half-hearted affairs, neither side wishing to beat the other too much. These soldiers of fortune plundered wherever they went, even when in regions friendly to the cause for which they were fighting. This fact accounts as much as the length of the war for the unparalleled devastation which was wrought in Germany.

The war may be conveniently divided into four periods. From 1618 to 1625 it was waged almost entirely by inhabitants of Germany. Spanish troops did indeed fight on the Catholic side: but neither then nor later did Spain throw her whole weight into the struggle. In these years religion was the predominant motive in each party, though political ambitions were by no means without influence. After 1625 the course of the struggle was largely determined by foreign powers. The first to intervene was Denmark: and what may be called the Danish period of the war lasted till 1629. The influence of religion was still strong, but other factors became more evident. With 1629 we reach the interference of Sweden; and though the religious motive remained conspicuous for some time, political considerations were rapidly getting the upper hand. From 1635 onward, the dominating influence was France, and religion counted for next to nothing.

The first important operations were naturally in Bohemia. When Ferdinand became Emperor, nearly all his dominions

were in revolt against him, and it was all he could do to avoid capture by the Austrian nobles, whose sympathies were with the Bohemian Protestants. Soon, however, his prospects improved. The Catholic League took up his cause; Spanish troops were also sent to his aid; and he found a useful ally in John George, Elector of Saxony, who was jealous of Frederick and hoped also to gain some territory in northern Bohemia. On the other hand, Frederick stood virtually alone; for the Evangelical Union was loth to encourage the rebellion of subjects against their lawful prince, and sent him no help. Even the Bohemian nobles showed little energy in his support. Under the skilful general, Tilly, the commander-in-chief of the Bavarian army, a Catholic force invaded Bohemia from the south, penetrated without much fighting to the neighbourhood of Prague, and in November 1620, at the battle of the White Hill, gained an overwhelming victory. Frederick fled from his kingdom, and Ferdinand set about the extirpation of heresy and the suppression of the nobles. By wholesale confiscations, savage executions, sentences of banishment, and an oppressive military occupation of the country, he soon accomplished his aims.

Frederick's punishment, however, was yet to come. He was of course put under the imperial ban, and Catholic armies invaded the Upper and Lower Palatinate. The Protestants were hopelessly demoralized; the Evangelical Union fell to pieces. Frederick's cause was championed by Count Mansfeld, the margrave of Baden-Durlach, and the adventurous and romantically-minded Christian of Brunswick. But these commanders were no match for Tilly or the Spanish general, Spinola. A Protestant victory at Wiesloch was speedily revenged by Tilly at Wimpfen on the Neckar and Höchst on the Main. Frederick disbanded his army, hoping thereby to secure easy terms: but the

Catholics proceeded with their operations, took Heidelberg and Mannheim, and occupied the whole of the electorate. Early in 1623 Ferdinand, with the consent of a majority of the princes, granted Frederick's lands and title to Maximilian of Bavaria, whose troops had been the backbone of the army of the League. The Catholics now had a majority of five to two in the electoral college.

The Bohemian rebellion had been crushed and Frederick punished. But there was no chance of the war coming to an end. Flushed with success, the League aimed at recovering all the ecclesiastical estates secularized since the Peace of Augsburg and, in fact, at stamping out Protestantism wherever it seemed possible. Tilly pursued Christian of Brunswick into north Germany, and in 1623 inflicted a defeat on him at Stadtlohn in the bishopric of Münster. Both Christian and Mansfeld retired to the Netherlands: but Tilly kept his army in Westphalia, and now made no secret of the far-reaching intentions of the League. Great alarm was caused among the North German princes, most of whom had benefited largely since 1555 by confiscations of Church property. Before long they received help from abroad. James I. of England had fallen out with Spain, and was anxious to strike a blow in behalf of the Protestant cause and of Frederick, who was his son-in-law. England, however, devoted most of her energy to naval operations, and it was by money rather than arms that she proposed to save German Protestantism. An alliance was made between England and Denmark, whereby the Danish king, Christian IV., was to receive a regular subsidy in return for his active intervention in Germany. Christian, an able and vigorous ruler, needed little encouragement. As duke of Holstein he was a prince of the Empire, and he had done well out of the secularization of ecclesiastical lands. He entered Germany, and placed himself at the head of an army of his

own subjects and troops from some of the Protestant princes.

Meanwhile there had been important developments on the other side. Indebted as he was to the League, Ferdinand viewed its triumphs with some concern. It paid no regard to his authority, and though it had restored him to Bohemia, its victories elsewhere had been to the advantage of Maximilian of Bavaria, whose extensive possessions now made him a formidable rival to Habsburg influence in the south. Moreover, it seemed to Ferdinand that the disunion and weakness of the Protestants gave him a chance of reviving the power of the crown. He wished therefore to place in the field an army independent of the League and fighting in the interests of the Emperor. But with the Habsburg lands generally disaffected and very little money in the treasury, Ferdinand could have done nothing had not Albrecht von Waldstein or Wallenstein, offered to raise an army without putting any charge on his revenues.

The Emperor's new general was a man of forty-two. He sprang from a noble Czech family of Bohemia, had been educated partly by strict Protestants and partly by the Jesuits, and after studying for some time at the University of Padua, entered the profession of arms in 1605. A lucky marriage brought him large estates in Moravia. He soon made some reputation as an officer, and having won the favourable notice of Ferdinand, he was able, after taking part in the suppression of the Bohemian rebellion, to secure for himself about seventy square miles of land round Gitschin in north-east Bohemia. He received the title of prince in 1623, and was now one of the most powerful and wealthy men in the dominions of the Habsburgs.

Wallenstein was one of the two really great men who appeared in the Thirty Years' War. His character and aims are not easy to fathom. He certainly cared nothing about the

religious issue. His education left him with a contempt for both of the warring creeds; his own faith was a strange mixture of mysticism and superstition, with a belief in his own "star" as its central article. In conduct he was thoroughly unscrupulous. There can be no doubt that throughout his public career his own aggrandizement was ever before his eyes. Yet he was not without nobler motives. He wished to secure Germany from foreign encroachments, to put an end to internal disorder and disruption, and to give her a strong and stable government. It was only by increasing the power of the Emperor that such benefits could be secured. Thus, by coming to Ferdinand's aid, Wallenstein hoped to serve Germany as well as himself. His personality and reputation soon attracted to his banner an army of 50,000 men, mostly professional soldiers. The force was to be fed and paid by the districts through which it passed.

In 1626 both sides had two main armies in the field. Christian IV. was to march up the Weser and drive Tilly into south Germany, while further east a force under Mansfeld sought to invade the Habsburg lands by the valley of the Elbe. In April Mansfeld was disastrously repulsed in an attempt to carry the bridge of Dessau, which had been strongly fortified by Wallenstein. He then attempted a daring flank-march through Silesia and Moravia, hoping to gain support from the rebellious inhabitants of Austria and Hungary. Wallenstein, however, fell back to the Danube, keeping always between Mansfeld and Vienna. The Protestant general dared not risk a battle with his inferior numbers; the Hungarian rebels failed him; and, in the desperate hope of gaining support from Venice, he set out on a mountainous winter journey to Italy. While crossing Bosnia he died. Mansfeld was neither a great leader nor a man of high character, but he was the best general on the Protestant side, and his loss was a grievous blow.

Meanwhile, Christian of Brunswick, after advancing into Thuringia, was driven back by the superior forces of Tilly. During its retreat the Protestant army was surprised in the hills near Lutter, and only got clear with the loss of all its artillery and 10,000 men. Christian withdrew what was left into Holstein and Mecklenburg.

Next year the Protestant collapse continued. Wallenstein swept victoriously through Silesia, joined Tilly in north Germany, overran all Holstein and Jutland, and forced the luckless Christian to take refuge on the Danish islands. In 1628 Wallenstein, who not long before had been made duke of Friedland, received from the Emperor the duchy of Mecklenburg, which was declared forfeit for its support of Christian. Wallenstein at once occupied his new principality, taking Wismar and Rostock with little trouble, and then forced the duke of Pomerania to admit imperial troops to his lands. Ferdinand was aiming at the establishment of his power along the Baltic coast, and his desire to secure command of that sea was shown by the appointment of Wallenstein as Admiral of the imperial fleet. That armada as yet was non-existent, but it was hoped that the few remaining members of the Hansa would provide ships. The Hanseatic towns, however, showed no enthusiasm. Stralsund in Pomerania and Glückstadt on the Elbe held out stoutly for Protestantism. For several months Wallenstein was kept inactive before one, Tilly before the other. Neither could be reduced without ships, and in the end both sieges had to be abandoned. Their resistance, as it happened, saved the Protestant cause.

Stralsund had received help from the Swedes, who were alarmed at Wallenstein's designs on the Baltic. Wallenstein knew that war with Sweden was bound to come; and wishing to devote all his energy to preparation for the struggle, he was anxious to bring the Danish war to an end. Christian had nothing to hope for from a continuance of the conflict;

early in 1629, he agreed to the Peace of Lübeck, receiving back his hereditary lands and abandoning all his claims to German bishoprics.

The treaty, however, passed almost unnoticed in the excitement caused by a recent act of the Emperor's. The Catholic princes thought that the time was ripe for a bold stroke. Won over to their views without difficulty, Ferdinand in March 1629 issued the so-called Edict of Restitution. All ecclesiastical property secularized since 1552 was to be restored, and Calvinists were expressly excluded from toleration.

The Edict was an act of grave injustice. Ferdinand of course claimed that he was merely enforcing the terms of the Peace of Augsburg. But, as we have seen, the clause about secularised lands was ambiguous, and the Protestants had never accepted Ferdinand I's declaration about the conversion of ecclesiastical princes, which had repeatedly been contravened with impunity. As more than a hundred-and-twenty religious foundations had been secularized since 1552, an enforcement of the Edict would plunge north Germany into utter confusion. Even less defensible was the treatment of Calvinism, which had for seventy years been peaceably established in many German states, and which had tacitly been treated as on the same footing as Lutheranism.

But apart from its injustice the Edict was a most serious political blunder. It drove the Protestants to desperation. It shook the loyalty of states like Saxony and Brandenburg —especially the latter, which in 1613 had adopted Calvinism as its established faith. Moreover, the Edict would have to be carried out by military force. Tilly and the army of the League could no doubt be relied on; but it was not so with Wallenstein. The Edict, in fact, met with his strong disapproval. His army contained Lutherans and Calvinists

among both officers and men. Their religion might be little more than nominal, but they would never obey orders to drive Protestant princes from their possessions. Wallenstein himself, moreover, disliked the intolerance of the Edict. Germany would never have peace if religious animosities were deliberately inflamed. If he could have had his way, toleration would have been granted to all.

The relations between the Emperor and his best general therefore became strained. And there were not wanting influences to increase the estrangement. The strict Catholic party hated Wallenstein because of his religious views, his readiness to enlist Protestants in his army, his custom of ravaging Catholic as well as Protestant districts, and, finally, his unconcealed dislike of the Edict of Restitution. The Catholic princes were also growing alarmed at the rise of the Emperor's power, which was due entirely to the genius of his great general. The Emperor's Jesuit advisers were never weary of pouring into his ear charges against Wallenstein, whom they accused of planning to destroy both his master and the Church. Spanish influence was exerted in the same cause; and the cunning intrigues of the French Cardinal Richelieu aimed at the ruin of the most formidable weapon of the house of Habsburg. A Diet at Regensburg in 1630 brought matters to a head. Ferdinand was told plainly that he must choose between Wallenstein and the League. He was not the man for a bold and unconventional move: Wallenstein was dismissed from his command, and retired to his estates in Bohemia. A week or two before, the king of Sweden had landed in Pomerania.

With the intervention of Gustavus Adolphus an element of heroism appeared in the war. For two years, its course was dominated by an even greater personality than Wallenstein. And not only was Gustavus a man of very high ability, but the motives of his intervention were in part

noble, and altogether honourable. He was sincerely religious, and honestly anxious to save German Protestantism from the destruction that threatened it. At the same time, his zeal was strengthened by political considerations. It had long been his ambition to make the Baltic a Swedish lake. Since his accession in 1611 he had waged wars to this end with Denmark, Russia, and Poland, winning valuable acquisitions from the last two. His schemes, and indeed the prosperity of his country, were threatened by Wallenstein's triumphs in Mecklenburg and Pomerania. He had, too, lesser incentives to action: the dispossessed dukes of Mecklenburg were his kinsmen, and Ferdinand had sent help to his Polish enemies. But whether his motives were religious, political, or personal, they were none of them petty or sordid; and if he was unduly ambitious it was in the interests of his country.

Gustavus brought with him no motley force of hirelings, but the Swedish national army, fired with a real love of their king and faith, and ruled with a strict discipline—the finest troops of the time. And the general was worthy of his soldiers. Great though Wallenstein was as strategist and tactician, he was equalled in these capacities by Gustavus, and the Swede excelled him in organizing skill, fertility of invention, and the faculty of inspiring his men to desperate exertions. One reason why Gustavus was so formidable was that he meant business. As a rule (though Wallenstein must be exempted from this accusation) the generals of the time were absurdly careful of their troops, especially of their cavalry, who were seldom allowed to come to close quarters with the enemy, but contented themselves with letting off their carbines and pistols at an ineffective range. But the Swedish horse were trained to charge home with the sword, and to reserve their pistols for the hand-to-hand struggle. In his use of infantry, however, Gustavus acted on another principle.

He abandoned the orthodox heavy column, and instead of being a mere factor in a mass, each soldier was an active and intelligent unit; while the comparatively open order of his lines enabled Gustavus to manœuvre his troops more readily in action. His pikemen, moreover, were armed with lighter pikes than those generally adopted; the proportion of musketeers among the infantry was much higher than usual, and they were mostly armed with the newly invented flint-lock, a far more serviceable weapon than the matchlock used by the Germans. His artillery, too, was of the latest pattern. His field-guns were light—he even had leather cannon—but against the heavier pieces of the Germans they could fire three shots to one. Gustavus, in fact, was one of the great military reformers of history, and, all things considered, one of the world's greatest generals.

In June 1630 Gustavus landed on the island of Usedom. No serious opposition was encountered. Wallenstein's fall was followed by the dismissal of half his army; the rest was put under the command of Tilly, who was occupied elsewhere. By the end of the year Gustavus had with him an army of 40,000 men and was in possession of almost all Pomerania. Meanwhile, he had been in negotiation with France. Cardinal Richelieu, who controlled French policy, wished to deal a blow at the House of Habsburg without as yet taking an active part in the war. The outcome was the Treaty of Bärwalde, signed in January 1631: Gustavus was to receive a large annual subsidy on certain conditions, one of which was that he must make no attempt to uproot Catholicism in districts where it was established. Such a stipulation merely draws attention to the entirely political character of the Cardinal's intervention.

For some months after the treaty with France Gustavus showed an unwonted lack of energy. He was trying to come to an understanding with the Protestant princes of north

Germany, most of whom, however, regarded their Swedish deliverer with grave suspicion. Brandenburg and Saxony, in particular, remained obstinately aloof. The inaction of Gustavus was partly to blame for a great calamity to the Protestant cause. Encouraged by the Swedish invasion, the city of Magdeburg had recalled the Protestant governor of the bishopric, thereby disobeying the Edict of Restitution and defying the authority of the Emperor. The town had made an alliance with Gustavus, who had sent a Swedish officer to organize its defence. The army of the League under Tilly laid siege to the city, and while Gustavus was idly negotiating, Magdeburg was stormed, sacked with unspeakable brutality, and burned almost entirely to the ground. Brandenburg, however, had at length yielded to Swedish pressure, and soon afterwards came an appeal for Swedish help from the Elector of Saxony, whom the Emperor was trying to coerce into activity on the Catholic side. Gustavus showed that he could move quickly when he liked. Marching up the Elbe, he joined the Saxon army at Düben and at last came face to face with Tilly at Breitenfeld. The fight was hot. The raw Saxons were driven from the field; but the Swedish artillery was terribly effective; the Swedish horse bore down all opposition; and the superiority of the Swedish infantry formation was strikingly shown by the speed and precision with which the foot changed front in the middle of the action. The Catholic pikemen, mostly men of Wallenstein's old army, fought most valiantly: but outnumbered and at last surrounded, they were slowly overwhelmed. As a fighting force the Catholic League for the time ceased to exist.

Gustavus sent the Saxons against Bohemia—an errand which the Elector was only too pleased to undertake—and himself led the Swedes into Thuringia. There he was joined by several princes, notably Bernard of Saxe-Weimar, who

united a genuine concern for Protestantism with great political ambition and much military skill. Marching through the Thuringian Forest, the Protestant army reached the valley of the Main; down this, through the row of ecclesiastical estates—known as the "Priests' Lane"—they rapidly passed, taking Würzburg on the way. Mainz fell after a short siege, and the Lower Palatinate was won back for Protestantism. The indefatigable Gustavus then turned against Bavaria. Tilly, seeking to prevent the passage of the Lech, was driven off, himself mortally wounded; Augsburg and Munich fell into the hands of the Protestants; and it seemed that the Elector Maximilian, who was at Regensburg with what remained of his army, would soon be altogether driven from his lands.

Gustavus, however, was now to meet a foe worthy of his steel. In his straits the Emperor had turned to Wallenstein. Early in 1632 that great commander was again in the field—appointed general for life, with almost unlimited authority. His object was to win for himself a large principality in return for the lost Mecklenburg, to secure the repeal of the Edict of Restitution, and then to make peace with the different Protestant princes. But his first task must be the expulsion of Gustavus. Accordingly, after easily clearing Bohemia of Saxons, he led his troops to Bavaria and entrenched himself in a strong position on the Alte Veste, a height close to Nürnberg. Gustavus soon marched up and established himself in a strong camp round the city. For some days the two armies watched each other. Then the outbreak of disease and the lack of provisions drove Gustavus to action, and a desperate assault was made on Wallenstein's almost impregnable lines. The attempt was repulsed; and Gustavus hurried away southward, hoping to draw his enemy after him. But Wallenstein, with brilliant insight, turned north, marched quickly to Saxony, and took Leipzig.

Fearing to lose the support of the irresolute but influential Elector, Gustavus followed as fast as he could. The two great leaders again met each other at Lützen. The battle was desperately waged. The Swedes at first gained ground, then were driven back by a furious cavalry charge. Gustavus, having rallied his men in person, was leading them victoriously forward, when he was somehow cut off with a few companions, and fell shot through the head. His white horse, dashing in riderless terror through the ranks of the Swedes, struck dismay to their hearts. But Bernard of Weimar took the command, heartened his men with the cry of vengeance, and after further desperate and doubtful fighting drove the Imperialists from the field. Wallenstein fell back into Bohemia, and Saxony was saved.

The intervention of Gustavus had achieved one of its objects: the extermination of German Protestantism was now impossible. There is little profit in speculating what he would have done had he lived longer. He had, it seems, no thought of making himself Emperor, still less of altering the German constitution. But he evidently hoped to gain for Sweden the duchy of Pomerania, and to form an Evangelical Union of German Protestant princes, with himself as president. If he had succeeded in these aims, North Germany would have fallen entirely under Swedish influence, and the development of the German nation would have been seriously hindered. For Germany it was as well that the career of Gustavus ended when it did.

After the death of Gustavus, the interest of the war again centred in Wallenstein. In 1633 he attacked Silesia, defeated the mixed army that opposed him, and pushed forward into Saxony and Brandenburg. All the while, however, he was negotiating with the Protestant leaders. He knew that if he could come to a private understanding with them he could impose on Ferdinand what terms he liked. For himself he

would demand a great principality; for Germany complete religious toleration. Then, with his own army and the German Protestants, he would drive out foreign intruders and restore peace and order. In the meantime, however, events in the south were undermining his schemes. There the Spaniards had sent forces to uphold the Catholic cause. But Oxenstjerna, the great Swedish diplomatist, drew closer the alliance with France, and with the South German Protestants concluded the Convention of Heilbronn, whereby they agreed to follow the direction of Sweden in the conduct of the war. Bernard of Weimar and the Swedish general Horn fought successfully against the Spaniards, and by a sudden attack captured Regensburg, which even Gustavus had never reached. Wallenstein's forced march to the rescue was too late.

This disaster sealed Wallenstein's fate. The Catholic party at the imperial court had renewed their intrigues against him, and Ferdinand was growing genuinely concerned at his independent attitude. Early in 1634 he removed from their commands Wallenstein and his most trusty officers, and ordered their successors to take them alive or dead. The machinations of the clerical party had not been without effect on Wallenstein's troops; many fell away from him at the critical moment. With a scanty remnant, Wallenstein made his way to Eger, in western Bohemia, hoping to get into touch with Bernard of Weimar. But a plot was formed against him, the chief movers being certain Scottish and Irish officers in his army; and at Eger, those who remained true to him were first murdered in the castle, and then, in his private lodging, the great leader was himself stabbed by the Irish captain Devereux.

With Wallenstein's murder perished the only man capable of averting long sufferings from Germany. At first, however, it looked as if Ferdinand was to be rewarded for his baseness by brilliant success. Some months afterwards the Catholic

army in the south gained an unexpected but overwhelming victory over Bernard of Weimar at Nördlingen. It was a momentous battle. South Germany again fell into the hands of the Catholics, and Bavaria was lost for ever to Protestantism. Saxony abandoned the Swedish alliance, and in 1635 concluded with Ferdinand the Peace of Prague, to which within the next two years, nearly all the North German states, Brandenburg included, gave their adhesion. The Palatinate was to be kept by Bavaria. The Emperor was to do as he pleased with the Protestants in the Habsburg lands. On the other hand, Saxony was given Lusatia; and ecclesiastical property secularized before 1627 might be retained by the Protestants. All parties to the peace were to unite in driving the foreigner from Germany.

But from Germany the foreigner was in no mind to be driven. The Peace of Prague gave nothing to the Swedes for the blood they had shed, nothing to the French for the money they had spent. So for another thirteen years the land was desolated by war. It was the most unheroic phase of the struggle. The war was now almost entirely political in its purpose. Some of the South Germans, indeed, were concerned to secure toleration for Calvinism, which had not been granted in the Peace of Prague. But even Bernard of Weimar, the general of the German Protestants, thought less of religion than of gaining a large principality for himself. And the Swedes and French were fighting for purely secular objects.

There is no need to narrate in detail the events of these years. In north Germany the Swedish army, under various able commanders trained by Gustavus, fought with general success against the parties to the Peace of Prague. In the south, French intervention became more active. At first Bernard of Weimar was taken into French pay, and French troops were not much used in Germany itself, being for the most part sent against the Spaniards in Italy and the Netherlands.

Bernard's efforts led to the conquest of the Breisgau, one of the oldest possessions of the Habsburgs. But after his death in 1639 the operations in the south were under the direction of French generals and carried out by French soldiers. For some years nothing decisive occurred. Led by the fiery and impetuous Condé, the French won several victories, but their campaigns lacked system and the enormous losses they suffered lessened the value of their successes. In 1646, however, Turenne, one of the greatest strategists in history, was placed at the head of a strong French army. His object was to concentrate the forces hostile to the Habsburgs and to strike a single hard blow at a vital part of the enemy's territory. Uniting therefore with the Swedes in the Main valley, Turenne marched southwards, skilfully eluded opposition, and laid waste Bavaria with fire and sword. So fearful were his ravages that Maximilian abandoned the Emperor and signed a truce. When after a few months he again ventured to draw the sword, the French and Swedes repeated their exploit, and made Bavaria a desert. This proved the last notable achievement of the war. While desperate efforts were being made by Maximilian to retrieve his fortunes, news came that a general peace had been signed.

The efforts of the Elector of Brandenburg were largely responsible for the end of the war. In 1642 he had made peace with the Swedes, and withdrawn from the conflict. It was in great measure due to his influence that in 1644 serious negotiations for a general settlement had begun. The representatives of the Catholic states met at Münster, those of the Protestants at Osnabrück. Questions of precedence and procedure, together with the number and intricacy of the interests involved, made progress very slow. But the blows dealt by Turenne convinced the Emperor and his allies of the necessity for large concessions, and in October 1648 the so-called Treaty of Westphalia was concluded.

It was a comprehensive and epoch-making settlement. Religious, territorial, and constitutional problems were alike dealt with. The religious question was settled without much difficulty and, on the whole, in a reasonable way. Calvinism was put on the same footing as Lutheranism. Ecclesiastical property was to remain as it had been at the beginning of 1624—an arrangement which usually left Catholics and Protestants under rulers of their own faith. Thus, though "one prince, one faith" was still the authoritative principle, in practice it involved little religious oppression. The Treaty of course meant that Germany was to be permanently shared between Catholics and Protestants. That, however, had become inevitable. German Protestantism was on the whole lucky to escape so lightly from the destruction with which the Counter-Reformation had threatened it.

The territorial arrangements were less happy. That Switzerland and the Northern Netherlands were declared independent was a wise recognition of facts, but other clauses contained the seeds of future trouble. France and Sweden both received their reward. The bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun were released from all allegiance to the Emperor, and France was allowed to annex the Habsburg lands in Alsace. Sweden was given western Pomerania, with the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, thus securing control of the mouths of the Oder, Elbe, and Weser. There was also much shuffling of territory among the German princes. Bavaria kept the Upper Palatinate and the electoral title: but the Rhenish Palatinate was restored to the son of the Elector Frederick, and for his benefit an eighth electorate was now constituted. Still more momentous were the changes in the north. Saxony kept Lusatia: but the most important acquisitions fell to Brandenburg. The Elector, who had claims on Pomerania, was given the eastern part of that duchy, and for the cession of the west to Sweden he was compensated

by the bishoprics of Minden and Halberstadt, and the reversion of Magdeburg, which finally came into his hands in 1680. Brandenburg thus obtained a strong footing in central Germany.

The peace was disastrous to the Holy Roman Empire. It was recognized that the German princes had full sovereignty in their own borders; they might engage in war or form alliances with foreign powers or one another, though not against the Emperor. Thus the struggle between the imperial authority and the princes had ended in favour of the latter. Germany became a loose confederation of states. The Empire, it is true, was not formally abolished. There was still an imperial Council, an imperial Chamber of Justice, an imperial Diet. But the Council and Chamber of Justice were henceforth cumbersome futilities, and the Diet became a permanent diplomatic congress, sitting at Regensburg, and attended by the representatives of the eight electors, of about a hundred spiritual and temporal princes, and of fifty-one imperial cities. It was supposed to pass laws and control foreign policy, but it had no means of compelling the princes to obey its decrees or supply the troops which each was supposed to contribute in time of war. In every detail, in fact, the machinery of the central government was so unwieldy as to be worse than useless, for it placed insurmountable obstacles in the way of reform.

It is of course true that the Peace of Westphalia, in recognizing the independence of the princes, only gave formal countenance to a state of affairs which had long existed. At the same time, this official acknowledgment of its impotence tore away the few shreds of prestige that still clung to the Empire. Ferdinand II.'s stroke for power had roused a little enthusiasm for the imperial cause, but after 1648 none was ever shown. Indeed, the house of Habsburg abandoned the game. It was still the chief power in Germany; it still

posed as the defender of German interests against France; but in future its heart was in schemes for its aggrandizement in south-eastern Europe and Italy.

But the political changes caused by the Thirty Years' War are of minor consequence compared with its effect on German economics, morality, and intellectual life. No country has ever suffered from a war as Germany suffered between 1618 and 1648. Most of the land was ravaged over and over again. We hear of a village plundered "twenty-eight times in two years, and twice in one day." Whole villages were wiped out, and the total population was reduced by about a half. Agriculture fell into utter decay. Cattle were destroyed by the thousand. A prosperous district of Thuringia had 1400 oxen when the war began and only 244 when it ended: not a single sheep remained, though nearly 5000 were kept in the district before 1618. Those of the inhabitants who survived were in wretched case. The landowners were burdened with debt. Labour being scarce and dear, they sought to increase their hold on the peasants, who, starving and helpless, were in many parts, especially in the east, reduced to the position of serfdom from which their ancestors had long raised themselves. Things were almost equally bad in the cities. There the prosperity of the sixteenth century disappeared. Industry was ruined; trade was impossible. Even when the war was over recovery seemed hopeless. For, while Germany was in the throes, other states—France, England, and especially Holland—had been making great commercial progress. The poverty-stricken Germans could not compete with their products. Frankfurt, Leipzig, and Breslau were the chief centres of trade, and remained fairly prosperous; but the great towns of the south were ruined. Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck still pretended to maintain the Hansa. But the mouths of the chief German rivers were in foreign hands, and the Baltic trade had fallen to the English



Photo. Photochrom Co.

The Ploenlein, Rothenburg

This view in one of the most picturesque towns of South Germany gives a good impression of the appearance of a German town at the time of the Thirty Years' War.

and Dutch. For over a century Germany was the poorest country in western Europe.

It is plain from history that war sometimes exercises a bracing effect on the morals of a people. But the Thirty Years' War, waged with fearful brutality and generally from the most sordid motives, did nothing but harm to German morality. All restraints had been cast to the winds. Thousands of Germans had joined the mercenary armies that cared only for the gratification of their greed and lust, and when the war was over, they could not abandon their habits. The typical army had been accompanied by an equally numerous force of dissolute camp-followers of both sexes; and it was inevitable that moral corruption should spread far and wide. And even among those who refrained from gross licence demoralization was evident: high ideals disappeared, and a selfish materialism ruled supreme. The peasant, it was noticed, became more cringing and obsequious; the burgher more greedy and sluggish; the noble more effeminate, luxurious, and fond of court life. Such conditions were inevitably accompanied by intellectual lethargy. In the second half of the century Germany's contribution to thought and letters was almost nothing. It was the age of Louis XIV., when France set the fashion in everything, and German writers, artists, and architects were content to follow French guidance. German religion, too, was in evil case. Lutheranism was inert, and theological speculation was trammelled by the bonds of a rigid dogmatic system. Calvinism had passed its best days. The momentum of the Reformation had in fact spent itself, and religious enthusiasm was regarded with suspicion.

It is needless to say that national feeling was, for all practical purposes, extinct. "Germany" was a geographical, not a political term. As in the later Middle Ages, its history became merely the history of the numerous states into which

it was divided. The one chance of German unity still lay in the rise of a state of commanding power. The Habsburgs had now recognized that it was not given to them to restore the greatness of the Empire. Henceforward the interest of German history is centred in the fortunes of the Hohenzollerns.

CHAPTER XVII

THE RISE OF PRUSSIA

THE Mark of Brandenburg and the family of Hohenzollern have appeared from time to time in our history: but it will be convenient to recapitulate briefly their fortunes up to the end of the Thirty Years' War.

When a separate kingdom of Germany was first established, the land between the Elbe and the Oder was almost entirely in the possession of the Slavonic tribe of the Wends. Henry the Fowler and Otto I. partially colonized this territory; but the great Wendish rising of 983 destroyed nearly all their work, and on the lower Elbe no counter-attack was made till in 1134 the Emperor Lothair granted the North or Old Mark on the left bank to Albert the Bear. Partly by conquest, partly by diplomacy, Albert and his successors acquired the country round the Havel and the Lower Spree, which they called the Mark of Brandenburg. In the thirteenth century the Ascanians planted themselves in the Neumark across the Oder, and secured the overlordship of Pomerania, from which they took the region known as the Uckermark. The margrave Waldemar, who died in 1319, raised the fortunes of his house to their highest point: he was one of the most powerful and magnificent rulers in Germany; the whole of Lusatia having come into his hands, his dominions stretched from the lower reaches of the Oder to the borders of Bohemia; and he was able to acquit himself well in a war against the kings of Sweden,

Denmark, and Poland, and a host of German and Slavonic princes.

By this time Brandenburg had been thoroughly colonized by Germans. But its social and political institutions gave it a unique place among the German states. A naturally poor country, with no good geographical boundaries, surrounded by jealous or hostile neighbours, peopled by settlers drawn from many different quarters and with few common sentiments and traditions, Brandenburg depended for its very existence on the maintenance of a strong and warlike central government. No prince in the rest of Germany was so free from control as the margrave of Brandenburg. He or his ancestors had planned and led the conquest of the land which his subjects occupied: the Mark was his to treat as he pleased, its inhabitants were there because he had asked them to come. For long feudalism scarcely affected Brandenburg. The nobles had small fiefs and few privileges; the towns often possessed valuable rights, but they had been granted by the margrave of his own free will, and there was no chance of usurping more behind his back. Even the Church had to bow to the margrave: in Brandenburg tithes went to him, not to the clergy. But the Ascanians were not tyrants, and their subjects were well-treated as long as they behaved themselves. The soil was mostly tilled by free peasant proprietors, who paid a fixed rent to the government. Serfdom was almost unknown. The administration was, for the Middle Ages, very efficient. The margrave had complete control over the higher officials, called "advocates," appointing them, dismissing them, or transferring them from place to place, according to his pleasure. The Ascanian margraves, warlike, restless, unscrupulous, the vicegerents of Providence to their subjects, impressed on Brandenburg a character which it never wholly lost. Their line died out in 1320, but their spirit still rules their lands.

The later Ascanians, able men as most of them were, could not maintain their authority at the pitch to which the early margraves had raised it. They remained exceptionally powerful for German princes; but their indefatigable ambition —for even then the rulers of Brandenburg believed that the best defence was attack—often exhausted the state treasury, and sometimes they gave way to the temptation of raising money by the sale of privileges to the nobles or the towns. Thus feudalism had begun to creep in for some time before the Brandenburg line of the Ascanians became extinct, and it speedily triumphed when in 1324 the vacant margraviate was annexed by the house of Wittelsbach, whose head, Lewis the Bavarian, was then Emperor. Under this family the Mark fell on evil days: the government was slack, civil wars broke out, and neighbouring states made encroachments on its borders. In 1356, it is true, the Golden Bull conferred on the margrave the title of Elector. But the Wittelsbachs never established themselves firmly, and in 1373 the Elector Otto the Slothful was forced to sell his territory to the Emperor Charles IV.

From 1373 to 1415 Brandenburg was under the House of Luxemburg. Charles IV. governed the Mark well, restoring order, encouraging trade, and recovering many of the dissipated rights of the Elector. Under his successor Sigismund, however, confusion again reigned; the nobles acted as independent princes, making war on one another at their pleasure; the peasants had mostly been reduced to the status of serfs; and only in the cities, some of which belonged to the Hansa, were order and prosperity to be found. A change for the better took place when in 1411 Sigismund appointed as his vicegerent in Brandenburg his faithful supporter, Frederick of Hohenzollern. Four years later Frederick was given the title of Elector and the Mark became his own.

The family of Hohenzollern derived its origin and name

from a castle on the Swabian Alp, round which its original estates lay. Since the thirteenth century it had been split into two lines, one of which held the ancestral lands in Swabia, the other certain property in Franconia, with the title of Burgrave of Nürnberg. From time to time the latter branch appeared conspicuously in German politics: but till 1415 the Hohenzollerns were only in the second rank of the German magnates. Henceforward, however, they figure among the great powers of Germany.

Frederick I. did something towards restoring the authority of the Elector over the rebellious nobles and cities of Brandenburg. But he devoted more of his attention to his Franconian lands, and it was left to his successor, Frederick the Iron, to bring the towns into complete subjection—many being forced to leave the Hansa—and to recover some of the lost dependencies of Brandenburg, notably the Neumark, which Sigismund had mortgaged to the Teutonic Order. Like other princely families, the Hohenzollerns were in danger of dissipating their strength by the subdivision of their estates among the members of the house. It was to guard against this that the Elector Albert Achilles (1470-1486) declared it to be a law for the house that the succession to Brandenburg and its dependencies should proceed according to primogeniture, and that they were to be inseparable. Younger sons might receive provision in Franconia. The Franconian Hohenzollerns speedily sank into comparative insignificance, and when the family is mentioned, it must be understood that the Brandenburg or electoral branch is meant.

In the sixteenth century the power of the Elector, both in Germany and in his own territories, increased but slowly. Joachim I. (1499-1535) put down the nobility with a firm hand, improved the finances of his state, and raised its culture by founding a university at Frankfurt on the Oder. It was a cousin of his who dissolved the order of Teutonic Knights,

and set up the duchy of Prussia. Joachim himself, however, was a firm Catholic, and in his dominions repelled the advances of the Reformation with much rigour.

Despite his good government, Joachim imperilled the future of Brandenburg by departing from the rule laid down by Albert Achilles, and on his death the Neumark passed to his second son, John of Küstrin. John at once introduced Lutheranism into his estates, and the new Elector, Joachim II., repudiated papal authority, and adopted a sympathetic attitude towards the Protestant princes. But he refused to join the League of Schmalkalden, and in the war between it and Charles V. maintained a neutral attitude. He was not a good ruler: his extravagance ran him into debt, and his need for money drove him to make concessions to the nobility.

Joachim II. died in 1571: the Neumark was soon afterwards re-united to Brandenburg, and his successors, by careful administration and refraining from activity beyond their borders, remedied the evils of his rule. Momentous changes, however, occurred under John Sigismund, who became Elector in 1608. The principalities of Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg were added to his dominions in circumstances mentioned above; but of much greater importance was his acquisition of East Prussia on the death of his father-in-law, Albert Frederick, who held that duchy. It was an event of little less significance than the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War in the same year. Another noteworthy event of John Sigismund's rule was his adoption of Calvinism as the established religion of Brandenburg. At the same time, he granted freedom of conscience to his subjects—the first European prince to do so—and strove, though with indifferent success, to induce Lutherans and Calvinists to live together in harmony.

John Sigismund died just after the beginning of the Thirty Years' War. George William, the next elector, proved him-

self altogether incompetent to cope with the trying situation which faced him. For long he remained obstinately neutral, while his fellow-Protestants were being overwhelmed. In 1631, under pressure, he joined Gustavus Adolphus, but gave him little effective aid. His reconciliation with the Emperor by the Peace of Prague did him no good, for it exposed his lands to terrible ravages by the Swedes, against whom he was helpless. His own troops, moreover, scarcely acknowledged his control, and were hardly less destructive than the foreigner. On his death in 1640 he left Brandenburg in a pitiable state.

His son, Frederick William, as we have seen, came to terms with Sweden, and it was largely due to his efforts that the general peace was at last concluded. He had done something towards restoring order and prosperity in the Mark, and at the end of the war he gained some valuable territory. Nevertheless, in 1648, Brandenburg had given little indication of her coming greatness. During the last two centuries, her Hohenzollern Electors had pursued a cautious, selfish, and unscrupulous policy which had indeed maintained her position as a first-class German state, but which had allowed her to be overshadowed by such principalities as Saxony and Bavaria. Even now these two probably ranked above Brandenburg in the estimation of most Germans, and Austria was, of course, immeasurably her superior. Within the next half century, however, Brandenburg had risen from the position of a considerable German state to that of an important power in Europe. This extraordinary advance was due almost entirely to Frederick William, whom history has consequently styled "the Great Elector."

The administration and diplomacy of Frederick William started the Hohenzollerns on the road to the headship of a united Germany. The fortunes of his house must therefore be the central theme of our further narrative. It is a subject

which naturally rouses much enthusiasm in patriotic German historians. To others, however, German history after 1648, if not less interesting, is likely to seem less attractive than before. We have left behind the splendid if unpractical idealism of the early Emperors, the picturesque if demoralizing lawlessness of the German princes of the later Middle Ages, the intellectual brilliance of the Renaissance scholars and the genial piety of a Luther, and even the grandiose ambitions of a Wallenstein. Instead, we are called upon to admire a stern, materialistic, unscrupulous policy, successful both abroad and at home, and not without benefits for its very victims, but untouched by any grace or inspiration. The Great Elector himself was what later times have taught Europe to regard as the typical Prussian statesman. Those who are acquainted with his descendants will not be astonished at his concern for the army, his admitted separation of morals and diplomacy, his personal friendship with the Almighty, his disregard of the wishes of his subjects, and his interest in their material prosperity. If people like the Hohenzollerns, the Great Elector is the sort of man they will like.

Frederick William's foreign policy had as its main objects the diminution of Swedish influence in north Germany and the maintenance of the interests of Brandenburg in the face of the aggressions of France. By intervention in wars when it seemed safe, and by unscrupulous changing of sides at various times, the Great Elector, if he did not achieve any great triumphs, succeeded in keeping his territories intact and in immensely raising Brandenburg's prestige. Very characteristic was his attitude when in 1655 war broke out between Sweden and Poland. At first he joined the Swedes, helped them to win a battle at Warsaw, and received from them recognition of the independence of East Prussia, hitherto under the overlordship of the Polish king. But when Denmark made war on Sweden, the Elector allied himself with

the Poles, and secured from them also the acknowledgment of his sovereignty over East Prussia. A great coalition being now formed against the Swedish king, Charles X., Frederick William took a vigorous share in the operations. The Peace of Oliva in 1660 confirmed him in the independent possession of East Prussia; he had hoped to gain Swedish Pomerania, but in this he was thwarted by the influence of France.

In 1672 Louis XIV. attacked Holland and seemed about to conquer it. The Elector thereupon took up arms to defend the freedom of the German princes, of trade, and of the Protestant faith. Despite these admirable motives, he made a separate peace with France in the following year. In 1674, however, he joined the strong coalition which had been formed against Louis. This move exposed him to an attack by France's ally, Sweden. Swedish troops invaded Brandenburg in the old way, but after receiving one or two checks they were utterly defeated at Fehrbellin. It was not a big battle: the Elector's army numbered only some 6000 men, the Swedish force only 11,000. But the fight had a great moral effect. It was a serious blow to the reputation of the famous Swedish troops, and it was the first victory won by the army of Brandenburg fighting alone. It was at once followed by the invasion of Swedish Pomerania, which after a year or two was entirely in the hands of the Elector. But the struggle between Brandenburg and Sweden was only part of a great European war, and when in 1679 peace was made, the strong position of France enabled her to force Frederick William to abandon all save a few square miles of his conquests.

The Elector had for some years been in alliance with the Emperor Leopold against France. But, impressed by the power of Louis, he now made an alliance with that great foe of Germany, and while the French were seizing German territory in a most unscrupulous way, he was contentedly pocketing French subsidies. In 1685, however, he again changed his

tune, resumed friendly relations with the Emperor, and, had he not been cut off by death, would have been a leading member of the Grand Alliance which William of Orange was building up against France. He died in 1688, shortly before William set out on his expedition to England.

Capable though the Elector's foreign policy may have been, it certainly would not earn him his title of "Great." His domestic administration, however, is far more notable, and has had much greater influence on his successors. The army was, of course, his first concern. When he became Elector, he found that his authority over the soldiers was very small: the colonels of the different regiments enlisted the men and chose the officers. Such absurdities were gradually abolished, though not without difficulty, and by the end of his rule, Brandenburg had a well-organized, sternly disciplined, and excellently equipped army of 30,000 men, under the supreme and absolute command of the Elector. The expense of such a military establishment fell heavily on Frederick William's subjects. There was much discontent, especially among the Prussian nobles, who would rather have been ruled by Poland than by Brandenburg. But the Elector put down disaffection with a strong hand, and raised the power of the central government to unprecedented heights. It was his aim to secure a permanent revenue. At his accession the finances of his territories were in confusion; but he resumed many alienated estates, increased the taxes on land and buildings in rural districts, and in the towns instituted an excise, which proved both more lucrative and less unpopular than the direct taxation previously imposed. Frederick William thus made himself almost independent of extraordinary grants, for which the consent of his subjects had to be obtained.

The Elector's lands were not naturally wealthy, and he recognized that if the Hohenzollerns were to maintain a high

position in Europe, industry and commerce must be fostered by the State. He invited into his lands Dutch farmers, who taught his subjects the most scientific methods of agriculture and cattle-breeding. Manufacturers were also taken under the wing of the government. There were state iron foundries and glass works; private enterprise was stimulated by bounties and monopolies, and protected from foreign competition by an elaborate tariff. When in 1685 Louis XIV. withdrew toleration from the Huguenots, the Elector welcomed them to Brandenburg, thus adding to his subjects many highly-skilled workers, and planting in his dominions several new industries.

Frederick William was equally concerned with the development of commerce. He made many roads, constructed a canal, and established a regular postal system throughout his territories. Abroad he strove to compete with Holland, and, it seems, had dreams of a colonial Empire. He founded a West Africa Company, which established several fortified stations on the Guinea coast, and he even built a navy which gained some successes against the Swedes. These efforts at maritime expansion were, however, premature: Dutch opposition was too strong: and early in the eighteenth century the possessions of the West Africa Company were sold to Holland.

Though Frederick William founded a university at Duisburg on the Rhine, and, in his relations with the churches of his dominions, carefully maintained the tolerant attitude initiated by John Sigismund, it is not as a friend of learning and religion that he is famous, but as the founder of his state's material strength. German writers like to hail him as one of the builders of the present German Empire. It is true that he sometimes appealed to German national feeling; it is likewise true that his chief enemies were also enemies of the real interests of Germany. But in his actions we can trace

concern for nothing save his own territories. It so happened that German unity could only be attained through the rise of a new power of commanding influence. Indirectly, therefore, Frederick William served the nation as a whole. But his motives were essentially the same as those of his fellow-princes; it is only by accident that he has become a German hero.

Frederick William's successor Frederick is best remembered for having gained the title of king for the Hohenzollerns. As the Elector of Brandenburg was a prince of the Empire, the crown could be granted only by the Emperor, and it cost much diplomacy to induce Leopold to bestow so high a dignity on one of his subjects. But in 1700 his reluctance was overcome by Frederick's offer to pay for the honour by sending to the aid of the Emperor against France a contingent over and above his legal quota. Frederick, however, had to take his title from Prussia, which lay beyond the limits of the Empire, and he was not allowed to style himself King *of* Prussia, but only King *in* Prussia, a distinction which seemed to Leopold of much importance. The state of the Hohenzollerns was now of course known as Prussia, but Brandenburg remained the centre of their power.

The acquisition of a crown raised Frederick's prestige among the European sovereigns; and the reputation of his army was increased by the part it played in the wars of the Grand Alliance and the Spanish Succession. Yet his rule was on the whole injurious to Prussia. Frederick lacked his father's caution, thoroughness, and thrift. He was interested in art, letters, and philosophy, founded the University of Halle, established at Berlin the famous Academy of Learning, and patronized the great scholar and thinker Leibnitz. His court was brilliant and extravagant; and polished favourites began to take the place of the old Elector's tried ministers. The finances fell into confusion; the adminis-

tration became corrupt. Prussia, in fact, was not yet strong enough to play an active part in Europe unless her rulers practised the strictest economy at home. It is true that her share in the war of the Spanish Succession won for her at the Peace of Utrecht the province of Upper Gelderland, but this was a small compensation for the damage wrought by Frederick's rule.

Meanwhile events which greatly influenced the future of Germany were coming to pass elsewhere. In the latter half of the seventeenth century the attention of Europe was mainly directed to the encroachments of France on the German frontier and the advance of Austria against the Ottoman Empire. France, already raised to lofty heights by her great statesmen Richelieu and Mazarin, became under Louis XIV. a danger to the independence of all her neighbours. With the best generals and the finest army of the age, Louis thirsted for military glory, and for long hoped to annex the Netherlands and to push forward his frontier to the Rhine. Germany was little affected by his ambitions till 1672, when a triumphant campaign against Holland seemed to presage the loss of Dutch independence. The Emperor and the Elector of Brandenburg both took up arms to oppose the arrogant policy of Louis. Other powers joined, and France, forced to abandon Holland, was hard put to it to hold her own. There was much fighting on the upper Rhine, where, however, the genius of Turenne long secured the ascendency of France. In 1674 he crossed the river, and laid waste the Rhenish Palatinate with a thoroughness unsurpassed even in the Thirty Years' War. The advance of an army of Austrians and Brandenburgers forced him to retire behind the Vosges, while the Germans occupied Alsace. But instead of going into winter quarters, according to the custom of the time, Turenne quietly concentrated a large force under cover of the mountains. Presently he marched rapidly over snowy

passes to Belfort, dashed through the famous Gap between the Vosges and the Jura, rolled up the German forces in Alsace, and chased them across the Rhine at Strassburg. But it needed a Turenne to perform exploits like this; and when, a few months later, a chance shot ended the great strategist's career, the prospects of a complete French triumph were ruined. There were two or three more years of indecisive fighting, and then, in 1678, the war was closed by the Peace of Nijmegen. France received the County of Burgundy, of late under the Spanish Habsburgs, and formerly, as we have seen, part of the Empire. She was also given the important town of Freiburg in the Breisgau, and extensive rights in the duchy of Lorraine.

The peace did not suspend Louis' encroachments on Germany. The treaties of Westphalia and Nijmegen had ceded to France certain regions "with their dependencies." What this phrase meant had nowhere been clearly defined, and, in the territories concerned, Louis now set up courts called "Chambers of Union," the task of which was to determine what these "dependencies" really were. The chambers soon asserted that all Alsace, the duchy of Zweibrücken, and other districts of less importance came under the term; and these decisions were immediately enforced by French troops. It was one of the most insolent moves in history. But there was no one to resist: Brandenburg was in alliance with France; Austria was in grievous peril from the Turks. So the aggressions of Louis went for the time unpunished. The most valuable of his acquisitions was the city of Strassburg, which he induced the magistrates to surrender in 1681, though it had been expressly reserved to the Empire in the Treaty of Westphalia.

It was not long before the unbridled ambition of the French king gave rise to another war. In 1685, on the death without direct heirs of the Elector Palatine of the Rhine, Louis, on

flimsy pretexts, laid claim to considerable parts of his lands. He was answered by the formation of the League of Augsburg, which was joined by the Empire, Brandenburg, Holland, Spain, and Sweden. War did not break out till 1688, when Louis invaded the Palatinate and at the same time tried to force a nominee of his own into the archbishopric of Köln. Almost simultaneously the Revolution in England deprived him of his most faithful ally, James II., and added immensely to the resources of William of Orange, the heart and soul of the hostile confederacy. Louis had to withdraw from the Palatinate, though only after subjecting it to ravages of unparalleled barbarity, in which Heidelberg, Mannheim, Speyer, and other towns were largely destroyed. The subsequent operations took place mostly in the Spanish Netherlands. Neither side won any overwhelming victories on land; but French resources were severely strained, and in 1697, at the Peace of Ryswick, she was compelled to surrender most of what she had gained in Germany through the Chambers of Union, though Alsace, including Strassburg, was left in her hands.

Only four years passed before all western Europe was again in arms. The new conflict is familiar to Englishmen as the War of the Spanish Succession. The occasion of it was the death without issue of Charles II., king of Spain, who left a will granting all the Spanish dominions to his great-nephew, Philip of Anjou, grandson of Louis XIV. Now the Habsburgs likewise had claims to the Spanish crown; but Louis, setting at naught a treaty recently made for the partition of the Spanish territories, allowed his grandson to accept Charles II.'s bequest, and prepared to support him by force. The Emperor Leopold, however, refused to acquiesce, and was supported by England and Holland, whose independence and commerce would have been gravely threatened if Spain had fallen under French control. Brandenburg and most

of the other German states joined the Emperor, but Bavaria took the side of France.

The most important fields of action were the Spanish Netherlands and Italy. It is true that there was a good deal of indecisive fighting on the upper Rhine, and that in 1704 an advance of the French towards Vienna led to Marlborough's famous march from the Netherlands to Bavaria and his great victory at Blenheim. But what determined the issue of the war was the expulsion of the French from the Netherlands by Marlborough, and from Italy by the Austrian general, Prince Eugene of Savoy. Nevertheless, the Archduke Charles, the Habsburg claimant to Spain, failed to secure the Spanish throne. For one thing, the Spaniards were on the whole in favour of Philip, and Charles's transitory successes never gave him a firm hold on the country. And his chances were adversely affected by the death of Leopold in 1705. Charles's elder brother, Joseph, who became Emperor, had no sons. Charles was therefore heir-presumptive to the Habsburg lands, and if he succeeded in winning Spain, it seemed probable that he would again unite in one hand the dominions of Charles V., a prospect as objectionable to his allies as the annexation of Spain by Louis. Moreover, changes in England brought into power a ministry in favour of peace. France, defeated and exhausted, was ready to compromise. Accordingly, in 1713 and 1714, the Treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt, and Baden brought the war to a close, and rearranged the map of Europe.

For Germany the importance of the peace lay in the division of the Spanish Empire between the two claimants. Philip had Spain itself, and the colonies in America; Charles received Naples, Sardinia, Milan, and the Southern Netherlands. The might of the Habsburgs was thus vastly increased; but at the same time their eyes were turned away from Germany. The possession of Belgium indeed gave them

an interest in resisting French encroachments on the west. But Italy now claimed much of their attention, and events in the east had also opened new paths for their advance. In 1683 the Turks for the last time invaded Austria, and laid siege to Vienna. The city was relieved by an army of Germans and Poles, and at the battle of the Kahlenberg the Turks were utterly beaten. After this, the Austrians took the offensive with brilliant success, supported by many German princes, and in alliance with Poland, Venice, and Russia. In a series of triumphant campaigns, the Turks were driven out of Hungary; the Hungarians acknowledged the hereditary right of the Habsburgs to rule over them; and by the Peace of Carlowitz in 1699, the Turks definitively surrendered nearly all the country, and, handing over most of Croatia as well, gave Austria new approaches to the Adriatic.

The triumphs of Austria stand in sharp contrast to the snail's progress of Prussia, whose share in the wars with France gained her only one small province. But as Charles V. had long ago proved, vast domains outside Germany gave an Emperor little power in Germany; and a German prince who had interests in half a dozen foreign countries was not likely to achieve much in his own.



Frederick William of Brandenburg,
"The Great Elector," 1620–1688



Frederick II. King of Prussia,
1712–1786



Albrecht von Wallenstein,
1583–1634

CHAPTER XVIII

FREDERICK THE GREAT

THE extravagant Frederick I. of Prussia died in the year of the Peace of Utrecht. His son and successor, Frederick William I., brought the state back to the path marked out by his grandfather. He was, however, far inferior to the Great Elector in ability. His foreign policy was undistinguished. His one war was against Sweden, whom he attacked when she was in straits under the assaults of Denmark, Poland, and Russia; and though he won part of the coveted western Pomerania, the seizing of so obvious an opportunity does little more credit to his head than to his heart. And in his later efforts to add to his lands on the lower Rhine, he was outwitted by Austria.

Nevertheless, Frederick William was just the king that Prussia needed. Of narrow outlook, wholly lacking in imagination, with no taste whatever for art or literature, and with a contempt for royal pomp, he was interested in nothing but affairs of state, and took pleasure in nothing but the improvement and inspection of his army. He completed the centralization of government begun by the Great Elector, placing the whole of the internal administration under a board called the General Directory of finance, war, and domains, of which he himself was president. Its work was divided among five departments, each with its own minister of state; while subordinate boards, appointed by the king, governed the several provinces. Frederick William's reforms

made the government of Prussia a thorough bureaucracy under the strict control of the king. Popular liberty had no place in such a system. Whatever independence had been left to the nobility and the cities by the Great Elector was taken away by Frederick William I.

But though nothing must be done by the people, much was done for them. A prosperous population was for the good of the State. So Frederick William, like his grandfather, fostered agriculture by state regulations and subsidies, and by encouraging Germans from other parts to settle in his dominions. Thus 20,000 Lutherans, driven from the bishopric of Salzburg for their faith, found a new home in East Prussia. Very rigid legislation protected industry and internal trade from foreign competition. And the king has the credit of having made elementary education compulsory for all children from six to twelve. It was not love of learning that prompted this step, but simply recognition of the fact that an intelligent subject is a more useful subject; and the king was guilty of no inconsistency when he banished the famous philosopher Wolff of Halle from Prussia because his teachings were suspected of being subversive of the State. It was power, not culture, that Frederick William wanted.

In his personal life, as in the administration of his realm, the king practised the strictest economy. Only on the army was he willing to spend money, and the army swallowed five-sevenths of his revenue. He raised it to the strength of 80,000 men, an enormous number for a state with the population and resources of Prussia. The army was subjected to a severe, indeed savage, discipline, drilled and drilled again till a brigade moved with the same precision as a section, and furnished with the newest weapons and equipment. Great care was bestowed on the choice and training of the officers, whose leading characteristics were brutality,

bravery, and absolute loyalty to the king. It was Frederick William who introduced into Prussia the principle that every young man was liable to be called upon for military service, but it was a long time before the obligation was generally enforced.

This wonderful weapon was never used by the inventor. He sent a contingent to the help of the Emperor in the War of the Polish Succession, but otherwise his last years were peaceful. But on his death in 1740 he was succeeded by a man who was little disposed to hoard the money which he found in the treasury or to keep in its scabbard the sword which had been so carefully polished and sharpened.

The new king, Frederick, called the Great, was twenty-eight years of age when he ascended the throne. He had already passed through strange vicissitudes of fortune. Frederick William had entrusted his son's education to two Prussian officers and a French nobleman of Huguenot faith, with instructions to make the prince a good Christian, a thrifty administrator, and a brave soldier. But the young Frederick soon rebelled against his father's rigid notions. He conceived a taste for literature, music, and profligacy, and wished to become a fine gentleman on the best French model. The wrath of the king was great: the "effeminate" youth was subjected to a sterner discipline than ever; even the rod was not spared. The prince then planned to run away and go abroad: but the scheme was betrayed, one of his accomplices was executed, and Frederick himself, after narrowly escaping a like fate, was stripped of his military rank, and given a post as clerk in a government office. His punishment afterwards stood him in good stead. But his active mind, already full of vast political schemes, refused to be fettered to an office stool; in 1732 he wisely reconciled himself to the king, who made him colonel of a regiment, and in the next year he obediently married a German princess of his

father's choosing. In 1734, when Prussian troops took part in the War of the Polish Succession, he saw some fighting on the Rhine under the famous Prince Eugene. From then to his accession he devoted himself to his military duties and the pursuit of his literary and artistic interests.

Frederick was by far the most able man who has ever sat on the Prussian throne. As an administrator he was the equal of his father or the Great Elector; as a diplomatist and a general he was incomparably better than either. He had a wider outlook and more varied tastes than any of his ancestors or descendants. His literary works are not without merit. If his "Anti-Macchiavelli," a treatise on politics, is neither profound nor sincere, his "Memoirs of the House of Brandenburg" and "History of my own Time" are not only good reading, but of much value as sources of historical knowledge. He had a genuine admiration for men of intellectual and artistic distinction, patronized the genius of Bach, was for years an intimate friend of Voltaire, and surrounded himself with a circle of clever and witty companions. His conversation was brilliant, his manner (when he chose) most winning.

But he was a sorry villain. Selfish, cynical, and faithless in his private life, he was as a king the most unscrupulous of an unscrupulous line. No regard for truth or honour restrained his ambitions. He cared for nothing save Prussia, which in his mind was identified with himself. Patriotic German historians have found him a stumbling-block. He was a great soldier; and it is clear that without his victories Prussia would never have gained the strength which finally enabled her to achieve the unification of Germany. Plainly he must be a national hero. But a friend of French infidels, who wrote in French and commonly spoke it, and who did not conceal his contempt for German culture—how could such a man be the chosen instrument of Providence for the uplifting of

the German people? The truth of course is that Frederick only became a German patriot long after he was dead. The other German princes of the time cared just as much for the German nation as he did, only they were less successful in pursuing their own interests.

Frederick soon had an opportunity of showing what manner of man he was. He had been king only a few months when the Emperor Charles VI. died. Since 1713 the prestige of Austria had on the whole declined. In Italy, she had been forced to surrender most of the lands gained by the Peace of Rastadt. Her advance against the Turks had of late been checked, and a war with France over the succession to Poland, which lasted from 1733 to 1735, had weakened her influence on Germany. It is true that the war ended in the establishment on the Polish throne of Augustus III., Elector of Saxony, who had been supported by Austria; but this result had been mainly due to her ally Russia; and in the fighting against the French the Austrian armies had fared badly. Moreover, at the end of the war, Austria was fain to agree that the German duchy of Lorraine should be given to the unsuccessful aspirant to Poland, and that, on his death, it should pass to France. It was an arrangement characteristic of an age in which subjects were handed over from one ruler to another without any regard for their own wishes. French influence, however, had long been paramount in Lorraine, and no one can have felt much change when in 1766 the duchy was formally annexed. But this bartering away of an imperial fief did not tend to increase the feeble respect felt for the Emperor in Germany.

Charles VI., however, cared little about the Empire. He had no male heir; and the main object of his policy was to provide for the security of his daughter, Maria Theresa. On his death the house of Habsburg would be exposed to two dangers. Its various possessions might try to establish their

independence, and foreign powers might try to seize some for themselves. In 1713, therefore, Charles published the Pragmatic Sanction—a declaration that the Habsburg lands were inseparable and that, in default of male heirs, they might be ruled by a woman. Henceforth his diplomacy was directed towards securing for the Pragmatic Sanction the guarantee of the European Powers; and before his death most of the states of the Empire and all others that mattered had promised to respect and uphold it.

But when Charles died, the spectacle of a young and inexperienced woman at the head of the Austrian dominions proved too strong a temptation for the honour of many statesmen. Various claims were raised to parts of the Habsburg lands, and the ministers of France made contemptible efforts to explain away their promise to Charles. But no one approached the brutal cynicism of Frederick. He had at first recognized Maria Theresa as ruler of all her father's territories. But no sooner had he realized that several states were ready to break their word than he mobilized his army, led it into the Habsburg province of Silesia, and then, without having ever declared war, offered Maria Theresa his aid against all her enemies in return for the cession of the occupied territory. It was a fitting opening of Frederick's royal career. To do him justice, he made little effort to excuse himself. His admirers have tried to justify him by urging that the Emperor had not fulfilled the conditions on which Frederick William I. had recognized the Pragmatic Sanction and by dwelling on some flimsy claims of the Hohenzollerns to certain Silesian estates. But no special pleading can conceal the fact that Frederick's action was a piece of brutal and cowardly aggression.

Silesia was undefended and speedily overrun by the Prussian army. But Maria Theresa refused to treat, and in 1741 an Austrian force tried to wrest Frederick's booty from

him. Frederick's first battle, Mollwitz, did not cover him with glory. He was within an ace of defeat, and himself fled from the field. But the immovable valour of his infantry saved the day; and the Austrian army soon afterwards retreated into Moravia.

A terrible storm now burst on Maria Theresa. France, Spain and Bavaria attacked her. Bohemia and Upper Austria were invaded; Vienna was threatened with capture. But Maria Theresa threw herself upon the sympathy of her Hungarian subjects, who rallied round her with enthusiasm. The French and Bavarians were driven back. Even Frederick was forced to retire when, early in 1742, he attempted an invasion of Moravia. But Maria Theresa's position was still perilous. Britain, her sole friend in Europe, urged her to get rid of one enemy by yielding to Frederick's demands, and, after a Prussian victory at Chotusitz in Bohemia, she consented to do so. In the summer of 1742 the Treaty of Breslau brought to an end the first Silesian war. Nearly all Silesia, a fertile country, rich in minerals, was added to the dominions of the Hohenzollerns.

It was not long, however, before Frederick was again fighting the Austrians. In 1742 the British had drawn the sword on behalf of Maria Theresa. A series of disasters befell the enemies of Austria, and the Elector Charles of Bavaria, who had been chosen Emperor, was driven from his lands and became a mere hanger-on of France. Though Frederick had no love for the French or the Bavarians, the triumphs of Austria filled him with alarm; and in 1744, on the mere suspicion that Maria Theresa would try to recover Silesia, he again attacked her. Eighty thousand Prussians invaded Bohemia, and took Prague. But harassed by a guerilla warfare against his communications, outgeneralled by the Austrian commanders, and gravely threatened in the rear by the hostile intervention of Saxony, Frederick had finally to beat an in-

glorious retreat to Silesia. Next year, however, an Austrian invasion of that province was repulsed, and counter-attacks on Bohemia and Saxony forced Maria Theresa to give way once more. The Peace of Dresden confirmed Frederick in the possession of Silesia, though in return he recognized as Emperor Francis of Lorraine, Maria Theresa's husband, who had been elected after the recent death of Charles of Bavaria.

The general European War, commonly called the War of the Austrian Succession, continued for another three years. Prussia, however, held aloof. Neither side winning any decisive success, peace was made at Aachen in 1748, nearly all conquests being given back to their former possessors. Thus the attempt to partition the Habsburg lands had failed, and the imperial crown remained in the family. But Prussia had successfully challenged Austria's claim to be the paramount power in Germany. The contest between the two lasted for a century and a quarter. There were many changes of fortune. But first blood had been drawn by the ultimate victor.

During the years which followed the second Silesian war, Frederick busied himself with the administration of his dominions and the removal of certain defects in the army. It soon became plain that the Treaty of Aachen was only a truce. Maria Theresa was bent on revenge; and English and French went on fighting in America and India.

In the tortuous diplomacy of the next years, it was the object of the Austrian minister Kaunitz to build up a league against Prussia, while Frederick with great skill strove to foil his schemes and to form a counter-alliance. In 1746 Austria had signed a defensive alliance with Russia, now ruled by the capable Empress Elizabeth. Frederick on the other hand maintained his friendly relations with France. But when, in 1755, the colonial struggle between France and Britain developed into a formal war, the latter made with

the Empress Elizabeth an arrangement whereby Russian troops were to be used for the defence of the electorate of Hanover, then of course annexed to the English crown. Frederick, who had no wish to see a Russian army so near the heart of his kingdom, thereupon concluded with Britain a treaty for the maintenance of the neutrality of North Germany. But this move had the effect of assisting the Austrian intrigues in France; and in 1756, the ministers of Louis XV., reversing the policy of the last two centuries, signed a defensive alliance with the house of Habsburg.

Four months later the Seven Years' War had begun. Although his enemies were not bound to assist one another unless attacked, Frederick resolved to take the offensive. His army was ready. Of his foes, the French would be faced by a British force in west Germany; the Russians could not come into action for some time; only the Austrians were immediately dangerous. Frederick had in his pay an Austrian attaché at Berlin who kept him posted as to the intentions of the Austrian government. He knew that Austria was collecting troops in Bohemia, and his peremptory requests for an explanation met with evasive answers. He knew also, through the treachery of a Saxon official, that Saxony was contemplating adhesion to the confederacy against him. Now the Elector of Saxony was also king of Poland, which protected Frederick's lands from Russia. Moreover, it would be most risky to invade Bohemia from Silesia with a hostile Poland in the rear and a hostile Saxony on the right flank. So Frederick resolved to fall upon the Saxons, crush them before assistance could arrive, and use their country as a base of operations against Austria.

The scheme was only partially successful. Saxony was suddenly invaded and Dresden occupied. But the small Saxon army took up a strong position in the difficult country round Pirna, and held Frederick in check for several weeks,

The delay gave the Austrians time to organize their forces, which were quite unprepared when Frederick opened his campaign. It is true that an advance to the relief of Pirna was foiled by the Prussians and that the Saxon army was finally compelled to surrender. But its resistance had spoiled Frederick's plan of surprising the Austrians and forcing them to sign a separate peace. In 1757 he had therefore to defend himself against attacks from three sides.

Frederick was already known in Prussia as "the Great," but if he has any real claim to that title, it is to be found in his exploits during the Seven Years' War. From 1757 to 1762 he was waging a desperate struggle against three states, each superior in population and resources to his own, while Sweden and most of the lesser German principalities were also arrayed against him. It is true that he did not fight alone, or he would certainly have been crushed. An army raised and paid by the British government fought successfully against the French, and after 1757 saved Frederick from any trouble from the west. In 1758 the great Pitt drew closer the alliance between Britain and Prussia, and for the next few years his lavish subsidies stood between Frederick and financial ruin. It is also true that the Austrians and the Russians never succeeded in carrying out a concerted plan of campaign, and thus threw away much of the advantage they derived from superior numbers. But, making every allowance for the help of Britain and the mistakes of Austria and Russia, we cannot deny to Frederick the utmost credit for his magnificent resistance.

That he saved Prussia from destruction was due mainly to his own energy and skill. In equipment and discipline his army was probably the best in Europe. But in many ways it was most unsuited for a desperate defensive struggle. Like all the European armies of the time, it was a paid, professional force; but more than half the soldiers were not

Prussians at all, and many were serving against their wills. For instance, the Saxons captured in 1756 were forced to fight under their conquerors, and later, when soldiers became desperately scarce, the Prussian recruiting-officers kidnapped likely men in all parts of Germany. Desertions were naturally numerous; only the most brutal discipline kept the army together at all; and the bravery of Frederick's soldiers in action was due rather to dread of their own officers than to zeal for the Prussian cause.

This danger of desertion was, however, common to all the armies of the time; and though Frederick felt it most seriously, he was able to draw certain advantages from its results. One of these was that operations were slow. An army could not live on the country through which it passed, for if men were sent out to forage they would probably never come back. Great depôts of supplies were therefore established; with these the army had to keep in touch; much transport was therefore necessary; and roads being generally bad, rapid progress was out of the question. It was thus in Frederick's favour that he was usually fighting near his supplies. The impossibility of trusting the private soldier also had its effect on tactics. In action the infantry fought in line in close order, so as to be immediately under the eye of the officer. Mechanical accuracy in drill was naturally a great asset in a battle between armies disposed in this way; and here the Prussians had the advantage.

Frederick's strategic skill enabled him to make the most of such initial advantages. The orthodox strategy of the time was cautious. The professional soldier was not easy to replace, and the generals were afraid of risking heavy losses. If possible, they would gain ground by skilful movements avoiding a pitched battle. Frederick, on the other hand, believed in striking hard and often. He grasped the principle that one can beat an enemy only by disarming him. Thus

the commanders opposed to him—and many of them were able strategists—often found their clever schemes upset by some sudden and unorthodox blow; while Frederick was repeatedly saved from disaster by their refusal to press home a success. In the later years of the war, however, when men were few and resources low, he showed that he could avoid risky actions as skilfully as any of his opponents.

If these considerations be kept in view, the vicissitudes of the war are readily understood. Frederick's methods and difficulties are excellently illustrated by the campaign of 1757, which perhaps showed him at his best. Leaving 30,000 men in East Prussia to hold back the troops of the Tsarina, he led his main army into Bohemia, captured several Austrian depôts, won a bloody victory near Prague, and laid siege to the city. On the approach of a relieving army under Marshal Daun, a skilful but very cautious strategist, Frederick left part of his forces before Prague, and with the remainder took the offensive. At Kolin on the Elbe, he attempted by clever tactics to neutralize Daun's great superiority in numbers. But Frederick's subordinates spoiled his plans by their impatience; he suffered a disastrous defeat; and the whole Prussian army had to withdraw to Saxony, suffering heavy loss on the way. Meanwhile a French force had joined the contingents of the smaller German states, and had advanced through Thuringia towards Halle. Frederick marched against them. They numbered 40,000, and he had only half as many. But near Rossbach an unsound move by the French delivered them into Frederick's hand, and one vigorous onset by the Prussians drove them into headlong flight. Frederick's losses were only 500: his western flank was secured: and the morale of his troops was greatly improved by so decisive and easy a success against the famous French soldiers, who, though defeated often enough since the beginning of the century, had never been so disgraced.

The victors, however, had no time to rest on their laurels. Off they were marched to Silesia, now invaded by a large Austrian army, which had already defeated the Prussian general in that province. Desperate measures were called for; and at Leuthen, near Breslau, Frederick flung himself upon an enemy of double his strength. He hurled nearly all his force against the Austrian left, broke it, and then "rolled up" the whole line. Silesia was evacuated by the vanquished.

But, despite Frederick's indefatigable efforts and wonderful victories, the net result of the year was a loss. The Russians were successful in East Prussia, where they established themselves in great force; and Frederick could spare neither men nor time to deal with them.

Except that Prussia had nothing to fear from the French, the campaign of 1758 was not unlike that of the previous year. After failing in an invasion of Moravia, Frederick had to march north against the Russians, who had now reached the Oder. A savage struggle at Zorndorf forced the invaders to retreat to Poland. The Austrians, however, took advantage of the king's absence to march into Saxony; Frederick, rushing back thither, fell into the fatal error of under-rating his opponent, and being surprised at Hochkirch, was only saved from utter ruin by the discipline and steadiness of his army. But Daun, having attempted one bold stroke, was in no mood to follow it up. He let Frederick march to Silesia, drive the Austrians thence, and return to Saxony, after which he beat an inglorious retreat to Bohemia. The year had added to Frederick's prestige, and had not cost him an inch of land.

In the next two campaigns, however, Frederick gradually lost ground. The Anglo-German army in the west kept the French in check, winning a fine victory at Minden; but the danger from the east became greater when an Austrian force


DENMARK
Heligoland
Kiel
1720
1866
1866
HOLLAND
HANOVER
BRANDENBURG
Magdeburg
Halberstadt
Hochkirch
Dresden
Pirna
Weimar
HESSE CASSEL
THURINGIA
SAXONY
Prague
Rhenish Palatinate
Mannheim
Heidelberg
Speyer
Zweibrucken
Saarbrück
Lorraine
ALSACE
Rastadt
Strassburg
Vosges
WÜRTTEMBERG
Ansbach 1791
Bayreuth 1791
Manberg
Ulm
Augsburg
Freiburg
BAVARIA
BOHEMIA
Kolberg
POMERANIA
1648
1778
WEST PRUSSIA
1772
EAST PRUSSIA
1618
NEW EAST PRUSSIA
1795—1807
1793
1807
1815
SOUTH PRUSSIA
1466
1482
Warsaw
Thorn
Culm
Graudenz
Marienwerder
Marienburg
1772
1793
1807
Vistula
RUSSIA
Kahlsberg
Vienna
THE RISE OF PRUSSIA
Brandenburg in 1415
Acquisitions, 1415 to 1648
Acquisitions between 1648 and 1756
From Poland 1772
1793
1795
In 1815
1815 to 1866
Boundary of present-day Prussia
Independent Principalities of N. Germany

joined the Russians, who were again advancing towards Berlin. With his customary contempt of superior numbers, Frederick attacked the invaders at Kunersdorf, near Frankfurt on the Oder, but this time he paid for his daring by a crushing defeat. He himself thought that all was lost; but his enemies unaccountably failed to use their advantage; and he was able to collect an army and march off to Saxony, where during his absence Dresden had been taken by the Austrians. An attempt to recover the lost ground led to the capture of one of Frederick's generals with 12,000 men; and half Saxony remained in the enemy's hands.

Early in the campaign of 1760 another disaster to a Prussian general opened the way to an Austrian invasion of Silesia. Frederick hastened thither from Saxony, dogged by his old foe Daun. But cleverly keeping the Austrian armies apart, he fell on the invaders and beat them at Liegnitz, thus saving all Silesia except a little territory near the frontier. Immediately afterwards, however, he had to hurry northwards. An army of Austrians and Russians had taken and pillaged Berlin; and again Frederick's position seemed desperate. But on his approach the enemy hurriedly retreated, leaving him free to return to Saxony. A victory over Daun at Torgau forced that unfortunate general to evacuate the northern half of the electorate, though he retained his hold on Dresden.

Torgau was the last big battle of the war. Prussia was growing exhausted. Try as he would, Frederick could not fill the gaps in his army. The eastern half of his lands was desolate. He was forced to abandon his bold strategy and to use Fabian methods. A strong entrenched camp in southern Silesia kept inactive a huge force of Russians and Austrians. But a purely defensive policy was not enough: in the north the Russians took the Pomeranian fortress of Kolberg, and threatened to cut off Brandenburg from the

Baltic. An even worse disaster was the fall from power of Pitt: English foreign policy was changed, and no more subsidies went to Prussia.

Austria was also feeling the strain of the war: but there can be little doubt that Frederick would soon have been overwhelmed but for an extraordinary turn of fortune. The cause was the death of the Tsarina Elizabeth, which occurred at the very beginning of 1762. She was succeeded by her nephew, Peter III., who had long admired Frederick. The new Tsar not only made peace, but even concluded an alliance with Prussia; and the unfortunate Austrians found themselves fighting against their late allies. This bitter experience, however, was soon over, for after reigning a few months, Peter was forced to abdicate by a revolution headed by his wife, who then became Empress as Catherine II. Catherine withdrew the Russian army, but as she remained at peace with Frederick, he easily maintained his advantage. The Austrians saw that the game was up; after meeting with one or two reverses, they agreed to a truce; and early in 1763 the Peace of Hubertsburg put an end to the weary struggle. Austria, Prussia, and Saxony, it was settled, were to retain exactly what they held when the war began. As Peter III. had already surrendered the conquests of the Russians, Frederick had lost nothing. He had, it is true, failed to hold Saxony; but in view of the odds against him, and considering that Austria and Russia had aimed at nothing less than the dismemberment of his kingdom, he might fairly claim the result as a brilliant triumph.

CHAPTER XIX

THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT

FOR the rest of his reign Frederick the Great was mainly concerned with the administration of his kingdom. The assistance of the crown was everywhere needed, for agriculture, trade, and industry had been almost ruined. The principles of Frederick's domestic policy were in general the same as those of the Great Elector, but circumstances compelled him to give more active help to his subjects than any of his predecessors had done. He distributed his favours impartially between agriculture and manufacturing industry. Farmers ruined by the war were supplied with money to rebuild their houses and barns and to buy seed and cattle. Marshes were drained, forests cleared, and thousands of colonists from other German states welcomed to the reclaimed lands. Very characteristic were Frederick's efforts to promote the cultivation of the potato, which was enjoined and regulated by law. Yet he never forgot those of his subjects who made their living by manufacture. In times of plenty he would buy corn and collect it in huge magazines; and when there was a bad harvest, these stores were sold at a moderate price. By bounties and monopolies he encouraged the erection of factories. He fostered the woollen and linen industries, which flourished already in Silesia; he even tried to introduce the silk-worm, though with small success. Like his ancestors, he maintained a high tariff for the protection of home industries.

Agriculture and manufacture were equally benefited by the king's efforts to stimulate trade. He improved the harbours on the Baltic, and linked the Elbe, Oder, and Vistula by a system of canals. And in the interests of foreign trade he founded trading companies which from their headquarters at Emden were to gain for Prussian goods a market in the Far East.

There was, it is true, nothing original in these measures. In his home policy Frederick was merely an enlightened Hohenzollern. His ideal was an industrious and prosperous state, in which the function of every class should be defined and its consequent rights respected, but all initiative should lie with the king, whose will should be executed by a highly-organized and highly-trained array of officials, and whose influence abroad should be upheld by a large and well-appointed army. So the Prussian bureaucracy tightened its grip on every class of Frederick's subjects, and the Prussian army, now raised to the strength of 186,000 men, still swallowed up two-thirds of the revenue. Yet Frederick did more for his people than either his father or the Great Elector. He was one of the greatest of the "benevolent despots" who appeared in the eighteenth century, and who honestly desired the welfare and happiness of their subjects, provided that the source of that welfare and happiness was themselves. They were generally influenced by the prevalent scepticism of the time, very contemptuous of the views and institutions of the past, and convinced that eighteenth-century philosophy would soon bring about the millennium. Frederick's benevolence, however, was hampered by his want of money, which prevented him from doing much for education and art. But he rendered Prussia a great service by his reform of the administration of justice. The courts were re-organized. New procedure was introduced, and one of Frederick's first acts was to abolish the use of torture. And

it was due to him that a uniform code of law was drawn up for all Prussia, though it did not come into force till 1794.

During the second half of Frederick's reign he kept clear of foreign wars. The chief object of his foreign policy was to remain on friendly terms with Russia, and so to deprive Austria of any chance of revenge for her losses. He managed, however, without striking a blow, to win territory even more valuable than Silesia. The kingdom of Poland had long been in a state of decline and confusion. The crown was elective; political influence was monopolized by the nobility, who, even had they wished, could not have established a stable government, for any member of the Polish Diet might veto any measure brought before it. Near the Prussian frontier were one or two cities of some consideration; but the bulk of the population were serfs, with no rights, miserably poor, ignorant, and superstitious.

The neighbouring states, especially Russia, had long cast greedy eyes on Poland. When in 1763 Augustus of Saxony died, the Tsarina Catherine managed to secure the election of one of her favourites, Stanislas Poniatowski. The new king was a tool of Russia; before long Russian intrigues provoked a civil war, which gave a pretext for the invasion of Poland by a Russian army. Frederick the Great had supported the election of Stanislas, and had tried to use him in the interests of Prussia. But he soon became alarmed at the successes of the Tsarina, and after cautious negotiations with Austria, who was bitterly hostile to the Russian policy in Poland, he suggested that Russia, Austria, and Prussia should improve the state of the wretched country by taking some of it for themselves, while a reformed constitution should be imposed on what was left. The project was accepted by the Tsarina, and, albeit reluctantly, by Maria Theresa: the Polish Diet was in no position to refuse its consent: and without a blow, one of the worst thefts in history was

perpetrated. The largest share of the plunder fell to Russia; the richest to Austria; but it was Frederick who drew most advantage from the crime, for his part included the long-coveted West Prussia. Thus at last the gap between Berlin and Königsberg was bridged.

German historians of course defend the justice of Frederick's policy. The partition of Poland, it is urged, averted a war between the great Powers of eastern Europe. The Poles, moreover, had merited their fate by their incompetence and insubordination. Those under Prussian rule soon became better off than they had ever been. And West Prussia rightfully belonged to Germany, for it had formerly been held by the Teutonic knights. As often happens, Prussian arguments merely point the weakness of the Prussian case. Frederick, indeed, made little attempt to whitewash his action. His attitude towards it is a good example of what Treitschke praises as his love of truth and most other people condemn as cynical shamelessness.

The poor remnants of Poland were furnished with a new constitution which perpetuated the worst features of the old one, and thus left the door open for a further partition in the near future. Poland, however, suffered no more violence till after Frederick's death. One reason was that the last years of the king of Prussia were disturbed by the efforts of the Emperor Joseph II. to restore Austrian supremacy in Germany. In 1778 his attempts to secure the succession to Bavaria very nearly led to war. The armies of Prussia and Austria were indeed mobilized, and Frederick invaded Bohemia. But before any serious fighting took place, an agreement was reached. Joseph was given a small piece of Bavarian territory, but abandoned his claim to the whole electorate. Nevertheless, he afterwards tried to gain his end by proposing to exchange for Bavaria part of the Austrian Netherlands; and one of Frederick's last acts was the forma-

tion of a league of German princes "for the maintenance of the imperial constitution," or, in plain words, for opposing the designs of Austria. Before this menace, Joseph again gave way.

Austria, however, had made an astonishing recovery after her reverses at the hands of Frederick. From 1740 to 1780, the hereditary lands of the Habsburgs were ruled by Maria Theresa, a woman of great personal charm, rare political sagacity, and unflagging energy in the government of her dominions. She reformed the administrative system, increased the revenue of the state, enlarged and improved the army, and fostered trade and industry. She was succeeded by her son Joseph, who since 1765 had been Emperor. Like Frederick the Great, Joseph belonged to the class of benevolent despots. Unscrupulous in his dealings with other states, he was genuinely anxious to promote the welfare of his own subjects. He abolished serfdom, and introduced religious toleration into the Habsburg lands, where even under his mother Protestants had still been persecuted. In his anti-clerical zeal—for he was a philosopher and a free-thinker—he suppressed a number of monasteries, and subjected the Catholic clergy to strict control by the State, disregarding both the threats and the entreaties of the Pope. He was, too, a patron of art; in his time Vienna became the capital of the world of music, whither all young composers flocked to sit at the feet of Haydn and Mozart. Joseph, in fact, is a much more gracious and attractive figure than his rival of Prussia. But he lacked Frederick's practical insight. He was too restless and hasty, serious defects in a ruler whose authority over his own subjects was none too certain. His efforts to unite Austria and Hungary under a strong central government provoked bitter discontent among the Hungarian nobility, and his social and religious reforms were hated in many parts. At his death in 1790 the Austrian Netherlands

were in active revolt, and it was only by withdrawing many of Joseph's measures that his successor, Leopold II., was able to allay the widespread and growing unrest.

Yet Joseph rendered great services to Austria. With the lower orders his social policy made him generally popular; and the hope and prosperity which he and his mother had brought to their subjects gave the Austrians something to fight for in the troublous times that were coming upon them.

In writing of Germany in the eighteenth century, one naturally dwells on the vicissitudes of Prussia and Austria. But it must not be forgotten that there were in Germany about three hundred states, many of which Frederick or Joseph could have devoured in a day. As a rule, the subjects of the smaller principalities were not to be envied. For the greater part of the century, the German princes were mostly selfish, extravagant, and profligate, caring little for the welfare of their people and nothing for Germany at large. Not a few made a practice of selling their subjects for service in the armies of Prussia or of foreign states. The landgraves of Hesse-Cassel were specially notorious for their success in this traffic; Frederick the Great bought many head of infantry from them, and among their most profitable customers was England, who repeatedly hired large troops of Hessians for her Continental wars, and even used them largely in the War of American Independence. Yet many of these princes, careless of their dominions as they were, showed much devotion to the cause of art and letters. Augustus the Strong of Saxony, a dissolute and extravagant ruler, made Dresden one of the most beautiful cities of Europe. Frederick II. of Hesse-Cassel, slave-trader though he was, spent a great part of his profits on his capital, which now ranked among the finest of German towns. And as the century went on, the influence of "enlightened" philosophy, and the example of

Frederick the Great and Joseph II., affected the policy of many princely houses. In Saxony, Frederick Augustus the Just reformed the judicial system, and did his best to promote industry and trade. The margrave of Baden followed the lead of the Emperor and abolished serfdom: he also showed great enthusiasm for popular education: and from his time dates Baden's reputation as one of the best-governed of German states. But most interesting of all was the little duchy of Saxe-Weimar, only a few square miles in extent—with its capital of seven thousand inhabitants; its homely but self-important little court; its army of six hundred foot and fifty horse in their green and yellow uniforms; its ministers of state at a hundred or two a year; its court theatre, where no one applauded unless the ducal party did, and the ducal party only when Goethe gave the cue, where people were liable to be turned out by the soldiers on guard if they laughed at the wrong place, and where the leading actress got about two pounds a week. This quaint little state was for years the centre of German intellectual life. At Weimar dwelt not only Goethe, but also Schiller and Herder, each supported by the generosity of the duke, Charles Augustus; and a few miles away was Jena with its university, the cynosure of German scientists. The duke, too, was no selfish dilettante endowing genius out of the scanty savings of his subjects, but a man with an active desire for his people's welfare and a sympathy for liberal opinions in politics as well as progressive views in letters and art.

But despite their sincere concern for the best interests of those under them, despite their sincere conviction that the inauguration of the rule of "reason" would end all injustice and oppression, these "enlightened despots" failed to give contentment to their subjects. Enlightened as they were, they were still despots. Revolutionary doctrines, now so potent in France, were beginning to find favour in Germany;

and a paternal government, though never so kindly, could not quench the growing thirst for political liberty. And of course there were still many states where the prince and his ministers were little or not at all affected by "enlightenment." The Catholic principalities seldom went far from the old paths of government; and the great bishoprics, in particular, were naturally ruled in a conservative spirit, for the very principles of enlightened despotism were drawn from an infidel philosophy, which was everywhere the bitter foe of ecclesiastical ascendency.

The widespread desire for political reform was rarely, however, associated with a zeal for German unity. It is true that, even outside Prussia, the exploits of Frederick the Great, especially his victory over the French, had here and there aroused a feeling of national pride: but such enthusiasm was uncommon, and to all seeming the unification of Germany was as far off as ever. Yet the eighteenth century is not, like the seventeenth, a period to which the German patriot looks back with shame and grief.' The effect of the Thirty Years' War had not yet disappeared. Germany was still a comparatively poor country; her material civilization was much behind that of France and England. Manners were rude, comforts rare, luxuries attainable only by the very great. The roads were very bad, and travelling was far slower than in England: in the middle of the century, it took six days to go from Berlin to Frankfurt. Even in the great towns, the state of the streets made it risky to go about after dark, for street-lighting was unknown in Germany till 1775. The average German was little troubled by such disadvantages; his ideal was a stay-at-home and even sedentary life; and fresh air was, next to cold water, his pet aversion. But, held back though she was by this unheroic element among her people, Germany was making remarkable progress in many directions. After all, Frederick's exploits did prove in the event to be a step

towards her political salvation. But it was in the intellectual and artistic spheres that the nation achieved the greatest advance. No longer was German culture bound hand and foot to France. Germans were beginning to claim, as Heine afterwards put it, that whereas power by land had fallen to France and the rule of the sea to England, Germany held the dominion of the air.

And it was true that in many departments of the world of ideas, Germany led the way. Even at the beginning of the century she had in Leibnitz the most powerful intellect of the time; and when the century closed she possessed in Immanuel Kant, the sage of Königsberg, the strongest influence in modern philosophy. No less splendid were her triumphs in art. Architecture, it is true, was in evil case, humbly following French and Italian fashions; and the many large palaces and public buildings erected in the first part of the eighteenth century were in the Baroque style, which shows an admiration of classical forms tempered by a certain originality in bad taste. The churches in this style seldom call for special notice; but the student of eighteenth century "enlightenment" may profitably examine the many Romanesque churches to which architects of the time have succeeded in giving the appearance of music-halls. In the latter half of the century, the Baroque style gave way to a purer, quite innocent, and altogether lifeless classicism. German painting, too, produced little of value, though much enthusiasm was shown for the collection of old masters, and many famous picture-galleries, notably that of Dresden, were founded by eighteenth-century princes. But if the plastic arts languished, it was far otherwise with literature and music. Soon after 1750 German literature entered on its most brilliant period. Lessing, Herder, Schiller, Goethe—great artists, and great critics of their own art—are only the most eminent of the many world-renowned and immortal men of letters who

flourished in Germany during the latter half of the eighteenth century. And no less glorious are the names of Bach, Handel, Mozart, Haydn, and others second only to them, who gave Germany that pre-eminence in music which long remained unchallenged. But though German thought gradually shook off its dependence on that of France, though—thanks largely to Herder—the history, literature, and folklore of Germany began to be studied with enthusiasm, though Germans became proud of their intellectual and artistic power, the revival of mental activity was not associated at first with national aspirations. The great thinkers of Germany rather prided themselves on their cosmopolitan outlook, and Lessing went so far as to condemn patriotism as a passion which distracted men from the pursuit of art and learning. The German people had to pass through deep waters before their intellectual leaders became fascinated by the ideal of nationalism.

CHAPTER XX

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE CONQUEST OF GERMANY

THREE years after the death of Frederick the Great came the outbreak of the French Revolution; and the calculations of every statesman in Europe were at once upset. It soon became clear that the Revolution could not be confined to France, for not only did the views of the revolutionaries arouse lively sympathy in other lands, but the French themselves called upon all peoples to cast off the yoke of their oppressors and promised to help them in their struggle for liberty. It was inevitable that the German princes should look askance at the movement. It threatened their own authority; indeed, the rising against Joseph II. in the Netherlands was partly caused by the example of France. Moreover, through the abolition of feudalism by the French National Assembly many German nobles with lands in Alsace were deprived of rights which, it was urged, had been guaranteed by France in the Treaty of Westphalia. Austria had special ground for concern, the Queen of France being the Emperor's sister; and it was not long before appeals for intervention began to reach the court of Vienna. And as time went on, other motives became powerful in Germany. France fell into utter confusion. Her new constitution worked badly. Financial ruin seemed imminent. The country was full of intrigues and plots. The army was disorganized and mutinous; most of its officers had fled to Germany. Was not France even as Poland, a helpless prey to the first who should attack her?

Austria, however, was afraid to fight France unless she was sure of either the support or the neutrality of Prussia. And Prussia was now under Frederick the Great's nephew, Frederick William II., a careless and irresolute king, much under the influence of favourites. There was little danger of revolution in the strictly-governed lands of the Hohenzollerns, and what cared Frederick William about the wrongs of Louis XVI. or the fears of his fellow-princes? Moreover, the Tsarina was resuming active intrigues in Poland, and if Prussia's eyes were turned elsewhere would probably try to annex it all. In 1791, therefore, a conference at Pillnitz between Frederick William and the Emperor Leopold led to nothing but a declaration expressing a hope that other states would intervene in behalf of the French king, and promising Russian and Austrian help to those who did

The French were resolved to brook no foreign interference. The Rhenish states were full of emigrant nobles, who were making preparations for a return to Paris in arms and were trying to induce Austria and Prussia to take up their cause. It is true that Leopold and Frederick William had refused to help them; but there was no knowing what might come of the Declaration of Pillnitz. The revolutionary leaders in France saw their whole work threatened with ruin. With admirable insight, however, they perceived that a call to arms against the invader would be the best means of stilling discord and maintaining revolutionary fervour. The French Government, therefore, assumed towards Austria a stiff and threatening attitude, and as the Emperor rejected its demands, declared war in April 1792.

Prussia, bound to Austria by a defensive alliance, soon entered the conflict, confident of a speedy victory. Within a few months the allied forces had entered Lorraine and were advancing on Paris. There confusion was worse than ever. In August the monarchy was abolished, and a National

Convention summoned to draw up a republican constitution. There seemed nothing to check the invaders. But they were badly led: their commander-in-chief was the Duke of Brunswick, an old man, whose natural want of resolution was made worse by his disapproval of the whole enterprise. Moreover, there was great jealousy between the allies, the Prussians being annoyed at the smallness of the force put into the field by the Austrians. Bad weather added to the difficulties of the army, and on 20th September it had advanced only as far as Valmy in the Argonne, where its flank was threatened by a French army under General Dumouriez. Despite his advantage in numbers, Brunswick refused to assault the French position; the invaders had rather the worse of a vigorous cannonade; the French were re-inforced; and the allies' general made the check a pretext for retreating to Lorraine.

Though in itself but a small affair, the cannonade of Valmy ranks as one of the decisive battles of European history. It repelled the invasion of France. It secured the Revolution from foreign interference. And it filled the young soldiers of France with an enthusiasm and confidence which swept all before them. Before the year was out the battle of Jemappes had placed all Belgium in the hands of the French, and an army from Alsace had marched northwards, taken Mainz and Frankfurt, and conquered nearly all Germany west of the Rhine. It was significant that the victorious troops were generally welcomed by the people of the districts they invaded.

The French successes were maintained in the following years. After the execution of Louis XVI., early in 1793, Britain, Holland, and Spain took up arms against the republic. The dreadful days of the Reign of Terror followed; but despite the efforts of half Europe and the convulsions of their own country, the French armies never met with a decisive defeat.

After hard fighting they made good their hold on Belgium and the left bank of the Rhine; and in 1795 they conquered Holland and made it a republic. A stern defensive war was little to the taste of Frederick William II.; he had, besides, become discontented with the Emperor's policy; and soon after the conquest of Holland he concluded the treaty of Basel with France, accepting the annexation of Germany west of the Rhine, on the understanding that Prussia should receive compensation for her losses out of certain ecclesiastical estates in the north.

The main cause of the estrangement of Prussia and Austria was the question of Poland. Soon after the beginning of the war with France Russian aggressions in that unhappy country had caused alarm to Frederick William. With the countenance of Austria, Prussian troops were sent into Poland; and as in 1772 Russia preferred partition to war. In 1793 accordingly Frederick William seized South Prussia, and the towns of Danzig and Thorn, which had not been surrendered at the first partition; while the Russians took an enormous tract in the east. Next year, however, the Poles had the effrontery to rebel under the famous Kosciusko; and it was only after a gallant resistance that they succumbed to the superior might of their oppressors. Then Austria, who had gained nothing in 1793, tried to keep Prussia from a share in the final division of Poland, which the revolt had made certain. But Frederick William made peace with France, and bestowing his undivided attention on Poland was able once more to gain a considerable accession of territory, including Warsaw. Austria won West Galicia, with Cracow; the greatest extent of land fell as usual to Russia. Thus, in 1795, the independence of Poland was totally extinguished.

Though Holland and Spain, as well as Prussia, were now at peace with France, Austria gamely continued the struggle. In 1796 the Archduke Charles won some considerable victories

in south Germany. Meanwhile, however, the young general, Napoleon Bonaparte, had been put over the French army in Italy—his first independent command. In a wonderful campaign he drove the Austrians out of Lombardy, pursued them across the Alps, and even threatened Vienna. In her extremity Austria was glad to escape with the Treaty of Campo Formio, whereby she abandoned her possessions in the Netherlands and Italy, though as some compensation Napoleon handed over to her most of the lands of the republic of Venice, which he had just seized. As for Germany, the French were confirmed in their possession of the left bank of the Rhine, and it was decided that a congress should be held at Rastadt to settle how the dispossessed German princes should be indemnified.

Austria did not long sit still under her humiliation. In 1797 France turned her attention to the overthrow of Britain, her one remaining enemy. Various plans for invasion having miscarried, Napoleon in the following year made his disastrous expedition to Egypt. In his absence Austria ventured to renew the struggle, encouraged by the active assistance of Russia. A French advance in south Germany was successfully countered by the Archduke Charles; while the brilliant strategy of the Russian general Suvóroff forced the French to evacuate nearly the whole of north Italy. But when, at the request of the Austrians, the Russians transferred their forces to Switzerland, they met with reverses and narrowly escaped disaster. Thinking that his allies were not supporting him properly, the Tsar soon afterwards withdrew from the Coalition.

Towards the end of 1799 Napoleon returned to France. Next year, after his famous march over the Great St Bernard, he beat the Austrians at Marengo and recovered his hold on Lombardy. Some months later, Moreau's victory at Hohenlinden, near Munich, shattered Austrian hopes in south

Germany. Early in 1801 the war was ended by the peace of Lunéville. Austria had to forgo part of Venetia, but otherwise no important transfers of territory were made.

The Congress of Rastadt had been broken up by the recent hostilities, but its work was now continued by a committee of the Diet, which was entirely under the influence of Napoleon. In 1803 it published its decisions. The territorial arrangements of Germany were turned upside down. All the ecclesiastical principalities except three were secularized and given to states which had suffered by the French annexations. A similar fate befell nearly all the free cities, only six retaining their independence. The greatest share of the spoil fell to Austria, Bavaria, and above all Prussia, who added to her dominions the bishoprics of Hildesheim, Paderborn, and Münster, with other lands of lesser note, thereby gaining a vast accession of power in north-west Germany. For the loss of forty-eight square miles she was, in fact, compensated by some two hundred and forty. In another way, too, her influence was increased, for the great ecclesiastics had always supported Austria, and now the vast majority of the German princes were Protestants, and looked to the Hohenzollerns rather than the Habsburgs as the leaders of Germany.

The Diet achieved more than it contemplated. It dealt the death-blow of the Holy Roman Empire. Francis II. kept his title for another year or two: but in 1804, when Napoleon became Emperor of the French, he prepared for its loss by assuming the style of Emperor of Austria. The old Empire was at its last gasp, and the next war ruined all chance of its recovery.

While the Continental states had been making war, suffering defeats, and signing treaties, Britain had steadily, and on the whole successfully, maintained the struggle against France. The peace of Amiens, which she signed in 1802,

was nothing more than a truce; and next year war again broke out. Napoleon's plans for the invasion of England were foiled by skilful strategy at sea, and by the formation of yet another coalition against him. The indefatigable diplomacy of Pitt induced Austria and Russia again to take up arms. Prussia, anxious to avoid all risks, temporized until it was too late. For in the autumn of 1805 Napoleon invaded south Germany, dexterously surrounded the Austrian general Mack, and forced him to surrender at Ulm with 30,000 men. Then, advancing into Austrian territory, he occupied Vienna, and after a rapid march forward met the main forces of the allies at Austerlitz in Moravia. The battle was one of Napoleon's most brilliant victories. The Emperor at once opened negotiations, and obtained peace by the Treaty of Pressburg. Austria of course lost territory in both Italy and Germany, and recognized the title of king bestowed by Napoleon on the rulers of Bavaria and Würtemberg, who with the Grand Duke of Baden, were declared to be independent sovereigns. A few months later Napoleon founded the Confederation of the Rhine, a league of sixteen states of south and central Germany, where the little principalities and the cities were "mediatized," that is, declared subject to one or other of the members of the Confederation. These were virtually vassals of Napoleon, whom they expressly recognized as their protector. At the same time they renounced allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire. Francis II. showed more respect for facts than most of his predecessors had done, and on 6th August, 1806, he formally laid down the imperial crown and proclaimed that the Empire had ceased to exist. Thus, unhonoured and unwept, the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation came to its end. Germany no longer possessed even a nominal unity.

A day or two later war broke out between Napoleon and

the one German state that seemed capable of resisting his progress. For ten years Prussia had pursued a cautious and selfish policy, keeping clear of hostilities with France, and trying to increase her territories. She had been very successful, and thanks to the partitions of Poland and the changes of 1803 her dominions were half as large again as they had been at the death of Frederick the Great. But her strength had really declined. Her unheroic policy had injured her prestige abroad. Many of her new subjects were ready to rebel. Frederick William II. had neglected the finances and failed to maintain adequate oversight of the administration. His son, Frederick William III., who became king in 1797, had a higher sense of public duty; but he was woefully wanting in decision and constitutionally unable to trust his ministers. The result was that the Prussian state-machine worked badly. It had no motive power apart from the king, and the king lacked force of will and fixity of purpose.

Prussia's gains in 1803 had been the reward of her inglorious attitude towards France. Nevertheless Prussian statesmen soon became nervous about Napoleon's designs, especially when, on the renewal of his war with Britain, he laid hands on Hanover. In 1805, however, despite the pressure of Russia, Frederick William refused to join the Coalition. It was a grievous blunder, as he himself soon found. He was aroused to a sense of the contempt into which Prussia had fallen when the French troops coolly violated the neutrality of Ansbach, a principality belonging to the Hohenzollerns. But even now he would not take the bull by the horns; and the outcome of an interview with the Tsar was merely a threat to Napoleon that unless he accepted Prussian mediation within a month, war would be declared.

The Prussian envoy, Haugwitz, perhaps from treachery, wasted much time before delivering this ultimatum to the


French Emperor, who was then in Moravia. He was sent back to Vienna, where he was fooled by Napoleon's foreign minister, Talleyrand. A few days later came the news of Austerlitz. Haugwitz hastened to convey to Napoleon his sovereign's congratulations, and shortly afterwards, yielding to the peremptory demands of the French Emperor, he signed the Treaty of Schönbrunn. Napoleon promised to give Hanover to Prussia if the latter would surrender Cleves to France and Ansbach to Bavaria and make an alliance with himself. It was a cunning proposal, for its acceptance would cause enmity between Prussia and England, who had been on the point of coming to an understanding. Frederick William did not approve of what his minister had done, and tried to obtain modifications of the terms of the treaty. But Napoleon let it be seen that Prussia must either accept it or fight him, and she accepted it.

There is evidence that Napoleon had already resolved to overthrow Prussia. At all events, he at once began to inflict insult after insult on his new ally. French troops encroached on Prussia's lands in Westphalia. When Frederick William tried to form a North German Confederation—a plan suggested by Napoleon—he found himself opposed at every turn by the French. And finally he learned that Napoleon had promised to give back Hanover to England. With the boldness of desperation, Frederick William mobilized his army, and demanded the withdrawal from Germany of all French troops.

The decision roused much enthusiasm in Prussia. Yet to an unprejudiced observer, her prospects were not bright. She entered the field a year too late. Austria was bleeding from the wound of Austerlitz and refused to move. Russia was indeed still at war with France, but it would be some time before her troops could reach central Germany in any strength. Of the German states, only Saxony and Weimar

adhered to Prussia, and their 20,000 men were hopelessly overweighted by the 60,000 with whom the Rhenish Confederation was pledged to support Napoleon. There was, of course, the famous Prussian army, and in it the Prussian leaders had the utmost confidence. But the army had paid the penalty for its victories under Frederick. It was taken for granted that Frederick's methods were infallible. The organization and equipment of the troops remained as they were in Frederick's days. His tactics and strategy were blindly worshipped by the Prussian generals. The significance of the recent victories of France was altogether ignored; the reforms and innovations of Napoleon were despised. And even if the military authorities of Prussia had been alive to the needs of the time, it is doubtful whether their heterogeneous army, held together by a brutal discipline, more accustomed to the parade-ground than to the battle-field, and led by generals of mediocre talents, could have achieved much against the enthusiastic veterans of France, commanded as they were by a great genius.

The Prussian commander-in-chief was the same Duke of Brunswick who had failed so miserably in 1792. Though he had only about 130,000 men in the field against Napoleon's 200,000 it was resolved to take the offensive. But Brunswick, with characteristic caution, held back part of his forces; so that after much confused marching and counter-marching the Prussian troops were scattered over a wide front in Thuringia. Meanwhile, Napoleon, who knew exactly what he wanted to do and how to do it, had pushed forward three strong columns towards the south-west corner of Saxony, his object being to separate the Saxons from the Prussians and threaten the Prussian line of retreat. Before long Brunswick found himself in difficulties. His advanced corps were beaten at Schleiz and Saalfeld, and he ordered a general retirement on Naumburg. The French had pushed on so fast that Brunswick's flanks


DENMARK
HOLLAND
HANOVER
Lübeck
Hamburg
MECKLENBURG
Münster
Cleves
WESTPHALIA
Brunswick
Magdeburg
Halle
Leipsic
Erfurt
Jena
Hanau
Frankfurt
Mainz
BELGIUM
Waterloo
Wavre
Quatre Bras
Ligny
Jemappes
Charleroi
Maubeuge
Beaumont
Amiens
MINOR STATES
Paris
Seine
Valmy
Marne
Nancy
Luneville
Rastatt
Rhine
Langres
Plateau
Basel
Munich
Hohenlinden
SWITZERLAND
TYROL
Campo Formio
KINGDOM OF ITALY
Venice
Mantua
FRENCH EMPIRE
Tauroggen
EAST PRUSSIA
Danzig
Königsberg
PRUSSIA
Thorn
GRAND DUCHY
OF
WARSAW
Posen
Vistula
Warsaw
Cracow
RUSSIA
MORAVIA
Austerlitz
Aspern
Wagram
Vienna
Schönbrunn
Pressburg
AUSTRIA
ILLYRIA
GERMANY IN 1812
Prussia
Rhine Confederation

were already in danger, and Prince Hohenlohe, with 50,000 men, was directed to hold the plateau to the north-west of Jena to cover the withdrawal of the main army. The prince, however, thinking only of retreat, neglected to guard the approaches to his position, and on the morning of October 14th was amazed to find that the French had occupied the heights commanding the plateau and that he was being attacked on three sides. Though outnumbered by two to one, the Prussians fought bravely for a time; but the furious attacks of the French were irresistible, and presently Hohenlohe's force broke into headlong rout, just as substantial reinforcements arrived on the field. Simultaneously, the duke of Brunswick was meeting with an even worse calamity. On retreating from Auerstädt he unexpectedly found his way blocked by a French force under Marshal Davoust. Brunswick had 50,000 men to the enemy's 27,000; but all his efforts to break through were foiled; he himself was killed; the daring French even threatened to surround the Prussians; and the king, who had taken command, resolved to fall back on Hohenlohe's army. But when he retired, he soon met that corps in utter disorder, which at once spread to his own men. Pursued by the dashing cavalry leader, Murat, the Prussian army lost all its discipline and morale. Sixteen thousand surrendered at Erfurt. An action at Halle gave the French the passage of the Elbe; and at Prenzlau the remainder of Hohenlohe's men laid down their arms. Strong fortresses like Spandau, Magdeburg, and Hameln fell with scarcely a show of resistance. Davoust took Berlin, and only thirteen days after Jena, Napoleon made a triumphal entry into the capital.

Here and there, it is true, Prussia's disgrace was relieved by deeds of valour. General Blücher, who had led the cavalry at Auerstädt, made an honourable retreat to Lübeck, where he surrendered only when his ammunition was exhausted.

Some of the Silesian fortresses held out bravely; Kolberg, too, made a heroic resistance under Major Gneisenau; and Danzig did not fall till the following spring. But, on the whole, Prussia was not only defeated but dishonoured.

Frederick William, however, refused the hard terms offered by Napoleon, and continued the struggle in East Prussia, supported in great strength by the Russians. When, early in 1807, the French advanced, they were met by the allies at Eylau. A most bloody and desperate struggle gave no clear advantage to either side, but as it was followed by a Russian retreat, the French were able to move forward. Then came a lull, marked by fruitless negotiations for peace. But in June a hard-fought battle at Friedland, to the south of Königsberg, drove the allied army in confusion behind the Niemen. The Tsar Alexander resolved to make peace; he met Napoleon at Tilsit and agreed not merely to withdraw from the war, but to make an alliance with the French and assist them against Britain. There was nothing left for Prussia but surrender. She was condemned to lose all her territories west of the Elbe, and, with the exception of West Prussia, all she had gained by the partitions of Poland. A huge indemnity was exacted, and until it was paid French troops were to remain in the country. But the worst blow came a little later, when Frederick William had to agree that the Prussian army should henceforth number not more than 42,000 men.

For the next year or two Napoleon's will in Germany was law. The Polish territories seized from Prussia he made into a Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which he bestowed on Frederick Augustus of Saxony, who had already joined the Confederation of the Rhine and received as reward the title of king. The Prussian lands west of the Elbe formed the nucleus of the new kingdom of Westphalia, which was placed under Napoleon's brother Jerome, and which included also Hesse-Cassel,

Brunswick, and a great part of Hanover. In 1810 Napoleon annexed to France the whole of the German coast as far as Lübeck. The princes of the Rhenish Confederation were bound to him hand and foot. The king of Prussia trembled at his nod. Opposition or criticism from lesser persons was sternly punished, as when in 1806 a bookseller of Nürnberg, Palm by name, was executed for selling a pamphlet called "Germany in her deep Humiliation." There seemed nothing to prevent the conqueror from seizing the whole land whenever he thought good.

CHAPTER XXI

THE WAR OF LIBERATION

At first, as we have seen, most Germans had been inclined to welcome Napoleon. There can be no doubt that the reorganization of Germany was on the whole beneficial to the people. The petty counts and knights who lost their independence had often been tyrannical rulers; the ecclesiastical principalities had been notoriously backward in their methods of government. The states in the Confederation of the Rhine felt the influence of the best fruits of the French Revolution; in many, the relics of feudalism began to disappear, and the judicial and legal system was reformed on the lines of the recently published Code Napoléon. Yet there gradually arose a feeling of patriotic resentment at the humiliations inflicted on Germany by a foreign Emperor. The Germans had never quite forgotten that they were a nation; hitherto the idea had possessed no political significance; but now there awoke a desire for a united German state. It is possible to suggest various reasons for this change of mood. The disappearance of the Holy Roman Empire made patriots of many who had hitherto, out of hostility to Austria, advocated the complete independence of the individual states. Economic influences were not lacking. In his desire to destroy England's commercial prosperity, Napoleon prohibited all trade between her and the Continent —a measure which caused to Germany vast inconvenience and some real distress. The example of Spain, where a

national rising had broken out against French domination, likewise made a great impression in Germany. But such cut-and-dried explanations never go to the heart of a great popular movement. It is perhaps wise not to attempt an analysis of cause and motives, and to be content with the undoubted fact that a spirit of national enthusiasm suddenly passed like a mighty wind through Germany, and filled her with long dormant aspirations.

The centre of the movement was Prussia. In the hour of her deepest need, she was able to command the services of several men of remarkable gifts of both character and mind, men who saw why she had fallen and how she might rise up again. Of these the greatest unquestionably was the Freiherr Karl vom und zum Stein. Like most of the heroes of the Prussian struggle for liberation, he was not of Prussian birth. But though he was a native of Nassau, his admiration of Frederick the Great led him to enter the Prussian government service, and when war broke out with Napoleon he was Minister of Trade and Customs. In the dark days after Jena, his never-ceasing advocacy of drastic reforms provoked Frederick William to dismiss him; but when peace was made, he was recognized as indispensable and recalled to be the chief Minister of State. Stein saw that Prussia had been too dependent on the king. The people had no share in the government, few of them even served in the army. In the nature of the case, they could take little interest in the State; and if the king, the officials, and the army met with disaster, they were unable to come to the rescue. It was therefore Stein's aim to enlist the Prussian people in the work of Prussian regeneration. They were to co-operate in the government of the country. The old traditions of Prussia should be broken: she must be more than the best-armed and most carefully administered state of Germany: she must become the home of a free and patriotic people, and

the centre of the nation's intellectual life. Only thus could she throw off the foreign oppressor and rise to the headship of a united Germany.

Stein's importance lies rather in his aims than in his achievements. He remained in office less than two years. Yet even in that time he accomplished some notable reforms. One of his objects was to break down the barriers between the different classes of Prussian society; and he took a great step in this direction by an ordinance permitting anyone—noble or commoner—to inherit or purchase any estate of land, and allowing nobles to engage in trade or industry. Even more beneficial was his abolition of hereditary serfdom throughout the Prussian dominions. On the other hand, he had no time to carry out his schemes for the reform of the administration, and the creation of a representative assembly; and though he gave the towns a measure of autonomy, his plans for the remodelling of local government were only executed long afterwards, and then with many modifications.

The circumstances of Stein's fall disgraced his country even more than her collapse in 1806. It became known to the French that he was hoping for a rising in Prussia like the one in Spain. Napoleon demanded his dismissal; and Frederick William obeyed. The French Emperor proclaimed him an "enemy of France and the Confederation of the Rhine," and the great patriot had to seek refuge in Austria. In high Prussian circles he was generally regarded as a dangerous revolutionary, and his failure was hailed with joy. But he had aroused a new spirit among the Prussian people.

Stein's influence, however, was still felt in Prussian policy. His work was in great measure continued by Hardenberg, who became chief minister in 1810. While Hardenberg had not the lofty ideals and penetrating insight of Stein, he was yet a statesman of broad views, anxious to associate king and people in the work of government and to remove

social and political inequality. He supplemented Stein's liberation of the peasants by allowing them to become independent owners of their holdings, though only, it is true, at the price of surrendering to their erstwhile lords a large part of the land they had previously been allowed to use. But his greatest services to Prussia were the reform of her financial system, and the removal of many irksome restrictions on trade and industry.

If Stein gave the Prussian people a mind for revolt, and Hardenberg the means to pay for it, the credit for putting weapons into their hands belongs mainly to Scharnhorst. Like Hardenberg, he was a Hanoverian by birth; it was not till 1801 that he entered the service of Prussia; but he was one of the few Prussian commanders who came with credit out of the calamities of 1806 and 1807. He was aided in his work by the great strategist Gneisenau, and had the enthusiastic sympathy of the dashing cavalry leader Blücher, whose soul was consumed with unquenchable hatred of Napoleon. The ideal of all these men was a national army, in which every Prussian subject was liable to serve. The professional force was abolished; foreigners were no longer allowed to enlist. The new army was to be held together by patriotism, and the savage discipline of Frederick William I. was modified. Of course the treaty with France stood in the way of the reformers. But it was easily evaded: Prussia never had more than 42,000 men under arms at one time; but as soon as a recruit was adequately trained, he was sent home on leave, and his place taken by another. Thus, by 1813, Prussia had 150,000 soldiers, perhaps not troops of the best quality, but much more dangerous than the victims of Jena. At the same time, the study of Napoleon's methods delivered the Prussian leaders of the misconceptions regarding equipment, tactics, and strategy which had caused the collapse of 1806.

While working primarily in the interests of Prussia, Stein and most of his followers hoped also to attain the ideal of a free and united Germany. And here they were powerfully reinforced by German learning and literature, which for the first time became touched with patriotic ardour. From preachers, professors, and poets flowed a stream of sermons, lectures, pamphlets, and songs, reminding all Germans of their common blood and their glorious past, and calling on them to shake off the foreign tyrant, to forget their individual prejudices in devotion to the general weal, and to work for the erection of a state which should embody the highest aspirations of German thought. Such exhortations naturally met with most response in Prussia; but over all Germany their influence was strongly felt. Patriotic societies, of which the most famous was the *Tugendbund*, or League of Virtue, numbered thousands of young Germans among their members; and the many gymnastic clubs founded at this time by Friedrich Jahn existed as much for political propaganda as for muscular development.

The chief obstacle to the plans of the patriots was the king of Prussia. He was, it is true, in a highly unpleasant position. A rising in Prussia would at once draw on his head the wrath of Napoleon, and if it were suppressed—the most likely result—would probably lose him his crown. But his timidity was excessive, and his treatment of the patriotic party enough to cool their zeal for ever. "Very good as poetry" was the opinion that Frederick William once expressed on a scheme of Gneisenau's for a Prussian rebellion; and the phrase sums up his attitude towards national aspirations. He has been commended for holding the enthusiasts back till they were ready to strike with effect; but the truth is, that but for a piece of extraordinary luck, he would never have allowed them to strike at all.

One promising opportunity was altogether wasted. The

growing enthusiasm for liberty had affected even Austria. There Count Stadion, a minister of enlightened views, was trying to bring people and government into closer relations and to reform the army on lines similar to those followed by Scharnhorst in Prussia. In 1809 a popular rising in the Tyrol gave the signal for war. After Austerlitz the Tyrolese had been handed over to Bavaria. Many of their cherished institutions had been abolished, and the authority of their beloved priests greatly restricted by their new masters; and, under their brave leaders Andreas Hofer, an innkeeper, and Josef Speckbacher, they made a skilful and spirited bid for freedom, driving the French and Bavarians from the land, and repelling several attempted invasions. But the main Austrian armies were less successful. Their advance into south Germany found the French unprepared; but the Austrian generals altogether failed to use their advantage; they were met by Napoleon in Bavaria, and, out-manœuvred and defeated in several actions, were driven back to their own territory. When, however, after occupying Vienna, Napoleon assayed to cross the Danube, he met with a severe reverse at the hands of the Archduke Charles. This—the battle of Aspern—was Napoleon's first defeat in the open field, and naturally aroused great joy in Austria and in the breasts of all patriotic Germans. But a few days later, having been strongly reinforced, he repeated his attempt with success, and the hard-fought battle of Wagram ended in the retreat of the Austrians. Soon afterwards the Peace of Vienna deprived the conquered Empire of yet more territory. The Tyrolese were put down, and Hofer was taken and shot.

The Prussian patriots gnashed their teeth at the sight of Austria's misfortunes. Frederick William had refused to raise a finger to help. Efforts had indeed been made to excite a rebellion in north Germany. A Colonel Dörnberg had

risen in arms near Cassel; but his movement was easily stopped. A dashing officer in the Prussian cavalry, Major Schill, made a daring raid on Magdeburg, only to be pressed back on Stralsund, where his little force was annihilated. Equally unsuccessful, though less fatal to its leader, was the effort of the young Duke of Brunswick to stir up Saxony and Westphalia. He was lucky to make good his retreat to the North Sea, where he and his men were taken off by British frigates. Germany had perforce to resign herself to another three years of French domination.

Though in 1807 Napoleon had made an alliance with Russia, it was not long before relations between him and the Tsar again became strained. In 1811 he resolved on war. All Germany was to aid him. The Confederation of the Rhine was in any case bound to do so. Napoleon's marriage in 1810 to the daughter of the Emperor Francis had made Austria his humble vassal, and, exhausted as she was, she furnished him with a force of 30,000 men. Even Prussia was constrained to give help: Frederick William dared not risk the consequences of refusal; and 20,000 men of Scharnhorst's army formed part of the French left wing in the ensuing campaign.

Everyone is familiar with the story of Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812. Before the end of the year the Emperor was back in Germany, driving hard for Paris, while a few thousand scarecrows, all that was left of the main French army, were slowly and painfully straggling over the frontier.

The Hohenzollerns have seldom been slow to kick a fallen enemy. But even now Frederick William hesitated, and it was well for Prussia that there were stouter hearts among his subjects. The first bold move came from General Yorck, who was commanding the Prussian contingent in the French army. He had not taken part in the advance to Moscow, but under Marshal Macdonald had been operating in the

Baltic provinces. On 30th December, acting without any orders, he concluded with the Russians the Convention of Tauroggen, wherein he declared himself neutral. Macdonald and his French troops had consequently to retreat, and the Russians entered East Prussia.

Frederick William disowned Yorck's action; but all his subjects applauded it, and for the next few weeks took the bit between their teeth. Stein, who had of late been in Russia, was sent by the Tsar to Königsberg, ostensibly to organize the government of East and West Prussia, really to excite feeling against Napoleon. His presence kindled immense enthusiasm. The assemblies of East and West Prussia called the manhood of these provinces to arms, and voted the necessary supplies. The Prussian kingdom was now so deeply compromised that chastisement from Napoleon was inevitable; and Frederick William, convinced at last that the Tsar would help him, came to the conclusion that he might as well be hanged for a sheep as for a lamb. He had left Berlin and gone to Breslau, where he was further away from French garrisons. Early in February the young men of Prussia who had not served in the army were invited to form regiments of volunteers. The appeal was joyfully welcomed, but there was no official statement concerning the enemy who was to be fought; and Napoleon, it seems, thought that the new troops would be used for France against the Tsar. But towards the end of February, wearisome negotiations ended in a treaty between Russia and Prussia. Both powers were to unite in driving Napoleon from Germany, and Prussia was to be restored to her boundaries of 1806 or their equivalent. Then the king threw off the mask. The whole manhood of Prussia was called to arms. Those who belonged neither to the army nor to a volunteer corps must serve in the Landwehr, or militia, unless they were under seventeen or over forty, when they were enrolled in

the Landsturm, a force for home defence, to be called out only in the last resort. The king founded the Order of the Iron Cross, and issued inspiring addresses to his army and people. On 16th March war was declared against France.

Even before this a daring raid of Russian cavalry had driven the French from Berlin and Hamburg, and the Prussian capital had been occupied in force by Yorck. But these initial advantages were not followed up. There was no lack of patriotism in Prussia. In a month or two 300,000 men were in arms—an eighth of the entire male population. But at least half were without military training; and despite the generosity of non-combatants, there was a shortage of uniforms, weapons, and transport. The Russians, too, advanced slowly, and it was some time before they could bring large forces to bear at decisive points. Thus the allies could do no more than occupy Saxony before Napoleon was on them with a large army. His best troops were dead in Russia or opposing Wellington in Spain, and it was only by enlisting boys and others of poor physique that he was able to meet his foes on terms of numerical equality. But his raw soldiers fought with great dash under his skilful leadership. A stubborn battle at Lützen led to the retreat of the allies over the Elbe, and cost them Scharnhorst, who died of a wound received in the fight. Pushing forward, Napoleon won another victory at Bautzen in Lusatia, thus recovering all Saxony. A few days later, however, a truce ended the first phase of the campaign of 1813. Both sides wished to repair their losses, and Napoleon, no less than the allies, was anxious to secure the assistance of Austria.

Austrian diplomacy had for a year or two been guided by Count Metternich, a suave, subtle, unscrupulous politician, who cared nothing for national aspirations and sought only the welfare of the House of Habsburg. He was not disposed

to run any risks; at the beginning of 1813 he had declared for neutrality; and now he put forward proposals for peace and offered his mediation, hinting that Austria would support his suggestions by force. Sooner than alienate Austria, the allies agreed to Metternich's terms, favourable as they were to the French. Napoleon, however, refused them. He was encouraged not only by his own campaign, but also by the success of the French in north Germany, and he hoped to crush the allies quickly and then turn against Austria. But Metternich saw through his plan; and when in August the war was resumed, Austria joined the ranks of Napoleon's enemies.

The intervention of Austria sealed the fate of the French. The allies had three armies in the field. A force of Prussians, Russians and Swedes—for Sweden had joined the allies—was covering Berlin; in Silesia were 100,000 men under Blücher, whose strategy was dictated throughout by Gneisenau; on the Elbe, just inside Bohemia, was the largest army of the three, consisting mostly of Austrians. The French, as usual, took the offensive; but General von Bülow, at the battle of Grossbeeren, beat back an advance on Berlin; and when Napoleon himself marched against Blücher, the army from Bohemia crossed the mountains and struck at Dresden. The Emperor hurried back, won a victory outside the Saxon capital, and drove the defeated force over the frontier. Meanwhile, however, Marshal Macdonald was beaten by Blücher at the Katzbach in Silesia; and a little later the famous Ney, making a further effort to reach Berlin, was worsted by Bülow at Dennewitz.

These events had much influence on the lesser German states. The allies guaranteed to the members of the Confederation of the Rhine their independence and their territories, with the result that early in October Bavaria declared in their favour. About the same time they began a vigorous offensive.

By a daring flank march Blücher threw part of his army across the Elbe at Wartenburg, and soon joined hands with the northern army, which had also crossed the river. At the same time the Austrians slowly advanced from the south. Napoleon, threatened on two flanks, fell back beyond Leipzig, and tried to strike a blow at Blücher. But the Prussian general marched westward, over the Saale, and turned against Napoleon only when the advance of the Austrians under Schwarzenberg had forced him to return to Leipzig and try to check them there. On 16th October the "battle of the nations" began. The Austrians were held to the south-east of the town, but on the other side Blücher's Prussians, who had come up from Halle, made substantial gains. Next day there was a lull in the fighting, and Napoleon made vain offers of an armistice. On the 18th, the allies, now heavily re-inforced, renewed the attack. Slowly the ring was closed round the French. In the afternoon 4000 Saxons and Würtembergers went over to the allies: their loss was a grave disaster, for hopelessly outnumbered as they were, the French needed every man. Towards evening, his troops forced back on all hands, his ammunition running low, Napoleon gave the order for retreat. All night the army filed out along the road to the west, the only one left open. Next morning the retreat was thrown into disorder by the rapid advance of the victors, and the premature blowing-up of the bridge over the Elster caused the loss to the French of many lives and thousands of prisoners.

The defeated army had no chance of making a stand till it was back in France. One by one the German states turned against Napoleon. The cavalry of the allies clung to the heels of his army. Yet the French never lost their discipline and morale, and at Hanau, where a force of Austrians and Bavarians tried to cut them off, they easily swept their road clear. Though the French losses were enormous, it

was a good if small army that Napoleon led over the river at Mainz.

In the closing days of 1813 the allies crossed the Rhine, and invaded France in two columns, Blücher marching through Nancy to the upper Marne, Schwarzenberg across the plateau of Langres. The progress of the Austrians was slow, largely by reason of the views of Metternich, who dreaded above all an increase in the power of Russia, and so did not wish to beat Napoleon too severely. But his offer to leave the French the left bank of the Rhine was rejected by Napoleon himself; and though the Emperor, after a defeat at the hands of Blücher, soon consented to the renewal of negotiations, these too proved abortive. For Napoleon, making skilful use of the 70,000 men at his disposal, won a series of brilliant successes, first against Blücher, then against Schwarzenberg. Nothing decisive was achieved; but the Emperor was encouraged to hope for complete victory and to break off the negotiations. Blücher, however, was reinforced, and beat off a further attack of Napoleon's, while Schwarzenberg pushed forward with more resolution and inflicted one or two severe blows on the French. A last move by the despairing Emperor against the allies' communications failed to turn them from their purpose: after easily defeating the small French forces before Paris, they entered the city on 31st March.

Napoleon immediately afterwards abdicated and was sent to Elba. France was treated mercifully, and allowed to keep her frontiers of 1791. A European congress met at Vienna to settle the territorial division of the rest of Europe.

It was not long before the diplomatists at Vienna found themselves at variance. Particularly difficult was the question of Poland. Russia claimed the lion's share of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, which Napoleon had set up; and Prussia, threatened by the Russian demands with the permanent loss

of some of her Polish lands, expected to be compensated by large accessions of territory in Germany. The aims of both Powers were opposed by Austria. The situation became grave when Metternich succeeded in making with Britain and France a secret treaty for the defeat of the ambitions of the Tsar and Frederick William. But all jealousies were forgotten when news arrived that Napoleon had landed in France, had been received with enthusiasm, and was again recognized as Emperor. Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Austria immediately declared war on him, and undertook to put 600,000 men into the field.

By June the forces of Britain, Prussia, and several smaller states were in Belgium. Napoleon resolved to attack them before the Austrians and Russians could come within striking distance. With wonderful speed and secrecy he concentrated a large army around Beaumont (now in Belgium) and Maubeuge, his object being to assail the Prussians first, and drive them away from the British. The plan was nearly successful, for the suddenness of his strokes took his foes altogether by surprise. After forcing back the Prussian advanced posts near Charleroi, he met Blücher's main army at Ligny, defeated it, and, as he thought, drove it towards Namur. Meanwhile, however, Ney had been held in check by the British at Quatre Bras, some miles to the west. Wellington was thus given time to concentrate his scattered detachments, and he was able, when the news of Ligny reached him, to retire along the main road to Brussels. Napoleon's plan was consequently foiled, for the Prussians had retreated northwards to Wavre, where they were still in a position to join hands with the British. This, as all the world knows, they did on the afternoon of 18th June, during the battle of Waterloo, and thereby converted a French reverse into an overwhelming disaster. There has been endless controversy as to the part played by the Prussians in determining the result. It is a rather idle dispute. Welling-

ton, it seems certain, would never have fought at Waterloo had he not counted on the arrival of the Prussians. If they had not come, the French would probably have been severely repulsed, but in all likelihood a strategic retreat by the British would have followed. The truth is that each army played its allotted part; and if the Prussians won little glory in the battle, they deserved high praise for their rapid and resolute march to Wellington's aid.

A few days after Waterloo Paris was again in the hands of an enemy. Napoleon surrendered to the British, and was soon sent to St Helena. Once more France was handled very gently. By the second peace of Paris she paid an indemnity, and gave up a little territory. She owed it to Britain and Russia that the terms were so lenient. The Prussians, eager for revenge, were bitterly disappointed.

NOTE TO THE MAPS ON PAGES 256 AND 280.

It should be remembered that between 1789 and 1807 Prussia gained much territory which was lost in the latter year, and only partially recovered in 1815. Her acquisitions in 1803, which were all taken from her four years later, are not indicated on the map on p. 256.

East Friesland, inherited by Frederick the Great in 1744, was lost in 1807, and not recovered till 1866. Ansbach and Bayreuth, inherited in 1791 and lost in 1806 and 1807, were never restored.

In the map of Germany in 1812, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw should be marked as including the country between the Vistula and the Bug.



Blücher, 1742–1819 Stein, 1757–1831 Bismarck, 1815–1898

CHAPTER XXII

THE PRINCES AND THE PATRIOTS

THE return of Napoleon to France had greatly accelerated the work of the Congress of Vienna, and it came to an end even before the battle of Waterloo. For Germany its results were most disappointing. The patriots had hoped for the establishment of a national state, with a strong central authority. But their aims clashed with very powerful interests. The lesser princes had no thought of surrendering their independence, which had in fact been guaranteed by the allies in the War of Liberation. Neither Prussia nor Austria would ever acknowledge the other's superiority; yet one of the two must stand at the head of a united Germany. Metternich, too, was a foe of national aspirations which could not be gratified without dismembering the Austrian Empire, or else excluding it from a share in German politics. The other European Powers had no desire for a strong German state. And so it came about that the Congress established nothing more than a German Confederation, which led a useless life of just over half a century.

On paper the new German Constitution looked very fine. All the states of Germany, thirty-nine in number, belonged to the Confederation. There was a Federal Diet, which sat at Frankfurt-on-Main, vested with impressive power: it was to fix the fundamental laws of the Confederation, to determine its foreign policy, to supervise the Federal army, to regulate the economic relations between the different

states. Religious and constitutional liberty was promised to the subjects of all the members of the league, and it was the duty of the Diet to see that these privileges were really conferred.

From the first, however, the Confederation was a mockery. The Diet was no elective assembly, but rather a diplomatic congress, consisting merely of delegates appointed by the authorities of the different states. Its constitution and powers were such that in practice it could decide scarcely anything of importance, and, in any event, had small means of enforcing its will. The presidency of the Confederation was given to Austria, who was opposed to any increase of the strength of the central authority—an attitude which was imitated by most of the lesser states, and by Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark, whose kings, as rulers respectively of Hanover, Luxemburg, and Holstein, each had a vote in the Diet. It was thus easy for Austria to use the Diet for the repression of the progressive party in Germany.

The territorial changes brought about by the war were likewise disappointing. The patriotic party had hoped for the recovery of the lands taken by France from the old German kingdom: but Alsace and Lorraine were left in French hands. Prussia, too, had to forgo a part of her former share of Poland; and though she received large compensations—notably in Saxony and the Rhineland—her gains involved loss to other Germans. It was generally felt that the sacrifices of the past three years had been out of all proportion to the advantages secured for Germany as a whole.

The generation after the downfall of Napoleon is one of the dullest in German history. The disappointments of the Congress of Vienna had their effect on the spirit of the German people. There was naturally a desire for peace and quietness after the late convulsions, and few were able to keep alive the enthusiastic hopes which had risen so high in 1813. For

many years the influence of Metternich remained all-powerful. After the battle of Waterloo, the Tsar had proposed to his brother-sovereigns the formation of a Holy Alliance, with a view to maintaining the principles of Christianity in the government of their respective states. Alone of the great powers Britain refused to join; and by Metternich, who soon gained much influence over the Tsar and Frederick William of Prussia, the "principles of Christianity" were taken to mean the suppression not merely of revolutionary free-thought, but of all national aspirations and all agitation for constitutional liberty. The greatest sovereigns of Continental Europe were thus arrayed against the progressive party in Germany. Their aim was to protect the existing order; and, as we have seen, the nature of the new German constitution, which they had pledged themselves to uphold, favoured their designs.

Nevertheless, German discontent soon made itself heard. A desire for national unity generally went together with Liberal views on government. Such views were popular among the young men, especially at the universities, where they were preached by many professors. It was in south Germany that the agitation first became dangerous; and before 1820, Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden had received from their sovereigns the constitutions under which they are in the main governed to-day. These triumphs of Liberalism caused no small alarm at Vienna and Berlin, and were soon followed by a heavy counterstroke. In 1815 there had been formed at the University of Jena a patriotic society called the *deutsche Burschenschaft*—the League of German Students—which soon had numerous members at other universities. The students—noisy and bombastic in the expression of their views—were a source of much concern to Metternich. In 1817 they held at the Wartburg a festive assembly in commemoration of Luther and of the recent War of Liberation; and some of the more

exuberant spirits solemnly burned certain books of conservative views, a copy of an unpopular police regulation, and, in contempt of reactionary militarism, a corporal's cane and a pair of the corsets worn by the Prussian Uhlans. This silly frolic caused a commotion throughout Europe, and the Holy Alliance sent a formal protest to the broad-minded Grand Duke of Weimar, who had patronized and encouraged the *Burschenschaft*. Soon afterwards, unfortunately, the dramatist Kotzebue, a diplomatic agent of Russia, and notorious for his hostility towards Liberalism, was murdered by a half-crazy student. Thereupon, Metternich called a congress of the ministers of the chief German states; and their nervousness found expression in the Karlsbad Decrees of 1819, which were afterwards confirmed by the Federal Diet. A strict censorship was established in all the states of the Confederation; the universities were placed under special supervision; an inquisitorial commission was established at Mainz to investigate and repress the revolutionary plots which were believed to exist; and it was declared that no state might adopt a constitution "incompatible with the monarchical principle." Some of the lesser princes resented the Karlsbad Decrees as an attempt to encroach on their independence; but Metternich's assurances soon pacified them.

For the next twenty-five years, Germany remained in general very quiet. There was much petty intrigue by the German states with foreign powers and one another, but there were no wars and no startling diplomatic victories. From time to time the Liberal and Nationalist party made its voice heard. Thus, in 1830, a successful revolution in France gave the signal for disturbances in many parts of Germany, and Saxony, Hanover, and the electorate of Hesse succeeded in winning a measure of constitutional liberty. In the south, very advanced, even republican, views found strong expression, bitter conflicts between the government and the representa-

tive assembly breaking out in several states. But a foolish attempt by a few students to excite a rising at Frankfurt gave the Diet a pretext for introducing further repressive measures and instituting a number of political prosecutions. The agitation died down, though in 1837 all Germany was greatly excited by the famous seven professors of Göttingen. Göttingen was in Hanover, where the new king, Ernest Augustus, had arbitrarily revoked the constitution granted a few years before, and given his subjects a new one of his own devising. The seven professors, among whom were some of the most renowned scholars in Germany, raised a solemn protest, declaring that they had sworn to observe and maintain the old constitution. They lost their chairs, but were regarded as heroes by all liberty-loving Germans. Their action was dignified and manly, and dignity and manliness were unfortunately rare qualities among the German Liberals, whose ill-success was largely due to their own tactlessness, verbosity, and lack of practical insight.

Nevertheless, this period saw real progress towards German unity. The nation became more self-conscious and self-confident. It was a time of brilliant and fruitful activity by German thinkers, scholars, and artists. With Hegel and Schelling, Germany still led the way in philosophy. The study of theology, history, law, and philology was revolutionized by an army of some of the finest scholars the world has seen. Even in scientific invention and research, though Germany enjoyed no ascendency, much valuable work was done. German literature was for the most part under the influence of the Romantic Movement. There were no new men of letters equal to Lessing, Schiller, and Goethe, who, though he lived till 1832, belongs properly to an earlier time. But Heine, Schlegel, Hoffmann—not to mention others—were in their different ways great writers, and a novel and wide influence was exercised by the patriotic poems and songs of

Arndt, Uhland, and their like. In music, also dominated by romantic ideas, Weber and Mendelssohn, though of lesser stature than the giants of the previous age, maintained the supremacy of Germany after Beethoven's death in 1827; and there was a flourishing romantic school of German painters, such as Overbeck and Cornelius. Sculpture and architecture also prospered, though in these arts classical influence prevailed—a fact of much moment for Berlin and Munich, where many famous buildings and monuments were erected at this time. In short, for intensity of intellectual and artistic life, Germany stood first among the nations of Europe. And the German people were conscious and proud of the fact.

The greatest step towards unity was, however, due to Prussia. For some years after 1815 Prussia had cut a sorry figure. After all, though she had played a valiant part since 1813, her conduct during the Napoleonic period had on the whole been anything but admirable. Austria had behaved much more honourably. It was clear also that but for the intervention of Austria, Prussia would probably have been crushed in 1813. After the Congress of Vienna, the prestige of Austria was consequently higher than that of her old rival. In Metternich, too, she had a statesman able to use his advantage. He had much influence over Frederick William, who, never in real sympathy with the views of Stein and his school, readily fell in with a policy of reaction. In 1815 he had promised to establish a representative assembly of his whole realm, and his subsequent omission to do so caused great discontent among his subjects, who refused to be pacified when, in 1823, he instituted for each province of his dominions a separate assembly with merely advisory powers. Meantime, it seemed as if the government had gone back to the days before Jena. If Hardenberg retained office for some years, it was only by

altering his policy to please his sovereign. In her treatment of Nationalist and Liberal propaganda, Prussia was second only to Austria in severity. After the episode on the Wartburg and the murder of Kotzebue, the gymnastic societies were suppressed as centres of sedition, and their founder, the eccentric but patriotic Jahn, was for a time imprisoned. The Karlsbad Decrees were of course executed with vigour. It is thus no wonder that the Prussian Government had a bad reputation in Germany. The patriots hated it as a champion of reaction, and the princes despised it as a faithful hanger-on of Austria.

Frederick William and his advisers had indeed some excuse for their attitude. In 1815 Prussia had acquired much new territory. Her new subjects were often anything but grateful for being given the blessings of Prussian rule, and it might fairly be urged that until they had become more contented, they could not safely be entrusted with control of their own affairs. Moreover, it took time to introduce into the new provinces the Prussian system of administration. Many parts, too, were suffering from material distress, and needed immediate assistance from the State. And it must be confessed that Frederick William applied himself to his task with great diligence and devotion, if not always with great wisdom. In the main, his policy was simply the traditional policy of Prussia. The army, now recruited by conscription, was still the first care of the government. Officials were as numerous, ubiquitous, and energetic as before. Prussian finance remained cautious and economical, as it had need to be after the strain of recent years. But in some respects even the Prussian bureaucracy had to move with the times. If the state was to be strong, a higher standard of education must be expected from its subjects. Accordingly, the University of Bonn was founded in the newly-acquired Rhenish province, and the establishment of numerous schools—

especially secondary schools, or *gymnasia*—all under State control, soon gave the Prussians the reputation of being the best-educated people in Europe. Nevertheless, the intellect of Germany would have taken care of itself without the aid of Berlin; and, as usual, Prussia's chief service to Germany at this time lay in the material sphere. True to the traditions of his house, Frederick William showed much concern for Prussian trade and industry. But here also Prussia was influenced by the spirit of the age. The doctrines of Free Trade were being loudly proclaimed by the most famous economists; and everywhere in Europe there was a tendency to relax the rigid protective systems of old days, based as they were on exploded economic theories. Germany had a special reason for welcoming the new views, for the existence of numerous states, each with its tariff and customs officers, was a fatal hindrance to her internal trade. In 1818 Prussia signalized her conversion by lowering many of her import-duties, and introducing free trade between all the provinces under her rule. The Prussian lands being scattered, the latter reform would be worth little unless an economic agreement could be made with a number of other principalities; and accordingly proposals were at once put forward for a customs union—a *Zollverein*—of all German states. At first the suggestion met with little favour. Austria opposed it as an insidious attempt to spread the political influence of Prussia. Many of the other states had conflicting interests: commercial centres wanted free trade with foreign states; industrial districts demanded protection. At first, then, only a few little states of the north fell in with Prussia's scheme, and one of them surrendered only after a long tariff war. In 1828, however, the adhesion of Hesse-Darmstadt to the Union added greatly to its influence. Henceforth progress was rapid. In vain did Bavaria and Würtemberg try to maintain a separate union of their own: they were soon

driven to an understanding with Prussia. Even less successful was a similar league established by Saxony, Hanover, and other central and northern states. By the end of 1835, apart from Austria and a few principalities of the north and west, all Germany had become an economic unity.

The establishment of the Zollverein was of the greatest benefit to Germany. Not only did industry and commerce rejoice in their freedom, but the members of the Union found themselves at once saving money and adding to their revenues. The produce of the customs duties was divided among the states in proportion to their size; as a rule each received more than it had gained by its old tariff, and it was relieved of the expense of maintaining a host of customs officers of doubtful honesty. The Zollverein came just in time to enable Germany to make full use of the new means of communication which were being introduced. Steamboats were beginning to ply on the rivers, and in the 'thirties the first railways were opened. Throughout Germany, and especially in Prussia, the standard of comfort rose, and the conditions of life became easier and more refined.

No less important were the political effects of the formation of the Zollverein. The foreign policy of any state must be in great measure concerned with economic questions; so that henceforward, in many international negotiations, most of Germany spoke with one voice. The individual states became more dependent on one another, and could no longer act without some regard to the interests of their neighbours. Moreover, the prestige of Prussia was naturally increased by the success of a project first suggested by her, and Austria, who stood haughtily aloof, underwent a corresponding loss of influence. Without the Zollverein, in fact, the work of Bismarck would have been ten times harder.

Nevertheless, few Germans at first realized the importance of the new Union. Even Metternich failed fully to appreciate

the influence Prussia would derive from it. The National party, too, could not see what an advance had been made towards the attainment of their aims. They still regarded Prussia as a dangerous enemy, and were still convinced that success must be won in the teeth of the princes. National enthusiasm was steadily rising. In 1840, when France seemed disposed for war in order to recover the left bank of the Rhine, she drew back before the outburst of patriotism which the danger evoked in Germany, whose spirit was well-expressed in *Die Wacht am Rhein*, written at this crisis. A few years later a dispute with Denmark about the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein caused a further outburst of national fervour. The nation was therefore in an excited and inflammable state when in 1848 it was given a great opportunity.

It was a year of revolution throughout Europe. France as usual took the lead, but her example was followed in many states of Germany. Here there were two movements, closely allied, yet each taking a separate course. On the one hand, the Liberals tried to secure constitutional liberties from those princes who had not yet granted them; on the other, the Nationalists attempted to establish a united German State.

The most formidable risings took place in Austria and in Prussia. Metternich was driven into exile; the Emperor Ferdinand was forced to abdicate, and was succeeded by his young nephew, Francis Joseph, who still wears the crown. There were risings in Bohemia, Hungary, and Italy, where national feeling ran high. Eventually, however, the rebellions were all put down, though in Hungary only with the aid of Russian troops. On the whole the Habsburg monarchy maintained its position, for the political liberties extorted from it were soon withdrawn.

In Prussia there was less violence. In 1840 Frederick William III. had been succeeded by his son of the same name.

The accession of the new king had roused great hopes, for he was said to favour Liberal opinions. It soon became clear, however, that his reputation was undeserved. He wished his people well: but what was well for them he alone was to decide. His interest in literature and art had filled his mind with romantic notions, which were reinforced by his conviction of the divine right of the Hohenzollerns. His ideal was to be the father of an orderly, contented people, doing their duty in the stations to which it had pleased God to call them, and taking part in the government of themselves when the king invited them to do so. When, however, the agitation of the disillusioned Liberals seemed to threaten serious danger, Frederick William agreed to call a united meeting of the assemblies of all the Prussian provinces. It began its sessions in April 1847, but accomplished nothing. Most of the deputies demanded for it powers which the king would not grant: they wished it to become a real parliament, meeting at regular intervals; whereas he regarded it as a merely advisory body, which might never be called together again if the king so willed. Among the few who supported Frederick William was the young Pomeranian squire, Otto von Bismarck. But his speeches failed to move the Liberal majority, and the assembly was soon dissolved. The result was that much irritation prevailed among the people when in 1848 the wave of revolution reached Berlin.

At first there was no violence; but tumultuous public meetings and innumerable addresses to the Crown so disturbed the king that on 18th March he solemnly promised to grant constitutional government and freedom of the press, and to put himself at the head of the movement for uniting Germany. Unfortunately, when the Berlin mob assembled in front of the royal palace to express their joy, the soldiers on guard mistook their intentions and fired on them. In their indignation, which was fanned by agitators, the populace rose in

rebellion, and for a day or two there was fierce fighting in the streets. The troops carried most of the barricades; but the king's nerve was so shattered by the consequent bloodshed that he withdrew the soldiers, issued a general amnesty, summoned to office a ministry of Liberal leanings, and sent his unpopular brother William to England. A day or two later he made a progress through the city wearing the colours of the National party, and repeated his promise to work for German unity.

For a time Berlin was quiet. But excitement rose again when in May a representative assembly met to draw up the new constitution. A party of advanced Liberals at once gained the ascendency, and advocated a scheme which would have deprived the Crown of nearly all its prerogatives and ruined the political influence of the nobility. With these views the Berlin mob was in sympathy, and men of conservative opinions went in danger of broken bones. The king, who was resolved to remain the motive force of the government, was finally driven to a bold stroke. In November he dismissed his Liberal ministers, substituted for them Conservatives, and ordered General Wrangel to occupy Berlin with a large force of troops. The assembly was adjourned and told to resume its sittings in Brandenburg; and when the Radicals refused to obey, the military prevented them from continuing their business. Next month the assembly was dissolved, and immediately afterwards the king promulgated a constitution devised by himself. The Crown was to retain control of the administration, the army, foreign policy, and the appointment of the Ministers of State. There was to be a parliament of two chambers, the Upper House consisting of members of the nobility and nominees of the king, the Lower, of representatives elected by an intricate process which gave a preponderating influence to the wealthy classes. Taxation and legisla-

tion must have the consent of both Houses. It was not, from the Liberal standpoint, a good constitution; and a new assembly quarrelled with the king, and was dissolved without accepting it. But in 1850 a further one approved of it, with some unimportant emendations, and under it Prussia has been governed unto this day.

Frederick William had promised to lead the way to the attainment of national unity. But his vacillating conduct in the recent crisis had lost him the confidence of the National party; and all patriotic Germans had centred their hopes on Frankfurt-on-Main, where striking events had meantime been happening. Early in 1848 the growing unrest had alarmed the German Diet into declaring in favour of a reform of the Federal Constitution, and lending its countenance to a national assembly which the Liberals had already summoned to meet at Frankfurt. This body immediately made arrangements for the election of an assembly representative of all Germany. There was to be one member for every 50,000 inhabitants, and all adult males might vote. The elections were completed with astonishing rapidity, most of the reactionary states being in no position to put obstacles in the way; and in May the so-called German Parliament met. The Federal Diet separated, and after some delay the Parliament established a provisional central government, with the Archduke John of Austria as Imperial Administrator.

The course of the Parliament now seemed clear. Nothing appeared too hard for it, for among its members were many of the most gifted minds in Germany—professors of European fame, brilliant lawyers, publicists, and journalists. But it was not long before elements of weakness became manifest. The leaders of the assembly were men who had pondered deeply on problems of State, but had never had any experience of practical politics. They made interminable speeches about abstract principles, and waxed hot over jots and

tittles of theory. To make matters worse, the Parliament soon became divided into several badly-disciplined parties. There were many who advocated a constitutional monarchy; but among these some wanted Austria to be included in the new state, while others asserted that no unity would be possible unless the Habsburgs and the Hohenzollerns were quite independent of each other. Then there was a strong party in favour of a republic after the best French pattern; and on the other wing, there were those who wished to preserve a large measure of autonomy for the individual states. Religious differences, too, cut across the political divisions, and intensified the confusion. But the most fatal weakness of the Parliament was its attitude towards the German princes. By the majority they were regarded as the enemies of the nation. No attempt was made to open negotiations with them or to ascertain whether they would consider any compromise. It was a decisive blunder; for, whatever resolutions the assembly might adopt, it had no means of enforcing them against the will of the princes.

After much wearisome and unprofitable debate, it was resolved, by small majorities, that Austria should not belong to the new German state, that this state should be an hereditary Empire, and that the imperial title should be offered to the king of Prussia. The government, however, was to be very democratic in character, and the Emperor's authority very small; while the claims of the princes had little consideration shown them. On paper the proposed constitution was very pretty; but it had been framed without any regard to the actual situation in Germany. Frederick William IV. had no desire to be a puppet in the hands of Liberal ministers and assemblies; he had a strong if mistaken sense of loyalty to his brother princes; and he rejected the proferred honour.

This refusal alone would have been almost enough to ruin the hopes of the German Parliament. It so happened,

moreover, that its prestige had already been grievously impaired by its conduct of foreign policy. Germany was now agitated by the Schleswig-Holstein question, one of the most complicated problems ever set before diplomatists. For four centuries Schleswig and Holstein had recognized the king of Denmark as their duke. But they had never belonged to the Danish kingdom, and Holstein was a member of the German Confederation. Charters four hundred years old, it was claimed, laid down that the two duchies were never to be separated, and that they were to remain independent of Denmark. The male line of the Danish royal house was threatened with extinction. In Denmark itself descent through females might give a claim to the throne; but in Schleswig and Holstein, it was asserted, no woman could either possess or confer any right to the succession. There was, however, in Denmark a strong party in favour of incorporating Schleswig in the kingdom. They maintained that it was a fief of Denmark whether the Danish king happened to be its duke or not.

The controversy became acute in 1846. Christian VIII. of Denmark officially declared that in any event both duchies must remain connected with the Danish kingdom. Two years later his successor Frederick VII. pronounced in favour of the incorporation of Schleswig in Denmark. The Holsteiners and the German party in Schleswig took up arms in defence of what they alleged to be their rights, and appealed for help to the German Confederation. Their cause aroused much enthusiasm among the German Nationalists. A Prussian force was sent to support the rising, and the Frankfurt Parliament prepared for action by a united Germany and hurriedly began to build a fleet. Denmark, however, was too strong to be crushed without a long struggle. Germany's trade in the Baltic suffered heavily through the blockade which the Danes established. The great Powers,

moreover, were sympathetic with Denmark, and in August 1848 their intervention led Prussia to suspend operations by the truce of Malmö. The Parliament furiously denounced Prussia for her pusillanimity; but as Frederick William took no notice, it ended by confirming the truce itself. The disgust of German patriots found vent in a riot at Frankfurt, during which two members of the Parliament were murdered.

It is thus no wonder that Frederick William's refusal of the imperial crown proved fatal to the Parliament. Most of its members recognized that they had failed. Many went home of their own accord; others were recalled by the governments of their respective states. The extreme Radicals, however, moved to Stuttgart and tried to continue their sessions, only to be driven away by the Würtemberg authorities. Republican risings broke out at Dresden, and in Baden and the Palatinate. In each case, Prussian troops soon restored order, though in the south-west, where the army of Baden had mutinied, there was some hard fighting.

The undignified collapse of the Frankfurt Parliament is of much significance in German history. It ruined the plans hitherto cherished by the National party. The patriots had proved themselves unfitted for their task. They were men of thought rather than men of action. Their ideals and theories had enslaved their minds, and blinded them to facts. Their cardinal blunder had been their attitude towards the princes. The events of 1848 had shown that the union of Germany could only be successfully achieved by a German prince, and the next years proved that none was as yet strong enough.

Though Frederick William IV. had snubbed the Frankfurt Parliament, he had not forgotten his promise to work for German unity, and in 1849 he opened negotiations with a view to forming a "Union" of German states under the presidency of Prussia. It was a step along the path which

eventually led to the establishment of the present German Empire. At first the prospects of the Union seemed bright. A number of states in the north and centre, including Saxony and Hanover, were apparently willing to join, and the constitution suggested by Prussia provided for a federal parliament of two chambers and was in every way better than that of the old Confederation. Nevertheless, the Union was no more successful than the theorists at Frankfurt. Both lacked effective power. The Frankfurt Parliament failed because it could not impose its will on the princes, the Prussian Union because it could not withstand Austria.

In 1849 Austria had completed the suppression of all her rebellious subjects, and she now set to work to recover her influence in Germany. She protested against the formation of the new Union, succeeded in persuading Saxony and Hanover to withdraw from it, and summoned the old Federal Diet to return to Frankfurt, on the ground that the Confederation of 1815 had never been formally dissolved. At first Prussia and most members of the Union refused to send representatives. Frederick William, however, soon showed his weakness. In Schleswig-Holstein, Prussian troops had again been fighting the Danes; but once more the threat of foreign intervention had foiled their plans and the king had been frightened into a peace with Denmark. The Danish king now appealed to the German Confederation for aid against his rebellious subjects in Holstein, and under Austrian influence the Diet was ready to comply. Prussia lodged a solemn protest, but did nothing.

It was, however, in the Electorate of Hesse-Cassel that the issue of the crisis was settled. The unconstitutional rule of the Elector had caused widespread insubordination among his subjects; he asked for the assistance of the Federal Diet, and Austria and Bavaria sent troops to his rescue. Now the Electorate was a member of the Prussian Union; and Prussia,

asserting that the Elector had broken the constitution he had granted to his people, mobilized her army, and invaded his territories to punish him. But at the last moment Frederick William's heart failed him. It became clear that war with Austria would mean war with Russia too; and by the Convention of Olmütz, signed in November 1850, Prussia humbled herself in the dust. She agreed that her Union should be dissolved and the old Confederation revived, and that the questions of Hesse and Holstein should be decided by the Federal Diet. The Elector of Hesse was with brutal harshness restored to his usurped authority, and Austrian troops helped the Danes to stamp out the revolt in Holstein. In 1852 an international congress at London decided that the succession to Denmark and the two duchies should go to a nephew of Frederick VII.—an arrangement which was accepted by Austria and Prussia. As if to emphasize the failure of the German nation's hopes, the fleet built by the Parliament of 1848 was about the same time sold by public auction.

There followed several dull and uninspiring years. The forces of reaction seemed triumphant everywhere, and German patriots, though national feeling was stronger than ever, knew not what to do or whither to turn. Several rulers made arbitrary changes in the constitutions of their states: in Prussia the press was muzzled, and personal liberty endangered by the powers given to the police; while the interference of the government in elections robbed the new constitution of its value. Any prince threatened with a revolution could always rely on the support of the Federal Diet.

There were, it is true, one or two gleams of light. Here and there, as in Saxony and Baden, a sovereign showed an enlightened concern for the welfare of his subjects. The Zollverein had survived the recent crisis, and now added to its members three states of the north-west which had hitherto

maintained a customs union of their own. In the Federal Diet the Prussian delegate was Bismarck, whose skill and determination steadily raised Prussian prestige from the depths to which it had sunk. And in 1859 Austria's power suffered heavy blows in a war against France and Sardinia, which cost her a great part of her possessions in Italy.

Nevertheless there seemed little reason to anticipate speedy changes in Germany when in 1857 the king of Prussia fell ill of a mental disorder, and his brother William had to assume the direction of affairs. The prince, in fact, was famous as an enemy of Liberalism, and had never shown any sympathy for the national cause. But while lacking his brother's intellectual gifts and interests, he excelled him in practical insight and fixity of purpose. He was determined to uphold the divinely-instituted authority of the Hohenzollerns and to make Prussia the leading power of Germany. By himself, this kindly, sanctimonious, and rather dull soldier, already past middle age, could never have achieved his ends. But he could see ability in others, and he was willing to subordinate his judgment to that of ministers wiser than himself. And partly by insight, partly by luck, he soon surrounded himself with a body of counsellors such as few kings have ever possessed.

It was plain from the first that the change of ruler had given to Prussian policy a resolution which had long been foreign to it. For a time, indeed, it seemed as though the new energy was to be directed along the old paths; for when Austria was being worsted by France, Prussia mobilized her army and gave the Emperor Napoleon to understand that she would resist any invasion of Austria's German provinces. The threat had its effect, and Austria escaped much more lightly than anyone had expected. And though Prussia had lost a chance of crushing her chief rival in Germany, her successful defiance of the victorious

Emperor of the French made a great impression on German opinion.

The Regent of Prussia, however, saw that her position would never be really strong until her military system had been thoroughly reformed. The army must be made bigger and better. In 1859 he appointed as Minister of War General Albert von Roon, who soon drafted a cut-and-dried scheme. Military service was to last three years instead of two; every year sixty thousand men were to be recruited, instead of forty thousand as hitherto; and the Landwehr or militia was to be kept distinct from the regiments of the line, and to be relieved of some of its responsibilities. As the execution of the plan would require a large sum of money, it had to be laid before the Prussian parliament.

William, though conservative in his views, was anxious to pacify the Prussian Liberals, so that he might carry out his reforms undisturbed by political agitation. He had therefore dismissed the reactionary ministers of his brother, and put men of progressive views in their place. Nothing had been done to influence the last elections, and there was now a Liberal majority in the Prussian Lower House. But the introduction of Roon's proposals ended the harmony between government and parliament. The Liberals were opposed to further expenditure on armaments, and while they were willing to give way on the question of the number of recruits, they refused to accept the extension of the term of service or the re-organization of the Landwehr. All they would do was to vote for one year the money needed to maintain the army at the strength to which it had already been raised. And even this would not have been done had not the government solemnly recognized that the concession left the parliament perfectly free in regard to the proposals they disliked.

Roon, however, was an old-fashioned Prussian, with all a soldier's contempt for political assemblies. He calmly

went on with his plans, and before the next parliamentary session, the re-organization of the army was in great part accomplished. The indignant House was met by the statement that the prerogative of the king empowered him to reform the army at his will, that the parliament had no right to discuss the matter, and that its duty was merely to consider how the necessary money should be raised. Again there were hot debates, ending as in the previous session with the voting of supplies for one year only. King William (his brother was now dead) tried a dissolution, but the elections only increased the strength of the Liberal party, which in 1862 carried a vote of want of confidence in the ministry. The king thereupon abandoned all attempt to conciliate the opposition: he recognized that the real question at issue was whether the Crown or the parliament should control the destinies of Prussia. The Liberal ministers were dismissed, and the conservative Roon joined by colleagues of his own views. Again the House was dissolved, but as was to be expected, the Liberals came back more numerous and determined than ever. The inevitable rejection of the army estimates was followed by the resignation of Prince Hohenlohe, the head of the ministry. Then the king nailed his colours to the mast by appointing as Minister-President Otto von Bismarck.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE OVERTHROW OF AUSTRIA

BISMARCK was now forty-seven years of age. He came of an old noble family of the Altmark, was at school in Berlin, and afterwards read law both there and at Göttingen. For a short time he was employed in the Prussian Civil Service; but as soon as he had completed his year in the army, he undertook the management of the family estates in Pomerania, where he led the life of a Junker or country squire. Among his acquaintances, he acquired some reputation as a man of unconventional views, but he did not become generally known till 1847, when he was elected to the assembly which Frederick William IV. had summoned to Berlin, where he made himself conspicuous by his weighty speeches against the Liberals. During the troubles of 1848 he became notorious as a "red reactionary": in fact, his unpopularity was so great that when his name was suggested as a minister, the king dared not appoint him. He maintained his reputation in the assemblies of 1849, which discussed the new Prussian constitution, and in the parliament of the short-lived Prussian Union which met for its one session at Erfurt in 1850. When the reaction had triumphed, he was rewarded by being sent to Frankfurt as Prussian envoy to the Diet—an important position for so young a man. In 1859 he was made Prussian ambassador in Petrograd, where he remained about three years. Then he had a short spell as Prussia's representative at Paris before being placed at the head of the Prussian ministry.

Bismarck's diplomatic experience had broadened his mind, and he no longer held the rigid views which he had maintained in 1848. But he was still a firm believer in monarchical government, and his contempt for doctrinaire Liberals was no whit diminished. He saw clearly the cause of Prussia's recent eclipse. Her policy had lacked consistency of aim. Frederick William IV. had behaved alternately as a tyrant, a benevolent despot, a Liberal, and a Nationalist. He had been the slave of a series of conflicting theories, and had turned his back on facts. What Prussia wanted was a resolute leadership, which would guide her on the path of *Realpolitik*—the policy which takes things as they really are and does not strive after unattainable ideals. Such an attitude was impossible for the Liberals, the worshippers of constitutional formulæ. The Crown must retain its ascendency or Prussia would be lost. To defeat the Lower House in the conflict over the army was therefore Bismarck's first object. That attained, Prussia must force herself to the leadership of Germany. In a speech which he made at this time occurred the memorable and ominous words, "Not by speeches and resolutions are the great issues of an age decided, but by blood and iron."

Bismarck is best remembered for his foreign policy, and for the three great wars whereby he raised Prussia to the headship of a German Empire. But never was he so strenuously resisted, never were such demands made on his temper and energy, as in the conflict with the Prussian parliament which he inherited from his predecessors. The Liberals were resolute if rather unpractical opponents. Persuasion and threat alike failed to move them. In the first three years of Bismarck's ministry no Budget was passed; and in 1863 he was furiously attacked for helping the Tsar to put down a rising in Poland. Bismarck for his part generally kept to the letter of the constitution. The taxes were

collected, the press was muzzled, public meetings were often forbidden, and an oppressive surveillance was exercised by the police: but all this was just on the windy side of the law. On the other hand, Roon's army reforms were completed, and to spend money on these or any other object not sanctioned by parliament was unconstitutional: but for that, said Bismarck, the constitution was to blame; the government must be carried on and the interests of the state preserved; if the king, as acknowledged head of the army, decreed that certain military reforms were essential, money must be found for them, and if this could not be done constitutionally, the constitution (which after all was the gift of the king) must be ignored. It was an argument which a later generation has applauded, but at the time it caused feverish excitement in Prussia. Revolution seemed imminent, and even moderate men wavered in their loyalty when it became known that the Crown Prince favoured Liberal views. But throughout Bismarck remained unshaken, and in 1863 even risked a breach with Austria by refusing to take part in a conference for considering a reform of the German Confederation. He was in fact convinced that the Liberal agitation would subside if only he could prove the value of the new army by some successful stroke of policy abroad. In 1864 he had his chance.

The Schleswig-Holstein difficulty had again become acute. Shortly before his death in November 1863, Frederick VII. of Denmark had agreed to a new constitution which treated Denmark and Schleswig as one state. When his intention first became known, the German Diet protested against the contemplated separation of Schleswig from Holstein, and prepared to send troops into the latter. Nevertheless, Christian IX., who, in accordance with the treaty of 1852, succeeded to the throne on Frederick's death, announced that he would carry out the late king's policy. The Federal

Diet had not been party to the so-called "London protocol" —the treaty which settled the Danish succession — and therefore felt free to support Prince Frederick of Augustenburg, who claimed the duchies, where he was supported by most of the population. Accordingly, a force of Saxons and Hanoverians occupied Holstein in the name of the German Confederation. The weak point of this policy was that Frederick of Augustenburg's father had promised that neither he nor his successors would press their claims.

The Federal Diet was concerned with Holstein alone: it had nothing to do with Schleswig, which did not belong to the Confederation. Prussia and Austria, however, were in a different position. They could not support the Prince of Augustenburg, for by the Treaty of London they had to recognize Christian IX. as heir to the duchies. But the same treaty had provided for the maintenance of the independent rights of Schleswig and Holstein, and, as regards Schleswig, this stipulation was infringed by the new Danish constitution. Acting as sovereign states, Austria and Prussia therefore called upon the Danes to abandon their scheme for the incorporation of Schleswig in Denmark.

Bismarck wanted war, for he had set his heart on securing the duchies for Prussia. The ultimatum to Denmark was so framed that the Danish government could not agree to it in time without a breach of the Danish constitution. Moreover, Bismarck had cunningly led the Danes to believe that Britain would support them in a war, though, as he afterwards admitted, he knew "this was not the case." In Prussia, as in Germany at large, nobody understood Bismarck's objects: it was thought that he meant to support Denmark against Frederick of Augustenburg: and his foreign policy was again fiercely criticized in the Prussian Parliament, which still refused to vote supplies. Bismarck, however,

held on his course, and as the Danes resolved to fight, an army of Austrians and Prussians invaded Schleswig in February 1864.

The Danes resisted bravely, but of course without any chance of success. Their carefully-prepared lines called the Dannewerk were turned, and they retreated to an entrenched position at Düppel on the peninsula opposite Alsen. While the Austrians overran Jutland the Prussians conducted operations against the Danish entrenchments, which they stormed in April. After a truce, during which an international congress in London failed to devise a settlement, the capture of Alsen brought the Danes to their knees; and by a treaty signed in Vienna they surrendered Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg to Prussia and Austria.

Both of the victorious Powers recognized that the Danish war was only the prelude to a much more serious struggle. Bismarck had a difficult game to play. He wanted the whole of the conquered districts. But their inhabitants wished to have Frederick of Augustenburg as their duke; public opinion in Germany was on his side; and Austria, who in any case had as good a claim to the duchies as Prussia, was prepared to support him rather than allow Bismarck to have his way. In the very intricate negotiations which occupied the next two years, Bismarck's diplomacy was marked by characteristic skill and lack of scruple. The Danish war had revealed certain defects in the Prussian army, and at first Bismarck's object was to gain time for these to be remedied. He demanded consideration of the rights of claimants whom he never meant to support, and suggested elaborate compromises which he knew neither Austria nor Frederick of Augustenburg could accept. All along, the inspired press was trying to alienate German opinion from Frederick, and Bismarck did not shrink from putting into his mouth words which he denied having spoken, and which, if uttered at all,

were used in a private and confidential interview. Nevertheless, so unjustifiable were Bismarck's aims that, even in Prussia, his devices produced little result; and in 1865 the Federal Diet passed a resolution calling on Prussia and Austria to leave the duchies to Frederick.

Prussia's refusal nearly led to immediate war. Austria, however, was not ready; the king of Prussia did not want to fight; and by the Treaty of Gastein, in August 1865, the conflict was deferred and a provisional settlement made. For the time being, Schleswig was to be administered by Prussia, Holstein by Austria; and Lauenburg was given outright to Prussia, who paid Austria a pecuniary compensation. The treaty scored a point for Bismarck. It gave Prussia a footing in Schleswig, and tended to cause bad feeling between Austria and the German states which supported Frederick of Augustenburg.

The Treaty of Gastein made no difference to Bismarck's preparations. During the next few months he secured the neutrality of France, and opened with the new kingdom of Italy negotiations which ended in a promise of Italian aid in the event of a war with Austria. In Holstein, meanwhile, the Austrians had been openly encouraging the agitation in favour of the prince of Augustenburg, and Prussia's remonstrances were met with the reply that the affairs of Holstein were no business of hers. The Austrian attitude provoked King William into giving his full adherence to Bismarck's policy; and when in the spring of 1866, Austria began to mobilize, Prussia at once followed her example. The outbreak of war was some time in coming, each side hoping the other would begin: but in June, Austria laid the whole question before the Federal Diet; Prussia, denouncing this as a breach of the Treaty of 1865, sent troops into Holstein; whereupon, at Austria's request, the Diet authorized joint military action against her. Despite Bismarck's assaults on

public opinion, Prussia had no allies except Italy and a few small principalities of north Germany. Of the other German states four remained neutral, but all the important ones took up arms for Austria.

The war lasted only a few weeks. The Prussian army was superior to its foes in numbers and equipment; and the Austrians had altogether underrated the Prussian needle-gun, a breech-loading rifle introduced by Roon. But the greatest asset of the Prussians was their commander-in-chief, Helmuth von Moltke, as a strategist and a tactician in the very first rank of military leaders. Moltke was now a man of sixty-six: since 1858 he had been chief of the Prussian General Staff, and closely associated with Roon in the reorganization of the army. He had long settled in his mind the plan of the Prussian campaign, which was carried out almost exactly as he had designed. The Prussians took the offensive, and the Saxons at once evacuated their country and joined the Austrian forces in Bohemia. Two Prussian armies soon followed them, one working up the Elbe, the other advancing from Lusatia. At the same time, a large force under the Crown Prince fought its way from Silesia through the Sudetic mountains. The main Austrian army was at first stationed in Moravia, but soon advanced in a north-westerly direction. It was presently joined by the troops from the north, who had met with a series of reverses at the hands of the Prussians from Saxony; and concentrating his forces at Königgrätz, the Austrian general, Benedek, resolved on a decisive engagement. The battle was very stubbornly contested, and the issue was for long doubtful. But, as Moltke had calculated, the Crown Prince's army came up at the critical moment; and outnumbered and outflanked, the Austrians and Saxons began a retreat which soon degenerated into a rout. The Prussians pressed on rapidly, but when close to Vienna, they were stopped by

the conclusion of a truce, and before this expired a provisional peace had been signed.

Meanwhile it had been going hard with Austria's allies in Germany. Although the Prussians could spare only 50,000 men against the armies of the central and southern states, the lack of a common leader and their inability to concentrate their forces robbed these of any advantage which superiority of numbers might have given them. The Hanoverian army tried to join its comrades in the south, but was surrounded at Langensalza in Thuringia, and forced to surrender. The victorious troops then entered northern Bavaria, and after successes there, occupied Frankfurt, which was treated with great harshness; next, marching up the Main, they defeated mixed forces of the enemy in several engagements, and finally drove the Bavarians over the river by a victory near Würzburg. Then, as in Austria, the campaign was ended by a truce.

There had also been fighting in Italy, where the Austrians won some notable successes. But on the news of Königgrätz, many of the Austrian troops were withdrawn to protect Vienna, and the Italians were able to occupy most of the province of Venetia.

If European statesmen had been astonished at the speed and success with which Prussia had conducted the war, they were utterly confounded by the speed and self-restraint with which she made peace. While the Prussian army was still marching southwards, Bismarck himself offered to Austria such lenient terms that within a few days they had been formally accepted. Only a very small indemnity was exacted from the beaten Empire, and except that Venetia was ceded to Italy, she lost not a foot of territory. Saxony was left intact, and while Prussia announced her intention of forming a new Confederation of North German states, she promised not to extend its scope further south than the Main.

Schleswig-Holstein, of course, went to the victor, and of her enemies Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and the city of Frankfurt were annexed. But considering the completeness of the Prussian triumph, the terms were remarkably lenient, and caused great disappointment to the leaders of the Prussian army.

But Bismarck had good reasons for his forbearance. In his conduct of the negotiations, he showed himself not merely an astute diplomatist but a far-seeing statesman. His eagerness to end the war is explained by the attitude of the French Emperor. Napoleon III. expected to draw some profit out of the confusion of Germany, and though his calculations were upset by the sudden collapse of Austria, he offered his mediation immediately after Königgrätz, hoping to receive a substantial reward for his good offices. Bismarck was determined that he should gain nothing, whether in prestige or territory, from the war; but as Austria, though badly hit, was not yet prostrate, it would be dangerous to provoke the hostility of France until peace was concluded. So Napoleon's overtures were courteously received; the utmost readiness to consider his wishes was shown; but before his suggestions had borne any fruit, Bismarck had completed his discussions with Austria, the war was over, and Prussia was prepared to face any trouble that might arise.

Bismarck's magnanimity towards Austria is partly accounted for by his anxiety to end the war quickly; but he also recognized that in future Austrian friendship might be a valuable asset to Prussia, and that, if Austria once acquiesced in her exclusion from German politics, the natural interests of the two states would soon bring them together again. As for his treatment of the South German states, he knew that they thoroughly hated Prussia, and that harsh measures would merely strengthen their attachment to Austria. For the time, he would find quite enough work in the establish-

ment of a confederation in the comparatively homogeneous north, without increasing his difficulties by attempting to coerce Catholic Bavaria or Liberal-minded Würtemberg and Baden.

After the war Bismarck's first care was the new North German Confederation. All the states north of the Main were perforce included in it. Though less extensive than the old Confederation it was far more powerful. In the first place it had a parliament of two chambers. The Upper House, or *Bundesrat*, was of the same character as the old Federal Diet—a council of representatives of the governments of the individual states. But the Lower House, or Reichstag, was a popular assembly elected by ballot and universal suffrage; and its consent was necessary for all federal taxes and laws. There was, too, a powerful executive. The king of Prussia was *ex officio* president of the Confederation. He represented it in its dealings with foreign states, could declare defensive war or make peace, and was commander-in-chief of its armed forces. Each state had to contribute to the federal army a fixed number of troops, which were organized, equipped, and drilled on Prussian lines, and indeed, except for those of Saxony, treated as part of the Prussian army.

The German language conveniently summarizes the essential difference between this Confederation and the old one: this is a *Bundesstaat*—a federal state; the other a *Staatenbund*—a league of states. In fact, with the establishment of the North German Confederation Bismarck achieved the establishment of the German Empire; for what we know under that name is simply the Confederation of 1867, dignified with a high-sounding title and enlarged by the inclusion of five more members. In essentials, the Constitution of 1867 remains in force to-day. It was almost entirely the work of Bismarck, and in every part bears the impress of his love of the practical and hatred of abstract theory. It is remark-

able that when submitted to a representative assembly of North Germany, his scheme, although criticized from many quarters, was accepted without vital modification.

The Nationalist Party, though disappointed that the southern states had not been brought into line, recognized that under Bismarck they had advanced a long way towards the goal of their hopes; and he was henceforth extolled as a German patriot. In Prussia, the recent triumphs ended the opposition of the Liberals, which had persisted to the eve of the breach with Austria. The parliament readily passed a bill of indemnity for any infringement of the constitution of which the government had been guilty. Most of the members of the so-called Progressive Party, the old foes of Roon and Bismarck, henceforth styled themselves National Liberals; their Nationalism at once began to encroach on their Liberalism; and for ten years they were Bismarck's closest allies. From 1867, in fact, dates the decline of German Liberalism, and some will say the demoralization of German thought. Blood and iron had done great things for the Hohenzollerns, who had decisively defeated the Prussian parliament, achieved a final victory over Austria, and brought all north Germany under their yoke.

Once the new Confederation was launched it became Bismarck's object to win over the South German states. There were already many bonds between them and the north. Certain schemes of Napoleon for the acquisition of land in south-west Germany had been revealed to them by Bismarck, and immediately after the war of 1866 they had signed secret treaties of alliance with Prussia, promising to reform their armies, and in the event of war to place them under Prussia's command. All of them, too, belonged to the Zollverein, and for the discussion of the customs they sent representatives to the North German Reichstag. Thus North and South had a common economic policy, and for the time a common

foreign policy. It was Bismarck's aim to make the treaties of alliance permanent, and by widening their scope to bring the southern states within the Confederation. The task was not easy, for their hatred of Prussia was inherited from a remote past. The south, moreover, was the stronghold of both Liberalism and Catholicism, which though in general at daggers drawn, were one in their dislike of the great militarist and Protestant power. Nothing but a wave of national enthusiasm could drown the old prejudices, and such a sentiment would be most readily aroused by a successful war against a traditional enemy of the German nation.

CHAPTER XXIV

THE DOWNFALL OF FRANCE AND THE CREATION OF THE GERMAN EMPIRE

THE war, and still more the peace, between Prussia and Austria had been a grievous blow to Napoleon. It had led to a great increase of Prussia's strength, and to the union of more than half Germany. Moreover, his mediation had gained him nothing—not even prestige as a peace-maker. He had been tricked. Bismarck had encouraged him to believe that Prussia would be willing to give him "compensations" for her accession of power; but it was in vain that he tried to secure some fulfilment of Bismarck's vague promises: when he asked for certain German lands west of the Rhine, he was indignantly rebuffed, and when he suggested the annexation by France of Luxemburg and Belgium, he was adroitly put off. The truth was that the French army was in no condition to undertake a serious war. Napoleon knew it, and, unfortunately for him, Bismarck knew it too.

It was, however, necessary for Napoleon to make some brilliant stroke in behalf of France. His power rested on no very stable foundations; he was becoming increasingly unpopular with his subjects; they expected military and diplomatic triumphs from a Bonaparte, and only some addition to French territory or a successful war could restore the Emperor to favour. In 1867 he made another attempt on Luxemburg, trying to buy it from its Grand Duke; but when he seemed on the point of success, Bismarck—whose consent

the Emperor thought he had obtained—sent word that popular opinion in Prussia would never allow the completion of the purchase, and at the same time revealed his treaties with the South Germans. Napoleon had ignominiously to withdraw; and an international congress declared Luxemburg a neutral state. Napoleon then set about reorganising his army, courting the favour of his own subjects by domestic reforms, and trying to find allies. He made some successful advances to Austria; but no definite treaty had been signed when the crisis came in 1870.

After 1867 Bismarck knew that whenever he threw down the challenge, Napoleon would not dare to refuse it. But he wished to make absolutely sure of success. Prussia was always ready; but the events of 1866 had shown that the armies of the other German states left much to be desired. At the same time it would not do to give Napoleon time to complete his own army reforms, or to strengthen his diplomatic position. Moreover, the North German Reichstag had voted supplies for the army to the end of 1870 only, and it was well known that in 1871 there would be an attempt to cut down military expenditure. It seemed then that 1870 was the best year for a war; and accordingly in 1870 the war broke out.

The final breach with France was cunningly prepared. In 1868 the throne of Spain became vacant through a revolution, and it was offered to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, a kinsman of King William, though not a member of the reigning branch of the family. The prince was at first not disposed to accept, but Bismarck strongly and repeatedly urged that it was his duty, in the interests of Prussia, to do so; and in June 1870, more than a year after the proposal had first been made, he gave way. Throughout, Bismarck had shrouded the negotiations in the strictest secrecy, and, though most of the leading statesmen and soldiers of Prussia knew

what was on foot, the question had never been brought to the official notice of the Prussian ministry. His object was to keep the transaction dark till the prince had been accepted as king by the Spanish parliament. Napoleon would of course protest, as well he might, seeing that, by all the rules of international etiquette, he had a right to be consulted on such a matter. Then Bismarck would say that the Prussian government had nothing to do with the affair, that it was purely an arrangement between the Hohenzollern family and the Spaniards, and that, if Napoleon objected to what had been settled, he must lodge a complaint at Madrid. Of course the French would know that Bismarck had been in the secret, but they would not be able to prove it; and if, as was likely, they went to war, Bismarck could appeal to all Germany on behalf of an innocent German state unjustly attacked by a national enemy.

The scheme nearly succeeded, but not quite; and its partial failure almost ruined Bismarck. The French got wind of the plot before Prince Leopold had been formally accepted by the Spaniards. Early in July they addressed a remonstrance to Berlin, but were of course told that the Prussian government knew nothing of the matter. This was not believed; warlike speeches were made in the French chamber; and Benedetti, the French ambassador to Prussia, following instructions from Paris, requested King William to use his influence in favour of Prince Leopold's resignation. The king's answer was that the matter must be left to the prince and his father; but they, anxious for reasons of their own not to offend Napoleon, gave way without much resistance, and on 12th July it was announced that the prince had withdrawn. Europe generally, including Bismarck himself, thought that France had gained a great diplomatic victory. But with incredible folly the French government refused to be satisfied with anything less than the utter humiliation of Prussia. Benedetti

was ordered to ask the king for a promise that he would never countenance a renewal of the prince's candidature for the Spanish throne. The request was made on the public promenade of the watering-place of Ems, where the king was staying; it was, of course, firmly though courteously refused; and later in the day, when Benedetti sought another interview, he was informed that the king had nothing further to say on the subject. Neither party, however, had overstepped the bounds of diplomatic politeness.

The king sent to Bismarck an account of the conversation on the promenade and his subsequent treatment of Benedetti. When the despatch reached Bismarck he was dining with Moltke and Roon in Berlin. Acting on the king's suggestion that the facts should be made known to the public, he sent to the press, under the heading "Telegram from Ems," an abbreviated form of the despatch. Not a word appeared which was not in the original, but Bismarck's version gave the impression that Benedetti had impudently intruded on the king's privacy, and that the king had refused to speak to him. In both France and Germany the desired effect was produced. Frenchmen seized on the fact that their representative had been snubbed; Germans dwelt on the rudeness of Benedetti in forcing himself on the old king. Exaggerated rumours and inspired leading articles fanned the indignation in each country. On 19th July the French declaration of war was formally presented at Berlin. Germany was yet more eager. The southern states stood by their treaties, and once again North and South went forth to battle together.

The war of 1870 was won almost as quickly as the war of 1866. Perhaps the word "won" is misleading; for the war was rather lost by the French than won by the Germans. The French chassepot rifle was a much better weapon than the German needle-gun, and there was nothing to choose

between the two sides in point of courage. In every other respect the Germans had the advantage from the outset—in numbers, in organization, in equipment, in transport; in artillery and cavalry; in scouting and marching; in tactics and strategy. The French were short of everything they needed. Their very mobilization was never completed: we hear of soldiers failing to find their regiments, and generals searching in vain for the army corps under their command. In the field the French leaders were mostly incapable; they seemed bent on putting their heads into traps; they had no clearly-defined plan of campaign, and they made every move with one eye on the political situation in Paris. On the other hand, the strategy of the Germans was good; their tactics were competent; their soldiers marched and fought with the utmost vigour and resolution. But they were never, in athletic phrase, seriously extended. In fact, only the most ingenious blunders could have lost them the war.

The German mobilization was accomplished with mechanical precision, and a fortnight after the declaration of war three great armies were ready to cross the frontier. The first two were to advance through Lorraine, the third, under the Crown Prince, was to attack Alsace. The general scheme was that the First Army, on the right, should act as a pivot on which the Second Army should swing round to outflank the French position in Lorraine, while a yet wider turning movement was to be carried out by the Third Army, which, after clearing northern Alsace, was to march across the Vosges on Nancy. The strategy of the campaign appeared on a small scale in battle after battle during the war.

The French troops—or such of them as were ready—were scattered about eastern Lorraine and Alsace; none of the generals had a clear notion of what he was to do or why he was stationed at the place where he found himself. On 2nd August, however, the French in some force made an


BELGIUM
PRUSSIA
PICARDY
NORMANDY
FRANCE
LORRAINE
ALSACE
BAVARIAN PALATINATE
BADEN
SWITZERLAND
Meuse
Rhine
Frankfurt
Moselle
St. Quentin
Mezières
Sedan
Oise
Luxemburg
Rethel
Beaumont
Stenay
Montmédy
Saar
Saarbrücken
Reims
Aisne
Gravelotte
Spicheren
Weissenburg
Verdun
Vionville
Metz
Worth
Marne
Paris
Chalons
Versailles
Pont-à-Mousson
Nancy
Strassburg
Toul
Seine
Le Mans
Coulmiers
Orleans
Loire
Belfort
Lisaine
Dijon
Besançon
MAP OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR
Territory acquired by Germany

attack on the frontier town of Saarbrücken; it was held by a mere handful of Germans, and taken without much difficulty —a trivial success which occasioned absurd jubilation in France. The rejoicings soon died away. On the 4th the Crown Prince, marching southwards, crossed the frontier of Alsace, and defeated the French advanced troops at Weissenburg. Two days later he fought a fierce battle against Marshal Macmahon's army at Wörth. With his 40,000 men Macmahon made a fine resistance to a force three times as numerous; but the inevitable turning movement drove him from his position, his army beat a disorderly retreat, and did not again become an organised force till it reached the French main base at Châlons. The Germans were free to besiege Strassburg and to advance over the Vosges.

On the very day of the battle of Wörth, another heavy blow was dealt to the French further west. General Frossard, one of the more competent of the French commanders, had fallen back over the Saar, and taken up a very strong position on the heights of Spicheren close to the river. There he was at once attacked. The battle was not very scientific; it had not been anticipated by the Germans, who fought at first on no reasoned plan, each division as it came up plunging into the conflict. For a long time the French held their ground; but outflanked by the enemy and unsupported by three French divisions which were near at hand, Frossard was at last compelled to withdraw from a position which should have been impregnable to any but overwhelming forces.

In the next few days the Germans came pouring across Lorraine, preceded by swarms of indefatigable cavalry, who found out more about the French forces than the French generals knew themselves. The French headquarters at Metz were full of misgivings, indecision, and intrigue. The

Emperor, who was grievously sick, laid down the command of the army, and appointed Marshal Bazaine in his place. On the 13th it was decided to abandon the line of the Moselle, and, falling back on Verdun, to hold that of the Meuse. A few days earlier this resolve would have been a wise one; as things were, it came too late. There was in those days no direct railway communication between Metz and Verdun; the retreat had to be made by road; of course the French lacked transport, and had no ordered plan of retirement; and the Germans were coming on fast. On the 14th an attack on the French rearguard east of Metz led to a sharp battle: the French, though driven back, averted a disaster by their stubborn defence; but the great retreat was further delayed.

Meanwhile the Germans had begun to cross the river in the neighbourhood of Pont-à-Mousson, some miles above Metz. During the 15th a considerable force reached the western bank, while the French retirement made little progress. Next day a force of German cavalry threw itself across the main road to Verdun; it was rapidly reinforced; and the efforts of the French to clear their line of retreat led to the battle of Vionville or Mars-la-Tour, the most stubbornly-contested fight of the whole war. For once, the French had the superiority in numbers: but Bazaine failed to utilize this advantage; and the Germans clung to their positions with great tenacity. After many changes of fortune, and some wonderful charges by the cavalry of each side, the Germans made good their hold on the French communications. Next day Bazaine withdrew his army to a position nearer Metz.

There on 18th August he was again called upon to defend himself. Once more the French had a strong position. On its left and centre the Germans, despite desperate efforts, made little impression. For long, too, they were foiled in their attempt to discover the French right flank, and an

ill-judged attack in this direction caused frightful loss to the Prussian Guard. But at last the end of the line was found. It was not well protected, for Bazaine had characteristically massed most of his troops at the strongest points of his position. Reserves which ought to have supported the exposed wing never came into the fight till the mischief was done. The French, in fact, sat still, and allowed their flank to be turned. Then of course they had to give way, and during the night the army retired under the forts of Metz.

This battle—commonly called the battle of Gravelotte—was a strategic victory of the highest possible importance, no less momentous in fact than the more famous battle of Sedan. The French retreated in good order, and only for a short distance. They left behind few guns, and their casualties were much lighter than those of the Germans. But the main French army was now surrounded at Metz, and though it still numbered 170,000 men, little could be expected from it as long as Marshal Bazaine was at its head.

Seven corps were left to besiege Metz under the command of Prince Frederick Charles, who had hitherto led the Second Army. The rest of the victorious force, with the Crown Prince's troops—now over the Meuse to the west of Toul—was destined for the march on Paris, which was resumed on the very day after the battle of Gravelotte. The advance was rapid, and within a week the Germans were drawing near to Châlons.

At Châlons there had been gathered a large but heterogeneous army drawn from all quarters. It was presently joined by Macmahon and what was left of his force after the flight from Alsace. Thither came also the Emperor, who had just managed to escape from Metz. Macmahon who, if no genius, knew his business fairly well, was disposed to retreat to Paris; Napoleon at first was inclined to agree. But news from the ministry stated that unless something were done to

help Bazaine, a revolution would probably break out. Thinking that Metz might best be approached from the north, Macmahon retreated to Reims. There he had from Bazaine a message which gave him to understand that the army at Metz would try to break out towards the north-west, and marching by Montmédy attempt the crossing of the Meuse at Stenay. On 23rd August, then, Macmahon left Reims with the object of gaining Stenay. To avoid the German advance it was necessary to swing to the north; and the army accordingly made first for Rethel. It is generally agreed that Macmahon's move was unsound: in fact, Moltke for a day or two refused to believe that the French could be guilty of such rashness. But the Germans had the whip hand; and only some daring stroke could restore fortune to the French. With a seasoned and well-appointed army, Macmahon might have achieved something, especially if Bazaine had done his obvious duty. Moltke and his staff were completely surprised, and as subsequent events showed, they were not always quick to adapt themselves to the unexpected.

However, the Germans soon got wind of what the French were doing, for in the absence of any systematic censorship the newspapers of Paris and London freely announced Macmahon's plans. At once Moltke wheeled his army to the right. His cavalry soon came into touch with the French, whose progress was very slow. Macmahon, seeing that his plan was discovered, would have abandoned it but for frantic messages from Paris ordering him to proceed. Meanwhile, the German infantry, by wonderful marches in miserable weather, were fast coming up with the French. There is little need to dwell on the involved operations of the next day or two. It is enough to say that the French, after some ill-conceived efforts to force their way forward, were skilfully shepherded towards the Belgian frontier. On 30th August a

sharp fight at Beaumont hastened the impending catastrophe. That day and the next Macmahon concentrated his weary and disheartened troops at Sedan, his intention being to collect the military stores in the town, and then to make for Mézières. But the Germans saw to it that he got no further. Almost without opposition they seized a bridge below the town, and thus put themselves in a position to fling troops at the French line of retreat.

Very early on the morning of 1st September the fateful battle began. A furious attack on the French troops to the east of the town was met by a gallant defence. But gradually the Germans progressed: Macmahon was wounded, and carried from the field: General Wimpffen, newly arrived from Algiers, took over the command, delivered a dashing counter-attack which nearly broke the German line, but which in the end achieved nothing of value. The situation was now desperate. A force under the Crown Prince had crossed the Meuse below Sedan, and while the attention of the French was directed to the combat on the other side, had advanced to the heights north of the town, which were easily occupied and obstinately held. Before long the troops to the north joined hands with those on the east; and the French were hopelessly encircled with a ring of fire. Despite frantic efforts to break through, in which their cavalry performed prodigies of valour, they were inexorably pressed back towards the town. A last charge by Wimpffen gained ground at first; but on its final failure, the white flag was hoisted on the citadel by the Emperor's orders. Napoleon forthwith communicated to King William his willingness to surrender, and that night, in an historic interview with the German leaders, Wimpffen was forced to agree to the capitulation of his whole army The total number of prisoners taken in and after the battle was over a hundred thousand. Nearly six hundred guns fell into the hands of the victors. The

French Emperor was sent to the Castle of Wilhelmshöhe, near Cassel. Well might Moltke think that the war was over, and that in a few weeks he would be killing hares instead of Frenchmen.

But Moltke did not know the French nation. The news of Sedan provoked the expected revolution in Paris. A republic was proclaimed; and at the head of the government were some of the men who had been the bitterest opponents of the Emperor's policy. But there was no thought of surrender. "Not an inch of territory, not a stone of a fortress," was the motto of the new ministers. Bismarck's proposals for peace were rejected. Efforts were made—though in vain—to secure the friendly intervention of some great Power. Léon Gambetta, the Minister of the Interior, made fiery appeals for volunteers, and from the thousands who eagerly came forward, several new armies were hastily organized and equipped.

At first, of course, the new government could do nothing to stem the German advance. Paris was invested on 19th September. One by one the French fortresses were taken. Toul fell on 24th September; Strassburg, after a murderous and unnecessary bombardment, surrendered four days later. At Metz, Bazaine, after one or two half-hearted sorties, sat still within his lines till 29th October, when he and 170,000 men, short of food and ammunition, laid down their arms. But Paris held out; and *francs-tireurs* and national guards worried the Germans till Gambetta's energy had put into the field 600,000 men and 1400 guns. Of course the new troops were not of high quality, and neither were the generals who led them. But they were brave and enthusiastic; and with a French army in Picardy, a second in Normandy, a larger one on the Loire, and yet a fourth around Besançon, the Germans besieging Paris had some anxious moments. The army of the Loire was specially

dangerous. General von der Tann was sent against it, drove it back and took Orleans; but a few weeks later the French returned to the attack, and their very superior numbers enabled them not only to re-occupy the city, but in a battle at Coulmiers to score their one real victory in the war. But the German grip on France was too firm to be shaken off. An ambitious scheme for the relief of Paris was easily foiled, and the baffled army of the Loire was again hunted out of Orleans by strong German forces, and after several reverses finally crushed in January at the battle of Le Mans. About the same time the Army of the North, which had held its own fairly well for some weeks, was decisively beaten at St Quentin by General von Goeben. Yet more miserable was the fate of a force which advanced from Dijon and Besançon to the relief of the great fortress of Belfort, which still held out. After a stubborn fight on the Lisaine, the French were beaten off; German reinforcements came up and cut their communications; the French general, Bourbaki, attempted suicide; and, short of food, with their morale ruined by their failure and the bitter weather, 80,000 French soldiers crossed the frontier into Switzerland, where they were disarmed.

Shortly before this calamity Paris had fallen. It was a wonder that it had held out so long. The fortifications were a quarter of a century old; the garrison, though nearly 300,000 strong, contained only 80,000 regular troops; and there were estimated to be provisions for not more than six weeks. But the Germans made no attempt to carry the city by storm, and it was not till the latter half of December that they brought up siege guns. Meanwhile, they were content to maintain a careful blockade, and to repulse the three sorties made by the French.

The besieged population soon began to feel the pinch of hunger; the very cold winter and an epidemic of small-pox added to its sufferings; and when, early in January, the

big guns began to bombard the forts, and at times the city itself, it soon became clear that the end was approaching. A last sortie failed; and on 23rd January the French government asked for and obtained an armistice. Before it expired, a national assembly at Bordeaux pronounced in favour of peace. A preliminary treaty was soon signed. Alsace and half Lorraine were ceded to Germany; an indemnity of £208,000,000 was imposed; and the German troops were allowed to make a triumphal entry into Paris. In May the Peace of Frankfurt ratified these terms, and brought the war to a formal end.

But it is not in the terms of the peace that the most important result of the war is to be sought. The victories of 1870, as Bismarck hoped and expected, dissolved many long-standing prejudices; and in the autumn the four states of south Germany asked to be admitted into the Northern Confederation. It was not difficult to make arrangements with the grand-duchies of Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt; but the kingdoms of Würtemberg and Bavaria, having more dignity to maintain, required careful handling. From the German headquarters at Versailles, Bismarck conducted the negotiations with the utmost patience and tact. He was willing to allow the two monarchies to retain a number of special rights, and his concessions to Bavaria were so great as to provoke strong criticism from the National Liberals. But Bismarck rightly clung to his conciliatory policy, and in November all four states signed treaties whereby they became members of the Confederation. Each treaty was accepted by the Assembly of the state to which it applied and by the North German Reichstag.

The great task was completed. But among Germans of all classes there was a feeling that the achievement ought to be signalized in some more inspiring way than the signature of a few documents. The term " Confederation " was associ-

ated in the German mind with disunion and disappointment; the chief glories of German history centred round the idea of Empire. Could not Germany once more have a Kaiser? Strange to say, the chief obstacle was the very man to whom the imperial crown would be given. William I., proud to be king of Prussia, had no wish to obscure a title which indicated real power by one which had long been a symbol of weakness; and his feeling was shared by many old-fashioned Prussians. In any case, the king's sense of loyalty to his fellow-sovereigns of Germany made it certain that, like his brother in 1849, he would never accept the honour unless it were offered him by them. The princes, however, were mostly of the same mind as their subjects; and some of them suggested that the king of Bavaria, as ruler of the biggest state after Prussia, should formally announce their wishes. When the king was in doubt as to the correct procedure, Bismarck, who had been unobtrusively pulling the strings, came to his rescue with the draft of a letter which the grateful monarch cheerfully copied and forwarded to William I. in the name of the German princes. Hard upon it came a similar document from the North German Reichstag. William gave way. On 18th January, 1871, in the Hall of Mirrors at the palace of Versailles, he was solemnly proclaimed *deutscher Kaiser*, promising "to build up the German Empire, not by warlike conquests, but by the blessings and gifts of peace, on the foundation of national prosperity, freedom, and culture."

CHAPTER XXV

GERMANY RULED BY PRUSSIA

THE German Empire, as we have seen, is in form merely an enlargement of the Confederation of 1867. The individual states have agreed to pool certain of their powers; but in all other respects their authority remains as it was before, and the form of the government which exercises that authority is a matter for themselves alone. In every-day affairs the ordinary German feels the control of his state much more than that of the Empire. And the federal character of the Empire is made more conspicuous by the lack of uniformity in the relations between the states and the central government. Several princes had special rights reserved to them when they joined the Confederation. Thus, the three kingdoms of Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Saxony may keep ambassadors at foreign courts; their armies, too, are separately organized, and the state governments appoint all except the highest officers. Bavaria issues her own coinage and postage-stamps; and it is only a few years since Würtemberg voluntarily surrendered a similar privilege. Baden is another state with noteworthy special powers, while Prussia's rights are so extensive as in themselves to place her head-and-shoulders above all her fellows.

But the importance of the federal element in the Empire may easily be exaggerated. A citizen of Dresden may pay his taxes to a Saxon collector, go to business in a Saxon railway-train, send his children to a Saxon school, and serve

in the Saxon army: but how much he pays, when his train starts, what his boy learns, how he is armed, equipped, and drilled, and where he is sent in time of war, depend very largely on the will of Prussia. For the creation of the Empire meant the conquest of Germany by the Hohenzollerns. Nobody had any illusions about the real status of the lesser members of the Confederation of 1867, and that the southern states had shared their fate was very imperfectly concealed by the treaties which in 1870 they made with Prussia as with an equal. Germany is now in essentials nothing but a big Prussia.

The causes for this ascendency of Prussia are easy to see. Two-thirds of the territory and over sixty per cent. of the population of Germany belong to her. Then she has a very secure hold on the imperial government. Her king is also Kaiser, and as such he is commander-in-chief of the army and navy, he accredits the imperial ambassadors to foreign courts, he can make peace and declare defensive war, he appoints the imperial chancellor, who is technically the only minister of state, and who nominates the subordinate ministers of Finance, War, the Navy, and the other great departments. It follows that the Chancellor, whose power is much greater than that of an English prime minister, is always a man whom the Hohenzollerns can thoroughly trust; in fact, he is generally Minister-president of Prussia as well. He is, too, *ex officio* President of the Federal Council or *Bundesrat*, where he can count on carrying his measures, for the members are merely delegates of their respective governments, Prussia has seventeen of the sixty-one votes, and the little states of the north are mostly at her beck and call. As for the Reichstag, with its 397 members elected by universal manhood suffrage, its influence is very much greater on paper than in practice. Neither the Chancellor nor the subordinate ministers are members of the

Reichstag; they may at any time attend its sittings to make speeches and answer questions; but they are in no sense responsible to it, and even a vote of censure passed by the Reichstag need not involve the Chancellor's resignation. And the Reichstag has shown little political wisdom in the exercise of what powers it has. It is split up into numerous parties, which have seldom formed coalitions strong or lasting enough to accomplish anything important, and an adroit Chancellor, by throwing a bone now to one and now to another, can nearly always get a majority for vital measures. It is rare for legislation on weighty matters to be initiated by the Reichstag, and of course the Bundesrat may veto any bill passed in the Lower House. The imperial constitution, in short, works together for the good of the king of Prussia and his bureaucracy, who thus determine the foreign, military, colonial, and economic policy of Germany, control almost the whole of her postal system, exercise a general supervision over her railways, regulate her newspaper press, and, in effect, enact the civil and criminal laws which her people must obey.

The individual states appoint most of the administrative and judicial functionaries within their territories, though these often have merely to do what the imperial authority tells them. The most important subjects on which the states may follow their own wishes are religion and education. In practice, however, there is little difference between the educational systems of the various principalities. Here, as in other matters where the states are free, Prussian prestige has generally caused the humble imitation of Prussian methods. And, more remarkable than the Prussianizing of all aspects of German government is the Prussianizing of the German mind. Germany is no longer the land of uncompromising idealists, of transcendental philosophers, of erudite and simple-minded scholars. If a modern German


claims for his country the dominion of the air, he is not thinking, like Heine, of art and metaphysics, but of Zeppelin airships and Taube monoplanes. It is in her "command of matter," as it has been well put, that Germany is now pre-eminent. Zeal for material power and wealth has been the most striking feature of her life in the past forty years. It is the very same spirit that has animated the more capable of the Hohenzollerns since the days of the Great Elector.

It is no cause for wonder that the triumphs of Bismarck, culminating in the unification of Germany, should have filled the German mind with an almost superstitious veneration for Prussian methods. To this day there are many Saxons and Bavarians who hate the "surly Prussian," but who yet feel that he is far more capable than they, and that they cannot afford to do without him. It is not astonishing either that the methods and tools of Bismarck's diplomacy—which were essentially the same as those of Prussian diplomacy for two centuries—should be regarded as infallible, and that when Treitschke and others dressed up in a philosophical garb the principles which Bismarck and the Hohenzollerns had long followed, they should be hailed as inspired prophets.

The domination of Prussia, it is true, has not been altogether unopposed. Resistance has come from three main sources. In the first place, there are elements who do not wish to be included in the Empire at all. Such are the Alsatians, the Danes of North Schleswig, and the Poles in the eastern provinces of Prussia. A party of Hanoverians, too, have never ceased to protest against the annexation of their kingdom in 1866. Each of these sections of malcontents has sent to the Reichstag representatives pledged to unvarying opposition to the government and continual agitation for independence. Only the Poles, however, have held their ground with any success. At present the combined forces of the others can muster only eleven votes.

The Poles, on the contrary, constitute one of the most perplexing problems for German statesmen. They are of course Slavs, and at present, like all Slavs, remarkably prolific. In West Prussia, Posen, and part of Silesia, there seems a possibility of their driving the Germans off the land. They are naturally affected by the ideals of the Pan-Slav movement, which aims at the creation of a great Slavonic state in east Europe—a consummation devoutly feared by German statesmen. The old conflict between Teuton and Slav, in fact, is still going on, and the forces of nature seem now on the side of the Slav. The Prussian government has been the more eager to stamp out Polish nationalism. Laws have been passed forbidding the use of the Polish language in the schools or at public meetings. A state commission was established to buy land from the Poles, and as Polish peasants used the money paid for their holdings to purchase larger and better estates, the commission was in 1907 given powers of compulsory expropriation. Nevertheless, the Polish element in the Prussian kingdom is still increasing, and its national consciousness has become more lively under persecution.

Another cause of trouble to Prussia has been the Catholic Church. For some years after its foundation, it was feared that the new Empire, like the old one, would find its most formidable enemy in the papacy. The conflict, however, has now subsided, and its ramifications are not very interesting. Its real causes were the uneasiness felt by the Bavarian Catholics at the triumphs of Protestant Prussia, and, on the other hand, the fears roused among German Protestants by the Vatican Council of 1870, with its assertion of the infallibility of the Pope. A Catholic party, commonly called the Centre, was from the first very strong in the imperial Reichstag, and stood not only for the claims of the Roman Church, but also for the maintenance of the rights of the individual states. Bismarck naturally regarded it with much dislike. A pretext



MODERN GERMANY

MINOR STATES:

1. Grand-duchy of Oldenburg
2. Duchy of Brunswick
3. Principality of Schaumburg Lippe
4. Principality of Lippe-Detmold
5. Principality of Waldeck
6. Duchy of Anhalt
7. Principality of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen
8. Thuringian States

The three Free Cities are underlined

for action was given by a dispute between the clergy and the government in Bavaria as to the position of the so-called Old Catholics, who had refused to accept the Vatican decree on Papal infallibility. The imperial legislature passed a law forbidding the discussion of politics in sermons, and followed this up by a measure expelling the Jesuits from Germany. Then the Prussian government began to act with a high hand, and with the help of the anti-clerical Liberals, carried the "May Laws" of 1873, placing under state control all schools and colleges, all appointments to ecclesiastical offices, and the exercise of ecclesiastical discipline. Nearly all the Catholic clergy of Prussia refused to accept these regulations, and those who gave way were generally boycotted by their flocks. Several bishops and many priests were imprisoned, and political agitation was rigorously repressed by the police. But the Church refused to yield, even though one or two other states adopted the Prussian policy. The Centre party increased in numbers, and the laity remained obstinately faithful to their priests, who often were kept in hiding in their own parishes, while the police vainly hunted for them. Bismarck's rigour became unpopular even with many Protestants, and the Conservatives in the Reichstag, who represented orthodox Lutheranism, viewed his measures with alarm. It was in vain that he appealed to national sentiment against Rome, melodramatically declaring that he would never go to Canossa. He was in the end defeated: there was no striking surrender; but after 1878, when Bismarck's alliance with the Liberals came to an end, the anti-clerical measures were nearly all repealed one by one, the conciliatory attitude of the new Pope, Leo XIII., enabling the retreat to be gracefully and unobtrusively accomplished. Thus the so-called *Kulturkampf* ended in a reverse for Prussia. But it soon appeared that Bismarck's apprehensions had been groundless, and by timely concessions the government has generally

been able to command the votes of the Centre on questions of national moment.

The third obstacle to the Prussianization of Germany has been Social Democracy—for long the most dangerous foe of the Prussian government. Basing their propaganda on the teachings of Marx and Lassalle, the German Social Democrats, under their leaders Bebel and Liebknecht, first became formidable in the 'seventies. Bismarck had for some time been meditating an attack on them, when in 1878 two attempts on the Emperor's life gave him a pretext for a strong move. Though there is no evidence that the would-be assassins had anything to do with the Socialists, indignation against the party ran so high that Bismarck was able to carry a very drastic measure which in effect forbade them to hold public meetings or to publish books and newspapers advocating their views. At the same time very wide powers were entrusted to the police, who used them with such unsparing rigour that many Socialists were forced to flee abroad. Nevertheless, the strength of the movement steadily grew, and in the Reichstag the number of Socialist members has increased after almost every general election. Since 1890 the laws specially directed against them have been abrogated, as the authorities wisely concluded that open agitation was less to be feared than secret intrigue. The government, however, has never ceased to regard the Social Democrats as its natural enemies. "It is," writes Prince Bülow, "the duty of every German ministry to combat this movement until it is defeated or materially changed."

Harsh though he was, Bismarck saw that mere oppression would never destroy the influence of the Socialists. He therefore tried to outbid them. It must never be forgotten that they call themselves Social Democrats, not simply Socialists; and from the official standpoint, their democratic ideals were even more objectionable than their social policy.

There has long been a strong flavour of socialism about Prussian methods of government; but it is bureaucratic, not democratic, socialism. Bismarck was therefore acting in full harmony with Prussian traditions when, early in the 'eighties, he inaugurated an elaborate policy of social reform. This took the shape of a series of acts for the compulsory insurance of workers against sickness, accident, and old age, the premiums being as a rule paid partly by the person insured, partly by the employer, while in some cases the State furnishes a supplementary contribution. The government also passed severe regulations on such matters as the hours of labour for women and young people, the fencing of machinery, and the ventilation, drainage, and lighting of workshops. This legislation, which since its introduction has been revised and extended, naturally came as a great boon to the German working classes. But it has altogether failed to check the growth of the Social Democratic party. After all, Bismarck's reforms did little but protect the German workman against exceptional misfortune. He still works long hours, still gets low wages, and still has often to pay a stiff rent for a wretched room in one of the barrack-like buildings which, with their imposing exteriors, often leave on hasty travellers the false impression that German towns have no slums. Thus the Social Democrats have still much to offer to the lower classes of Germany: at the general election of 1912 they secured 110 seats, and polled over four million votes: they are the strongest party in the Reichstag, and the best-organized party in the country. Yet their strength is often over-estimated. They are divided among themselves; the stern and unbending disciples of Marx advocate uncompromising resistance to the government, while the growing section of the "Revisionists" are ready to consider its proposals on their merits. Moreover, many of those who vote Socialist at elections are notoriously not Socialists at all, but wish

merely to see in the Reichstag a strong body that may be trusted to criticize the ministry. And it cannot be denied that the Social Democrats have hitherto been mightier in words than in deeds, and have never shown much instinct for practical politics. Still, they are a formidable force; and if some great disaster were to befall the nation they might perhaps be able to lead a successful revolution.

As its opponents, if not pacified, have generally proved ineffective, the imperial government has nearly always had its way. German policy since 1871 has therefore been marked by a steadiness of purpose unattainable under the British constitution. Nevertheless, two dates stand out as important dividing-marks: the first is 1878, the second 1890. They are equally conspicuous in both foreign and home affairs.

The diplomatists of the new Empire were faced with a difficult task at the end of the Franco-German War. The other Great Powers of Europe were naturally not disposed to welcome the new state, and the vengeful hostility of France was of course unavoidable. It was well for Germany that her foreign relations were under the control of a man with Bismarck's subtlety, restraint, and coolness. Bismarck, though ready enough to fight when it suited his purpose, had no love of war for its own sake; and as long as he remained at the head of affairs his object was to keep on friendly terms with everybody, and give the German Empire time to gain internal cohesion and develop its material resources. France was his only source of serious anxiety; and her astonishing recovery after the war soon made her once more an enemy to be feared. Alone, she could not have hoped for revenge, and Bismarck probably intended to strike her to the ground again as soon as she raised her head. But in 1875, when war seemed imminent, Britain and Russia made it clear that they would not tolerate any repetition of 1870. Henceforward, therefore, Bismarck had to content himself

with keeping France isolated. At first this was easily done. Conflicting interests in many quarters stood in the way of an alliance between France and Britain. With Russia, the Hohenzollerns had a long-standing friendship, which Bismarck took care to cultivate, and which even the Tsar's attitude in 1875 scarcely impaired. At the same time Bismarck began to reap the fruits of his leniency towards Austria, whose ruler in 1872 united with the new Kaiser and the Tsar in the so-called League of the Three Emperors. It was rather an *entente* than an alliance, but for some years it secured Germany from complications in Eastern Europe.

In 1877, however, war broke out between Russia and Turkey, and during the negotiations at Berlin which preceded the final conclusion of peace, Bismarck was considered by the Russian envoys to have shown marked antagonism to their claims. Relations between Russia and Germany at once became cooler. From 1878, in fact, Russia ceased to be Germany's chief supporter in European diplomacy, and Bismarck set his mind on an alliance of the Central Powers of Europe. In 1879 he concluded with Austria a treaty which pledged both parties to common military action if either were attacked by Russia, while if the aggressor were any other Power, the party not attacked must observe at least a benevolent neutrality. Four years later Italy joined the league, and thus was formed the famous Triple Alliance, which was not formally dissolved till 1915.

Bismarck, however, had no mind for an open quarrel with Russia. The terms of the treaty with Austria were kept secret; his relations with the Tsar became friendly again; and for a time the understanding of the three Emperors was revived. Indeed, at some date during the 'eighties—whether 1884 or 1887 is not certain—he actually concluded with Russia a defensive alliance against his own ally Austria. As for France, she caused little apprehension to Germany at

this time. Her one possible ally, Britain, was alienated from her by differences over Egypt. In 1886 she made a large increase in her army; but Germany promptly did the like, and next year, when there was serious danger of war, Bismarck's skill ruined the French hopes of aid from the Tsar, and in fact drew closer the connection between Russia and Germany. It was Bismarck's last great stroke in European diplomacy.

Meanwhile the German Empire had become a colonizing Power. Bismarck never was an enthusiast for colonial expansion, believing that Germany needed all her strength to maintain her position in Europe. It was, however, urged on the other side—notably by the German Colonial Association, founded in 1879—that Germany could not hope to hold her own unless she became a great manufacturing country, that the demand of her own people alone would never create prosperous industries, and that to secure foreign markets it was necessary, in view of English competition, to have trading posts and unexploited territory in German hands. The acquisition of colonies, it was also hoped, would save to the Empire the thousands of German citizens who were every year emigrating to America. It was a time when all eyes were turned towards Africa, and Bismarck ultimately consented to take a hand in the game of parcelling out that continent. In 1884, by granting imperial protection to the settlement of a German trader, Bismarck established the first colony of the German Empire—that of South-West Africa. Within the next year the German colonies of Togoland, the Cameroons, and East Africa were also founded, while in the South Seas part of New Guinea and several of the adjacent islands were officially annexed. Bismarck wished to leave the colonies to develop themselves; but in most of them troubles with the natives soon forced the government to send out troops and a staff of administrative officials. Never-

theless Bismarck's colonies have not been a great success. For some time other Powers refused to regard them seriously, or to believe that Germany herself cared much about them; and such views, it was thought, were amply confirmed when in 1890 she exchanged Zanzibar for Heligoland, which since the Napoleonic period had belonged to Britain. At the time, it is true, few people even in Germany perceived the close connection between the possession of Heligoland and a vigorous colonial policy.

In home affairs Bismarck's personality was as predominant as in international diplomacy. Up to 1878 he maintained that alliance with the National Liberals which had already been established before the foundation of the Empire. As he needed their help in the *Kulturkampf*, it was natural that in other directions his policy should be tinged by their principles. Thus in economic affairs free-trade doctrines were followed, and in one or two ways the authority of the individual states was reduced and that of the central government enlarged. But Bismarck soon began to find the Liberals uncongenial allies. He grew alarmed at the progress of the Socialists, and came to the conclusion that if German trade was to grow, her industries must be protected from foreign competition. In 1878 therefore he not only introduced legislation against the Social Democrats, but also laid before the Reichstag a comprehensive customs tariff. Both sets of proposals encountered strong opposition; but both were eventually carried with the help of the Conservatives and the Centre. The new taxes affected food stuffs as well as manufactures; they were not, however, so high as to exclude foreign goods altogether, and the imperial treasury benefited greatly by them.

For the rest of his life Bismarck's attitude towards Liberalism, if not so antagonistic as in his early days, was one of dislike not unmixed with contempt. It is true that the

National Liberals were still generally found voting on his side: but they really represented only half the party that had previously been in alliance with him, and though they kept the old name, there was now little Liberalism about their views. Besides them, Bismarck relied mainly on the Conservatives and the Centre, though the latter could not always be trusted. He was opposed by various Radical groups, including many of the old National Liberal party, by the Socialists, and of course by nationalists like the Poles. In the last decade of his official career the chief features of his domestic policy were his measures of social reform; his attempts to suppress socialistic and other criticism, often by very arbitrary police action; his gradual withdrawal of the anti-ecclesiastical legislation of the *Kulturkampf*; and his efforts to bring all railways under state control and to improve Germany's water communications. Now and then he encountered sharp opposition in the Reichstag or the Prussian parliament. But he nearly always carried his point in the end, and in the administrative sphere the government might of course go on its way without troubling much about criticism.

Though far freer from parliamentary control than a British Premier, an Imperial Chancellor is far more at the mercy of his sovereign. As long as William I. lived, Bismarck had nothing to fear from the side of the crown. But the opposition parties were openly confident that the accession of the Crown Prince Frederick would be followed by the great minister's downfall; for the prince had for twenty-five years been famous for his Liberal views and his strained relations with Bismarck. When, however, in 1888, the old Kaiser, at the age of ninety, died, his son was already under sentence of death, stricken by an incurable disease of the throat. He wore the imperial crown for only ninety-nine days; and though one or two of his acts betrayed his Liberal leanings,

he naturally made no attempt to change the complexion of the ministry. His son and successor, William II., a man of twenty-nine, was reputed to share the political ideals of his grandfather; and Bismarck, it was thought, was quite out of danger.

But the new Kaiser—a man of some parts and extraordinary self-confidence—was in no mind to play second fiddle to a minister. Before long, differences of opinion showed themselves. Bismarck wished to renew the law against the Socialists: but William II., who had philanthropic ideals, was for conciliating the working-class and introducing further social reforms. The Kaiser had his way: the law was rejected in the Reichstag, and a General Election went against Bismarck. In March 1890 the dispute came to a head. William II. wished to deal directly with all imperial or Prussian ministers; whereas Bismarck maintained that none besides himself, as imperial Chancellor and Minister-President of Prussia, might have direct official relations with the sovereign. With respect to the imperial ministers he could appeal to a clause in the imperial constitution, which the Emperor dared not infringe; but with respect to those of Prussia, he was supported by no law, but only by an Order passed by the Prussian Cabinet in 1852. William therefore requested him to sign a decree reversing this Order. Bismarck refused: he was told that the Emperor's will must be carried out, if not by him, then by someone else. He took the hint, and sent in his resignation, the last hours of his official life being rendered very painful by the inconsiderate impatience of the Emperor to get him out of the way. He retired to his country estates, living mostly at Friedrichsruh near Hamburg, which became a place of pilgrimage for patriotic Germans. Though the Kaiser loaded him with honours when he left office, the two were never completely reconciled. Bismarck, in fact, by his outspoken and often carping criticism of his successors,

did much to increase the difficulties of the government. To the end he was a hero to the people at large, but his death in July 1898 came as a relief to German officials.

It seems on the whole unlikely that history will confirm the verdict passed on Bismarck by his admiring contemporaries, dazzled as they were by his extraordinary success. He was not a man of originality, either in his aims or in his methods. He knew exactly what he wanted; he had no scruples; and he had in the Prussian army the very instrument he needed. On that triple foundation his triumphs were based. He was also, like all successful statesmen, remarkably lucky. In 1863, the death of the king of Denmark, in 1870 the incredible folly of the French, saved him when ruinous defeat seemed imminent. The danger threatened by a change of sovereign was averted for years longer than anyone had a right to expect. Generally, moreover, his opponents were men of mediocre ability. Nevertheless, Bismarck, if not a genius, was a statesman of great talent. Future ages will perhaps remember him best for his sense of facts. His schemes were always based on a consideration of things as they were, not as they ought to have been or were conventionally supposed to be; and while he was often short-sighted in his domestic policy, he had an almost uncanny faculty for distinguishing between reality and make-believe in his international dealings. He was seen at his best in the years 1866 and 1867, when, with marvellous acumen, he laid the foundations of his later alliance with Austria, and when he gave the North German Confederation a constitution which was a stumbling-block to the Liberals and foolishness to all political philosophers, but which, being founded on facts, has worked.

With Bismarck's resignation there opened a new era of German policy. From the historian's point of view, that era cannot be satisfactorily treated, for, as these lines are

written, no one knows when it will end or whither it will lead. It is therefore best to note only the main tendencies of the last twenty-five years of German history, and to avoid detailed narrative until their consummation has been reached.

It is in foreign policy that the difference between Bismarck's age and more recent times has been most evident and also most regrettable. For Bismarck's successors, while all claiming to imitate him, have lacked not merely his insight, but also his tact, coolness, and restraint. A blustering arrogance has taken the place of his quiet strength. Recent German statesmen have been no more unscrupulous than he, but they have despised their scruples at the wrong time and place. Whereas Bismarck could secure his ends by adroit manipulation of opposing interests, those who came after him have had but one device—increase of armaments. Once during his long term as Chancellor, in 1886, did Bismarck raise the numbers of the army, and that was in reply to an increase made by France. But every one of his four successors has greatly enlarged Germany's military forces—Count Caprivi in 1893, Prince Hohenlohe in 1899, Count (afterwards Prince) Bülow in 1905, and Dr Bethmann-Hollweg in 1911, 1912, and 1913. At the same time there have been several Navy Acts, which in less than twenty years have transformed a small and weak squadron into a great fleet second only to that of Britain.

Once a statesman puts his trust in the mailed fist, he soon loses his other supports. In 1890 Germany was in formal alliance with three Great Powers, and on friendly terms with the British. The Triple Alliance, it is true, remained intact till 1914; but for some years previously it was notorious that Italy would gladly be free of it. As for Russia, William II. deliberately destroyed that close relationship between her and Germany which Bismarck had so sedulously maintained; and in 1896 the isolation of France formally came to an end, and

the Triple Alliance found itself faced by a league of the Tsar and the French Republic. And, as if this were not enough, Germany fell foul of Britain, with whom William II. had at first kept on good terms. From 1896 onwards relations between the states became worse and worse. The Kaiser's unwarrantable interference in South Africa after the Jameson Raid, Germany's naval policy—only to be accounted for by aggressive ambitions—the enmity shown towards Britain during the Boer War, all contributed to break down old prejudices, and led first to the *entente cordiale* between Britain and France, and finally to the Triple Entente, which was strong enough to stand up to any combination of Powers that was in the least likely to be formed against it.

In these circumstances, Germany might count herself lucky if she maintained in Europe that position which Bismarck had given her. But her statesmen aimed at even more than that: Germany must become a "world power"; she must obtain colonies suited for European settlers, otherwise the overflow of her rapidly-growing population would be entirely lost to her. The colonies acquired by Bismarck had scarcely added to Germany's strength. New ones must be taken, whether by bargaining with some half-civilized or decadent state or by a victorious war with some great colonial Power. Such convictions as these lie at the root of Germany's naval policy. She must be able to make her strength felt at the vital point, whether it be China, Asia Minor, South America, or the English Channel and North Sea. And it is Germany's *Weltpolitik* that has been the chief danger to European peace since the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1905 she nearly caused a great war by interfering in Morocco, where only a few months earlier her Chancellor had declared that German interests were not threatened. Three years later her ally Austria, taking advantage of a revolution in Turkey, annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina; and when

Russia protested, Prince Bülow declared that Germany stood by Austria in "shining armour" and would brook no intervention. Russia gave way, and thus the influence of Germany was pushed southward towards the coveted port of Salonica and the Asiatic dominions of the tottering Ottoman Empire. Again, in 1911, the despatch of a German gunboat to the Moroccan port of Agadir would have plunged half Europe into war, but that the *entente cordiale* proved unexpectedly solid and too formidable for Germany to face at the moment. And finally there can be little doubt that the war of 1914 was in great measure due to Germany's desire to reverse the changes wrought by the Balkan Wars, for the gains of Serbia and Greece in 1912 and 1913 were a serious blow to her ambitions in the East. Germany's eyes, in fact, are now in the ends of the earth, whereas Bismarck's were primarily fixed on Europe.

In domestic affairs the contrast between Bismarck and his successors has been less marked. It is most conspicuous in the attitude of the government towards the Social Democrats, for the attempt to suppress them by force has never been repeated under William II. But Bismarck's policy of social reform has been continued; and in economic affairs Germany has held to the principle of protection. At the same time, the details of the tariff have caused much controversy. Manufacturing industry has of course made wonderful advances, and Germany's trade, both at home and abroad, has increased by leaps and bounds. But the future of agriculture has occasioned some anxiety. German statesmen became more and more obsessed with the idea that a great European war was not only inevitable but even desirable. It was therefore, they argued, necessary for Germany to be self-sufficing, or she would be starved into surrender. Moreover, she must have a big army, and the best soldiers came from the rural districts. Thus German agriculture must at all

costs be protected and fostered. Now in the first years of William II. there was a certain leaning towards Liberal principles in government circles, and Count Caprivi, Bismarck's immediate successor, with a view to benefiting manufacturers and artisans, reduced the customs on food-stuffs. The result was that agriculture appreciably declined, land went out of cultivation, and the depopulation of country districts became a serious problem. For some years the Conservative party, which represents the agrarian interest, was in bitter opposition to the government. Alarmed by the damage done to agriculture, and embarrassed by the Conservatives, Count Bülow in 1902 adopted what he called a middle policy, and, while not giving the landed interest all it wanted, considerably raised the duties on imported food-supplies. Bülow's measures inaugurated a period of new prosperity for German farmers; and though up to 1914 Germany still imported much food, it was claimed that improved methods of tillage and the cultivation of waste land would soon enable her to live on her own produce. In view of the rapid growth of the population the soundness of this forecast is very questionable. At all events, Bülow's policy was far from popular. Radicals and Socialists complained bitterly at the increase in food prices which the new tariff naturally caused; even the Conservatives were not altogether pacified, and in 1909 it was their rejection of the budget that led to Prince Bülow's resignation.

Germany's economic aims, it will be seen, are very closely connected with her foreign and colonial aspirations. The line between domestic and international affairs is equally vague when we consider her military and naval schemes. Though dictated primarily by Germany's relations with other states, they affect her home politics profoundly. For one thing, they compel the State to protect manufactures as well as agriculture; for, it is argued, only manufacturing

industry can raise the money to pay for big armaments. Thus the tariff must be manipulated so as to secure the greatest good of the greatest number of industries, and thus the government, having to compromise between the capitalist and the farmer, has generally failed to please either. Until recently, moreover, proposals to increase the army or the navy generally encountered sharp opposition in the Reichstag. In 1893 Count Caprivi had to dissolve the House before he could get his Army Bill passed. Not till 1898 would it agree to the construction of a strong navy; and in the following year it was only after a hard struggle that the government carried its proposals for further enlarging the army. Thus it was for long the main concern of the Chancellor to conciliate various parties in order to secure their votes on what Prince Bülow calls "national questions." Latterly, however, the mind of the nation has become more and more a prey to militarist theories. It is significant that the Army Bill of 1913 encountered little opposition even from the Socialists. Yet it was more drastic than any of its predecessors. Previously, only some fifty per cent. of the men eligible had been accepted for military service, and increases in the army had been defended on the ground that they were strictly proportional to the growth of the population. But now the government admittedly aimed at introducing universal service, as well as universal liability to serve. The new Act involved extraordinary expenditure to the amount of fifty millions, and a permanent addition of ten million a year to the army estimates. The heavy taxation necessary to maintain a big army and navy will, if the policy is continued, undoubtedly have a vast effect on German domestic politics in future. The strain has already been grievously felt, and it is no wonder that the war of 1914 was welcomed by many Germans who, weary of the burden, were ready to put their fate to the touch to win or lose it all.

"World-power or downfall" is the dilemma on which German statesmen have deliberately impaled themselves. Forgetting the fate of their medieval Emperors, they have refused to be content with maintaining for Germany her just and natural position, high and honourable though it would be. And forgetting what their ancestors helped to do in the days of Louis XIV. and of Napoleon, they have failed to understand that unbridled ambition and confidence in brute force, though they may achieve world-power for a time, will inevitably, whether soon or late, be punished by downfall.

APPENDIX

[*This Statistical Summary has been prepared by* OLGA EPSTEIN.]

AREA AND POPULATION.—The following table shows the area and population of the States and Free Towns which together with the Reichsland of Alsace-Lorraine make up the German Empire :—

	Area Sq. Miles	Population				Pop. per Sq. Mile
		Dec. 1st, 1910			Dec. 1st, 1905	
		Male	Female	Total	Total	1910
Prussia	134,616	19,847,725	20,317,494	40,165,219	37,293,264	224.0
Bavaria	29,292	3,379,580	3,507,711	6,887,291	6,524,372	234.4
Württemberg	7,534	1,192,392	1,245,182	2,437,574	2,302,179	323.2
Baden	5,823	1,059,579	1,083,254	2,142,833	2,010,728	367.9
Saxony, Kingdom of	5,789	2,323,903	2,482,758	4,806,661	4,508,601	829.5
Mecklenburg-Schwerin	5,068	317,964	321,994	639,958	625,045	126.2
Hesse	2,966	639,198	642,853	1,282,051	1,209,175	439.0
Oldenburg	2,482	244,018	239,024	483,042	438,856	194.3
Brunswick	1,418	242,783	251,556	494,339	485,958	348.6
Saxony, Grand Duchy of	1,397	204,375	212,774	417,149	388,095	298.6
Mecklenburg-Strelitz	1,131	53,518	52,924	106,442	103,451	93.8
Saxe-Meiningen	953	136,614	142,148	278,762	268,916	291.5
Anhalt	888	161,134	169,994	331,128	328,029	373.9
Saxe-Coburg-Gotha	764	125,330	131,847	257,177	242,432	337.0
Saxe-Altenburg	511	106,278	109,850	216,128	206,518	423.3
Lippe	469	73,254	77,683	150,937	145,577	321.4
Waldeck	433	30,544	31,163	61,707	59,127	142.5
Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt	363	49,335	51,367	100,702	96,835	277.5
Schwarzburg-Sondershausen	333	44,149	45,768	89,917	85,152	270.2
Reuss, Junior Line	319	74,345	78,407	152,752	144,584	478.9
Schaumburg-Lippe	131	23,400	23,252	46,652	44,992	352.5
Reuss, Elder Line	122	34,781	37,988	72,769	70,603	595.2
Hamburg	160	504,902	509,762	1,014,664	875,149	6973.1
Lübeck	115	56,911	59,688	116,599	105,857	1013.3
Bremen	99	148,529	150,997	299,526	263,440	3017.6
Alsace-Lorraine	5,604	965,625	908,389	1,874,014	1,814,564	333.9
Total	208,780	32,040,166	32,885,827	64,925,993	60,641,489	310.4

The population of the lands now constituting the German Empire was in 1816, 24,883,000; in 1840, 32,787,000, so that the population has become nearly doubled in the last 70

years. In 1871 the figures were 41,058,792; in 1880, 45,234,061; in 1890, 49,428,470; in 1900, 56,367,178. The average rate of yearly increase per 100 of the population was greatest for the decade 1900-1910, being 1.41% as compared with 1.31% for 1890-1900; 0.89% for 1880-1890 and 1.08% for 1871-1880.

For the years 1905-1910 the greatest increase in population was noticeable in Hamburg, 15.9%; Bremen, 13.7%; Lübeck, 10.1%; Oldenburg, 10.1%; Prussia, 7.7%; Baden and Saxony, 6.6%. The least increase was felt in Anhalt, 0.9%; Brunswick, 1.7% and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 2.4%.

On June 30th, 1914 the total population was estimated to be 67,812,000.

In 1900 there were 17,098,806 unmarried males and 16,421,317 females—total 35,520,123. In 1910 the figures were 19,516,340 and 18,591,604—total 38,107,944. In 1900 there were 9,797,924 married males and 9,794,955 females—total 19,592,879. In 1910 these figures had risen to 11,608,028 males, 11,621,085 females—total 23,229,713.

The number of households in 1900 was 12,260,012; in 1905, 13,274,531; in 1910, 14,346,692. The number of divorces in the years 1907-1911 averaged 14,177 or 22.2 per 100,000 inhabitants. In 1912 the number was 16,911 or 25.6 per 100,000 inhabitants. In the same year there were 14,864 suicides (11,313 male and 3,551 female), being 22.5 per 100,000 inhabitants.

The following figures show the decrease in infant mortality during recent years and relate to children under 12 months of age:—

DEATHS (EXCLUSIVE OF STILL-BIRTHS).

Year	Legitimate children	Illegitimate children	Per 100 births (exclusive of still-births)		
			Total	Legitimate children	Illegitimate children
1901	361,745	58,478	20.7	19.4	33.9
1905	353,342	54,654	20.5	19.4	32.6
1910	267,171	44,291	16.2	15.2	25.7
1911[1]	308,765	50,757	19.2	18.2	29.9
1912	234,544	41,027	14.7	13.9	23.2

[1] Increase due to excessively hot summer.

The number of foreigners resident in the German Empire was as follows on the 1st December 1900, 1905, and 1910 :—

Subjects of Countries	1900	1905	1910
Austria-Hungary	390,964	525,821	667,062
British Empire	16,130	17,253	18,319
Belgium	12,122	12,421	13,455
Denmark	26,565	29,231	26,233
France	20,478	20,584	19,140
Italy	69,738	98,165	104,204
Luxemburg	13,260	14,169	14,356
Netherlands	88,085	100,997	144,175
Norway	2,715	2,921	3,334
Russia	46,967	106,639	137,697
Sweden	9,622	8,932	9,675
Switzerland	55,494	62,932	68,257
Total Europe (inclusive all countries)	757,151	1,007,179	1,236,048
America	20,685	20,641	22,462
Africa	390	99	148
Asia	468	641	1,215
Australia	..	..	43
Total	778,737	1,028,560	1,259,873

In 1900 the German-speaking population numbered 51,883,131, whilst those unable to speak German numbered 4,231,129, and those speaking German and a foreign tongue were 252,918.

MOVEMENT OF POPULATION.—The following table gives figures for the most important Federal States and for the Empire as a whole :—

1913

States	Marriages	Births	Deaths	Still-births	Surplus of Births
Prussia	323,709	1,209,518	656,490	35,975	553,028
Bavaria	48,438	207,457	126,136	5,433	81,321
Saxony	40,307	127,482	73,009	4,497	54,473
Württemberg	17,733	70,068	40,711	1,838	29,357
Baden	15,284	59,752	34,930	1,485	24,822
Hesse	9,621	33,291	17,840	994	15,451
Alsace-Lorraine	13,170	45,614	30,501	4,273	15,113
Other States	45,021	141,416	81,181	4,453	60,235
German Empire 1913	513,283	1,894,598	1,060,798	55,848	833,800
1912	523,491	1,925,883	1,085,996	56,247	839,887
1911	512,819	1,927,039	1,187,044	56,310	739,945
1910	496,396	1,983,836	1,103,723	58,058	839,113
1909	494,127	2,038,357	1,154,296	60,079	884,061

EMIGRATION

Year	Total	Destination						
		Europe	United States	Canada	Brazil	Other American Countries	Australia	Africa
1910	25,531	77	22,773	460	367	1724	128	16
1911	22,690	98	18,900	511	353	2554	246	18
1912	18,545	90	13,706	891	363	3307	322	4
1913	25,843	68	19,124	1306	140	4814	359	32
1914	11,803	51	9,614	580	77	1241	232	8

The following figures give the population of the largest towns on December 1st, 1910 (inclusive of the military) :—

Town	Population	Town	Population
Berlin	2,071,257	Strassburg	178,891
Hamburg	1,006,748	Schoeneberg-Berlin	172,823
Leipzig	613,940	Altona	172,628
Munich	607,592	Elberfeld	170,195
Cologne	593,556	Gelsenkirchen	169,513
Dresden	551,697	Barmen	169,214
Breslau	514,979	Posen	156,691
Frankfort-on-Maine	414,576	Aachen	156,143
Essen	410,307	Cassel	153,196
Düsseldorf	358,728	Braunschweig	143,552
Nürnberg	333,142	Augsburg	143,128
Charlottenburg	305,978	Bochum	136,931
Hannover	302,375	Karlsruhe	134,411
Chemnitz	293,761	Lichtenberg (Greater Berlin)	133,141
Stuttgart	286,218	Krefeld	129,406
Magdeburg	279,629	Erfurt	123,548
Bremen	247,437	Plauen	121,272
Dortmund	247,068	Mainz	118,107
Koenigsberg	245,994	Mühlheim-on-Ruhr	112,580
Stettin	237,399	Wilmersdorf (Greater Berlin)	109,716
Neukölln	237,289	Lübeck	109,106
Duisburg	229,483	Wiesbaden	109,002
Kiel	211,627	Mühlhausen (in Alsace)	105,488
Mannheim	206,049	Saarbrücken	105,089
Danzig	182,762		
Halle on Saale	180,843		

CONSTITUTION.—The Constitution of the German Empire was drawn up in April 1871 by the Reichstag summoned in Berlin. The Empire is a confederacy of 25 States (for list of which see population statistics above), the head of the Empire being the King of Prussia, who bears the title of German Emperor. In this capacity the Emperor is the representative of the Empire for all international purposes; he can declare war, conclude peace, and make treaties (with

the consent of the Bundesrat); in him is vested the chief control of all the military and naval power of the Empire. The Bundesrat represents the 25 States of Germany and is composed of 61 members appointed for each session. The constituent States are represented as follows:—Prussia 17, Bavaria 6, Saxony and Württemberg 4 each, Baden and Hessen 3 each, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Brunswick 2 each, all the others 1 each, and the Reichsland of Alsace-Lorraine 3. The Chancellor of the Empire is the President of the Bundesrat. Prince Bismarck was the first to hold this office, 1871-1890.

The people are represented by the 397 deputies elected by universal manhood suffrage, for a period of five years to the Reichstag. These deputies elect their own President and receive as remuneration for their services the sum of £150 per annum. The States are represented in the Reichstag by: Prussia 236 members, Bavaria 48, Saxony 23, Württemberg 17, Baden 14, Hesse 9, Mecklenburg-Schwerin 6, Saxony, Oldenburg, Brunswick, and Hamburg 3 each, Saxe-Meiningen, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and Anhalt 2 each, the rest 1 each, and Alsace-Lorraine by 15. In 1915 the strength of the political parties was:—Social Democrats 111, Centre Party 90, Radicals 45, National Liberals 43, Conservatives 41, Poles 18, Free Conservatives 12, Economic Union 9, Anti-Semites 3, and 25 belonging to various other parties. At the last general election in 1912, 14,442,387 electors had the right to vote. Of these 12,260,731 actually exercised their right and of this total more than one-third (4,250,000) were Socialists.

RELIGION.—All religious denominations are considered to be on an equal footing in the German Empire according to its Constitution and theoretically the individual is under no disability owing to his creed. The following are figures of four religious censuses:—

Religion	1890	Per 1000 of Pop.	1900	Per 1000 of Pop.	1905	Per 1000 of Pop.	1910	Per 1000 of Pop.
Protestants .	31,026,810	628	35,231,104	625	37,646,852	621	39,991,421	616
Catholics .	17,674,921	358	20,327,913	361	22,109,644	365	23,821,453	367
Other Christians.	145,540	2.9	203,793	4	259,717	4	283,946	4
Jews . .	567,884	11	586,948	10	607,862	10	615,021	10
Unclassified	13,315	.3	17,535	.3	17,203	.3	214,152	3

EDUCATION.—Throughout Germany school attendance is compulsory between the ages of six and fourteen. Elementary schools (Volksschulen), provided by the local authorities, are found even in the smallest village, and parents are obliged to send their children to these or to the private schools where the curriculum is on similar lines. In 1911 there were in Germany 61,557 public elementary schools (Volksschulen) with 148,217 male and 39,268 female teachers. The number of pupils was 10,309,949 (5,157,446 boys and 5,152,503 girls). In 1906 the figures were: 60,584 schools with 166,597 teachers and 9,737,262 pupils. Of private schools there were in 1911 480 with 26,151 pupils as against 614 schools with 42,094 pupils in 1906. The next grade of education is attained in the "Middle Schools" (Mittelschulen), of which there were 914 public and 1135 private institutions in 1911. The number of teachers was 7521 in the former and 4534 in the latter. The number of pupils was 273,394 (135,799 boys and 137,595 girls) and 80,660 (21,873 boys and 58,787 girls) respectively.

Preparation for the Universities and Technical High Schools is given in the next group of Schools, the "Higher" (Höhere Schulen or Lehranstalten). These include Gymnasien, Realgymnasien, Oberrealschulen, Progymnasien, Prorealgymnasien and Realschulen. In 1911 the number of these "Higher" Schools was 1687 for boys (452 being maintained entirely by the State) with 22,941 teachers and 427,644 pupils. For girls there were 828 such schools (15 entirely State provided)

with 12,398 teachers (3012 male and 9386 female), and 234,461 pupils. The total expenditure on the three grades of schools was as follows: Elementary Schools, £33,491,828, of which £10,690,998 was State provided; Middle Schools, £1,528,329, of which sum £128,882 was a State grant and £584,943 was received in fees. Higher Schools, £8,857,933, including £2,546,153 State grant and £3,413,180 from pupils' fees.

There are 11 Technical High Schools in existence, and these have the right to grant degrees in Chemistry, Mining, Engineering, Architecture, Agriculture, Mathematics, and General Science. The following is a list of these schools and their pupils, etc., for the winter half-year 1913-1914:—

Schools	No. of Staff	Students		
		Male	Female	Total
Aachen	84	917	139	1,056
Berlin	176	2,820	66	2,886
Brunswick	55	539	129	668
Breslau	42	348	9	357
Danzig	57	1,319	..	1,319
Darmstadt	88	1,393	185	1,578
Dresden	73	1,371	276	1,647
Hannover	80	1,232	512	1,744
Karlsruhe	91	1,194	136	1,330
Munich	74	2,849	51	2,900
Stuttgart	81	1,012	374	1,386
Total	901	14,994	1877	16,871

In addition to the foregoing there are Veterinary Schools, Arts and Crafts Schools, Music Academies, and many others. In Berlin and Munich are the two chief military academies (there are 18 others), and at Kiel is the College for naval cadets.

In the autumn of 1914 a University was opened at Frankfort-Maine, thus bringing the number of Universities in Germany

to 22. The following table gives the statistics for the 21 Universities in the winter session 1913-1914 :—

Universities	Staff	Students				
		Theology	Jurisprudence	Medicine	Philosophy	Total
Berlin . .	502	675	1,982	2,430	4,506	9,593
Bonn . .	191	567	768	813	2,122	4,270
Breslau . .	107	465	461	766	1,099	2,791
Erlangen .	81	238	203	437	463	1,341
Freiburg .	151	354	509	1,074	419	2,572
Giessen . .	106	90	118	525	607	1,340
Göttingen .	163	223	401	442	1,749	2,815
Greifswald .	98	136	167	309	638	1,250
Halle . .	170	443	482	403	1,582	2,910
Heidelberg .	163	166	413	884	628	2,409
Jena . .	121	103	320	425	1,014	1,862
Kiel . .	148	77	406	560	804	1,847
Königsberg .	158	162	219	529	658	1,568
Leipzig . .	251	558	918	1,082	2,974	5,532
Marburg .	118	209	324	543	1,092	2,168
Munich . .	265	184	1,095	2,477	2,543	6,802
Münster .	90	316	415	..	1,392	2,123
Rostock .	73	44	91	363	416	914
Strassburg .	178	272	430	616	450	2,092
Tübingen .	128	529	285	399	264	1,887
Würzburg .	101	131	288	732	364	1,515
	3450	5842	10,295	16,303	25,784	60,095

INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS—RAILWAYS.—On March 31st, 1915 there were 40,120 miles of railway in use for traffic, of which number 2923 miles were owned by private companies. The subjoined table shows the length of line belonging to each of the State systems :—

Railways	Normal Gauge	Narrow Gauge	Total
	Miles	Miles	Miles
Prussian-Hessian State Railway	24,735	149	24,884
Bavarian " "	5,208	72	5,280
Saxony " "	1,773	319	2,092
Württemberg " "	1,251	63	1,314
Baden " "	1,141	18	1,159
Mecklenburg " "	684	..	684
Oldenburg " "	421	..	421
Royal Military " "	44	..	44
Alsace-Lorraine " "	1,269	50	1,319
Total State Railways	36,526	671	37,197
Private Railways	2,208	715	2,923
	38,734	1386	40,120

In 1912, 3783 accidents of major and minor importance occurred on the State railways, and 1179 persons were killed, whilst 2575 were injured. The number of passengers carried in the same year was 1,744,000,000 as against 958,000,000 in 1903. The number of employees of all kinds was 740,249 in 1912 and 557,751 in 1903. The amount received in fares for 1912 was £48,052,050.

The following figures show growth and expenditure of the railway system for various years:—

	Length	Capital	Receipts	Expenditure
	Miles	£	£	£
1904	34,669	716,286,450	113,923,950	72,071,750
1906	35,760	759,843,550	132,054,800	85,305,050
1908	37,026	821,379,310	135,555,040	99,753,320
1910	36,599[1]	875,917,215	152,524,442	103,725,098
1912	37,823[1]	922,850,000	173,850,090	117,300,000

[1] Exclusive of narrow gauge lines.

INLAND NAVIGATION.—By the combined use of navigable rivers, canals, and lakes, Germany is the possessor of some 8500 miles of inland waterways. A considerable amount of shipping

is done. On December 31st, 1912 there were 29,533 vessels, of a total tonnage of 7,394,657 in use in the German Empire as against 20,390 vessels of 2,100,705 tons in 1887. In 1912, 93,481,057 tons of merchandise (53,475,066 tons for home commerce, 17,634,724 tons for export, and 22,371,267 tons import) were carried, while for 1911 the number was 79,961,435 tons.

Posts and Telegraphs.—With the exception of Bavaria and Württemberg, all the States are included in the Imperial Post and Telegraph Union. Bavaria is the only State now issuing her own postage stamps. The following are figures for several years dealing with post, telegraphs, and telephones:

Year	No. of Employees				No. of Post Offices				No. of Telegraph Offices			
	Imperial Post	Bavaria	Württ.	Total	Imperial Post	Bavaria	Württ.	Total	Imperial Post	Bavaria	Württ.	Total
1906	243,788	23,010	11,170	277,968	33,474	5061	1083	39,623	28,741	3735	1993	34,469
1908	269,861	23,794	11,814	305,469	34,286	5151	1129	40,566	32,921	6246	2109	41,276
1910	270,549	27,996	9,882	305,427	34,417	5227	1172	40,816	35,332	7591	2193	45,116
1912	283,172	27,032	10,260	320,464	34,690	5308	1194	41,192	37,369	8538	2260	48,167
1913	224,530	16,941	6,724	248,195	34,860	5355	1200	41,415	38,509	9136	2368	50,013

In 1913 the following postal packets were carried:—

	Imperial Post	Bavaria	Württemberg	Total
Letters	3,423,465,970	326,585,140	122,112,750	3,872,163,860
Post Cards	1,872,365,120	160,720,550	64,473,570	2,097,559,240
Printed Matter	1,729,515,740	166,152,740	67,698,190	1,963,366,670
Samples	113,423,230	8,140,590	3,239,130	124,802,850
Money Orders	161,364,340	17,039,530	6,795,280	185,199,150
Newspapers	2,074,631,350	280,111,000	107,887,360	2,462,629,710
Parcels	289,191,830	25,879,010	13,720,140	328,790,980
Total, including others not mentioned	9,807,020,430	998,233,210	391,958,780	11,197,212,420

The total value of the money sent through the post was, in 1913, 65,924,348,070 M., or £3,296,217,403, divided up as follows:—Imperial Post, 58,666,067,290 M. (£2,933,303,365); Bavaria, 5,031,878,890 M. (£251,593,944); and Württemberg, 2,226,401,890 M. (£111,320,094).

The receipts and expenditure for the post, telegraph, and telephone services for 1912 and 1913 were :—

	Imperial Post	Bavaria	Württemberg	Total
1912	£	£	£	£
Receipts . .	39,640,000	3,895,000	1,520,000	45,055,000
Expenditure .	34,960,000	3,100,000	1,090,000	39,250,000
Surplus . .	4,680,000	795,000	430,000	5,805,000
1913				
Receipts . .	41,660,000	4,035,000	1,598,000	47,300,000
Expenditure .	37,180,000	3,214,000	1,146,000	41,540,000
Surplus . .	4,480,000	821,000	452,000	5,760,000

Telegraph Statistics for 1913 :—

	Imperial Post	Bavaria	Württemberg	Total
Length of Line in miles	121,148	19,626	7,090	147,864
Length of Wire in miles	402,889	59,469	12,143	474,153
Inland Telegrams .	36,221,810	2,677,290	837,320	39,736,420
Official ,, .	3,102,720	93,790	164,946	3,361,450
Foreign ,, sent	7,995,020	565,600	199,540	8,760,160
Foreign ,, received	8,304,460	582,970	258,890	9,146,410
Passing ,, . .	3,309,920	12,470	3,210	3,325,600
Total Telegrams .	58,933,930	3,932,120	1,463,990	64,330,400

Telephone Statistics for 1913 :—

	Imperial Post	Bavaria	Württemberg	Total
No. of Trunk Call Offices . .	32,897	5,935	2,255	41,087
No. of Installations . . .	1,221,867	115,054	50,405	1,387,326
Urban System—				
Length of Line Miles . . .	72,292	6,655	1,597	80,744
Length of Wire Miles . . .	3,540,146	334,941	79,773	3,854,860
No. of Conversations . . .	1,867,491,150	151,598,530	54,668,270	2,073,757,950
Interurban System—				
Length of Wire Miles . . .	758,643	56,011	33,121	847,775
No. of Conversations . . .	411,582,310	20,916,240	11,696,150	444,194,700

The statistics for 1912 in the three services mentioned worked out per head of the population as follows:—97.7 letters, etc., 35 newspapers, 2.7 money orders valued at 138 Marks, .79 telegrams, and 35.2 conversations. The expenses were 11.8 Marks per head.

FINANCE.—The following is the budget for the year 1915-16:—

REVENUE

				Marks
Posts and Telegraphs				881,569,500
Imperial Printing Office				13,885,000
State Railways				162,246,000
Various Sources				79,822,732
Treasury				2,185,558,199
Customs Duties and Excise			1,701,282,900	
Customs	712,930,000	Illuminants Duty	15,896,000	
Tobacco Duty	10,876,000	Matches	21,035,000	
Cigarette Duty	39,202,000	Brewing Tax	128,950,000	
Sugar Duty	163,252,000	Playing Card Tax	2,033,000	
Salt Duty	61,144,000	Bill Stamps	19,100,000	
Brandy Duty	193,995,000	Stamp Duties	250,085,000	
Vinegar Duty	825,000	Supertax	100,000	
Sparkling Wines Duty	9,970,000	Succession Duties	50,000,000	
		Statistical Fees	1,919,900	
Balances			51,195,644	
Military Tax			327,740,881	
Bank Dues			18,791,000	
Miscellaneous			34,607,980	
Federal Contributions			51,940,794	
Prussia	33,898,100	Saxe-Coburg-Gotha	217,000	
Bavaria	3,407,100	Anhalt	279,500	
Saxony	4,048,000	Schwarzb.-Sondershausen	75,900	
Württemberg	1,620,300	Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt	85,000	
Baden	1,808,100	Waldeck	52,100	
Hesse	1,082,000	Reuss Elder Line	61,400	
Mecklenburg-Schwerin	540,100	Reuss Younger Line	128,900	
Sachsen-Weimar	352,800	Schaumburg-Lippe	39,400	
Mecklenburg-Strelitz	89,800	Lippe	127,400	
Oldenburg	407,700	Lübeck	98,900	
Braunschweig	417,200	Bremen	252,800	
Sachsen-Meiningen	234,500	Hamburg	856,300	
Sachsen-Altenburg	182,400	Alsace-Lorraine	1,578,600	
Ordinary Receipts				3,323,081,431
Extraordinary Receipts				20,042,342,000
Imperial Debt			20,040,290,210	
Military Administration			2,051,790	
Total Receipts				23,365,423,431 (£1,168,271,171)

	EXPENDITURE		Marks
	Ordinary	Transitory	Extraordinary
The Reichstag	2,269,483	..	..
The Chancellory	333,970	..	..
Foreign Office	17,824,038	102,000	..
Ministry of Interior	108,836,051	13,867,800	4,000,000
War Office	446,589,708	69,375,403	..
Military Courts	266,250	..	..
Imperial Navy	110,430,749	31,775,702	..
Ministry of Justice	2,889,350	..	..
Treasury	47,897,730	14,000	..
Colonial Office	2,964,392	21,951,113	..
Imperial Railways	478,660	..	..
Imperial Debt	1,267,627,723	6,161,700	..
Audit Office	1,362,504	..	..
Pensions Fund	145,316,708	..	..
Posts and Telegraphs	749,932,648	34,084,906	18,000,000
Imperial Printing Office	10,123,691	437,084	..
Administration of Railways	114,203,380	17,887,071	20,342,000
General Expenses	69,082,673	28,994,974	..
Special War Expenses	..	..	20,000,000,000
	3,098,429,708	224,651,723	20,042,342,000
Total		23,365,423,431 (£1,168,271,171)	

On 30th October 1914 the total amount of the funded debt was 5,260,394,300 Marks (£263,019,715), an increase of 83,169,000 Marks (£4,158,450) over the amount in 1913. This sum is divided into interest and non-interest bearing debts as follows:—1,137,807,400 Marks (£56,890,370) bearing interest at 4 per cent. (65,799,900 Marks increase over 1913); 1,983,199,300 Marks (£99,159,965) at 3½ per cent. (increase over 1913, 12,396,700 Marks), and 1,639,387,600 Marks (£81,969,380) at 3 per cent. (increase over 1913, 4,972,400 Marks). In addition the Treasury Bonds at 4 per cent. amounted to 220,000,000 Marks. The non-interest bearing debts were:—Treasury Bonds for 160,000,000 Marks £80,000,000), and Treasury Bills or "Reichskassenscheine" for 120,000,000 Marks (£6,000,000).

In the fortress of Spandau a " war-chest " of 120,000,000 Marks in gold was, in peace times, preserved. Since the outbreak of war this sum has been expended in its entirety. Three War Loans have been issued during the first 14 months of hostilities. The first, in September 1914, issued at 97½ at 5 per cent., yielded 4461 million Marks (£223,000,000). 9103 million Marks (£455,000,000) were subscribed for the second loan in March 1915, and finally six months later, September 1915, 12,066 million Marks were subscribed, making a total of 25,630 million Marks (£1,281,000,000).

BANKRUPTCIES.—The last available figures on this subject are given below :—

Quarter	1911	1912	1913
First . . .	2411	2341	2721
Second . . .	2188	2312	2558
Third . . .	2015	2141	2224
Fourth . . .	2128	2424	2222
Total for Year.	8742	9218	9725

UNEMPLOYMENT.—During 1913, the year before the outbreak of war, the curve of unemployment rose higher than in any year since 1908. In the latter year, for every 100 places vacant the annual average number of applicants was 156.34, whilst in 1913 it rose to 158.39. In 1914 the industrial federations, with a membership of 2,048,928, filed the following statistics for the year 1913 :—Cases of unemployment per 100 members were 9.5 the first quarter, 8.7 the second, 9.2 the third, and 11.1 the last quarter of the year. The number of days unemployed averaged 2.1 for every 100 possible working days. The average duration of unemployment was 18 days the first quarter, 17 the second, 17 the third, and 17 the last quarter of 1913.

MONEY.—The Mark of 100 Pfennig, is in normal times

equivalent to 11¾d. English. Multiples of the Mark are the silver coins of the value of 5, 3, and 2 Marks, and the ½ Mark. The gold coins are the 20 and the 10 Mark pieces. Smaller values are represented by the 25, 10 and 5 Pfennig pieces in nickel, and by the 10 and 5 Pfennig pieces in iron, struck during 1915. The smallest denominations are the 2 and 1 Pfennig pieces in copper.

Between 1871 (the foundation of the German Empire) and March 1914 the coinage struck was to the total value of 6,585,464,500 Marks, made up thus:—gold, 5,287,446,500 Marks; silver, 1,160,635,900 Marks; nickel, 113,166,200 Marks; copper, 24,305,900 Marks. Of this, 174,656,100 Marks had been withdrawn from circulation.

The following figures show the position of the coinage in December 1915 and January 1916:—

	Dec. 1915	Jan. 1916
	Marks	Marks
Value of gold coins struck	Nil	Nil
Total value of gold coins in circulation	5,155,855,590	5,155,852,880
Value of silver coins struck—		
3 Mark pieces	Nil	Nil
1 Mark pieces	93,500	350,000
½ Mark pieces	1,815,493	1,942,924
Total value of silver coins in circulation	1,260,033,047	1,262,324,079
Value of nickel coins struck—		
10 Pfennig pieces	40,031	112,841
Total value of nickel coins in circulation	114,263,355	114,374,366
Value of iron coins struck—		
10 Pfennig pieces	Nil	107,068
5 Pfennig pieces	1,531,013	1,352,444
Total value of iron coins in circulation	2,529,875	3,989,388
Value of copper coins struck—		
2 Pfennig pieces	6,004	600
1 Pfennig pieces	511	22,759
Total value of copper coins in circulation	24,807,936	24,831,231

PRODUCTION AND INDUSTRY.—*Agriculture.* Of the total area of the German Empire 91 per cent. is fertile. In 1895

80,319,094 acres were under cultivation, divided into 5,558,317 holdings. In 1907 the area had decreased to 78,632,138 acres, and the number of holdings had increased to 5,736,082. In the same year 61,080,885 acres were arable land, 17,013,590 acres were meadows and pasture, 1,492,710 acres were used as vineyards and market gardens, 19,199,385 acres were woods and forests, and 8,979,645 acres were devoted to farm buildings, moors, etc.

The size and number of the individual holdings was in 1907: Under 5 acres, 3,378,509; over 5 and under 12 acres, 1,006,277; over 12 and under 50 acres, 1,065,539; over 50 and under 250 acres, 262,171; over 250 acres, 23,566.

The following are statistics of acreage and crops yielded for several years:—

	1912		1913		1914	
	Acres	Metric Tons	Acres	Metric Tons	Acres	Metric Tons
Wheat .	4,814,027	4,360,624	4,935,222	4,655,956	5,048,255	3,971,995
Rye .	15,070,390	11,598,289	16,035,347	12,222,394	16,245,807	10,246,718
Barley .	3,973,980	3,481,974	4,134,527	3,673,254	4,057,290	3,137,983
Oats .	10,966,335	8,520,183	11,095,388	9,713,965	11,278,665	9,038,185
Potatoes .	8,353,675	50,209,466	8,530,077	54,121,146	8,678,942	45,569,559
Hay .	14,806,530	27,681,860	14,808,492	29,184,994	14,822,475	29,156,024
Tobacco .	39,440	38,892	35,752	38,855	35,405	28,833

The value of the vine harvest was £2,915,000 in 1910, £8,915,000 in 1911, £4,720,000 in 1912, and £2,420,000 in 1913.

In 1900, 52,332,000 apple-trees, 25,116,000 pear-trees, 69,436,000 plum-trees, and 21,548,000 cherry-trees (total 168,432,000 trees) were counted in the German Empire.

On December 2nd, 1912, there were 4,523,059 horses, 13,147 mules and donkeys, 20,182,021 cattle, 5,803,445 sheep, 21,923,707 pigs, 3,410,396 goats, 82,702,030 heads of poultry, and 2,630,837 beehives included in the census of the Empire. On December 1st, 1913, the figures were: 20,944,258 cattle, 5,504,195 sheep, 25,591,794 pigs, and 3,535,697 goats. In

1913 the carcases of 163,282 horses and 7,356 dogs were passed as fit for human consumption.

Fisheries.—The North Sea and the Baltic, together with the estuaries of the great rivers and the small portion of the Lake of Constance belonging to the German Empire, are the chief fishing grounds. In 1911 the yields of the North Sea and the Baltic respectively were valued at £1,417,140 and £412,445; in 1912, £1,549,230 and £529,105; in 1913, £1,730,560 and £518,410.

Mining.—The following tables deal with the quantity of minerals raised, their value, and the number of people engaged in the mines:—

Mineral	1911			1912		
	No. of Persons employed	Metric Tons	Value	No. of Persons employed	Metric Tons	Value
			£			£
Coal	600,607	158,581,400	78,739,000	610,988	174,875,300	91,997,150
Lignite	57,645	71,620,000	8,019,600	55,412	80,934,800	8,781,100
Iron Ore	40,794	24,319,200	4,937,450	40,877	27,199,900	5,506,650
Lead Ore	23,073	107,000	704,200	22,314	107,600	962,450
Zinc Ore	..	475,200	2,318,600	..	516,400	2,490,500
Copper Ore	13,924	829,500	1,225,050	13,228	913,500	1,595,600
Potassic Salt	30,173	10,819,500	5,436,950	33,828	12,457,700	6,292,600

In 1910 the total value of the minerals raised was 2009 million Marks; in 1911, 2086 million Marks, and in 1912, 2369 million Marks.

The quantity, value, etc., of the output of the foundries of the German Empire (and of Luxemburg) was as follows:—

	1911		1912	
	Metric Tons	£	Metric Tons	£
Pig-iron	15,574,039	43,399,000	15,220,900	46,143,900
Zinc	243,784	5,918,200	313,600	7,463,950
Lead	161,500	2,209,600	165,000	2,804,900
Copper	37,455	2,200,850	45,500	3,287,950
Silver	869	3,180,500	895	3,707,250
Gold	44	6,161,850	43	6,067,150

In 1913 the total production of pig-iron was 19,291,920 tons, and in 1914, 14,480,566 tons.

In 1911 the total value of the production of all the foundries was £16,204,750 (as compared with £14,471,650 in 1910).

Manufactures.—In 1910 there were 43 establishments where silk was spun. The number of spindles was 84,932, and the quantity spun was 1902 tons in 1910, valued at £1,451,600.

In 1909 the number of cotton mills was 401 with 10,086,141 spindles, with an output of 369,464 tons, valued at £29,990,500.

In 1912, 124 motor-car manufacturers, employing 35,877 persons, turned out 16,078 motor vehicles of all kinds of a total value of £11,080,100 (as compared with £3,045,000 in 1907).

In 1910, 1340 tanneries and leather factories produced goods to the value of £32,825,350.

An important industry is the production of beet sugar, concerning which the following table gives statistics for several years:—

Year 1st Sept. to 31st August	No. of Factories	Beetroot used, in Metric Tons	Production in Metric Tons	
			Raw Sugar	Molasses
1903–04 .	384	12,677,099	1,822,491	276,288
1905–06 .	376	15,733,478	2,314,779	328,752
1907–08 .	365	13,482,750	2,017,071	287,266
1909–10 .	356	12,892,068	1,947,580	282,411
1911–12 .	342	9,060,576	1,407,781	302,164
1912–13 .	342	16,642,237	2,632,282	380,868

TRADE.—The Constitution of the German Empire provided for the organisation of the States into a Customs Union, the boundaries of which are coincident with those of the Empire, with the following inclusions and exceptions. Included: the Duchy of Luxemburg and the Austrian communities of Jungholz and Mittelberg. Excluded are: Hamburg, a part of the municipality of Cuxhaven, Bremen, Bremerhaven, Geestemünde, the island of Heligoland, and a small district of Baden near the canton of Schaffhausen.

The population of the excluded territories numbered, in 1905, 17,588 inhabitants. The population of the Zollgebiet, or Customs Union, was, in 1905, 60,871,554, and in 1913, 67,082,000.

The following figures are those for the special trade of the Empire for 5 years:—

	Imports			Exports		
	Thousand Marks			Thousand Marks		
	Merchandise	Bullion	Total	Merchandise	Bullion	Total
1909	8,526,885	333,525	8,860,410	6,594,170	264,523	6,858,693
1910	8,934,126	375,806	9,309,992	7,474,661	169,537	7,644,198
1911	9,705,661	301,284	10,006,945	8,106,063	118,335	8,224,398
1912	10,691,750	325,714	11,017,464	8,956,800	142,729	9,099,529
1913	10,770,394	436,394	11,206,788	10,097,944	101,372	10,199,316

The total amount of the imports in 1913 was 81,412,300 tons, and the exports 82,194,800 tons.

The subjoined table gives the figures for three years of the special commerce of the German Customs Union with the principal countries:—

From or to	Imports			Exports		
	Value in 1,000,000 Marks			Value in 1,000,000 Marks		
	1913	1912	1911	1913	1912	1911
Austria-Hungary	827.3	830.0	739.1	1104.8	1035.3	917.8
Belgium	344.6	386.6	340.1	551	493.3	412.7
Bulgaria	8.8	18.0	10.6	30.3	28.6	23.9
Denmark	191.9	202.2	180.2	283.9	254.2	218.0
France	584.2	552.2	524.4	789.9	689.4	598.6
Greece	26.0	25.1	23.7	24.4	18.9	17.8
Great Britain	876.1	842.6	808.8	1438.2	1161.1	1139.7
Italy	317.7	304.6	284.8	393.5	401.2	348.0
Netherlands	333.0	345.4	297.7	693.5	608.5	532.1
Norway	82.0	63.9	54.1	161.7	144.7	124.3
Portugal	25.3	24.7	25.5	52.1	42.2	40.2
Rumania	79.8	138.2	107.7	140.0	131.7	91.4
Russia	1424.6	1527.9	1634.3	880.0	679.8	625.4
Serbia	10.5	19.7	24.8	19.4	18.5	21.3
Spain	198.7	189.8	164.1	143.0	113.0	88.4
Sweden	224.1	214.0	183.0	229.8	197.4	191.6
Switzerland	213.3	205.7	179.6	536.1	520.5	482.4
Turkish Empire	73.9	77.6	70.1	98.4	112.8	112.8
Total Europe (including all countries)	5888.0	6008.4	5690.0	7677.5	6743.6	6069.6
Algeria	34.6	31.5	25.9	6.2	5.4	4.2
British S. Africa	69.6	67.2	55.9	46.9	44.5	47.5
British W. Africa	134.5	118.6	106.7	16.7	15.2	13.7
Total Africa (including all countries)	496.8	478.6	416.7	210.7	185.3	188.0
British India	541.8	533.3	440.3	150.7	107.5	99.5
Ceylon	41.9	39.7	37.0	5.1	4.3	3.7
China	130.0	115.6	103.3	122.8	81.7	71.8
Dutch Indies	227.6	214.9	184.4	98.6	74.5	61.1
Japan	46.6	43.1	37.6	122.7	110.6	112.6
Total Asia (including all countries)	1049.4	1006.3	856.0	547.9	420.2	383.5

From or to	Imports			Exports		
	Value in 1,000,000 Marks			Value in 1,000,000 Marks		
	1913	1912	1911	1913	1912	1911
Argentina	494.6	444.9	369.9	265.9	239.4	255.9
Brazil	247.9	313.2	320.0	199.8	192.8	152.0
Canada	64.1	58.1	24.0	60.5	54.3	42.9
Chile	199.8	209.7	158.3	97.8	112.0	85.4
Guatemala	34.9	31.6	27.2	4.7	4.2	3.6
Mexico	25.0	35.5	31.0	48.0	43.3	45.1
Uruguay	43.2	50.3	35.4	35.8	38.5	32.9
United States	1711.2	1586.0	1343.4	713.2	697.6	639.8
Total America (including all countries)	2994.4	2885.4	2462.2	1546.5	1496.4	1361.9
Australia and Polynesia	327.7	304.2	273.1	103.6	99.9	91.7
German Colonies	53.4	52.9	..	57.1	57.3	..

The following are the chief imports and exports for 1913, 1912, and 1911 arranged according to the value in 1913:—

IMPORTS

	Value in 1,000,000 Marks				Value in 1,000,000 Marks		
	1913	1912	1911		1913	1912	1911
Cotton, raw	607.1	579.8	604.1	Lard	146.7	141.1	112.8
Wheat	417.3	395.8	398.9	Wood	135.8	151.2	135.4
Wool	412.7	405.9	371.7	Tobacco, raw	134.3	135.6	116.5
Barley	390.4	444.2	462.1	Linseed	129.7	104.8	94.4
Copper	335.3	313.0	231.0	Copra	121.9	96.0	74.2
Hides	321.8	250.8	207.1	Butter	118.7	126.3	129.2
Iron Ore	227.6	201.1	178.6	Oil Cake	118.6	116.5	104.3
Coffee, raw	219.6	252.6	251.6	Horses	116.3	100.1	106.4
Coal	204.6	191	179.3	Cottons	116.2	104	98.9
Eggs	193.9	193.1	175.8	Yarn, woollen	108.0	107.6	113.8
Furs	187.8	194.8	161.7	Rice	103.9	102.6	88.2
Nitrate	171.9	178.8	135.2	Maize	101.9	143.2	86.7
Raw Silk	158	146.9	136.4	Cattle	87.3	73.4	60
Rubber	146.8	184.8	194.6	Cocoa, raw	67.1	63.6	55.5

EXPORTS

	Value in 1,000,000 Marks				Value in 1,000,000 Marks		
	1913	1912	1911		1913	1912	1911
Machinery	680.3	630.3	544.4	Rye .	132.9	125.5	109.6
Iron Goods	652.3	580.9	522.3	Leather Goods	114.1	98.1	81.6
Coal .	516.4	436.6	368	Toys . .	103.3	92.3	90.6
Cotton Goods .	446.5	421.6	389.9	Oats . .	93.1	62	43.0
Woollens	270.9	253.4	262.4	Woollen Yarn	90.6	84.1	88.1
Sugar (Beet)	264.7	130.5	210.6	Wheat .	87.6	63.4	55.3
Paper and Card-board	262.8	232.2	225.2	Books and Music .	74.3	66	64.3
Furs .	225.7	211.5	170.5	Motor-cars .	71	65.1	42.3
Pig-iron .	204.6	166	124.1	Cotton Thread	61 1	64.1	59.2
Silk Goods	202.7	190.9	193.5	Pianos and Organs .	55.5	53.4	51.9
Coke .	146.7	126.4	96.1	Indigo .	53.3	45.2	41.8
Aniline Dyes .	142.1	133.8	116.5	China Goods	50.7	47.5	47.2
				Electric Lamps .	48.1	50.4	45.8
				Flour . .	44.2	39.6	37.0

The following figures give the amount of trade between Great Britain and German Empire for 4 years :—

	1911	1912	1913	1914
	£	£	£	£
Imports from Great Britain	39,283,683	40,362,767	40,677,030	23,075,000
Exports to Great Britain	65,280,739	70,048,152	80,411,057	46,928,000

The chief imports from Great Britain during 4 years were :—

	Value in 1,000,000 Marks			
	1913	1912	1911	1910
Coal	91.3	93	89.3	92.2
Cottons and Thread .	71.4	68	67.9	68.4
Herrings . . .	28.5	25.4	22.1	22.1
Alpaca Yarn . .	27.9	27.2	32.0	34.6
Woollen Cloths . .	21.9	24	21.6	19.5
Ships and Dynamos .	21.6	4.4	9.1	3.1
Fish	13.1	13.2	11.3	9.1

The chief exports to Great Britain during 4 years :—

	Value in 1,000,000 Marks			
	1913	1912	1911	1910
Sugar	191.5	72.9	149	133.9
Iron and Steel	44.3	39.9	38.6	30.9
Silks	37.4	37.9	44.5	46.5
Cloth	29.7	28.4	27.8	28.4
Furs	26	25.2	18.6	25.3
Toys	25.7	27.9	21.1	20.1
Dyes	22.5	23.4	21.3	23.0

The commercial intercourse between the German Empire and the United States for the last three years, ending June 30th, was as follows :—

	1913	1914	1915
	£	£	£
Imports from U.S. to Germany	66,336,842	68,958,855	5,772,671
Exports to U.S. from Germany	37,792,614	37,943,827	18,274,542

The chief exports from German Empire to United States were :—

	1913	1914	1915
	£	£	£
Dyes	1,153,300	1,193,107	848,336
Lace	1,309,861	1,180,751	663,407
Knit Goods	552,810	1,053,455	757,617
Hides	1,050,320	1,078,252	130,714
India-rubber (crude)	1,188,474	719,073	71,386
Toys	1,380,155	1,543,771	1,356,570

The chief imports to the German Empire from United States were:—

	1913	1914	1915
	£	£	£
Wheat	2,390,002	2,120,938	497,423
Copper	9,192,072	9,224,554	608,075
Cotton, raw	28,835,031	36,378,384	3,095,910
Furs	1,051,347	873,707	21,583
Lard	3,615,855	3,318,608	82,550
Oil Cake	1,030,203	708,099	18,022

STRIKES.—The total number of strikes that took place in the German Empire in 1915 was 137, with 47,010 persons involved. For 1914 the figures were 1115 and 193,414 respectively. For 1913, 2127 and 572,842. For 1912, 2510 and 887,041. With regard to the reasons for the strikes in 1913, 2117 dealt with the question of wages and 738 with the question of working hours. (In these figures strikes in which both questions have been brought up are considered under each heading separately.) The number of successful strikes in 1915 was 24 as compared with 190 in 1914, 356 in 1913 and 415 in 1912.

In 1915 there were 4 lock-outs involving 1346 persons, as against 108 and 44,781 respectively in 1914. In 1915, 2 lock-outs were successful compared with 47 in 1914.

SAVINGS BANKS.—In 1912 there were in the German Empire (excluding Brunswick) 2907 public savings banks with 21,207,782 depositors with 17,354,635,000 Marks (£867,731,750) to their credit. In addition there were 220 private savings banks with 1,771,472 depositors and 1,325,338,000 Marks deposits, making a total of 22,979,254 depositors and 18,679,973,000 Marks (£933,998,650) deposits. For 1911 the figures were 22,349,570 depositors and 17,821,684,000 Marks

deposits. Preliminary figures for 1913 : 23,871,657 depositors with 23,429,910,000 Marks (£937,196,400) to their credit. This works out at 281 Marks per head of the population, which is the second highest of the countries of Europe, Switzerland coming first with 345 Marks.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books in English on German History are few, and, as a rule, not very scholarly. Those mentioned below are merely a somewhat arbitrary selection from the books most suitable for the general reader. Works for advanced students, and those in foreign languages, are enumerated in the bibliographies of the *Cambridge Medieval History* and the *Cambridge Modern History*.

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much light on the state of contemporary society and even of politics.

On the nineteenth century Seeley's *Life and Times of Stein*, and J. W. Headlam's *Bismarck* (Heroes of the Nations), are valuable biographies. For quite recent times J. H. Rose's *Development of the European Nations, 1870 to 1900*, may be profitably consulted, though the history of Germany is only a part of his subject. Bismarck's *Reflections and Recollections*, and Busch's *Bismarck: Some secret Pages of his History* (both translated from the German) are long and biassed, but extremely interesting.

In regard to the characteristics and policy of modern Germany, books are legion. It has been thought well, however, not to mention any written since the outbreak of the war, as nearly all such books, whatever their merits and force, are avowedly intended to establish some particular opinion on the cause or significance of the struggle. Of works written before 1914, the following are specially instructive:—

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Treitschke, H. von: *Selections from Lectures on Politics.* (The translator has not always chosen his passages wisely, but the book brings out the chief characteristics of Treitschke's views and methods.)

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[No reference is made to the Appendices.]

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